


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ELEMENTS

OF THE

CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY:

CONTAINING

A CONCISE ACCOUNT OF ITS ORIGIN AND TENDENCY ;

A VIEW OF ALL THE WORKS PUBLISHED BY ITS FOUNDER,

PROFESSOR IMMANUEL KANT;

AND A GLOSSARY FOR THE EXPLANATION OF TERMS AND PHRASES.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED :

THREE PHILOLOGICAL ESSAYS ;

Chiefly translated from the German of

JOHN CHRISTOPHER ADELUNG ;

Ablic Counsellor and First Librarian to the Elector of Saxony.

BY

A. F. M. WILlich, M. D.

L O N D O N :

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1798.

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To

The Right Honourable


SIR WILLIAM MILLER of GLENLEE, Bart.

One of the Senators of the

College of Justice

in Scotland :

To



To

The REV. JAMES FINLAYSON, F. R. S. E.

Prof. of Logic and Metaphysics
in the University of Edinburgh;

And

The REV. JAMES MILNE,

Professor of Moral Philosophy
in the University of Glasgow;

These Elements

are

very respectfully inscribed

by

Their most obliged and humble Servant

The AUTHOR and TRANSLATOR.

P R E F A C E!

THE task of writing prefaces is none of the most grateful; especially when a variety of circumstances concur, to impose it as a duty upon one, who is, in a manner, partly the author, and partly the translator of a new work, on a new subject.

It has now become the frequent practice of certain translators, to issue their mangled productions into the world as their own manufacture; though, upon comparison, they do not even deserve the character of being accurate translations from the German; a language, with which our modern translators, in general, are but very imperfectly acquainted.

To obviate a charge of this nature, and to acknowledge my obligations to those meritorious friends of literature in Germany, from whose labours I have derived very considerable assistance in the composition of this work, I must mention, in the first place, the REV. DR. STAEUDLIN, PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY AT GOETTINGEN. His classical performance, "*On the Spirit and History of Scepticism*, in two Volumes, octavo, 1794," has afforded me the materials of the 'HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.'—In reliance upon a character of so much
worth

P R E F A C E.

worth and eminence, as that of Dr. Staeudlin, I have not hesitated, pp. 23 and 24, to record, with due praise and respect, a work written by Mr. ADAM WEISHAUP. Without entering upon an inquiry into Mr. Weishaupt's *moral* character, I can safely aver, that his *literary* works have been received, upon the Continent, with almost universal approbation. In this assertion, I am supported by the Conductors of the first German Reviews in general, and particularly by the respectable evidence of Prof. Staeudlin himself, as well as by that of the celebrated Prof. EBERHARD of HALLE; both of whom have ranked Mr. Weishaupt's writings among the first philosophical compositions of Germany. And as he has lately published the third volume of his work "On Truth and Moral Perfection; Regensburg, 1796;" as likewise another work entitled; "On the secret Art of Governing; Frankfort on the Main, 1795;" I must leave Mr Weishaupt to defend his private character in Britain, as well as he has done it to the satisfaction of his learned friends in Germany.

For the conciseness of the 'SYNOPSIS,' which contains the statement and general solution of *Five connected Problems*, I need make no apology; as the terms occurring in this part of the 'ELEMENTS' are, I hope, sufficiently explained in the GLOSSARY. Without this expedient, I might have extended the Synopsis alone to a length, far exceeding the whole of the present work.

In the 'CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS,' perhaps, I have been in some parts too prolix; while others might have
been

been enlarged upon with advantage. But it is not an easy matter to keep within proper bounds, in the discussion of abstract metaphysical subjects. Nor dare I flatter myself, that I am sufficiently acquainted with the idiom of the English language, to exhibit the most abstruse inquiries of the human mind, in a luminous point of view. In this respect, I can offer no better apology than that given by my great master, whose own words I have quoted in page 9. of the Introduction.—Although I had the good fortune to attend Prof. Kant's Lectures between the years 1778 and 1781, during my residence at the University of Koenigsberg; and again heard several of his Lectures in summer 1792, when I revisited my native country; yet I must confess, that my other professional labours have not permitted me to devote, to the study of the Critical System of Philosophy, that portion of time and close application, which, in more favourable circumstances, I should have been happy to bestow upon this important branch of human knowledge.

Relying, however, on the candour and impartiality of the learned in this country, I trust they will not decide upon a work of so comprehensive a nature as the present, from partial views; nor do I entertain the least apprehension, that they will be deterred from a *thorough* examination of it, by any *paradoxical* positions, or even *apparent* contradictions, that may occur in the *first* perusal.—A nation, which has produced a BACON, a NEWTON, a LOCKE, a HUME, and so many other *profound* inquirers, cannot be supposed to have a taste merely for the lighter,

(or

(or what are vulgarly called) *popular* pursuits of literature. Valuable and useful as these are to the community at large, no man of any penetration will deny, that metaphysical speculations, or inquiries into *first truths*, are equally beneficial and honourable ; though they must ever remain the property of the few, whose genius leaves the beaten track, and searches for higher principles than such, as are barely deduced from the world of sense, or experience.

To those, therefore, who are both able and disposed to become acquainted with the spirit of the Critical System, I beg leave to address myself in the words of the worthy PROFESSOR WILL of ALTDORF, who gives his pupils the following excellent advice :

1. “ Not to prejudge and decry the works of KANT, as being too subtle and abstruse, as being couched in unintelligible terms, as breathing innovation, and productive of confusion in philosophy :

2, “ Not to complain of the want of that plainness, which is necessary to render a book palatable to *popular* readers ; since difficulty of apprehension appears to be peculiar to the inquiries, that form the object of the ‘ CRITIQUE :’

3, “ Not to appeal, according to the prevailing fashion of the age, to the decision of the multitude, whenever an abstract proposition occurs, which cannot, at first view, be clearly understood from the simple operations of *Common Sense* ;’ for Metaphysics do not acknowledge the *exclusive competency* of this tribunal :

4, To abstract from all other Metaphysical Systems, in studying the Critical, i. e. not to make any other System the standard, by which the merits of the present are to be tried :

5, To study *first* the general aim of the work, by successively examining every solution, which the *Critique* of Kant affords in regard to the five principal problems (contained in the 'Synopsis') : and lastly,

6, As the inquiries forming the object of Kant's Critique are merely of a speculative nature, to proceed likewise in the prosecution of them merely upon speculative grounds, and to abstain carefully from all partial views of any interest whatever. For the result of sound speculation can never be prejudicial to the true interests of human nature."

With respect to the GLOSSARY, I must refer the reader to the few observations premised at the head of it : and if I have not succeeded in rendering the subject itself more intelligible, by the definitions given of those terms, in the use of which Kant differs from his contemporaries, I can only plead the good intention, and the patient industry, with which I collected and arranged the materials.

The 'THREE PHILOLOGICAL ESSAYS' have been added to these 'ELEMENTS' by way of Appendix ; in order to relieve the reader, in some degree, from the arduous task—and such it undoubtedly is—of reflecting upon so great a variety of abstract subjects. And as these Essays are, in a manner, unconnected with the Philosophy
of

of Kant, they have been at the same time separately printed, in a form somewhat different from the present; in order to accommodate those, who might wish to possess them as a distinct work.

Finally, the style and composition of this work, I am sensible, require more than common apology. Unfortunately, however, it is a matter of no small difficulty to make *good* apologies, especially in a foreign language. Whatever the execution may be, for the anxiety of my wishes I can confidently appeal to the testimony of those literary friends, who have occasionally lent me their aid in correcting the grammatical part of both the Elements and the Essays. They well know my eager and sincere desire of improvement in English composition; and if any material errors should occur in the course of such a diversity of subjects as the present, I beseech the judicious reader and the candid critic to consider, that I have ventured into a field of inquiry, of which but a small part has hitherto been explored.

The indulgence, which I claim, will not be withheld by those, who have tried their strength in translating from a foreign into their own language: and I apprehend still less severity from the few individuals, who have attempted to write, or to translate into, a foreign language, which they had an opportunity of acquiring, merely by reading and conversation.

NOVEMBER, 1797.

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Corrigenda.

p. 16, l. 21 *for* directs, *read* deserts.

p. 19, l. 24, *for* Propædæutic, *read* Propædæutic.

p. 32, l. 23, *for* close, *read* those.

p. 83, l. 25, *for* inherent to, *read* inherent in.

Note: The terms *intuition* and *intuitive* have, by inadvertency, sometimes been used instead of the words, *cognition* and *cognitive*, particularly in No. XVIII. (2) of Kant's works, or between pp. 64. and 80.—The reader is therefore requested to attend to this circumstance, especially in places, where the promiscuous use of these terms might occasion some ambiguity.

ELEMENTS OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY, &c.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

IN Germany, two circumstances in particular have contributed to bring about a revolution in philosophy, and to diminish the estimation in which the *dogmatical system* of WOLF was formerly held: the study of the writings of the later English and French philosophers; and the appearance of a philosophic prince upon the throne of Prussia.]

The former circumstance made the German philosophers acquainted with many objections that had been started against the dogmatical system of Metaphysics, gave rise to a turn for popularity in philosophical inquiries, and awakened a spirit of emulation among them. Selections were made from various systems; and the learned, now for the first time, began to convey information with elegance and taste. There arose a sort of *Eclecticism*, which discouraged party-spirit, and recommended philosophical discretion; but which was, at the same time, attended with some injurious effects; for incoherent systems were thus formed, inconsistent systems were mingled together, and philosophy became still more wavering and flimsy, and was still farther removed from the perfection of a science.

The history of philosophy was now investigated with greater attention, and more generally studied than it had formerly

been : With many, the study of philosophy was converted into that of its history ;—a clear proof, how much the turn for dogmatism had declined, and how little hope was entertained of forming a system, at once stable and suited to the spirit of the age.

FREDERIC the Great collected a number of foreign philosophers round him, who, in a great measure, merely to pay adulation, and from selfish views, openly professed, like him, infidelity and scepticism. This circumstance, from the novelty of the thing, and from the admiration in which the character of Frederic was held, had an almost magical influence on all the opinions of the age. It would, however, be equal to ingratitude towards the manes of this surprising monarch, to omit mentioning in this place, that the system of his own practical philosophy has been held out, both by divines and laymen, as complete and downright Atheism ; whereas it is now clear and uniformly admitted by sound and unprejudiced inquirers, that it amounted to nothing more than simple Deism.

Among the philosophers who surrounded Frederic, no one declared himself so expressly, and so openly, in favour of scepticism as d'ARGENS, the author of the “ Philosophy of good sense,” which is written in a superficial manner, with a view of gaining popularity, but which is not even calculated for the Fair Sex and Gentlemen of fashion, for whose use it was originally designed ; though it abounds in erudition and abstract speculation. D'Argens there endeavours to show the uncertainty of History, (and this is the best part of the work) of Logic, of Physics, of Metaphysics, and of Astronomy, without advancing, in opposition, any new, or genuine, philosophical principles. It does him, nevertheless, some honour that, with regard to the morality of life, he observes a respectful silence. His scepticism is directed more against the usual

pretensions of the schools, and the learned in particular, than against human knowledge in general.

It is more remarkable, though less known, that, in the same country, a celebrated and profound Divine declared himself in favour of an almost unlimited *Pyrrhonism*.—M. de BEAUSOBRE, in his “*Pyrrhonisme raisonnable*,” called it rational, because he allowed certain probabilities, both in kind and in degree, and maintained certain first principles, which did not admit of doubt. The work is written in a lively sceptical humour, and affords pleasure in the perusal. It contains, indeed, many new and unexpected remarks; for it is an assault upon all systems, especially upon that of Wolf. “ARISTOTLE,” the author somewhere says, “had numerous followers for many centuries. The
“time of his fall is now come; and DESCARTES has given him
“the last blow. The fame of the French philosopher was of
“shorter duration, because people now possessed more un-
“derstanding and less pedantry. LEIBNITZ came; Wolf
“was his successor: At present philosophers are in a sort of
“anarchy; they wait for a man who is bold enough to build
“upon the ruins of former Systems, new opinions, and conse-
“quently new errors.” No where does Beausobre attack religion and revelation, but rather respectfully affirms their certainty. The following passage is worthy of attention: “Al-
“though it be difficult to prove the existence of God by the
“light of reason, yet even this light is sufficient to convince
“us, that the proof of the contrary is impossible. How can
“we satisfactorily prove the opposite, if we have no clear idea
“of the subject which we wish to call in question? Although
“I could bear in my mind no sufficient proof of the existence
“of God, yet the advantage which attends the belief of this
“truth, the impossibility of comprehending the nature of an
“infinite Being, and the reflection that this truth is both the
“most rational and useful of all others, would be sufficient to

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

“ induce any thinking person to give his assent, nay even to
“ determine *me*.”

But after this we are astonished to find him considering all morality as uncertain. His chief reason is, “ that the goodness of actions depends upon their consequences, which man cannot foresee, nor accurately ascertain.” This argument, maturely considered, is obviously shallow, because it proceeds upon false ideas of morality : But the following objections are of greater importance : “ That we are so little acquainted
“ with the motives from which we act, and in general with
“ our passions, that we know not how far our prejudices,
“ and our weakness, can justify our actions ; and that the interference and collisions of our different duties are inexplicable to most men, nay some of them inexplicable to all.” The remark at the end of this work is not less striking. “ The
“ uncertainty of our knowledge should not render us dissatisfied ; its advantage, or disadvantage, will not thereby be
“ much affected. Certainty, with respect to us, is not even
“ the most useful quality of our knowledge. The difficulty
“ of acquiring accurate knowledge, is an admonition of nature,
“ which reminds man of his weakness, and of the caution he
“ ought to observe.”

The inclination to Scepticism showed itself also in other parts of Germany, in different writings. It appeared manifestly, for instance, in the “ Physical Causes of Truth,” by LOSSIUS, and in the first edition of PLATNER’s “ Philosophical Aphorisms.” In the systems of Logic and elementary books also, much more regard was paid to it than formerly ; in proof of which I shall only mention the excellent discussions in “ LAMBERT’s Organum,” and in the elementary publications of FEDER.

But no author had, on the one hand, paid more attention to the objections of the Sceptics, and the distinguishing characteristic

istic of the possible systems; and on the other, investigated more profoundly the faculties of the Human Understanding, and, indeed, of the whole Human Constitution, than TETENS, in his “Philosophical Inquiries concerning Human Nature, and the developement of it,” which were published in two volumes, in the year 1777. It is not our business here to mark minutely the excellencies or defects of this work; we take notice of it on this account chiefly, because that profound philosopher was the first among the Germans, who examined some of the ideas of HUME, with an acuteness worthy of such an opponent; and he has investigated the doctrines of *objective* truth, and of the objective existence of things, more deeply and more precisely than had been done before. Against the explanation given by Hume, of the idea of Causation, he objected with justice, that it did not exhaust the subject; for we understand by it not merely a connection, but also a dependence of one thing upon another. He remarked that we perceive in ourselves ideas in a necessary succession, and that this is properly our notion of a cause, or connection: he pointed out instances, in which the subjective connection of ideas arises from a necessary operation of the understanding, and, actually, has another foundation than the association of ideas formed by experience;—cases where we explain a compound effect from compound causes; and where the idea of the complex effect has never been before associated with that of the complex cause, but where the connection is the work of reflection: in fine, he has pointed out the operations of the mind, by which we deduce one truth from another. He maintained, therefore, that the idea of Causation is abstracted from certain associations of ideas, in which we remark something more than mere succession and combination.

Although this explanation is not altogether satisfactory, yet it, in a great measure, holds good against Hume's idea. Tetens
admits

admits that sensations afford the materials for all ideas ; but he contends that *their* form depends upon the mind, or the power of thinking. After having, in a very profound manner, illustrated the origin of our knowledge, from the objective existence of things, he next examines the truth of objective knowledge. According to his acceptance of the terms, our knowledge is called objectively true, in so far as objects must be perceived by every other being, in the same manner in which we represent them to ourselves ;—a being who has such a mind as we have : and in so far as the relations, which we remark in our external perceptions, correspond with those of every other being, whose understanding is so constituted, that it thinks of the objects in question, as we do. The necessary rules of thought, according to which the mind proceeds, are, with him, not only *subjective* rules of our thinking faculty, but of every reflecting principle ; and the general truths of reason are not only truths with respect to us, but to every reasoning being. We cannot conceive an understanding which is capable of thinking against the principle of contradiction, or in other words, of disputing the admissibility of that principle : hence this is justly considered as an objective principle.

Tetens here contradicts what Lossius had laid down; and what Descartes had indeed, pretty distinctly before explained : That truth is only a relation with respect to the being who thinks of it, and that the contradiction is incapable of being an object of thought, only with respect to our understanding. Thus Tetens, with many others, proceeded in reasoning upon subjective necessary principles. He appealed to the fact, that when we apply theories to real objects, we always suppose that the reality is so constituted, as the general ideas represent it. But here, argues he, the mind proceeds according to laws which we must consider as the laws of every reasoning being ;

being ;—consequently the truths which are here admitted, or supposed, are objective truths.

With respect to the objects of sense, the knowledge of them, indeed, is often only an objective appearance ; but the necessary laws of thought lead to this conclusion, that other thinking beings, in similar circumstances, represent these objects to themselves in a similar manner ; that these objects, with certain conformations, exist without us, and that certain properties of the impressions which we experience, are also the properties of the objects themselves.—A Sceptic, however, without going out of his way in quest of far-fetched arguments, might easily find a good deal to object against this deduction.

The work of Tetens had not the effect of promoting a solid philosophic spirit, and of bringing about a salutary revolution in the study of philosophy, which might otherwise have been expected. But this was not merely the consequence of the circumstances of the times ;—but also of a stile, not so much obscure, as languid, prolix and affected ; as well as of a slavish dependence upon the Empiricism of Locke, which is insufficient for the explanation of the most important problems.

What this work did not accomplish, another did.—KANT, who by various compositions upon philosophical subjects, had long ago announced himself as an original genius, and an excellent philosopher, published in the year 1781, the “ Critique of Pure Reason,” which promised a total and beneficial reform in every philosophical department. For a long time, however, after its publication, it had been unaccountably neglected, or, at least, misunderstood. This was surely not in consequence of the difficulties, with which the study of it, as well as of every metaphysical subject, is necessarily attended ; but of a certain indifference to philosophy, and of a rooted taste for shallow and popular discussions, which Kant directly opposed. But as soon as the work was more studied and investigated

gated, and had found several successful Commentators, at once a revolution in philosophy commenced: It soon met with numerous admirers and friends, and even its opponents could not withhold their admiration from this masterly production. They saw themselves, every where, driven from their strong holds, and obliged to erect new fortifications for the defence of those philosophical tenets which they wished to maintain. Nay, many of the enemies of this system became its friends; and the invaluable part of it, which treats of morals, met with an almost universal approbation. All the different branches of Philosophy were examined with greater ardour, and new sources of knowledge, which formerly had scarcely been conceived, were now exposed to view. The limits of the science were more accurately defined, and the laudable researches after stable and simple principles, and after a rigid method, gave to philosophical inquiries a certainty, and an interest, which for a long time they had not possessed. Long before this period doubts had arisen, in reflecting minds, concerning the systems of Leibnitz, Wolf and Locke; but these had never been unfolded with sufficient clearness, nor a better system substituted in the place of that which was to be relinquished. Here all systems were examined with critical acumen, and a solid foundation was laid for a new one. This New Philosophy, in a short time, was attended with an almost magical influence upon all the Sciences. It found friends and adherents, even among ranks of people who had not devoted themselves to Science, or least of all, to Metaphysics. It excited in Germany, a sound, philosophic spirit of inquiry, of which the present age was scarcely deemed capable. It contains such an immense store of new ideas and views that, hitherto, only a small part of these materials can be considered as digested, and even, in a distant age, new branches of knowledge may shoot forth from it.

The work itself is arranged with a systematic spirit, and written with a noble philosophic impartiality. The style is somewhat obscure *, the construction and arrangement of the periods, in many places, ungraceful, heavy, and over-loaded ; but a reader who has a tolerable understanding, and an interest for truth, is sufficiently recompensed by the originality of thought, and by the new and striking images in which it abounds. The celebrated author discovers all the talents requisite to a reformer of philosophy, especially in our age :—not merely an admirable acuteness, and a rare talent of making *himself* the object of *his* reflection, but also a knowledge in Mathematics and Natural Philosophy, of which he had formerly given proofs : a nice sensibility of the Beautiful and Sublime ; and in general, a cultivated manly taste, a thorough acquaintance with the different Systems of philosophy that prevailed before his time ; and a refinement of feeling, which is truly honourable.

It is not my design *here*, to describe minutely the system of this philosopher, which, besides the work already mentioned, is explained in the “ Prolegomena to every future System of Metaphysics,” published in 1783 ; in the “ Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics (Theory) of Morals,” in 1785 ; in the “ Metaphysical Principles of Natural Philosophy,” in 1786 ; in the “ Critique on Practical Reason,” in 1788 ; in the “ Critique on Judgment,” in 1790 ; and in the “ Religion within the limits of Pure Reason,” in 1793 : And which System has found in REINHOLD, SCHULZ, SCHMID, and others, friends and commentators,—men who themselves were quali-

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fied

* “ I am not very conscious,” says KANT, in his preface to the 2d edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 43. “ that I possess the talent of exhibiting an abstract philosophical subject in a luminous point of view : I trust that the occasional defect of style will be further supplied by the writings of those deserving characters who, together with a solid judgment, are in the possession of that talent. For, this being the case, there is no danger of being refuted, but rather of being *misunderstood*.”

fied to advance science. The following abstract will be sufficient for our present purpose.

Kant begins with doubting, whether Metaphysics, in general, be capable of being studied as a science. He remarked that, hitherto, this branch of knowledge could not lay claim to the appellation of a science; although it was older than all the others, and besides, by the interest it excited, always obtruded itself upon our attention. Two circumstances led him to discoveries, which were to bring about a revolution in Metaphysics, and secure to them the rank of a science;—the observation, by what means Mathematics and Natural Philosophy had become sciences; and Hume's inquiries concerning the idea of causation. We begin with the latter, and shall make Kant himself give the account of it.

“ Since the Essays of Locke and Leibnitz, or rather since
 “ the origin of Metaphysics, as far as their history extends, no
 “ circumstance has occurred, which might have been more
 “ decisive of the fate of this science, than the attack which
 “ David Hume made upon it. He brought, indeed, no light
 “ into this department of knowledge, but he struck a spark
 “ which, if it had fallen among combustible materials, and had
 “ been carefully fanned, might have been easily kindled in-
 “ to a blaze. Hume proceeded upon a single but important
 “ idea in Metaphysics, the connection of cause and effect, and
 “ the concomitant notions of power and action: he challenged
 “ *reason* to answer him, what title she had to imagine, that any
 “ thing may be so constituted as that, if it be given, something
 “ else is also thereby inferred: for the idea of cause denotes
 “ this. He proved beyond contradiction, that it is impossible for
 “ reason to think of such a connection *a priori*, and out of
 “ its own ideas; for it contains necessity; but it is not pos-
 “ sible to perceive how, because something is, something else
 “ must

“ must also necessarily be ; nor how the idea of such a connection can be introduced a priori.”—

“ Hence he concluded, that reason entirely deceives herself with this idea, and that she erroneously considers it as her own child, when it is only the spurious offspring of imagination, which imagination, impregnated by experience, has brought certain ideas under the law of association, and substituted a subjective necessity, thence arising, that is habit, for an objective one derived from perception. Hence, again, he concluded that reason had no title to think of such connections, even in a general manner ; because then all her general ideas would be merely fictions, and all her pretended notions, stamped a priori, would be nothing else than counterfeited ordinary lessons of experience : which is just saying, there is no science of Metaphysics at all, and there can be none.”

“ However hasty and unwarrantable Hume’s conclusion might appear, yet it was founded upon investigation, and this investigation well deserved, that some of the philosophers of his time should have united to solve more happily, if possible, the problem in the sense in which he delivered it : a complete reform of the science might have resulted from this solution. But it appears to have been the unavoidable destiny of Metaphysics, that *he* should not be understood by his cotemporaries. For it is a mortifying reflection, that *his* opponents, REID, BEATTIE, OSWALD, and lastly PRIESTLEY himself, totally misunderstood the *tendency* of his problem. Always admitting as granted, what he never had called in question, they so misunderstood his aim at improvement, that every thing remained in the same state, as if nothing had been done.—The question was not, whether the idea of cause be in itself proper, and indispensable to the illustration of all natural knowledge ; for this Hume had never doubted ; but whether this idea is an object of thought through reasoning a

“ *priori* ; and whether, in this manner, it possess internal evidence, independently of all experience ; consequently, whether it be of such extensive utility, as is not limited to objects of sense alone.—It was upon this point Hume expected an explanation.

“ The opponents of this celebrated man, in order satisfactorily to solve *his* problem, would have been under the necessity of penetrating more profoundly into the abstract nature of reason, in so far as it is employed in *pure* thought ; an inquiry to which *they* were little, if at all, disposed.—Hence they contrived a more convenient method of displaying their malignity, without subjecting themselves to the trouble of making further researches ; namely, the appeal to the *common sense of mankind*.—It is indeed a great gift of Heaven, to possess a plain and unbiassed understanding ;—but we must manifest it, and establish ourselves in this possession, by facts, by reflection, and by reason, by what we do and say ; not by appealing to it as an oracle, when we can produce no rational arguments to justify the claim.—When observation and science are put to the last shift, then, and not sooner, is it time to appeal to common sense.—This is one of the subtle contrivances of modern times, by which the shallow prattler assumes a right, boldly to challenge a man of profound erudition, and frequently maintains the contest. As long, however, as there is any room left for discovery, we shall do well to beware of having recourse to this last expedient. And, in truth, this appeal is nothing else than a submission to the judgment of the multitude, a reference at which the Philosopher blushes, but in which the silly witling triumphs and exults.—I should think, too, Hume might have laid claim to a sound understanding, as well as Beattie ; and besides, to what the latter certainly did not possess, to a critical acquaintance with
“ that

“ that species of reasoning, which keeps common sense within
“ due bounds, and prevents it from losing itself in specula-
“ tions ; or what is more to the present purpose, which hin-
“ ders it from deciding upon any subject, because it knows not
“ how to justify its mode of proceeding upon its own prin-
“ ciples ; a restraint, without which an understanding will
“ not long remain sound.—The chissel and the mallet may do
“ well enough for shaping a piece of timber, but the ra-
“ dius-needle, a nicer instrument, must be employed for en-
“ graving.—In the same manner, a sound and plain under-
“ standing, as well as a speculative one, are each of use in
“ their turn ; the former, when we are conversant about
“ judgments that are immediately applicable to experience ;
“ the latter, when we are about forming general judgments
“ from mere abstract ideas, as in Metaphysics, where the un-
“ derstanding, termed sound or plain, but often erroneously so
“ denominated, cannot afford any assistance.

“ I freely own, the suggestions of David Hume were, what
“ first, many years ago, roused me from my dogmatical slum-
“ ber, and gave to my inquiries quite a different direction in
“ the field of speculative Philosophy.—I was far from be-
“ ing carried away by his conclusions, the fallacy of which
“ chiefly arose from his not forming to himself an idea of the
“ *whole of his problem* ; but merely investigating a part of it,
“ the solution of which was impossible, without a comprehen-
“ sive view of the whole.—When we proceed upon a well
“ founded, though not thoroughly digested thought, we may
“ expect, by patient and continued reflection, to prosecute it
“ farther, than the acute genius had done, to whom we are in-
“ debted for the first spark of this light.—I first enquired,
“ therefore, whether Hume’s objection might not be a general
“ one, and soon found, that the idea of cause and effect is far
“ from being the only one, by which the understanding a
piori

“ *a priori* thinks of the connection of things ; but rather, that
 “ the science of Metaphysics is altogether founded upon these
 “ connections.—I endeavoured to ascertain *their* number, and
 “ as I succeeded in this attempt, upon a *single principle*, I pro-
 “ ceeded to the deduction of those general ideas which, I was
 “ now convinced, are not, as Hume apprehended, derived
 “ from experience, but arise out of the pure understanding.
 “ This deduction, which seemed impossible to my acute pre-
 “ decessor, and which nobody besides him had ever conceived,
 “ although every one makes use of these ideas, without asking
 “ himself, upon what their objective validity is founded ; this
 “ deduction was, I say, the most difficult which could have been
 “ undertaken for the behoof of Metaphysics. And what was
 “ still more embarrassing, Metaphysics could not here offer me
 “ the smallest assistance, because that deduction ought first to
 “ establish the possibility of a system of Metaphysics. As I
 “ had now succeeded in the explanation of Hume’s problem,
 “ not merely in a particular instance, but with a view of the
 “ whole power of pure reason, I could advance with sure,
 “ though tedious steps, to determine completely, and upon
 “ general principles, the compass of pure reason, both what
 “ is the sphere of its exertion, and what are its limits : which
 “ was all that was required for erecting a system of Meta-
 “ physics upon a proper and solid foundation.”

Kant remarked, that Mathematics and Natural Philosophy
 had properly become sciences by the discovery, that reason
a priori attributed certain principles to objects ; and he in-
 quired, whether we could not also succeed better in Meta-
 physics by taking it for granted, that objects must be accommo-
 dated to the constitution of our mind, than by the common
 supposition, that all our knowledge must be regulated accord-
 ing to external objects. The following are the elements of his
 “ Critique of pure reason,”—the first of Kant’s systematical
 works,

works, and the most remarkable for profound reasoning, and the striking illustrations, with which it throughout abounds.

“ We are in possession of certain notions *a priori*, which
 “ are absolutely independent of all experience, although the
 “ objects of experience correspond with them ; and which are
 “ distinguished by necessity and strict universality. To these
 “ are opposed empirical notions, or such as are only possible *a*
 “ *posteriori*, that is, through experience. Besides these, we
 “ have certain notions, with which no objects of expe-
 “ rience ever correspond, which rise above the world of
 “ sense, and which we consider as the most sublime, such as
 “ *God, Liberty, Immortality*.—There are *analytical* and *syn-*
 “ *thetical* judgments *a priori*; the former are merely illustra-
 “ tive, and depend upon the principle of contradiction ; the
 “ latter are *amplificatory*, i. e. they enlarge our knowledge,
 “ and are established upon another (assertory) principle. The
 “ last are peculiar to the science of Metaphysics ; although it
 “ also contains analytical judgments. Besides, there are con-
 “ tained in all theoretical sciences of reasoning, purely syn-
 “ thetical judgments *a priori* as principles, namely, such as
 “ amplify, or enlarge our knowledge of objects, without im-
 “ mediate perception.—Mathematical judgments are altoge-
 “ ther synthetical. The Mathematician may by his position
 “ always give something material, or empirical ; but there is
 “ always supposed in it a pure perception *a priori*, a form of
 “ the sensitive faculty, viz. *Space* and *Time*. This form first
 “ renders every actual appearance of objects possible. Thus
 “ pure Mathematics are possible, and can be reduced to a sci-
 “ entific form—Natural Philosophy also contains synthetical
 “ judgments *a priori*, as its principles.—By the sensitive
 “ faculty we are able to form perceptions : by the under-
 “ standing we form general ideas. By the sensitive faculty
 “ we experience impressions, and objects are given to us : by
 the

“ the understanding we bring representations of these objects
 “ before us ; we think of them. Perceptions and general
 “ ideas are the elements of all our knowledge. Without the
 “ sensitive faculty, no object could be given (proposed to)
 “ us : without the understanding, none could be thought of
 “ by us. These two powers are really distinct from one ano-
 “ ther ; but neither of the two, without the other, can pro-
 “ duce a *notion*, (*Erkenntniß*) In order to obtain a distinct
 “ notion of any one thing, we must present to our general ideas,
 “ objects in perception, and reduce our perceptions to, or con-
 “ nect them with, these general ideas.—As the sensitive fa-
 “ culty has its determined forms ; so has our understanding,
 “ likewise, forms *a priori*. These may be properly termed
 “ *Categories* ; they are pure ideas of the understanding, which
 “ relate, *a priori*, to the objects of perception in general. The
 “ objects of experience, therefore, are in no other way pos-
 “ sible ; they can in no other way be thought of by us ;
 “ and their multiplied diversity can only be reduced to
 “ *one* act of judgment, or to one act of consciousness, by
 “ means of these Categories of sense. Hence, the Catego-
 “ ries have objective reality.—They are either Catego-
 “ ries of 1. *Quantity* ; as unity, number, totality : or 2. of
 “ *Quality* ; as reality, negation, limitation : or 3. of *Rela-*
 “ *tion*, as substance and accident, cause and effect ; or the re-
 “ ciprocal operation between agent and sufferer : or 4. of
 “ *Modality* ; as possibility and impossibility, existence and
 “ non existence, necessity and contingency.—The judgment is
 “ the capacity of applying the general ideas of the under-
 “ standing to the information of experience. *) The objects of
 “ experience are regulated according to these ideas ; not, vice
 “ versa

* Hence we observe in those who are deprived of, or deficient in, this important
 faculty, that they are unable to determine between good and bad, between danger
 and safety, and so forth.

“ versa, our ideas according to the objects. We can attain no
 “ knowledge of an object, as a thing in itself, but only so far
 “ as it is an object of our sensitive perception, or a phenome-
 “ non ; though we must be capable of conceiving objects as
 “ substances, and likewise of admitting their reality ; because
 “ our *internal* experience, the consciousness of our own ex-
 “ istence, is only possible on the supposition of *external* expe-
 “ rience, or by the perception of other things without us.
 “ As soon as we pretend to consider the objects of sense, as
 “ things in themselves, reason falls into a contradiction with
 “ itself, into opposite principles which it cannot unravel, so
 “ that as much can be said for one position, as for its opposite.
 “ Our knowledge, then, is wholly confined to the objects of
 “ experience, without which the pure abstract ideas of the
 “ understanding are of no value, and consequently they are
 “ no longer of use, when we abandon the regions of the *sensi-*
 “ *ble* world. Liberty, God, and Immortality are ideas which
 “ are exalted above all sensitive faculties ; they are not ob-
 “ jects of sensitive knowledge, nor of objective certainty, but
 “ of *necessary* thought and belief. *Speculative* reason, when it
 “ considers any thing, as to what it *is in itself*, directs us here,
 “ or leads us into conjecture and contradiction ; but *practical*
 “ reason, when it considers that which *shall be*, by clear ex-
 “ pressions announces to us truths, than which nothing can
 “ be more important. It declares us, as moral beings, to be
 “ free agents, who are not subjected to the mechanism of na-
 “ ture : it holds out to us an *ideal*, moral perfection, which
 “ we *ought* to attain, but which we *can* attain only by an
 “ endless progression, and therefore enjoins us to cherish a be-
 “ lief in immortality. By the idea of a most perfect state, it
 “ satisfies that instinctive desire of happiness, which is a con-
 “ stituent part of our sensitive nature ; and while it holds out
 “ to us the idea of a most *perfect harmony*, in which happiness

“ and virtue must one day be united ; it teaches us to believe
 “ in the existence of that Being, who alone can establish this
 “ harmony.”

This imperfect account will, at least, serve the purpose of shewing, how this system, on the one hand, sets limits to the *Scepticism* of Hume ; while it refutes and overturns *Materialism*, *Fatalism*, *Atheism*, as well as *Fanaticism* and *Infidelity*.

—Kant does not attack the dogmatical process of reason employed in pure (abstract) notions, but rather enjoins so far a more strict dogmatism than formerly prevailed, while he raises Metaphysics to the rank and solidity of a science : he combats that arrogant dogmatism, which sets out with its *hypothetical* notions, without previous enquiries, whether, and how far reason is intitled, by its peculiar judging powers, either to admit, or to reject, these notions. “ This critical work of mine,” he says, “ is not written with a view of encouraging prattling shallowness, under the arrogant name of popularity, nor for the purpose of supporting scepticism which, as well as the former, is rather an excrescence, than an ornament of the sciences. The *Critique* is the previous preparation for the advancement of a well-founded system of Metaphysics, as a science which, necessarily dogmatical, and in the strictest sense systematic, must be formed according to scientific rules, not merely adapted to the vulgar.”—Upon Scepticism, its value, its limits, its relation to the Critical Philosophy, Kant, in another part of his inquiry, has made excellent remarks.—JACOB, another German Philosopher, has since, in a more direct and comprehensive manner than Kant himself, employed the Critical Philosophy for the confutation of Scepticism in general, and that of Hume in particular.

Not long after Kant's *Critique*, there appeared a work, by an ingenious and liberal author, “ upon the doctrine of Spinoza, in Letters to Moses Mendelssohn, 1785, which accidentally,

ly, in many instances, confirmed the doctrines of the Critique. The author defined *belief* to be immediate certainty, which required no support by arguments, superseded all proofs, as it rested upon a revelation, and contained the elements of human knowledge; he maintained, that reason only leads to doubts and errors in the most important objects of thought, that Spinozism is still the most coherent system of reasoning, but it establishes downright atheism; and that in general, according to the expression of PASCHAL, "*Reason exposes the Dogmatist to shame, and nature itself refutes the Sceptic.*"—As little however, as his doctrines of belief agree with the principles of Kant, so much were his opinions, of Scepticism and Spinozism, a strong corroboration of Kant's assertions; that *speculative* reason teaches us *nothing*, with demonstrative certainty, upon the existence of God, and the objects beyond the world of sense.—Soon after this, in 1787, the worthy son of a truly philosophical father, Joh. Albr. Heinr. REIMARUS of Hamburgh; published a work "upon the foundation of human knowledge, and natural religion," in which he examines the different doctrines of Jacob and Kant, and which here deserves honourable mention, as it contains many valuable hints, together with happy illustrations of interesting, though abstruse, subjects. In the mean time Kant's system, or rather his elementary *Propædæutic* for a system, acquired still greater reputation, and gained every where friends notwithstanding several accidents of so serious a nature, as to threaten its subversion. The system of Locke, that of Leibnitz, a species of Eclecticism, and finally the Philosophy of Common Sense, were alternately opposed to it. Some imagined they saw in it a concealed infidelity; others an over-credulous religious and moral *Mysticism*; a third party maintained, that it led to Scepticism; and a fourth, that it contained nothing new. All these obstacles could not retard the rapid progress it was daily making, almost without exception, in the Protestant Universities of Germany: in ma-

ny of the Catholic [Schools, too, it obtained decisive victories over the systems of Aristotle and Descartes.

But however much, from conviction, enlightened minds were inclined to befriend this philosophy, yet with a moderate acquaintance with the history of Ethics, it was easy to foresee, that even Kant's System, notwithstanding all the evidence and strength of its principles, could scarcely withstand the furious attacks of Pyrrhonism, or rather the pyrrhonic art, by which, without discrimination, every thing is called in question; Mathematics and Natural Philosophy itself not excepted. Without doubt, many of the opponents of the New Philosophy, long ago remarked this; but they hesitated to make the pyrrhonic experiment with Kantianism; because every other possible system, that could be substituted in the room of the Critical, might in like manner be rendered wavering and uncertain; and because such a pyrrhonism, in general, either leads to no end at all, or it is attended with consequences detrimental to morality and happiness.—Further, this attack would only have served to place the strength of the system attacked, in a more striking point of view.—But a more moderate scepticism might have been easily and advantageously employed against certain principles of the Critical Philosophy, if its opponents had been aware of denying, or calling in question, some facts of consciousness, to which Kant necessarily appeals. It was not, therefore, a matter of surprise that, after repeated attacks in our times, this species of scepticism also should be employed against the Critical Philosophy.

The author of "Aenesidemus," or, on the foundation of the "Elements of Philosophy, published by Prof. Reinhold, in Jena; together with a defence of Scepticism, against the "pretensions of the Critical Philosophers, 1792," has endeavoured to prove, that the sceptical doctrines of Hume are

not in the least confuted by the Critique of Pure Reason. The work, here mentioned, is written with uncommon perspicuity, acuteness, and respect towards the Father of the Critical Philosophy. The anonymous author directs his objections against the chief pillars of Kant's System, the derivation of necessary synthetical judgments from the mind, and the reference of these to the perception of *empirical* objects. He allows, that there are necessary synthetical judgments in human knowledge, that they form an indispensable part in it, and that the necessity which takes place in the connection of the predicate with the subject, in these judgments, can be derived neither from pre-existence, from frequent repetition, nor from the conformity of a certain number of facts. But he maintains, that, in the "Critique of Pure Reason," the mind is held out as the real ground of these necessary judgments, that from our being able to think only of the power of representation (or conception) as the foundation of necessary synthetical judgments, a conclusion is drawn, that the mind *must actually be* the foundation of these. Now, argues he, what Hume called in question, is here plainly taken for granted; namely, 1st, that for every thing we perceive, there is objectively pre-existing a real ground, and a really distinct cause of it, so that the position of the sufficient ground, in general, depends not only upon the representations and their subjective association, but also upon *things in themselves*, and their objective connection: 2dly, that we are intitled, from the constitution of a something in our conception, to form conjectures respecting the constitution of that something without us.—Kant, continues this Sceptic, has not proved, that our mind alone can be the ground of synthetical judgments; for the consciousness of necessity, which accompanies these judgments, is not an infallible criterion of their origin a priori, and from the mind.—That we *cannot* now think of, or explain something otherwise but in a certain manner;

ner ; this circumstance by no means proves, that we *could not* have thought of it in any other way. Another origin of these judgments is conceivable, than from the mind ; namely, from the operation of real objects, and their various modes of affecting us. It might, therefore, be easily conceived, that representations and general ideas, which exist in us a priori, are still in another way referable to real objects, than merely by the circumstance, that they exhibit to us the conditions and forms of the objects. These representations and ideas a priori, might also relate to the objective constitution of things without us, by means of a pre-established harmony between these, and the operations of our understanding; and agreeably to this harmony, something might be represented to the mind by means of perceptions and general ideas a priori, which should not only have objective validity in our understanding, but also correspond with the constitutions of things in themselves, and be the means of representing them.—The Critical Philosophy, he adds, proves the origin of necessary synthetical judgments from the mind, by making such use of the principle of causation, as is contrary to its own principles in the application of the Categories ; whether we understand by mind a *Noumenon*, a thing in itself, or a transcendental idea.—To these doubts, several of which were formerly proposed by FLATT and BRASTBERGER, the friends of the Critical Philosophy have already answered. Whether the scepticism of this author agrees with that of Hume, whether it does not contain in some respects more, in others less than the last, I shall not venture to determine.

PLATTNER, that excellent *Anthropologist*, who, in a rare instance, to a profound knowledge of medicine, joins extensive erudition in philosophy, and peculiar penetration, and who deserves to be ranked among the first philosophers of Germany, has employed rational scepticism against the Kantian System,
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in an elementary treatise, designed chiefly for academical instructions, and has even declared himself in favour of this mode of thinking in general, with respect to all philosophical subjects. "Would not a well understood scepticism," says he among other things, "be the most natural way to avoid all metaphysical controversy, and at the same time the most rational means for calming all dogmatical and critical passions? What can be our aim under the titles of Logic, Metaphysics, Critic of Reason; what else can be our object under the general title of Philosophy than, after admitting the unquestionable reality of our representations, to sketch faithfully the history of them; and *then* to prove what is true and certain with respect to them; and what in the human mind (whether it be the lower, or more exalted part of it) carries the conviction of truth and certainty along with it?"—This philosopher wishes the whole of his work to be considered merely as the *subjective* conviction of a Sceptic, and describes the sceptical mode of thinking more accurately than has been done by any of his predecessors. In opposition to the Critique of Kant, he has started a number of questions, some of which are completely in the spirit of the old Pyrrhonists. —Upon these doubtful points, likewise, answers have already been published by the friends of the Critical System. However conclusive such refutations may appear to the party, on whose behalf they were attempted, it still remains to be wished, though there is now little hope left for this prospect, that the aged Father of Rational and Critical Dogmatism may deign to defend himself against the attacks of Plattner, and those of the New Acnesidemus.

With pleasure I proceed, by opposing to these sceptical writings a work written with noble intentions. Although it deviate in some respects from the principles of Kant, yet it supports, [with energy, the truth and certainty of human knowledge,

knowledge, and at the same time places the interesting nature of these questions in a clear point of view.—The treatise, here alluded to, is “On Truth and moral perfection; by ADAM WEISHAUP, 1793.”

All the writings of Sceptics, it is sincerely to be hoped, will never totally deprive man of the belief in objective truth; and the Sceptic himself will never be capable of abandoning it completely. For it is of the utmost importance, that we should admit something objective, for the sake of morality and religion, both of which must lose their value, and their existence, as soon as they are considered merely as something subjective and relative. Philosophers ought, therefore, rather to justify the belief in objective reality, than represent to us, that there is no other but subjective conviction, which they hold out as the highest step of philosophical and consistent thought.—We cannot, indeed, proceed beyond the power of comprehension, and all conviction merely rests on our state of mind; but could it be otherwise?—It is sufficient that, in our consciousness, clear traces are given us of objective truth; that it is in our power to distinguish objective and subjective truth from one another; and that from the whole mode of our thought and action, and from the ideas of duty exalted above all necessity, we must reasonably admit *something objectively true*.

Philosophical Scepticism, which is not merely pretended, or affected, and which does not flow from an impure source, has as yet found, and ever will find, but a few *genuine* supporters: but when it is taught and extolled in writings, and in public places of instruction, it may, in a great number of individuals, gradually produce a shallow mode of sceptical reasoning, destroy the spirit of inquiry, and ultimately promote immorality. Perhaps, Philosophy would soon fall into disrepute, and the public spirit among mankind, as well as the general utility of the learned, would suffer extremely, were our attention confined

fined merely to the description of the phenomena that occur in the mind, and to the limited consideration of what is subjective alone, without placing any value upon what is objective.—It would be rash and irrational, to obtrude our maxims, opinions, and convictions upon others ; though every one wishes to cultivate what *alone* is stable in us, our *reason* ; and to try by gentle and suitable means, to bring to the clear consciousness and conviction of others, what our fair and candid examination teaches us to be uniformly true and good. We wish not, individually, to consider ourselves as insulated creatures that live, each of us, in our own world of ideas ; but to believe, that we all have a claim upon a certain number of truths, and that it depends upon our own exertions, to get possession of these.

In our times, it might be more dangerous than many imagine, to represent the Scepticism of Hume as incontrovertible, or incapable of solution ; for the greater number of superficial readers might thus be induced to surrender their weak minds to the most dangerous apathy, to shun every mental exertion, to search for no further discoveries in the department of philosophy, and—by gradually returning to the age of barbarism—to leave every thing in this deplorable situation, in which they themselves ultimately fall victims to infidelity, or fanaticism.

There prevails at present, in almost every civilized country, a very shallow and dangerous scepticism, extending its influence over the most important objects. It has assumed a systematic form, to which people readily subscribe ; because it is more discreet, and less intolerable, than the *professed* mode of thinking, which characterizes almost every philosophic sect. This species of scepticism, in the greater number of individuals, assumes the appearance of an indolent and irresolute disposition of mind ; and in many, that of a wild, fanatical

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sickleness

ficklenefs ; a ficklenefs, with which one party, by way of retaliation, ufually reproaches the other.

The caufes of this fingular propenfity, it is not difficult to trace : an inclination for fenfual indulgence is every where manifef ; the intereft in *pure intellectual truth* is univerfally weakened ; the old philofophical and theological fyftems have been shaken in their foundations, while the new ones have as yet been able to procure but little public reputation.

Prof. STAUDLIN diftinguifhes with accuracy the different fpecies of fcepticifm, and he endeavours to afcertain their true origin.—As a fpecimen of his mafterly method of inquiry, I conclude this *Introduction*, with a faithful extract from his Treatife “ On the Sources and Origin of Scepticifm.”

“ There is,” fays he, “ a certain kind of fcepticifm which deferves to be ftiled the *philofophical*, and which arifes nearly in the following manner. Men of vigorous minds, in whom a lively intereft for every important truth is joined to an uncommon degree of penetration and activity, begin to think, and to inquire for themfelves : fuch men divest themfelves of their juvenile opinions and prejudices, at a much earlier period of life, than others. Their propenfity to peculiar and original ideas exhibits every thing in a fufpicious light, which formerly, either from mere cuftom or authority, had formed a part of their creed. The conftant defire of difcovering truth ; the ftrong confcioufnefs of their own powers to fearch for it ; the bold profpect of opening, perhaps, new views in philofophy, continually induce them to inquire into every fource, from which truth may be derived :—thus they are impelled by a kind of philofophic enthufiafm.”

“ That remarkable epoch of human life, in which fometimes the painter, fometimes the poet, as if by infpiration, feels in himfelf the genius of his art ; this epocha has been frequently obferved by men whom nature had defigned for celebrity.

lebrity. The philosophic genius, not unfrequently, discovers a similar period, in which the views he directs to his intellectual nature, the manner in which he reflects upon the whole created fabric, and the researches he makes into the writings of the ancient philosophers, fill his mind with a pleasing anxiety, with a lively energy, and lead him to augur his future destiny : but this exertion of evolving talents not rarely terminates in scepticism. His mind trespasses upon regions unknown, and far remote from human conception ; he is first induced, and that most frequently, to start questions which, to men, are altogether unanswerable. Unfortunately, too, he begins with the most difficult subjects of inquiry ; for the more easy propositions appear to him beneath his dignity. The latter he treats with contempt ; and grasping principally at the former, he is continually disappointed by the transient hopes of discovering mysteries, which lie concealed behind an impenetrable gloom. The unsuccessful efforts made upon that which is difficult, soon render him suspicious of what is both easy, and within his horizon. He wanders from one system to another in order to find the philosopher's stone ; (or, as it is very forcibly expressed in the original) *to solve the riddle of the world*. He alternately pays homage to the different systems, which engage his attention ; so that at one time the adherents of LOCKE, at another those of LEIBNITZ, at another those of DESCARTES, and at length those of ROUSSEAU are, with him, the representatives of truth. Sometimes, he creates systems of his own ; but they are as quickly destroyed, as they were erected."

" He is, finally, led to investigate the foundation of all human knowledge and evidence, as well as to inquire into the possibility of an *objective* truth. Here, where he was in search of a certain resting point, a boisterous ocean of uncertainties, at once, appears in view. In vain he attempts, af-

ter the most accurate scrutiny of his intellectual powers, to discover the general and necessary characters of truth. His sensations, every where, appear to inform him of things, not in unison with his reason; and upon the most important concerns, which inspire his heart with hopes and desires, his reason is silent; or it torments him with such doubts and apprehensions, as are sufficient to blast his most sanguine expectations. In vain he endeavours to reconcile that at least, in which the opinions of all men coincide, with the general characters of truth. With indignation he observes the contradictory opinions of the greatest philosophers of all ages; with surprise he sees, how frequently he had already imagined himself in the possession of truth; and how frequently he had also been obliged to reject it, as illusory. The most opposite judgments of men, even in common life; the operation of physical causes; the influence of the passions, of authority, and of the most incidental circumstances, as affecting these judgments,—now excite the whole of his attention. The observation, that innumerable multitudes had from the beginning of time lived happy, and found the most complete conviction in speculative fancies and errors; this observation makes him despair of discovering certainty in any subject whatever. With a compassionate smile he beholds the dogmatist, bold and decisive, proud and self-sufficient, proposing his opinions, in which he discovers little more, than proofs of ignorance, or of arrogance and dissimulation. At last, he forms the resolution of renouncing all discoveries tending to establish absolute truth; of deducing in every instance no other than doubtful results; and of obtruding his judgments as little upon any man, as he would be inclined to adopt them from others. But as he feels in himself an irresistible propensity, still to adopt *some* things, and to lay down for himself some rules of conduct, not being able to act altogether without

out *fixed* principles ; there is no wonder that he bestows his approbation upon some sentiments and judgments ; yet he does this with the constant restriction, *that these are by no means absolute, and that they are true only as to himself.*"

" The philosophical scepticism, the origin and progress of which we have here described, is, however, extremely rare. We meet more frequently, particularly in the present age, with other species of it, which arise from very different sources, and which may with more justice be termed *premeditated pyrrhonism*, or a decided propensity of the mind to universal doubt."

" Scepticism, also, frequently derives its origin from indolence and ignorance. Some people acquire a superficial knowledge of the history of philosophical opinions ; they are perhaps informed, that there has been a set of men who doubted every thing ; they are fond of claiming the name of philosophers, who are not blind followers of others, and who rise above the common set of men. Instead of instituting profound inquiries into the nature of the human faculties for acquiring knowledge ; instead of calmly and patiently comparing the opinions of philosophers ; they raise a host of doubts upon every subject, that requires acute reflection : thus they study the art of contriving endless objections."

" It is, indeed, much easier and more convenient to frame objections against every conclusion, than to draw the result from laborious researches, and to defend this result against the objections of others.*—When a subject is only in part understood, doubts must spontaneously arise, which may confound the

* BAYLE, in his letter to MINUTELLI ; "*Oeuvres div. IV. p. 537.*" very justly remarks : " En vérité, il ne faut pas trouver étrange, que tant de gens aient donné dans le Pyrrhonisme : car c'est la chose du monde la plus commode. Vous pouvez impunément disputer contre tous venans, et sans craindre ces argumens ad hominem, qui font quelque-fois tant de peine. Vous craignez point la retorsion ; puisque ne soutenant rien vous abandonnez de bon cœur à tous

the clearest proposition. Among this class of ignorant and shallow sceptics, we frequently meet with the strangest compounds of scepticism, credulity and dogmatism. They are apt to believe the grossest absurdities, provided that the objects be very contiguous to their sight, and require no acute investigation: but they entertain doubts concerning the demonstrative evidence of mathematics, and the reality of moral law."

"Ambition, a fondness for paradoxes and novelty, are, with many, the principal springs of scepticism. It is something so very uncommon to doubt every thing; it discovers so much boldness, superiority, acuteness and liberality, so much art, to combat every opinion that enters into the common creed. On the other hand, it appears so very modest, when in imitation of SOCRATES—the sceptical genius pretends to know nothing; nay, he goes even farther, in confessing, that he is not quite certain of *this*! Such is his modesty, produced by a still greater impulse of self-denial."

Nil sciri quisquis putat, id quoque nescit
An sciri possit quo se nil scire fatetur.

LUCRET. IV. 471.

"It is a peculiar satisfaction, to triumph over that pedantic dogmatism, which arises sometimes from ignorance, sometimes from an abundance of *knowing*, but not of *real knowledge*. It is a pleasing reflection, to behold the ardent contest of opinions, and to look on this dangerous and tempestuous passage upon the sea of human uncertainties, with a calm, perhaps affected, resignation."

Suave mari magno turbantibus æquora ventis
E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem,
Non quia vexari quemquam, est jucunda voluptas,
Sed quibus ipse malis careas, quia cernere suave est.

"We

"tous les sophismes et a tous les raisonnemens de la terre quelque opinion que ce soit. En un mot vous contestez et vous *daubez* sur toutes choses tout votre saoul, sans craindre de peine du talion."

“ We find, in the records of philosophical history, many celebrated characters who were professed sceptics, and who, in that history still shine as luminaries : though, by the moderns, consigned to obscurity. Is it not honourable, to rank among men of such celebrity ?—This ambitious scepticism, certainly, arises from immoral sources : it is productive of frequent mischief, both in the moral character of those who profess it, and of those who listen to this deception. Its progress, in the present age, is very considerable.—As the modern system of toleration is frequently the most intolerant, this modern scepticism also frequently appears in the highest degree fanatical and magisterial. By means of this delusive art, men of a *certain description* endeavour to render *every thing* doubtful, which is believed by the generality of mankind ; to destroy without mercy, all the antiquated forms and species of belief, and to impose upon us the inventions of their own brain, in the most insinuating and decisive tone. Unhappily, they find easy access, through the vices and passions of man, so that great moral and political revolutions have been frequently produced, in consequence of metaphysical speculations which, at first, seemed to have little, or no influence, upon the practice of life.”

“ Avoid those—says the Vicar of Savoy to the young man, to whom he delivers his confession of faith—“ who, under
 “ the pretext of expounding nature, fill the heart of men with
 “ inert doctrines, and whose apparent scepticism is infinitely
 “ more decisive and dogmatical, than the positive tone of their
 “ adversaries. Under the ambitious pretence, that they alone
 “ are enlightened, veracious and sincere, they imperiously
 “ subject us to their destructive decisions, while they affect
 “ to communicate to us the true principles of things, by
 “ means of those unintelligible systems which are the productions of their own fancy. Hence, they subvert, destroy, and
 “ trample

“ trample under foot, every thing that is venerable to man
 “ in society ; they deprive the afflicted of the last comfort in
 “ their calamities ; the rich and powerful of the only bridle
 “ of their passions ; they snatch the flings of conscience from
 “ the recesses of the heart ; their propitious hopes from the
 “ virtuous ; and withal, they still boast of having been the
 “ benefactors of the human race. Never, they say, is truth
 “ pernicious to man. I believe this, as well as they ; but
 “ this very circumstance is, in my opinion, a strong proof,
 “ that *their* doctrines cannot claim the character of truth.”

Luxury and degeneracy of manners are perfectly consistent, as well with each other, as with a partial illumination and improvement of the mind. If we neglect to unfold the mental faculties ; if the interest which ties us to the intellectual and invisible (not, visionary) world gradually vanishes ; then this immoral and shallow scepticism easily arises, and infects even numerous classes of society. It carries along with it the appearance of cultivation and enlargement of mind ; but, at the same time, it opens an extensive field to every selfish desire.

Legion is the number of the deluded, who are in search of illumination of mind, chiefly by disputing and cavilling upon close subjects of intellectual inquiry, which were formerly held to be most true and worthy of veneration. Those fortunate travellers, whose object, in visiting the reputed Capitals of Europe, was not amusement alone ; they must have the clearest proofs, how much that flimsy mode of reasoning now prevails, and how certain it is, that it arises from the sources here mentioned. The authors of the most enlightened nations of Europe agree that, many new philosophical productions, as they are called, are nothing but the offspring of this crude and unphilosophical scepticism.*

Many

* Vid. for instance “ Letters of Literature, by Robert Heron ; London, 1785.”
 — a strange medley of undigested thoughts.

Many remarkable events of the present age may be considered as the consequences of a philosophy—without having the least claim to that dignified name—which undermines the pillars of every useful institution, but rears no fabric ; which leaves man in a state of indolence and indifference with respect to his most important concerns ; and which converts him into a sensual and selfish being, that is determined solely by time, accident, and circumstances ; and that is tossed, to and fro, on this sea of life, without a rudder or compass, without a sure rule for his conduct or belief, without any fixed object, to which his future prospects and hopes can be rationally directed.

Placed on this isthmus of a middle state,
A being darkly wise and rudely great :
With too much knowledge for the sceptic side,
With too much weakness for the Stoics pride,
He hangs between ; in doubt to act, or rest ;
In doubt to deem himself a God or beast ;
In doubt, his mind or body to prefer ;
Born but to die, and reas'ning but to err ;
Alike in ignorance, his reason such,
Whether he thinks too little, or too much :
Chaos of thought and passion, all confus'd,
Still by himself abus'd, or disabus'd ;
Created half to rise, and half to fall ;
Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all ;
Sole judge of truth, in endless error hurl'd :
The glory, jest, and riddle of the world.

POPE.

E

ELEMENTARY

ELEMENTARY VIEW
OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF KANT.

Preparatory Remarks.

BEFORE we enter upon this arduous task, it may be of some importance to premise a few necessary observations on the method which has been adopted in the execution of it; and on the various obstacles which the student of every new System, particularly of Ethics, must unavoidably encounter.

It appeared to me, at a very early period of my studies, that the principal dissensions, and subsequent divisions in philosophy, have arisen *chiefly* from the following obvious sources. —Every systematic writer on subjects, which, from their nature, do not admit of demonstrative certainty, nor of any such proofs as are manifest from *objective reality*, is almost involuntarily led to employ new terms and phrases, in order to express the different opinions he broaches among his contemporaries. It is of little consequence *to him*, whether the ideas, which gave rise to these opinions, be also new. For, though the latter may be already germinating in the seeds sown by his great predecessors, or may only have been differently explained, he is equally certain of finding *some* adherents, who pride themselves upon discovering a new sense, or perhaps a new application of the sense, in which his terms, the definitions of them, or the scientific divisions, are now more clearly, or more obscurely, understood. This has uniformly happened, I could almost

almost say, since the beginning of philosophical speculations : hence the absolute necessity of giving, in every instance, the clearest possible definitions of words, must be obvious to every novice in philosophy. But this I consider as a task, the *strict* performance of which, from the very imperfect state of language, has been (and probably will never cease to be) one of the many *human desiderata*. Hence, the immortal BACON, when the same, or at least a similar idea pervaded his comprehensive mind, was induced to express himself upon this subject, in the following excellent words : “ *Præterea ut bene sperent, Instaurationem nostram ut quiddam infinitum et ultra mortale fingant, et animo concipiant ; cum revera sit infiniti erroris finis et terminus legitimus.*”

Were it, however, possible to define *all* philosophical terms with that degree of precision which we, sometimes, observe in the works of a BACON, a NEWTON, and a KANT ; yet we could also suggest the remark—a remark which is by no means in favour of human perfection—that, even these illustrious characters, in their own elementary works, not rarely deviate from the original, or primary, definitions of terms. Those, who are conversant in speculative inquiries, will readily, and within proper limits, understand this assertion ; and such readers as might extend the meaning of it further than I am inclined to admit, I only remind of the *logical* difficulties attending every long demonstration. It would, therefore, be rash in the extreme to charge these eminent characters with incongruity of thought, or reasoning ; as the *more minute* deviations, in terms, are chiefly owing to the unsettled state of language in general ; and as the very term, *perfection*, when speaking of human beings provided with human organs, is only *relative*.

A long and dear-bought experience in teaching has first induced me to entertain thoughts upon this important theme,

which may not find many supporters. Yet I think myself justified in asserting, that the most, if not all, Systems of Grammar and Rhetoric, as well as the Dictionaries of languages, are compiled upon mechanical, wavering and untenable principles; * for they are, more or less, liable to the following serious objections:

1st. That the rules contained in Grammars, generally admit of a greater number of *exceptions*, than of *positive determinations*,

2d. That the inflections of nouns and verbs are not accommodated to the *etymology* of words, but are chiefly taken from *analogy*;—a circumstance productive of endless mistakes and confusion in the grammars of *modern* languages.

3d. That so far from improving the phrases and idioms of languages, grammarians seem to labour hard to render them, if possible, more perplexed and inconsistent; †—by daily adopting new idioms in one language, which are borrowed from another; by using words in a figurative sense, which cannot be *thus* employed without impropriety; by transferring words from the *physical* to the moral *sense*, and vice versa, when there is no other necessity for this outrage upon *good sense*,

* Whether the *Elementary Grammar* of the German Language, which I propose to publish, together with an *Identical Dictionary* of the German, English, French and Latin languages, will be liable to the charges which my predecessors have incurred, I am not confident enough to aver. The short specimen given of the latter at the end of this work) which accompanies the *third* “ Essay, On the merits and demerits of JOHNSON’S English Dictionary, on language in general, &c. by ADELUNG,” will serve as a tolerable criterion of the execution of the whole.

† If it be objected, that this is no fault of Grammarians, since language is formed and modelled by a whole people, I shall briefly answer; that tradition and custom *alone* do not appear to have any such tendency, as to make a whole nation speak and write jargon, or nonsense, for ever; and consequently, that errors and mistakes ought not to be perpetuated in *elementary* books of instruction.

sense, than the fancy or caprice of the speaker, and subsequently, that of the writer *.

4th. That instead of giving a syntax of speech, or sentences arranged in the most natural order, and still conformable to the premises, as well as to the subsequent conclusions, they adhere to the opposite extreme; by neglecting the *general*, and giving the *special* construction of the individual parts.—This, indeed, is of itself a useful piece of labour, if the rules were not too much crowded upon the tyro; but it by no means deserves the name of a *syntax*, for its object is merely the *inflection* of nouns and verbs, as preparatory to a *General Syntax* †.

5th. That no Grammarian, or Lexicographer, excepting perhaps ADÉLUNG, has accurately and *uniformly* distinguished, both the *moral* and *physical* sense of words—however easy this may appear at first sight—nor the *objective* and *subjective* application of terms and phrases ‡.

As

* This charge cannot, in justice, be levelled at the captivating effusions of Poetry; an art which, from its nature, and the frequent good effects it produces in rousing, like music, the palsied organs of mortals, deserves more deference, than any of the liberal arts; as it is likewise understood to possess a much greater latitude, than all the sister-arts.

† Upon accurate investigation, it must strike even the novice in grammar, that there can be *only two parts* in the nature of speech, which being the *regulators* of all the Data involved in the rest, produce that change of place, or situation, which we express by the term *Syntax*: these *two* unquestionably are the nominative of the *Noun*, with its corresponding *Verb*.—All other parts of speech are, in my opinion, liable to the same modifications, or changes, which characterize a numerous progeny, whose father and mother alone are stable and fixed.

‡ The immortal author of the “Critique of Pure Reason” was, among the Germans, without exception the first, who perceived the *absolute* necessity of this distinction in philosophical inquiries.—In justice to the high rank held by the English and French philosophers, however, I must frankly own, (what I have, in part, already declared in the Preface) that I have not been so happily situated as to examine, with critical accuracy, *their* respective *nomenclatures*. But if I may
rely

As KANT's *Critique of Pure Reason* is the principal elementary work, upon the pillars of which the whole of his System, together with all the works that illustrate it, must either stand, or fall, we shall first explain its *aim* and *moral tendency*, by giving KANT's peculiar definition and division of philosophy, accompanied with *five connected problems*; and in the next place, it will be useful to lay down the *particular contents* of all his works. The former we shall exhibit in the *Synopsis*:* the latter must be the feeble effort of a *literal*, not elegant, translation; and we propose to comprize them in the subsequent *Chronological Analysis*.

I. SYNOPSIS.

A. DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY.

Philosophy is the system of all philosophical, i. e. *discursive* knowledge derived from bare ideas, or notions.—This is the scholastic definition; but, in a cosmological sense, it is the science concerning the relation of all our knowledge to the essential purposes of human reason, (*teleologia rationis humanæ*) and the philosopher is not an architect of reason, but
the

rely upon the information of that learned and sagacious pupil, who condescended to translate the *Synoptical Problems* here stated, with their solutions, as a specimen of his progress in the German,——Dr REID, of Glasgow, was the first among the British Philosophers, who distinguished clearly between the *objective* and *subjective* use of the words, which are employed to express the immediate objects of *sensation* and *perception*.

* Originally digested by Mr JOHN SCHÜLZE, an eminent Divine and Court-Chaplain at Königsberg; a particular friend of KANT's who, on that occasion, congratulated him upon having *fully* entered into the spirit of the *CRITIQUE*; and bestowed upon him every mark of approbation.

the law-giver of it. We cannot, hence, learn philosophy itself; it is philosophizing which ought to be our study.

1. *Philosophical Knowledge*

a.) is *discursive*, as derived from ideas, and opposed to mathematical *intuitive* knowledge, derived from the construction of ideas.

b.) is to be understood *objectively* :

1.—as the prototype for judging upon all the attempts of philosophizing.

2.—as a bare idea of a possible science, which is nowhere given *in concreto*: for where is it? who is in the possession of it? and by what means may it be distinguished from others?

c.) considers particulars only in the general; while mathematical knowledge considers general subjects in the particular, nay, even in the individual.—Those who pretend, that *quality* is the object of philosophy, *quantity* the object of mathematics, have erroneously adopted the effect, instead of the cause.

2. The *scholastic definition of philosophy* denotes a system of knowledge, which we pursue only with a view of reducing it to scientific rules, without any other aim, than that of attaining to a logical perfection of knowledge.—Thus philosophy is merely considered as one of those arts, which may be applied to certain arbitrary purposes; and in this sense the philosopher is an architect of reason.

3. The *cosmological idea of philosophy* implies that, which necessarily concerns every individual.—In this view the philosopher is the legislator of human reason.

4. Among the *essential purposes of human reason*, one is the final

final purpose, and this is the *complete* destination of man. The philosophy which has this purpose for its object, is called Ethics. Hence the ancients always understood by the name philosopher, at the same time, and principally, the Moralist, the Stoic, or him who can govern himself.

5. To *Philosophize*, means to exercise, by certain plain experiments, the talent which reason displays in judging conformably to its general principles.—According to Kant's System, philosophy is divided into, and considered as

1st. *formal* (methodical) *philosophy*, which concerns merely the form of the understanding and reasoning faculties, as well as the general rules of thought, throughout independent of the objects: hence *Logic*, *Canon* for understanding and reasoning.

2d. *material philosophy*, such as is employed in reflecting upon any one object, and again is

A. the *pure*, or the philosophy of pure reason, which depends upon fundamental principles and notions *a priori*. This is,

- a. *Propædæutic*, or *Critique*, which inquires into the faculty of reason with respect to all its pure knowledge *a priori* ;
- b. *Metaphysics in a more extensive sense*, the system of pure reason ; or the collective philosophical knowledge from pure reason, in systematic connection, whether real, or imaginary.—This again comprehends

a.) *Metaphysics of Nature* ; Metaphysics in a more limited sense, that of the speculative use of pure reason, which confines its inquiries to what actually is, or exists. Its component parts are the following four :

- aa. *Ontology*, the system of all ideas and principles

ples, which relate to subjects in general, without proposing any objects of perception.

bb. *Rational Physiology*, which investigates nature, i. e. the complexus (compass) of subjects; whether they be exhibited to the senses, or to any other perceptive faculty. It comprehends 1st, *Rational* (not empirical) *Physics*, treating of material objects, and including every thing that may be known by means of the external senses;—2d, *Rational Psychology*, which considers the subject of the internal sense, mind; and, according to its fundamental notions, the reflecting capacity in general.

cc. *Rational Cosmology*, which employs itself with the internal combination of the objects of experience; but which proceeds beyond the possibility of experience; *general knowledge of the world*, by which nature is considered as an absolute Univerſum.

dd. *Rational Theology*, which investigates the connection subsisting between Nature and a Supreme Being.

b.) *Metaphysics of Morals*, or the practical use of pure reason, which attends to the laws, according to which every thing happens in this, and no other, manner;—*pure morals, Ethics*.

B. The *experimental, practical Philosophy*, which is altogether established upon experience, and again consists of three principal divisions, viz.

1. *Physics*, the experimental doctrine of the material world.

2. *Psychology*, the experimental doctrine of mind.

3. *Anthropology*, the practical doctrine of free-acting man, derived from experience.

Corrolaria.

1. Material Philosophy is, therefore, divided like Mathematics, into *pure* and *applied* (practical).
2. There are, originally, only *two* principal divisions of philosophy, *Logic* and *Metaphysics*; or, according to the plan of the ancient Greeks, *three*; namely, *Logic*, *Physics*, and *Ethics*.

B. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS.

Exordium.

The aim of KANT's *Critique* is no less, than to lead Reason to the true knowledge of itself; to examine the titles, upon which it founds the supposed possession of its metaphysical knowledge, and by means of this examination to mark the true limits, beyond which it cannot venture to speculate, without wandering into the empty region of pure fancy;—an attempt, the bare idea of which sufficiently discovers the philosophic spirit of its author.

In order to acquire a correct notion of the term *Pure Reason*, we must consider it in this point of view.—Every act of judgment, which is not mingled with any *heterogeneous* ingredients, is called *pure*. But particularly every piece of comparative knowledge, which is unmixed with any experience, or sensation, and which consequently is possible altogether a priori, deserves the name of *absolutely pure*; v. g. *Liberty*, *God*, *Immortality*.—Reason, then, is that faculty, which affords to us the principles of comparative knowledge a priori.

Hence

Hence *pure reason* contains the principles of judging upon any thing *absolutely* a priori. The whole compass of those principles, conformably to which all pure judgments a priori can be acquired and carried into effect, might be called an *Organon* of pure reason.—The whole Critique of pure reason, therefore, is established upon this principle, (not *postulate*, nor *petitio principii*, but the result of an appeal to *acts of consciousness*) that there is a free reason independent of all experience and sensation*.

Reason, as the organ of mind *in concreto*, must be considered, both subjectively, and objectively. *Subjective* reason is capable of perpetual increase, by approximation to the *objective* state of it, viz. to the perfect model, (standard).

PROBLEM FIRST.

To determine the nature of the Sensitive Faculty and its distinction from Understanding.

1. The *Sensitive Faculty* consists in the capacity of our Soul to receive immediate representations of objects, merely from being affected by them in this or that way.

2. The representations, which the Sensitive faculty affords to us, are therefore referred to the object which affects us, i. e. they are *Perceptions*.

F 2

3.

* Although M. SELLE, one of KANT's opponents, has endeavoured to prove, in an Essay published in the *Berlin Monthly Magazine*, for December 1784, "that there are no pure ideas of the reasoning faculty, independent of experience;" yet I think it necessary to remind the reader, that all such *negative proofs*, as arise from the *subjective* conviction of an individual, say as little against the validity, or stability, of a philosophical proposition which altogether depends on the manner of exhibiting it to the mind, as the failure of converting the Turks and Jews to the Christian Religion, can furnish any argument to the disadvantage of the latter.

3. All our Perceptions have a twofold form, *Space* and *Time*, as representations which relate to objects, and which are themselves Perceptions, pure Perceptions that, *a priori*, previous to all actual sensation, are discoverable originally in the representing capacity of our Soul, and lie already at the foundation of all our actual sensations, as necessary conditions of their possibility.

4. Hence Space and Time are not something attached to objects themselves, but mere subjective representations *in us*. The Being in Space and Time, consequently extension, impenetrability, succession, change, motion, &c. are therefore not qualities which belong to objects *in themselves*, but representations in our minds, which attach barely to the nature of our Sensitive Faculty. In other words, the motion of matter does not produce representations in us, but is itself mere representation.

5. Hence also we know things merely as they appear to us ; that is, we know only the impressions which they make on our Sensitive Faculty ; but what they may be in themselves, and for other reasonable Beings, is altogether unknown to us.

PROBLEM SECOND.

To investigate the whole store of original notions discoverable in our Understanding, and which lie at the foundation of all our knowledge ; and at the same time to authenticate their true descent, by showing that they are not derived from experience, but are pure productions of the understanding.

1. The perceptions of objects contain, indeed, the matter of knowledge, but are in themselves, *blind* and *dead*, and not knowledge : and our soul is merely passive in regard to them.

2. If these perceptions are to furnish knowledge, the *Understanding* must think of them, and this is possible only through notions (conceptions), which are the peculiar Form of our

Under-

Understanding, in the same manner, as Space and time are the Form of our Sensitive Faculty.

3. These notions are active representations of our understanding-faculty; and as they regard *immediately* the perceptions of objects, they refer to the objects themselves only mediately.

4. They lie in our Understanding, as pure notions a priori, at the foundation of all our knowledge: they are necessary forms, radical notions, Categories, (Predicaments) of which all our knowledge must be compounded: and the Table of them follows.

Quantity: Unity, Plurality, Totality.

Quality: Reality, Negation, Limitation.

Relation: Substance, Cause, Reciprocation.

Modality: Possibility, Existence, Necessity.

5. Now to *think* and to *judge* is the same thing; consequently every notion contains a particular form of judgment concerning objects. There are *four* principal genera of judgments: they are derived from the above four possible functions of the Understanding, each of which contains under it *three* species, namely with respect to

Quantity, they are univessel, particular, singular

Quality, ——— affirmative, negative, infinite

Relation, ——— categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive

Modality, ——— problematical, assertory, apodictical

} Judgments.

6. And thus not only the whole power of our understanding is fathomed out of its own nature, and therefore perfectly a priori; but also, at the same time, the pure descent of our notions from the Understanding; and their perfect independence on all experience, is proved.

PROBLEM THIRD.

To shew in what manner we are entitled to ascribe objective reality

reality to those notions, which are merely something subjective in us ; or in other words, to shew how the understanding is justified in going, as it were, out of itself, and in transferring its notions to things which are external to it, that is, to refer them to objects.

1. Space and time are, as pure perceptions a priori, merely *subjective* ; but as *forms* of our *Sensitive Faculty*, they have a necessary relation to objects of sense,—are necessary Predicates of whatever can be an object of sensation ; and therefore the following synthetical principles a priori are established :

a. Every thing that can be an object of our external senses, so as to be perceived or felt, is in *Space* ; and all the predicates of space, extension, divisibility, &c. *necessarily* belong to it.

b. Every thing that can be an object of our senses in general, whether external or internal, is in *Time* ; and therefore, all the predicates of time, simultaneity, succession, &c. also of *necessity* belong to it.

2. In like manner, all pure notions a priori are, indeed, something merely *subjective* in our Understanding ; but as *forms* of our *Thought* (of the Thinking Faculty), they must likewise relate to all objects of our Sensitive Faculty. Hence the following universal synthetical maxim, a priori, is established.

Every thing which can be an object of possible experience, must not only be in Space and Time ; but to it also must belong *one* of each class of the pure notions of the understanding.

3. Our notions, therefore, receive relation to objects, or *objective reality*, only through a third mediating representation a priori, which has something in common with the perception, as well as with the notion, and by means of which, therefore, the union of the Notion with the Object becomes possible.

possible. This, in reality, is *Time*, which KANT calls the Schema of Notions *; for it has something common with all
per-

* The Schemata are indetermined sensualized representations which the imagination places under pure notions of the Understanding; and conformably to the Number of the Categories, they may be exhibited in the following Table :

1. QUANTITY, i. e. Series of time.

Number.

2. QUALITY, i. e. things contained in time.

Reality, i. e. existence, sensation in time, time filled,

Negation, i. e. non-existence, absence of feeling, vacuum in time.

Limitation, i. e. transition from feeling through its various degrees, till it has vanished, or vice versa.

3. RELATION, i. e. arrangement in time, relation of feelings to each other in time.

Substantiality, i. e. the real, in so far as it is permanent in, and with, time—the substratum of all changes: and accidents, i. e. the real in so far as it changes.

Casuality, i. e. succession of different feelings in time, conformably to a rule.

Community, i. e. simultaneity of feeling, according to rule.

4. MODALITY, i. e. the modes, in which an object belongs to time.

Possibility, i. e. the representation of a thing, conformably to the conditions of any one time—in general.

Actuality, i. e. the representation of a thing, in a determinate time.

Necessity, i. e. the representation of a thing at all times.

(FINIS)

perceptions, because it is itself a perception a priori, and it has something common with all notions a priori; because it is a Form of all Sensations and Representations a priori. The uniting of a pure Notion with an object is, therefore, possible merely through time as its Schema.

4. Through means of this Schema, according to the Table given in the preceeding note, all synthetical axioms may now be exactly determined a priori, and they are the following:

Axiom of Quantity, (or of perception). "All phenomena in perception are exhibited under the notion of extension."

Axiom of Quality, (or of the anticipation of observation). "In all phenomena, sensation, and the reality which corresponds to it in the object, have *intensive quantum*, or a degree; that is, every reality can, through infinite gradations, become less and less, till it be $= 0$."

Axioms of Relation, (or Analogies of experience).

- a. "In all phenomena there is something permanent, i. e. Substance; and something shifting, or accidents."
- b. Every event has a cause.
- c. All substances, so far as they are co-existent, stand in reciprocation with each other.

Axioms of Modality, (or Postulates).

- a. That which agrees with the form of experience (according to Perception and Notion) is possible really, not merely logically.
- b. That which is connected with the matter of experience, i. e. with sensation, is actual.
- c. That which is connected with what is actual, agreeably to the universal conditions of experience, is (exists) necessary.

PROBLEM FOURTH.

To determine by these means the true bounds of human reason, consequently to explain positively, how far our reason can reach through mere speculation, where ; on the contrary, our proper knowledge ceases, and nothing but faith and hope remain.

1. All the elementary notions, of which our Understanding is capable, are exactly those which the foregoing Table of them indicates, so that there are neither more nor less of them in number.

2. All these elementary notions are applicable merely to sensible objects, and hence they serve only for determining the necessary predicates of every possible perception. From this the following consequences result.

a. We cannot apply our notions to the most perfect Being ; consequently we cannot prove that he has extension, or qualities ; that he is a substance, a cause of other things ; that he is possible or actual, or necessary.

b. Even as to the objects of our sensitive faculty, all our elementary notions can teach us none of the predicates that belong to them in themselves, that is, to their Essence ; but all predicates which, through these notions, can be ascribed to them, concern merely their perception, and the union of the varieties in it, consequently the-way merely, in which they *appear* to us. Things in respect of what they are in themselves, are no objects, either of our senses or of our understanding.

c. Hence the three *cosmological* questions are mere chimeras, viz.

Whether the world, in point of space, be finite or infinite ?

Whether it has had a beginning, or has existed from eternity ?

G

Whether

Whether the number of parts, of which matter consists, be finite or infinite?

d. But as the understanding cannot assert, or prove, any thing of objects that come not under the cognizance of the senses, as little can it deny, or refute them, by any argument that has even the appearance of validity. And hence arises the (sublime) presupposition and belief of a Supreme Being, and of an immortality of the Soul; because there are certain necessary purposes of human nature, moral laws, which require this presupposition.

e. Yet though we have sufficient *subjective* grounds for presupposing and determining certain supersensible objects; we have not, through such grounds, the least knowledge, how these objects may be constituted in themselves; but we try to determine them, only by analogy.

3. All the Synthetical Axioms of our Understanding, by means of which we are able to judge of objects, are *exactly* those which the foregoing Table of them indicates, and we know, therefore, a priori, the whole foundation of all the knowledge of which our Understanding is capable.

4. But all these axioms of our Understanding have objective validity, only so far as the possibility of experience depends on them; and they serve merely to determine the necessary connection of sensible things with each other. It may hence be justly said, that our Understanding, instead of first learning its axioms from nature, rather through them, a priori, prescribes laws to nature; and that on this account it is the *true legislature of nature*, so that, without these axioms of our Understanding, all regularity and order among the objects of sense, consequently the possibility of experience itself, would cease. Hence, too, as soon as we wish to rise with the axioms of our Understanding to supersensible objects beyond nature, we always make an unjustifiable use of them.

5. And as our *Understanding* can neither form a notion of supersensible objects, nor judge of them ; as little can our *Reason* discover by inference any supersensible object ; consequently, no Syllogism can lead us to new objects, which lie without the sphere of possible experience.

6. All notions which our reason can form of something, that is absolutely *unconditionate*, are therefore mere *Ideas*, whose objective validity can be proved through no species of Syllogism.

7. Hence the Axiom, “ If the conditionate thing be given, the absolutely unconditionate thing is also given,” is nothing but a subjective logical Maxim of Reason, i. e. a Maxim which regulates the train of reasoning in the Mind itself.

8. As now the whole of speculative Cosmology, Psychology and Theology entirely rests on this Axiom ; these three Sciences, as far as concerns their speculative parts, are nothing but Systems of fallacies *. Ontology, also, completely fails, and must be changed into a bare Analysis of the notions of our Understanding.—The whole body of Metaphysics, then, must be confined to the Metaphysics of Nature.

PROBLEM FIFTH.

To solve the riddle, why our Reason is so irresistibly inclined to venture with its speculations beyond the bounds of possible knowledge ;

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* From what is here said, the reader may be led to suppose, that KANT altogether denies the possibility of proving the existence of a Supreme Being, the immortality of the Soul, &c. This supposition, however, would be ill-founded ; for Kant distinctly and repeatedly admits the existence of these supersensible objects ; but maintains, that we arrive at the knowledge of them through a process of practical, not speculative, Reason. This process he endeavours to vindicate and illustrate, by the most appropriate examples, in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, the contents of which the Reader will find in our CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS.

knowledge ; and hence to detect the fallacy, by which it is in this respect involuntarily deceived.

1. The ground of this irresistible bias lies in the nature of our Reason itself. Reason cannot be satisfied with the original Notions and Axioms of the Understanding alone ; but through categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive conclusions, it attains to the *Idea* of a simple substance, of an absolute Univerſum, of an absolute exiſtent perfection in the number of real parts of matter, of an absolute perfection in the ſeries of cauſes, of an absolute neceſſary Being, and of a Substance that poſſeſſes all realities.

2. Conſequently the Idea of the abſolutely unconditionate thing has indeed perfect *ſubjective* validity, and is in no manner an arbitrary fiction : Reason forces it on us neceſſarily. But hence it does not follow, that this Idea has alſo *objective* validity. Reason commits a very concealed, indeed, but undeniable ſophiſm, when from mere Notions it forms the ſynthetical Axiom, “ that, if the conditionate thing be given, ſo muſt be alſo the abſolutely unconditionate.”

3. As the Idea of abſolutely unconditionate objects is indiſpenſibly required by our Reason, it is very natural, that even the acuteſt philoſopher ſhould not only feel in himſelf an unavoidable bias to ſuch fallacious conclusions ; but alſo, that it muſt be very difficult for him to diſencumber himſelf from them completely, though he be fortunate enough to diſcover the deception.

Scholion.

Thus, through the CRITIQUE of KANT, all theſe five problems, concerning the poſſibility and the limits of pure rational diſcoveries, have been thoroughly ſolved, but in a way which perhaps no philoſopher had ſuppoſed. According to the reſult

of this *Critique*, the possibility of pure rational knowledge, such as Metaphysics *can* furnish, *has been* established. But that knowledge extends no further, than to the world of sense, consequently only to the universal and necessary laws of nature. A demonstrably certain System of Metaphysics is indeed possible, but a very different one from what we have had hitherto, which, as its name indicates, sets out with propositions for judging dogmatically upon things discoverable beyond the region of Physics, i. e. without the limits of Nature.—If the principles above delineated be just, the *only possible* Metaphysics, so far as we are entitled to proceed dogmatically, are the *Metaphysics of Nature*.—Consequently the Critique of Kant considers all the Metaphysical Systems, which have been hitherto proposed, as false ware, and maintains that we have as yet no just Metaphysics. His own work is important and profound, and deserves to be carefully examined by those who are conversant in such studies. Whatever the result of this examination may be, philosophy will undoubtedly gain by it: and although the Critique of Kant should not stand the test of future, perhaps more successful researches, it will nevertheless form a remarkable epoch in the history of Metaphysical Science.

II. CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS.

Exordium.

In venturing upon this essential part of the Elements, which are designed to afford a concise, though comprehensive view of the diversified labours of KANT, I deem it a duty incumbent upon me to state that, both his systematic works *, as well as those

* That these may be more easily distinguished from others, I have arranged them by a second number enclosed in ().

those which treat upon general subjects of philosophy, are here *successively* submitted to the consideration of the reader.

I must however remark that, consistent with the plan and extent of these *Elements*, the review of so great a variety of subjects cannot abound in Criticism; but I hope it will be found the more complete in the *analytical* part of it, comprehending *every* subject * treated by the illustrious author, during a period now exceeding half a century.

Though my abilities—the limited compass of which is best known to myself—were adequate to do the works of KANT that justice in reviewing them critically, to which they are certainly entitled; I would still hesitate to engage upon an undertaking, obviously not the most grateful, and in my relative situation, as a former pupil to the most renowned Professor in Europe, perhaps unbecoming. Hence I shall content myself with the humble province of briefly commenting upon the aim of every individual publication, and then of exhibiting the contents of each through a precise translation.

The difficulty of understanding the peculiar terms and expressions of KANT must, I have reason to hope, in great measure vanish; if the reader, in every instance, with patient and diligent application, resorts to the *Glossary*.

In order to characterize the early genius of the author, who, in the twenty-second year of his age, published an Essay upon one of the most abstruse subjects of inquiry, I shall conclude these preliminaries with the singular *Motto* prefixed to this juvenile production:

Nihil

* Those Essays, which have not been separately printed, and the most of which were published in the *Monthly Magazine of Berlin*, I could not procure from Germany; but I have still introduced them in this review, merely for the sake of completeness, upon the authority of *Prof. WILL of Altdorf*, and *Prof. SCHMID of Jena*.

Nihil magis præstandum est, quam ne pecorum ritu sequamur antecedentium gregem, pergentes, non *qua* eundum est, sed *qua* *itur*.

SENECA *de vita beata* ; Cap. I.

- I. *Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte*.—Reflections upon the true computation of living (moving) powers. Königsberg, 220 pp. large 8vo. with two plates, 1746.

After having paid handsome and due compliments to his meritorious countrymen LEIBNITZ, WOLF, HERRMANN, BERNOULLI, BULLFINGER, and many other eminent philosophers, the young author examines the different theories and proofs advanced “on the living (inherent) powers of bodies,” and endeavours to shew, that *their* notions on this intricate subject were far from being correct, and that the dissensions prevailing among them arose chiefly from having, each of them, considered the subject in a different point of view. Thus their understandings were misled by paying an undue regard, partly to the *obstacles overcome by weight*; partly to *matter as acted upon, or moved, by weight*; partly to the *pressure suffered by elastic bodies*; and finally to the *velocities arising from compound motion*.—He attacks LEIBNITZ most severely, while he enters upon a fundamental inquiry into the origin of his theory concerning the moving powers. It appears obvious to KANT, that LEIBNITZ had been led to this theory, by implicitly proceeding on the known rule from which DESCARTES explains the nature of the lever. Prior to LEIBNITZ, the world had admitted the simple proposition of DESCARTES, “that the mere velocity of bodies, even such as are in actual motion, serves as a rule for ascertaining their power.” But LEIBNITZ suddenly roused the reasoning powers of man, by proposing a new law which, since that period, has offered rich materials for discussion to the most learned and acute. DESCARTES had computed the powers of bodies in motion by *mere* velocity. But LEIBNITZ adopted the *square of velocities* in this computation.

Whatever

Whatever merit may be due, from this CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS, to the Recorder of KANT'S COLLECTIVE WORKS, and from having engaged in a task—perhaps the most toilsome in life;—I have still to lament the impossibility, or rather the impracticability of giving the respective contents of each work at full length; especially when I consider, both the limited size of these ELEMENTS, and the almost boundless region of KANT'S speculations.

Nothing, therefore, but the well-founded hope, that no reasonable man will expect to find in these CONTENTS more, or less, than I have promised,—can support me in this laborious undertaking;—

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER FIRST. *Of the power of bodies, in general.* § 1. Every mechanical body possesses an *essential* power. 2. This power of bodies LEIBNITZ expressed by the common name, *effective power*. 3. It ought to be called *vis motrix* (moving power). 4. On the method of explaining motion from the effective powers in general. 5. Of the difficulties arising from the theory of reciprocal operation of body and mind, if we attribute to the former no other power, than the *vis motrix*. 6. Of the obstacles thence arising in the explanation of the manner, in which the mind affects the body; of the method of removing them, if we adopt a common *vis activa*. 7. There may exist things, the presence of which cannot be at all demonstrated. 8. It is not improbable, in a strict metaphysical sense, that there may be more than *one* world. 9. If bodies, or substances, had no power to operate *externally*, there would be neither *extension* nor *space*. 10. The *triple* dimension of space is probably derived from the law, according to which the powers of substances affect each other. 11. Of the condition which renders the existence of a plurality of worlds probable. 12. Some Metaphysicians maintain, that bodies, by means of their (peculiar) powers, incline towards motion in all directions. 13, 14. Two objections against this opinion: a.) That the moving body does not advance in an equal ratio with the body moved; b.) That the effort towards motion, which substances manifest in all directions, must have a certain degree of intensity; for it cannot be infinite, and a finite (limited) exertion, without a certain degree of effort, involves a contradiction. 15. Motion must be considered to be of *two* different kinds. 16. Motion of the *first* kind is analogous to dead (inert) pressure. 17. 18. 19. Motion of the second kind presupposes a power, which corresponds with the square of velocity.

CHAPTER SECOND. *Inquiry into the principles, upon which the adherents of LEIBNITZ explain the living powers.* § 20, 21 BUELFINGER'S advice in settling differences between parties 22 LEIBNITZ'S and DESCARTES'S method of computing powers. 23. *First* error of LEIBNITZ, in asserting "if a body is in actual motion,

its power is equal to the square of its velocity." 24. Actual motion is that, which is not merely at the point of beginning, but during which a certain time has elapsed. This intermediate time, between the beginning of motion and the moment in which the body moves, properly constitutes what is called *actual motion*. 25. Second error of Leibnitz, "that the time consumed during motion is the true and only character of living power, and that from this alone the difference of computing dead and living powers must result." 26. Further proof against Leibnitz, from the law of continuity. 27. The time elapsed during motion, consequently the reality of motion, is not the true criterion of computing the living power of bodies. 28, 29. Mathematics cannot prove the reality of living powers. 30. Leibnitz was first misled in the computation of living powers, by Descartes's explanation of the lever. 31. HERRMANN's assertion, that the powers are in proportion to the heights, to which they may rise. 32. Refutation of this assertion. 33. The followers of Descartes commit the same error. 34, 35. LICHTSCHEID's doubts upon this head removed. 36, 37, 38. An instance which proves, that in the computation of power arising from weight, time must be necessarily taken into account. 39. Summary of all the proofs derived from the motion of elastic bodies. 40. The Leibnitzians refute their own conjectures, through the Systems of Mechanics which they establish. 41. Herrmann's statement, respecting the repulsion of three elastic bodies, examined. 42, 43. The origin of the fallacy in the reasoning, by which he established his conclusion. 44. This conclusion was unknown to *Mad. de CHASTELET*. 45, 46, 47. JURIN's objection concerning the reciprocal pulsion of two elastic and unequal bodies;—BERNOULLI's answer to this objection, in comparing it with the pressure suffered by elastic bodies;—his ideas on the subject are refuted by his *own* premises, which confirm KANT's opinion. 48. Defence of the living powers, supported by the constant balance of power in the world. 49, 50. Two different ways of explaining this assertion. 51. The source of Leibnitz's hypothesis relative to the preservation of a uniform power, with proposals for settling this controversy, and a conclusive answer to *his* assertion. 52. According to the law established by LEIBNITZ, the power exercised in the touch, between a small and a larger elastic body, is the same before as after this contact. 53. The fallacy of this observation itself refutes the theory of the living powers, as maintained by the Leibnitzians. 54. This appears still more obvious, by inverting the case; if, namely, a larger elastic body is brought into contact with a smaller one. 55. Calculation affords proofs of the Cartesian law, that "if a larger body touches a smaller one, there remains an equal proportion of power." 56. The power, with which a smaller body recoils from a larger one, is called *minus*. 57. *Mad. de CHASTELET* has very improperly ridiculed this determination, which *M. de MAIRAN* first proposed. 58. The Leibnitzians shrink from the inquiry into the living powers, by means of the pulsion observed in *unelastic* bodies. 59. The latter is more decisive in determining the living powers, than the resistance of elastic bodies. 60, 61. The Leibnitzians give a frivolous answer to these objections, by saying, that "in the repulsion of unelastic bodies, one half of the power is consumed in the impression

made upon the parts of these bodies." 62. Reply *first*: because this is a mechanical, not a mathematical effect of bodies. 63. Reply *second*: because we have right to call a body unelastic, tho' it be perfectly hard. 64. Reply *third*: the impression made upon the parts, offers no argument for asserting, that a part of the power of unelastic bodies is lost by the resistance exerted on their side. 65. Reply *fourth*: the degree of hardness in unelastic bodies, and the degree of power exerted in the contact, must yet be determined by the Leibnitzians. 66. The resistance of unelastic bodies entirely destroys the living powers. 67—70. General proof, that the concussion of elastic bodies must, in every instance, evince the falsity of supposing living powers;—that in the percussion of elastic bodies we ought to consider only the *incipient* velocity of the body *percussed*. 71—77. Examination of the proofs of the living powers derived from compound motion: particularly BUELFINGER's, which is refuted in several ways. 78. The straight power in the diagonal line does not correspond with the amount of power exerted towards the lateral parts. 79. In the computation of power by LEIBNITZ, the amount of it, in an oblique direction, is equal to the diagonal power; but in that by DESCARTES, the former frequently is infinitely greater than the latter. 80—83. A new case towards the refutation of living powers; viz. "that a body moving in a circle produces the same effect, with respect to gravity, as if it reclined upon an oblique surface;—and that a circular moving body, in every finite measure of time, produces the effect of a finite power, even against the obstacles of gravity." 84. DESCARTES removes this difficulty by his method of computing power. 85. Another contradiction in this computation by the square; for every one agrees "that the computed power of velocity resulting from the multiplication with itself, according to the right angle, must have infinitely more force, than that which is simply expressed by the measure of velocity; and that it has the same relation to this, as the surface has to the line." 86. The case stated by BERNOULLI, concerning the elastic power of four similar springs, is here refuted. 87—90. MAIRAN's objection against the statement of HERRMANN; the utility of the method adopted by the former; its tendency to prevent certain palpable mistakes, which have long remained concealed. 91. BUELFINGER's distinctions, by which he endeavours to elude the objection of MAIRAN, are settled by this method. 92, 93. A singular compound case by LEIBNITZ, which rests upon fallacious reasoning.

"As BERNOULLI, HERRMANN and WOLF, the admirers of LEIBNITZ, have not, in the usual manner, informed us—that *nothing* equals this proof in point of invention and (apparent) strength.—I am inclined to think, 'says Kant,' that "so great a man as LEIBNITZ could not err, without gaining reputation by the very idea, that misled him into this error." I cannot, upon this occasion, forget "the words of HECTOR in VIRGIL:

————— Si Pergamia dextra
Defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent.

Virg. Aeneid.

94, 95. The power, which the body A has acquired by the arrangement of a machine

machine, is not the effect of power produced by the body B. 96. The same is confirmed from the law of continuity. 97. The whole extent of the sufficient reason in the preceding position. 98. The only difficulty, that still prevails in the Leibnitzian argument, is answered. 99. PAPIN's evasive objection is weak and untenable, viz. "*Quomodo autem per translationem totius potentia corporis A in corpus B, juxta Cartesium, obtineri possit motus perpetuus evidentissime demonstrat, atque ita Cartesianos ad absurdum reductos arbitratur. Ego autem et motum perpetuum absurdum esse fateor, et Cl. Vir. demonstrationem ex supposita translatione esse legitimam.*" And after having, in this positive manner, declared himself against that important position of DESCARTES, he seeks for shelter, in disputing the premises of his adversary; and in challenging him, to solve this Gordian knot. The following words discover his opinion: *Sed Hypothesis ipsius possibilitatem translationis nimirum totius potentia ex corpore A in corpus B pernego, etc. (Ad. Erudit. 1691. page 9)*—100—101. LEIBNITZ's reply to PAPIN is equally inconsistent, and KANT believes that the former has written these words in good earnest: "*Cum Florentia essem, dedi amico aliam adhuc demonstrationem, pro possibilitate translationis virium detalium, &c. corpore majore in minus quiescens, prorsus affinem iis ipsis, quo Cl. Papinus ingenuissime pro me juvando excogitavit, pro quibus gratias debeo, imo et ago, sinceritate ejus dignus.*"—Proof, that a quadruple body may communicate to a single body four degrees of velocity by means of percussion upon a lever;—how PAPIN ought to have reasoned against LEIBNITZ; all the arguments for proving the entity of living powers against the computation of Descartes have failed; no hopes are left to reconcile them. 102. The principal arguments of the Leibnitzians refuted. 103, 104. WOLF's argument, and his principal axiom: "if a body has passed through the same space; it has also produced the same innocuous effect." 105. Another axiom of the *Wolfian Scholastica*: "As spaces (objects of space), in the act of uniform motion, bear a compound relation to the velocities and times; so the innocuous effects correspond with the masses, times, and velocities of bodies." Upon this axiom, WOLF establishes the following erroneous theorem: *Actiones quibus idem effectus prodantur, sunt et celeritates.* 106. We are not yet in the possession of a *System of Dynamics*. 107, 108. The argument of MUSCHENBROEK examined. 109. A new case for the confirmation of the Cartesian method of computing powers. 110. The doubts of Leibnitz solved by Jurin. 111, 112. *Mad. de Chasfelet's* frivolous objection against Jurin's argument exposed. 113. RICHIER's objections share the same fate.—The author concludes this Chapter with some supplementary notes and illustrations, in which he unfolds the following particulars: (a) Why the undetermined idea of finite time, also includes the portion of time infinitely small? (b) Leibnitz's method of computing powers cannot even be admitted under the condition of finite (limited) velocity. (c) Why time must necessarily enter into the computation of the obstacles occasioned by gravity.

CHAPTER THIRD. *A view of a new method of computing the living powers; being the only true measure of natural powers.*—§ 114. That law, which has been found inapplicable in *Mathematics*, may nevertheless apply to *Natural Philosophy*. 115. Distinction between *mathematical* and *natural* bodies, and between the laws relative

to both. 116. Velocity affords no just idea of power. 117. There would be no power, if there were no effort to preserve the *status in se*; illustration of the idea of *intension*. 118. If intension be comparable with a *point*, power resembles a line, namely that of velocity. 119. If intension be finite, i. e. like a line, power is comparable with a *square*. 120. A body, that manifests an internal effort to preserve its motion free and constant, has a power analogous to the square of velocity. 121. A body cannot acquire its living power from without. 122. There is an infinite number of intermediate degrees between dead and living power;—the latter can arise only in a finite time, after the beginning of motion. 123. That state, in which the power of bodies is not yet *living* (evolved), but is in a progressive crisis, KANT terms the *vivification*. 124, 125. According to a new estimation of powers, a body that preserves its velocity, in free motion, in *infinitum* undiminished, possesses living power, i. e. such a power as can be estimated by the square of velocity. 126. As there are free motions, there are likewise living powers.—Mathematics admit no free motions. 127. An easier method of applying these reflections to advantage. 128. BERNOUILLI was not unacquainted with these ideas, "*Vis viva*," says he, "*est aliquid reale et substantiale, quod per se subsistit, et quantum in se est, non dependit ab alio* : ————— *Vis mortua non est aliquid absolutum, et per se durans*, &c. 129. The living powers are of an accidental nature." 130, 131. Experience confirms the successive *vivification*. 132, 133. Vivification is not applicable to all velocities in general;—application of this rule to motion, in a resisting medium. 134, 135. Whether vivification and free motion, in all the higher degrees of velocity, are possible in *infinitum*. 136—138. The living power may in part vanish, without having produced any effect. 139, 140. The phenomena of those bodies which overcome gravity, neither manifest any living power, nor do they militate against it. 141. Soft bodies do not operate with their collective power. 142, 143. Query: whether the effect of bodies, without distinction, is proportional to the mass of their living power. 144, 145. The mass, in which a body can produce effects proportional to its living power, must be determined; smaller masses, under a certain size, cannot produce that effect. 146, 147. Fluid bodies operate in proportion to the square of velocity. 148—151. The motions of elastic bodies are inconsistent with the computation of Leibnitz, but they agree with that of Kant. 152, 153. Mechanical proof of the living powers, by MUSCHENBROEK. 154, 155. A spring of equal elasticity communicates a greater degree of power to a larger body than to a smaller one. 156—158. Whence the squares of velocities of cylinders are in an inverse ratio to the masses. 159—161. In the effect of gravity, time ought to be computed;—soft substances are of a very different nature. 162. The force of resistance of soft matter takes place with finite velocity.

II. *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte, oder Theorie des Himmels, nach Newtonischen Grundsätzen.* A general history of nature, or theory of the heavens, upon Newtonian principles. 8vo. Koenigsberg. 1755.

- III. *Principiorum metaphysicorum nova dilucidatio.* 4to. 1755.
- IV. *Dissertatio de principiis primis cognitionis humanæ.* 4to. Regiomonti. 1755.
- V. *Monadologia physica.* 4to. 1756.
- VI. *Geschichte der merkwürdigsten Vorfälle des Erdbebens, welches am Ende des 1755 sten Jahres einen grossen Theil der Erde erschütteret hat.*—History of the most remarkable events produced by the earthquake, which convulsed a great part of the globe, towards the end of the year 1755. 4to. Koenigsberg, 1756.
- VII. *Neuer Lehrbegriff der Bewegung und Ruhe, und der damit verknüpften Erfahrungen in der Naturwissenschaft.*—New theory of motion and rest, together with an account of the experiments relative to them in Natural Philosophy. 4to. Koenigsberg. 1758.
- VIII. *Betrachtungen über den Optimismus.*—Reflections upon Optimism. 4to. 1759.
- IX. *Entwurf und Ankündigung eines Collegii der physischen Geographie, nebst einer Untersuchung: ob die Westwinde in unsern Gegenden darum feucht sind, weil sie über ein grosses Meer streichen?*—A sketch and annunciation of a course of lectures on physical geography; together with an inquiry whether the westerly winds are for this reason moist in our climate, because they blow over a great sea. 4to. Koenigsberg. 1759.
- X. *Erweis der falschen Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren.*—The false subtleties of the four syllogistical figures proved. 8vo. 1762.
- XI. *Versuch, den Begriff der negativen Grössen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen.*—An attempt towards introducing the idea of negative magnitudes into philosophy. 1763.
- XII. *Einzig möglicher Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration*
des

des Daseyns Gottes. The only possible method of proving the existence of the Deity. 8vo. Koenigsberg. 1763.

XIII. *Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen.* Observations upon the effect of the Beautiful and Sublime. 8vo. Koenigsberg. 1764. 2d Edit. 1770.

XIV. *Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik.* Dreams of a Fanatic, illustrated by dreams in Metaphysics. 8vo. 1764.

XV. *Abhandlung über die Evidenz in Metaphysischen Wissenschaften; die bey der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften das Accessit erhalten hat, und mit Moses Mendelsohn's Preisschrift zugleich erschienen ist.* A Treatise on Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences, &c. 8vo. Berlin. 1764.

XVI. *Anmerkungen zur Erläuterung der Theorie der Winde.* Remarks serving to illustrate the theory of the winds. 4to. 1765.

Of these works, the reader will scarcely require a detailed account; for the most of them, though several times reprinted, have become very scarce. They are indeed, in some degree, connected with the following systematic works of the author; but as Professor Kant has not strictly adopted that method of demonstration, which he *first* proposed in the publication stated under No. XII. viz. "The only possible method of proving the existence of the Deity," I considered it as an unprofitable task to translate the Indexes belonging to these respective works; though it were in my power to procure them from Germany. For the same reason, I presume, Mr. Nitsch has remarked in his late excellent publication, "A general and introductory view of Prof. Kant's principles concerning man, the world, and the Deity;" that the work above alluded to, No. XII, does not constitute any part of the Kantian System, as the first edition of it was published ten years (or from the first Edition of it, eighteen years) before that system was completed.

XVII. (1) *De Mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis.* Dissertatio pro loco professionis Log. et Metaph.

taph. ordinariæ rite sibi vindicando; quam exigentibus statutis academicis publice tuebitur IMMANUEL KANT.—*Regiomonti*; in auditori maximo, horis matutinis et pomeridianis consuetis; Die XX. Aug. MDCCLXX.

SECTIO I. *De notione mundi generatim.*—Momenta, in mundi definitione attendenda, hæc sunt: 1. *Materia* (in sensu transcendentali) h. e. *partes*, quæ hic sumuntur esse *substantiæ*. 2. *Forma* quæ consistit in substantiarum *coordinatione*, non *subordinatione*. 3. *Universitas* quæ est omnitudo compartium *absoluta*.

SECTIO II. *De sensibilibus atque intelligibilibus discrimine generatim.*—*Sensualitas* est *receptivitas* subjecti, per quam possibile est, ut status ipsius repræsentativus objecti alicujus præsentia certo modo afficiatur. *Intelligentia* (*rationalitas*) est *facultas* subjecti, per quam, quæ in sensus ipsius per qualitatem suam, incurrere non possunt, sibi repræsentare valet.

SECTIO III. *De principiis formæ Mundi sensibilis.*—*De TEMPORE.* 1. *Idea Temporis* non oritur sed *supponitur*, a sensibus. 2. *Idea Temporis* est *singularis*, non *generalis*: *Tempus* enim quodlibet non cogitatur, nisi tanquam pars unius ejusdem temporis immensi. 3. *Idea* itaque temporis est *intuitus*, et quoniam ante omnem sensationem concipitur, tanquam conditio respectuum in sensibilibus obviatorum, est *intuitus*, non *sensualis*, sed *purus*. 4. *Tempus* est *quantum continuum* et legum continui in mutationibus universi principium. 5. *Tempus non est objectivum aliquid et reale*, nec substantia, nec accidens, nec relatio, sed *subjectiva conditio* per naturam mentis humanæ necessaria, quælibet sensibilia, certa lege sibi coordinandi, et *intuitus purus*. 6. *Tempus* est conceptus verissimus, et, per omnia possibilia sensuum objecta, in-infinitum patens, intuitivæ repræsentationis conditio. 7. *Tempus* itaque est *principium formale Mundi sensibilis* absolute primum.—*De SPATIO.* A. Conceptus spatii non abstrahitur a sensationibus externis. B. Conceptus spatii est *singularis representatio omnia in se comprehendens*, non *sub se* continens notio abstracta et communis. C. Conceptus spatii itaque est *intuitus purus*; cum sit conceptus singularis, sensationibus non constatus, sed omnis sensationis externæ forma fundamentalis. D. *Spacium non est aliquid objectivi et realis*, nec substantia, nec accidens, nec relatio; sed *subjectivum et ideale et a natura*

tura mentis stabili lege proficiscens, veluti schema, omnia omnino externe sensa sibi coordinandi. E. Quanquam *conceptus spatii*, ut objectivi alicujus et realis entis vel affectionis, sit imaginarius, nihilo tamen secius, *respective ad sensibilia quæcunque*, non solum est *verissimus*, sed et omnis veritatis in sensualitate externa fundamentum.

SECTIO IV. *De principio formæ mundi intelligibilis.*

SECTIO V. *De methodo circa sensitiva et intellectualia in Metaphysicis.*

Concerning the last two Sections, I cannot omit mentioning, that an abstract of them could not be rendered intelligible to the reader, without stating likewise the illustrations of the different positions, at full length. Of this detail, the present sketch will not admit; especially as the principles, resulting from the disquisitions contained in these two Sections, have been already expounded in the *five problems*, which constitute the principal part of the present *Elements*; and which, I have reason to hope, will afford a comprehensive, though succinct, view of KANT'S CRITIQUE.—No further apology will be required by the learned, that the preceding extract from the author's *Inaugural Dissertation* has been given in his own words, in the original Latin; for, to translate this into English, might be considered as an insult offered to the literati of this country.—With respect to the subsequent works, it must be remembered, that our object is merely to exhibit the contents of those, which could be procured from Germany, during the limited intercourse with that country, and to define the most difficult and abstruse terms in the *Glossary*, which concludes this publication.

XVIII. (2) *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Critique of Pure Reason. 8vo. Riga. 1781. Second Edition improved, 1787. Third Edition 1790. Fourth Edition, 1794. pp. 884, and xlv pages Preface.

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dental illusion. II. Of Pure Reason being the seat of transcendental illusion. a.) Of Reason in general. b.) Of the logical use of reason. c.) Of the pure use of reason. Book I. Of the notions afforded by Pure Reason. *Seçt.* I. Of ideas in general. II. Of transcendental ideas. III. System of transcendental ideas. Book II. Of the dialectic conclusions of Pure Reason. *Chap.* I. Of the false conclusions of Pure Reason, respecting their form (*paralogismi*). Of the antinomy of Pure Reason. *Seçt.* I. System of the cosmological ideas. II. Antithesis of Pure Reason. III. Of the interest of reason in this contest with itself. IV. Of the transcendental problems of Pure Reason, in so far as they must necessarily be solved. V. Sceptical exhibition of the cosmological questions, through all four transcendental ideas. VI. Transcendental Idealism, being the key to the solution of cosmological Dialectic. VII. Critical decision of the cosmological contest, into which reason falls with itself. VIII. Regulative principle of Pure Reason, with respect to the cosmological ideas. IX. Of the empirical use of the regulative principle of reason, with respect to all cosmological ideas.—1. Solution of the cosmological idea respecting the totality of the composition of the phenomena of a whole universe. 2. Solution of the cosmological idea respecting the totality of division of a given whole in perception.—Concluding remark on the solution of the transcendental ideas in Mathematics; and previous remark on the solution of the transcendental ideas in Dynamics. 3. Solution of the cosmological ideas respecting the totality of deriving the events of the world from their causes.—On the possibility of causality by the idea of liberty, as combined with the general law of physical necessity.—Illustration of the cosmological idea of a liberty, that is connected with the general laws of physical necessity. 4. Solution of the cosmological idea respecting the totality of the dependence of the phenomena, according to the reality of their existence in general. *Chap.* III. The *Prototype* of Pure Reason, i. e. an idea of reason *in concreto*. *Seçt.* I. Of the prototype in general. II. Of the transcendental prototype. III. Of the arguments of speculative reason, to conclude the existence of a highest Being. IV. Of the impossibility of an ontological proof of the existence of God. V. Of the impossibility of a cosmological

mbological proof of the existence of God. VI. Of the impossibility of a physico-theological proof. VII. Critique of all Theology from speculative principles of reason.—Of the final purpose of the natural Dialectic of human reason.

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Although we have already given the substance of this work in the *Problems*, which are exhibited in the foregoing part of these Elements; yet in a matter of such importance as the present attempt of KANT actually is, we do not hesitate to insert here another exposition of his principles, so that the reader may acquire a complete analytical view of their origin.

In order to trace the principles of all human knowledge and judgment, from what source both may arise, Kant deemed it incumbent upon the enquirer, to institute an accurate analysis of the intuitive faculty of man. The chief object of this inquiry was, 1, to separate the notion we have of the *intuitive faculty*, from all other notions connected with it; 2, to lay aside, or to abstract from, the concomitant and accidental characters of it, and to retain in this notion merely those characters, without which no intuitive faculty can at all be conceived: thus he obtained a general notion of the intuitive faculty of man; i. e. such as consists of no foreign ingredients. This faculty is the attribute of every man, it is given him in his own personal consciousness, and the reality of it cannot be proved otherwise than by an appeal to this consciousness. The existence of such a faculty has never been called in question, it is granted by all parties, and hence it is to be considered as a fair point, from which the philosopher may begin his inquiries.—To premise a definition of the intuitive faculty, is by no means ne-

cessary; for its reality will be sufficiently proved, if the constituent parts and characters produced of it, be of such a nature as can be discovered in every individual, who has the requisite capacity and inclination of reflecting upon the successive operations of his mind. Of infinitely greater importance we shall find the complete analysis of this faculty; since the definition of something, the truth of which cannot be discovered otherwise than by the preceding operation, can be of no positive advantage.

KANT seriously discovered, that the intuitive faculty of man is a compound of very dissimilar ingredients; or, in other words, that it consists of parts very different in their nature, and each of which performs functions peculiar to itself; namely the *Sensitive Faculty*, and the *Understanding*. The former represents the matter of things, so as it is affected by them; the latter connects the variety of these materials into a whole. These two operations must always precede, if there shall take place a representation or intuition of a determined object. Both, therefore, are essential constituents of the intuitive faculty of man, and both must be active, at the same time, in every intuition.

LEIBNITZ, indeed, had likewise remarked the distinction subsisting between the Sensitive Faculty and the Understanding; but he entirely overlooked the essential difference between their functions, and was of opinion, that both faculties were different from one another only in degree, while he supposed the Sensitive Faculty to be only a weaker degree of the Intuitive, which, when operating in a stronger degree, was called the Understanding: both, according to him, represented the same objects, save that the Sensitive Faculty exhibited those objects in a confused and obscure manner, which the Understanding precisely and clearly apprehended. But this distinction is altogether false and without foundation. The Understanding, as far as we can explore this faculty, still remains, even in its weakest degree, essentially different from the Sensitive Faculty, and the most perfect functions of the latter can never supply the functions of the Understanding. For, while the senses receive the matter of the objects, the Understanding combines the variety in that matter, and forms a determined representation of an object, or an intuition. The former may receive clear or obscure

scure impressions ; the latter may also combine in a distinct or confused manner. Clearness and obscurity, distinctness and confusion, may, therefore, be common to both ; nay, what is clearly perceived by the senses, may yet be obscurely apprehended by the Understanding ; and what the former exhibit in a confused and obscure manner, may nevertheless be very clearly conceived by the latter. The Understanding may even form a clear notion of things, that never can become objects of sense ; and *vice versa*, the senses may perceive things, which the understanding cannot represent, either clearly or obscurely ; although it is impossible to have an intuition of any one object, unless both faculties are actively concerned in the same object. For instance, to *think* of God, liberty, virtue, and immortality, cannot yet be called to *recognise* or to have an intuition of the objects, different from their ideas ; and to perceive spaces and times, and sensible objects of all kinds, can likewise not be said to have intuitions of them. For, to acquire the latter, we must reduce the objects to ideas, and combine them according to certain laws. The senses can do nothing further than perceive, i. e. represent the given thing *immediately* ; and the understanding only can think of it, i. e. combine the thing perceived, or exhibit the given thing by *mediately* connecting it into one. The reality of the object, that is conceived by us in an idea, can be represented only by the senses, since the object itself is either perceived through the sensation occasioned by it, or it must necessarily be combined with any one perception, according to the laws of possible experience.

In the works of the English and French philosophers, we find this essential distinction between the sensitive and the intellectual faculties, and their combination towards producing one synthetical intuition, scarcely mentioned. LOCKE only alludes to the accidental limitations of both faculties ; but to inquire into the essential difference prevailing between them, does not at all occur to him. It is, however, obvious, that from this neglect there have arisen many fallacious conclusions, which for a long time, at least in their consequences, have been hurtful to sound philosophy.

This distinction then, between the sensitive and intellectual faculties, forms an essential feature in the philosophy of Kant ; it is
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the basis, upon which the most of the subsequent inquiries are established. It must nevertheless be remembered, that Kant, in distinguishing these two faculties, does not speak of real substances, different from one another. His intention merely is, to point out what every reflecting mind may easily observe within himself, if he attends to what precedes an intuition, and how the understanding combines every act of perception. Now, since the ground or source of these two faculties obviously discovers two distinct powers, it is both rational and necessary, to denote their functions by distinct names; though their essentially different operations should be formed in one and the same substance. We cannot attend here to an inference, that may be drawn from this identity of origin, against the discrimination of powers, that are in themselves as distinct as the motion of a clock is from that of the hammer, which strikes the bell, though by the same mechanism, that moves the pendulum and the hands. In this very contrivance, we may find the most convincing instance of the actual difference between the exercise of the sensitive and intellectual faculties, if we consider it both, in an *objective* and *subjective* view. In the former, we behold no more than a machine that moves, at certain equal distances, the hands which are attached to it; and he, who is unacquainted with the purpose for which it is designed, will view it with the astonishment and fear of the Swiss peasant, who formerly destroyed a time-piece dropped by a traveller, because he apprehended mischief from the noise that accompanied its motion. But, if this untutored son of nature had been informed of the great utility of that machine, by the construction of which mankind have contrived to measure time apparent, his intellectual faculty might thus have been enlarged, and he would have acquired the *subjective* view of a watch. Without having had any previous experience of the design, with which the motions of a time-piece are arranged *in spaces*, he could now conceive, *a priori*, the necessary result of this arrangement, by dividing the duration of the day into hours, minutes, and seconds; although experience would *a posteriori* confirm this intuitive notion, and give it *objective reality*. This, indeed, cannot be obtained in any other way than by means of the senses; for the question, here, is not of the last and absolute ground or substance of the intuitive faculty, but concerning the intuitive faculty as an appeal

to this last substratum, that is determined by its operations.—Thus COPERNICUS acquired demonstrative certainty upon what he, at first, had conceived only as an hypothesis; for the central laws of the motions of celestial bodies at the same time proved the reality of that invisible power of attraction, which supports the fabric of the universe, and which NEWTON never could have discovered, if the former had not ventured to go beyond the limits of possible experience, and to search for the ground or cause of the motions observed, not in the objects of the celestial bodies, but in the eyes of the spectator,

KANT, therefore, previously analysed the Sensitive Faculty, and endeavoured to discover the necessary conditions, without which *our* Sensitive Faculty cannot perceive any objects whatever. After having cautiously separated all that, which, in the phenomena exhibited by the senses, either is merely accidental, or is owing to the function of the intellect, he discovered, that *two conditions* only remain, without which, every where, neither our Sensitive Faculty, nor its objects, are conceivable. These conditions are, *Space* and *Time*. They have ever been the stumbling block of all metaphysicians, and the source of endless disputes. KANT considers them in such a manner as will afford satisfaction to every cool and unbiassed enquirer after truth, since none but the most inveterate Sceptic, or the obstinate Systematic, can withhold their assent. He shows namely,

1, That both these representations are the immediate productions of the senses, and consequently admit of no further derivation. Hence it was a fruitless attempt of LEIBNITZ, who endeavoured to explain their origin from intellectual notions. The Understanding has, indeed, the power of arranging Space and Time with their modifications, under the ideas of order, unity, and so forth, but it cannot derive either of them from these ideas; it can unfold and explain their contents, but it cannot conceive the possibility of their origin, any further than that they are something given us by the Sensitive Faculty itself.

2, They must be thought of as the substratum of all sensible objects, i. e. as the forms of all phenomena. But they are not real objects and self-subsistent, as CLARKE imagined: their reality wholly

wholly depends upon those things, which can be observed in them : abstractly considered, they are the bare forms of our Sensitive Faculty ; forms, through which we are enabled to determine, that all real objects of sense are conformable to them, or that these objects must of necessity be given in them.—It is by this manner of representation, that we can explain *all* the predicates of Space and Time, as that of infinity, continuity, uniformity, &c. without incurring those difficulties, which have been productive of the greatest confusion in philosophy, and which have involved Mathematics and Metaphysics into perpetual dissensions.

3, Finally, Kant also shows, that space and time, being the forms of *our* Sensitive Faculty, must consequently be conceived as the forms of those objects only, of which *we* can attain intuitions : thus they are merely forms of phenomena, and not the forms of all things in general, that are the objects of knowledge. Nay, it is even conceivable, that the things exhibited to us in space and time, abstractly considered, may be viewed or perceived by other thinking beings, under very different forms ; although it is not in our power, either to determine more precisely this difference, or to ascertain the real possibility of it, by any arguments favourable to this conjecture.

From the preceding statement, the reader will be able to form a general idea of the manner, in which the universal truths of Mathematics may be demonstrated upon the principles of the Critical philosopher, and how these principles may be employed, to determine thereby the objects of the world of sense. For, since space and time are apprehended immediately through the nature of our sensitive faculty, it is now conceivable ; how we can perceive all their relations, compare them with one another through the understanding, and deduce general principles from these sources. And as all the objects of sense necessarily appear in these forms, the explanation is self-evident, that all the relations apprehended *a priori*, must also necessarily be discovered in all these phenomena. It likewise follows from this illustration, that all Mathematics consist in a science, relating only to objects of sense, and admitting of no application whatever, to those of an opposite nature.

After having satisfactorily proved, that there are neither more

nor fewer of the necessary conditions of perception in the Sensitive Faculty, than Space and Time, Kant proceeds to the investigation of the Understanding, as the second principal constituent of the intuitive Faculty. He remarks, that all the operations of the understanding may be ultimately reduced to the *act of judging*, and he concludes from this, that the different modifications in a judgment, in general, are the principles, according to which the pure notions of the intellect must be determined. Upon this ground, he previously unfolds all the simple and pure notions of the intellect, and exhibits them, in a complete and systematic manner, as the ultimate elements of all judgments.—It is well known, how much the simple notions or first principles have interested the Metaphysicians of all ages; it is also known, that they never could agree with respect to their number; whether, among the simple or primary notions, there had not been included some of a compound nature; whether those considered as original ones were not at the bottom merely derivatives; whether there is no chance of discovering in future a greater number of simple notions, or of reducing those already discovered to a smaller number. All these doubts and disputes, Kant has now terminated, by discovering a principle, from which it appears evident, that there can be neither more nor fewer than *twelve* * originally pure notions of the understanding.

The way, in which Kant discovers these Categories or primary notions, and how he proves their completeness and validity, cannot be detailed nor abridged in this general retrospect of the Critique; but I shall briefly remark, that the categories exactly comprise those notions, without which the understanding is unable to conceive any objects whatever, i. e. to judge of them. Hence they express nothing further than the mode or manner, how the Understanding, by the laws of its constitution, must necessarily combine the varieties in perception, whenever it attempts to judge upon objects. But the forms of objects naturally lie in the understanding, and as such they have always been investigated and de-

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* See the Categories, p. 45, and compare them with the definitions in the *Glossary*.

terminated in Logic. Thus the Logicians have long ago taught us, from the nature of the Understanding, that every judgment must be determined by its extent and compass, as well as by its relation to synthetic unity and consciousness; or that it must have a certain quantity, quality, relation, and modality. But that, through this process alone, the conceivable objects are determined, that consequently the forms of judgment are carried over to the objects of thought, and can be predicated of them *a priori*, this necessary inference has been less attended to, by former philosophers. For, though they have not failed to make use of the notions thus arising, in order to determine the objects *a priori*, yet the peculiar source of these notions has hitherto remained undiscovered.

From this source, Kant derives all our notions *a priori*, and makes them the predicates of general principles, which throughout, become the laws relative to objects of experience *a priori*; for they do not contain actual experience itself, but the general conditions, that render experience possible, between the nature of man and things. These laws are systematically exhibited in the CRITIQUE, agreeably to one principle, so that the reader is convinced, that there are neither more nor fewer of the general, necessary, and elementary principles, than are unfolded through this inquiry. But these principles are likewise the axioms of a physical science, so far as nature consists of nothing else but the whole complex of experimental objects; and consequently, from this idea of nature, we not only conceive, very perfectly, the possibility of reducing Physics to a scientific system, but likewise this system itself is, in its pure or transcendental part, thus actually formed.

Having stated in the preceding outlines, how our Understanding must represent to itself given objects, or how an intuition of them becomes possible through it, I can now proceed to the particular analysis of the intellectual faculty in forming conclusions, which Kant denominates *theoretical reason*. This branch of the intellectual faculty, by virtue of its constitution, produces certain notions, to which no objects whatever correspond in experience, although they are connected with it in succession, and are both influenced and determined by experience. It is namely, in general, the idea of the *unconditional* or *absolute*, that is immediately connected with the

the nature of Reason, and through which, according to the different form of rational conclusions, the ideas of an absolute subject or *mind*, of an absolute cause or *liberty*, and of an absolute totality of all that is possible, i. e. the idea of *God*, take their respective origin. The further deduction of these notions, abstracted from pure Reason, must be studied from Kant's Critique; it forms one of the most excellent parts of that work. We learn from it, not only to understand completely, how all mankind, immediately after the evolution of their mental faculties, attain these ideas; but we likewise conceive, how the representations formed concerning the objects of these ideas, appear under so great a variety of aspects, as soon as we venture to determine the objects beyond the nature of the ideas founded upon human reason: nay, we can even generally understand, how variously these determinations may be modified. We further learn, that those, who endeavour to derive every thing concerning religion, from habit, education, and other accidental circumstances, judge with the partiality and fallacy of others, who consider their incidental opinions as incontrovertible principles, which are deduced from the essence of transcendental objects themselves, or to which they fondly would give the appearance of infallibility, by appealing to the authority of a divine inspiration. We also see, how easily the *accidental* may be confounded with the *necessary*, the *subjective* with the *objective*, the *natural* with the *artificial*; unless we are acquainted with the sources, from which all these objects flow, not only so far as their primary origin extends, but also with their minutest difference.— Without being enraged against those writers, who, from their assertions, appear to have formed the artful design of depriving man of every thing, that is valuable and interesting to him as a rational being, we can without difficulty conceive, that it is only a different interest or motive of our reason, which incites men to propagate irreligious doctrines; that it is not entirely their immoral will, but rather their too extensive views, encouraged by the weakness of their adversaries, that induce them to expose the arguments employed in favour of the most interesting principles of religion, while they flatter themselves with the prospect of controverting all the opinions of their opponents.

The CRITIQUE OF KANT holds out the prospect of a most complete victory over all the enemies of Religion, and I shall now state, in what manner the principles of Religion are secured against all the attacks of its adversaries, and how religion is fortified against arbitrary and accidental additions. After having shown, that the ground of the idea concerning Mind, Liberty, and the Deity, is to be met with in the nature of Reason itself, and that every rational being is involuntarily led to the formation of these ideas, the author endeavours to prove, and he does this very satisfactorily, “ *that the Intuitive Faculty of man has not the power of apprehending objects in a determined manner, or of pointing out characters of them, which are derived from immediate perception.*” He demonstrates, that we can indeed *think* the objects of these ideas, but that, at no time whatever, we are able to apprehend them *theoretically*. For, to acquire a theoretical idea of things, we must not only predicate of them, that they are conformable to the laws of our Understanding, or that they are not something contrary to them, but we must likewise be enabled to point out determinate and *real* predicates, which are taken from the thing itself under apprehension. But the real predicates of a thing cannot be conceived in any other manner, than through sensible perception; whether this take place by immediately perceiving the thing itself, or mediately through some other object, which has certain real properties, in common with that to be apprehended. Hence it follows, that we are unqualified to apprehend the real predicates, or the transcendental properties of those things, which, by their nature, neither in part nor in the whole, can ever become objects of sensible perception. We are altogether deficient in a faculty designed for that purpose; hence we are, for instance, unable to determine positively the nature of mind, according to its internal constitution. We can indeed predicate of it, with certainty, that it is not of itself an object of sense, consequently, not a phenomenon; but whatever predicates of reality may, in other respects, belong to it; how its existence may be constituted, whether it be a simple substance, and different from the internal absolute grounds of matter; how the idea of liberty is evolved; what properties belong to the Deity in a transcendental view, and
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the like ; all these problems could be solved only through the perception of supersensible objects. And as we are provided with no faculty for the exercise of such a function, we cannot at all determine the real characters of these things; nay we do not even understand the real importance of the term "*existence*," when we apply it to supersensible objects. For, with respect to the objects of sense, the expression, "*something exists*," signifies no more than that it affects our senses, by producing a sensation, as soon as it is placed in proper connection with them. But the idea of existence cannot imply the same meaning with respect to supersensible objects ; for the term "*existence*" is not to be defined in its bare relation to our Intuitive Faculty, but as an *internal property*. Yet the impossibility of giving such a definition is obvious, not merely from the failure of all the attempts hitherto made for that purpose, but likewise from the investigation of the sources, from which such a determination ought to be derived.

Although we cannot comprehend, through perception, the objects of those ideas, which, in their nature, lie beyond the world of sense ; and though we cannot, on that account, obtain any theoretical intuition of them ; we can discover another source, from which, however, we derive no intuitive knowledge of the objects themselves, but a practical and subjective knowledge of their relations to the nature of man. Though our views of the nature of these objects be not thereby enlarged, that knowledge affords us sufficient grounds, upon which we may safely establish rules for our conduct, and convince ourselves of the reality of that ultimate design, which our Reason cannot consistently call in question.

The chief point of this inquiry is, to discover a sufficient ground for the reality of those ideas, and to open a source, from which the determinations of their objects, relative to our practical advantage, shall be derived with safety and without ambiguity. This source, then, according to Kant, lies in the nature of our own subject, i. e. the mind, and is actually that, which we understand by the term *moral sense*. This alone is a safe intuitive ground for determining the reality of the ideas concerning Liberty, God, and Immortality ; and this alone establishes the true relations, in which we can form dignified conceptions of the Deity.

KANT admits it as a matter of fact, that we are moral beings, and consequently this moral sense is an essential part of human nature ; that reason places the highest value of man, solely and exclusively, in his moral feelings ; and that it reduces all his power and prosperity to these feelings, and values the whole of the former according to effects produced upon the latter. After having demonstrated the essential difference subsisting between the moral and sensitive nature of man, and having analyzed the different laws, by which both are governed respectively ; he now proceeds to prove,

- 1, That the reality of Liberty is necessarily connected with the moral nature of man, and that the latter is wholly inconceivable without the former ; that consequently our Reason forces us to acknowledge Liberty as a certain, though unaccountable, fact relative to man ; because, without doing this, we would be obliged to renounce all claims to Reason, and to consider it as perfectly useless ;
- 2, That the reality of a being, which contains the sufficient ground of a thorough moral order, must be conceived equally combined with the Deity, as it is with the moral nature of man, so that the immortality of the soul must be considered as a necessary constituent of this moral order. Reason, however, being the supreme tribunal, to which man may appeal, persuades us to receive, not only these ideas, but also their objects as founded upon truth ; we are therefore justified in relying upon the justness of our Reason, provided that we do not presume to determine with regard to the internal nature and essence of these objects ; a determination, which can be made only through the immediate, though impossible, perception of them. Hence we are utterly incapable of ascertaining the nature of a free subject, as an independent substance ; the positive constitution of mind, by which immortality becomes possible ; and finally, the manner in which the Deity has accomplished a moral connection between man and the world. We only know, that those objects, which we conceive, through general ideas, as the causes of certain effects, are reclaimed by our reason as the necessary conditions of our moral destination ; and that ground, on which we must admit them, or believe their reality, lies in our subject, namely in our moral sense, which partly as an intuitive principle, partly as a practical motive, generates and

and supports the belief in the fundamental truths of religion. Since, then, the intuitive principle respecting the reality of these transcendental objects, or of religious truths, is perfectly consistent with Reason, not from the immediate perception of objects (the reality of which requires no proof), but from a certain qualification of our own subject, as connected with the real state of these objects; a state, the existence of which is far from being imaginary only; Kant, consequently, calls this a *subjective* ground of conviction, in contradistinction to an *objective* ground, which is derived from the perception of the objects themselves.

In representing the Kantian doctrine of morals, every thing depends upon our being conscious of a moral law, conscious of right and wrong, of good and bad, so that the intuitive ground of moral principles be rendered independent on all theology; for the doctrines of the Deity and Immortality must be deduced from pure morals; or the latter must be the intuitive ground of all religion. And this is likewise the actual and necessary result of his principles. Morality rests upon its own basis; and, in the sublime view which Kant presents of it, all other things relative to man, must be decided by that standard. It is principally in Ethics, we learn, to consider the things of this world as purposes; and by collectively employing them as the means of attaining one ultimate purpose, we introduce unity among them. Thus we discover their subordinate laws, acquire systematic unity, and produce a perfect harmony throughout the whole sphere of the intuitive knowledge of man. Yet, through all the illustrations afforded by Ethics, we do not learn to comprehend the possibility of the things themselves; we only acquire intelligence respecting the possibility of our destination in general. Hence the intuitions, which we derive from morals, do not enlarge our penetration into the nature of the things themselves, but they render our reason consistent with itself, and restore harmony between the moral laws and other intuitions and thoughts; an operation, which is attended with no theoretical, but certainly with great practical, advantage.

This view of morals, however, if it shall serve as the basis of religion, must be extremely different from that, which we find in the "*Système de la Nature*, in the writings of HELVETIUS, and several

veral other reputed philosophers, who speak indeed much of Human Nature, but have penetrated less into its essence than they themselves assure us : and though these inquiries constantly appeal to experience, they make use of principles very different from those, which experience *can* furnish.—To describe, at length, the Moral System of Kant, which affords, at once, solidity and consistency in that of Religion, would require a separate publication. But we shall exhibit the outlines of this system in reviewing another work of Kant's, treating particularly of that subject, which the reader will find mentioned under No. XXI. (5) of this analytical retrospect.

XIX. (3) *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können.* Introductory observations with respect to every future System of Metaphysics, that may deserve the name of a science. 8vo. Riga, 1783, pp. 222.

In the preface to this work, the author explains his aim at convincing those who employ themselves in metaphysical inquiries ; that it is indispensably necessary to suspend their labours for some time, to consider every thing hitherto done as undone, and above all things to propose the question, “ whether there is any prospect of establishing every where such a science as Metaphysics ? ”

‘ If it is a science already, how does it happen, that it has not, like other sciences, obtained general and lasting reputation ? If it is none, how is it permitted continually to boast of the illusory name of a science, and to uphold the human understanding with hopes equally permanent and unaccomplished ?—Let us therefore demonstrate, either our knowledge or our ignorance ; the nature of this pretended science ought to be thoroughly investigated ; for it is impossible to leave things any longer upon the old footing. It appears almost ridiculous, while every other science is making incessant progress, that in this one, which aspires to the character of being the oracle of wisdom itself, man continually turns round upon the same spot, without advancing a single step. It is even observed, that the number of its votaries is much decreasing, and that those, who feel themselves sufficiently able to
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gain credit in other sciences, do not choose to venture their reputation in this. On the other hand, it is equally certain, that every tyro, who is ignorant in all other branches of knowledge, here claims the right of pronouncing a decisive opinion; because in this territory there exists in fact no settled measure and weight, by which the rational inquirer can be discerned from the shallow prattler.'

'To make plans, is frequently a luxuriant and ostentatious employment of the mind, by which some people acquire the appearance of inventive genius; while they demand what they cannot furnish themselves, censure what they cannot improve, and propose what they themselves do not know where to discover it:—though it may be easily conjectured, that a little more than a declamation of pious wishes will be requisite, to form a just plan of "a general Critique of Reason." But *Pure Reason* is a sphere so insulated and so thoroughly connected with itself, that we can approach no part of it without touching all the rest, and that we can do no good, without having assigned each part its proper place and influence upon the other. For, since without Reason there is nothing that could correct our judgment, the validity and use of every part depends upon the relation, in which it stands towards the others, within the bounds of Reason itself; as in the structure of an organized body the purpose of every member can be deduced only from the complete idea of the whole. Hence we may say of such a *Critique*, that no dependence can be placed upon it, unless it be *entire* and *complete*, even extending to the minutest elements of Pure Reason; and that we must be enabled to determine either *the whole* or *nothing*, that relates to the sphere of this faculty.'

'Although the bare plan of such a science, had it been premised to the "Critique of Pure Reason," might have been unintelligible, suspicious, and useless; it will, on the contrary, become the more advantageous, when it appears in illustration of that work. For, by this plan, we shall be enabled to take a view of the whole, to investigate the principal points, upon the solidity of which this science is erected, and to understand more clearly the principles, which at first appeared obscure.'

'These Prolegomena then contain such a plan as ought to be
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stated in an analytical method, since the preceding work necessarily required a synthetical arrangement : in order that this science might be exhibited in its individual parts, and as the structure of a very peculiar faculty in the acquisition of knowledge, which presents itself in its natural connection. Those who should find this plan as obscure as the Critique itself, must consider that the study of Metaphysics is not the business of all ; that there are many ingenious men, who make considerable proficiency in sciences, that lie more within the bounds of sensible perception, and who do not succeed in inquiries carried on through pure abstract notions. Such individuals must employ their mental faculties upon other objects. Those, however, who venture to judge upon Metaphysics, or even attempt to frame systems of their own, must previously satisfy the demands made in this work. Whether this be done by approving of the method, in which I have solved the different problems ; or by refuting this solution, upon well-established principles, and giving another in its place ; in either case they will do justice to the cause. For, to reject a plan without trying its merits, is equally frivolous and illiberal. I confess I did not expect to hear philosophers complaining, that my works were deficient in popular, entertaining, and easy language ; when the question relates to the existence of a source of knowledge, which is highly valuable and indispensable to man, but which cannot be demonstrated, without observing the strictest rules of scientific deduction. Popularity, indeed, will in its turn attend these investigations, but to aim at it in the beginning, would be a silly and fruitless attempt.—That very obscurity, which is so much decried, and which is frequently used as a cloak for the conveniency and mental weakness of its adversaries, is not without relative advantage ; for all those, who observe a cautious silence in other sciences, enjoy an opportunity of speaking and deciding in a magisterial tone upon metaphysical subjects ; because their ignorance, here, does not form so remarkable a contrast, when compared with the knowledge of others, as it does in opposition to genuine critical principles, of which we may justly say with the Roman poet,

Ignavum, fucos, pecus a præsepibus arcent.

VIRG.

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As these Prolegomena are a concise and perspicuous abstract from the preceding *Critique*, in an analytical method, which the author employs, as it were, to go back again the same path, upon which he had synthetically advanced in the *Critique*; we could only repeat that deduction of Kant's principles, which we have already premised at sufficient length.

XX. (4.) *Betrachtungen über das Fundament der Kräfte und Methoden, welche die Vernunft anwenden kann, darüber zu urtheilen.* Reflections upon the foundation of the powers and methods, which Reason is entitled to employ in judging upon their validity. 8vo. Koenigsberg, 1784.

Of this small work, I know little more than its title, not having been able to procure a copy of it; and as, from the German Reviews, it appears to be a further deduction of the principles laid down in the preceding two works, I shall immediately, and at considerable length, review the following, which is uniformly considered as the most perspicuous and valuable production of Kant.

XXI. (5) *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten.* Fundamental principles of the Metaphysics (Theory) of Morals. 8vo. Riga. 1785.—2d Edit. 1792, pp. 128 and 14 pp. Preface.

The outlines of KANT'S System of Morals, I shall endeavour to exhibit, as clearly as possible, in the following analysis of his principles.

The desire of happiness is inherent to human nature: all the instinctive propensities of man are directed to that purpose. But our reason still restrains that desire, and considers only such a possession of happiness as worthy of our exertions, which is perfectly consistent with morality, or rather, which is the reward of moral actions. Morality and happiness, therefore, are two different but essential determinations originating in human nature; which, when united by the dictates of reason, render the destination of man perfect. This union, however, cannot be better conceived by reason, than that morality itself contains the cause, through which the

happiness of man is accomplished. If we ourselves are the purposes and not the *bare* means in the hands of nature or any other Being; it follows, that the necessary attributes of our constitution must likewise be conceived as possible: there must exist such an arrangement of things, as contributes to realize our moral destination. The former part of this destination, namely morality, depends on ourselves, and on the degree of self-activity, with which we practise the moral law. This faculty of practising what the moral law commands, we presuppose in every rational being; for otherwise it would be highly absurd, to impose upon ourselves a law, obedience to which Reason could not acknowledge as practicable. It must consequently be in our power, to be morally good, if Reason commands us to act in conformity to the moral law. In whatever subject then Reason actually exists, it must also be possible, that it manifest itself by actions: whoever has the ability to apprehend what is good as a thing absolutely necessary, on its own account, he must likewise be provided with the faculty of performing it. But it is not physically necessary to do it; for we nowhere discover our Reason subject to this species of necessity. Why Reason very frequently does not practise what it must acknowledge to be morally good; why our sensitive nature is not always vanquished, but frequently prevails in this contest; these problems we are unable to solve; because we do not in any manner comprehend that, which forms the moral nature of man, as an object of perception; and because we can only derive the moral faculty of man from the idea of the possibility of morality in general. We know only this much with certainty, that we judge upon the moral value of man, merely and entirely, by the degree of moral motives, which we observe in his actions or sentiments. If, therefore, the physical energy is properly arranged in a man, so that the use of Reason, in general, is possible to him; we presuppose, that the performance of morally good actions is really entrusted to his will: and if we did not presuppose this inclination, we would in fact deny all the influence which Reason exercises over human affairs, and thus be obliged to declare the general laws of morality, afforded by this faculty, as mere phantoms of the brain. Our moral perfection depends upon our own exertions, and it is from this quarter, that we may more and more approach our destination.

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What, on the other hand, relates to the second part of our destination, namely to our happiness; this depends on the institution of the things in nature, as well those of our own subject as the external objects, and their influence upon us. By means of Reason and its inherent liberty, we can indeed make such a use of the things in nature, as to produce certain degrees or parts of happiness. But the rules calculated to produce these effects, Reason cannot derive from its own nature *a priori*, as is the case with the moral law; because experience must be consulted first, that we may learn, how the nature of man, and that of individual subjects, is constituted, and in what relation the things are to human happiness. The laws by which happiness is attained, are founded upon the nature of phenomena: man may apply them to his advantage, but he cannot determine them; he may regulate, in a certain degree, the influence of the things upon himself; but he must still submit to their laws. If, then, we were to consult Reason, and to ask, by what laws happiness ought to be distributed in the world; it could give no other answer, but that the moral law ought to decide this. Morality should always be attended with a proportionate share of happiness; whether it of itself produced that happiness as its real cause (according to physical influence), or that a third being allotted to every individual, such a portion of happiness as he deserved through the degree of his moral activity:—here we would admit an *ideal* influence, in which a third being had so regulated the course of nature, that her laws were in perfect harmony with the demands of Reason, relative to the happiness of moral beings.

But if we consult experience, we by no means learn, that such a moral order really subsists in the world; since we frequently observe men of bad morals, and of a depraved character, apparently happy, while good and virtuous men are afflicted by misfortunes. For, though the consciousness of just and good actions be accompanied with agreeable feelings, this alone does not constitute human happiness; since the most excellent man must be called unhappy, if he is labouring under such calamities as are the permanent cause of painful sensations. The wants of human nature are very numerous! Many of them are independent on our will: the
failure

failure in satisfying urgent necessities, is unavoidably accompanied with pain, frequently the most acute ; nay, even a great number of the voluntary or artificial wants are, by degrees and through incidental circumstances, so intimately interwoven with the well-being of man, that he must always feel unhappy, when he is deprived of those means, by which he was accustomed to satisfy them. Besides, there is a great number of accidents, which render him who is exposed to them always unhappy ; and experience does not teach us, that any distinction prevails here between the good and bad. Diseases, war, famine, and all physical evils, oppress the honest man with equal, and frequently with much greater, rigour than the dishonest : the former, as well as the latter, is placed in unhappy situations, without the means of evading these evils. It requires, upon the whole, no proof that in the distribution of physical goods, though a necessary part of human happiness, no moral order at all can be discovered in experience ; and that, if the latter alone could decide the question, we must explain all the agreement between happiness and virtue, entirely by the law of chance. What happens in nature according to physical laws, is equally different from what ought to happen according to the laws of moral order, as the usual actions of man differ from their duties.

But although we observe in this world no such moral order, as exhibits happiness and morality in constant proportion ; our Reason still preserves an uncommon propensity to maintain, that such an order must actually exist. This, however, is a presupposition, which can be justified, neither by argument nor demonstration, nor through the real exposition of such an order ; but which is established merely upon a ground contained in our own mind. This ground rests on the necessary internal obligation of being morally good, or on the moral feelings common to all mankind, and acknowledged by all good men. The actual existence of a moral order is so intimately connected with these feelings, that the consciousness of them continually impels us to presuppose this order. And the more eagerly we cultivate morality, by displaying much vigour in the observation of its laws ; the more firmly and thoroughly we become convinced, that there must exist a complete moral order.

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The train of thought, by which Reason forms and justifies this conclusion, is nearly the following.

Reason acknowledges it as indispensably necessary, that man ought to act conformably to moral laws. As long as man enjoys the use of Reason, no situation or relation in life can be conceived, in which he is exempted from the obligation of acting as a moral being. To act morally right, is therefore the highest object, at which every man ought to aim: Reason cannot, upon any condition whatever, reverse this judgment, without falling into an obvious contradiction with itself. Now, we find, in human nature, at the same time, a desire of happiness, which is not always gratified. Our nature, however, is so constituted, that we must feel a necessary desire of happiness; and this natural wish is a sufficient ground for exerting ourselves, to realize it by all the means in our power. The rules, in consequence of which men attain to real happiness, are solely and exclusively learned from experience; while the moral laws are derived *a priori* from Reason: and thus it happens, that many rules for procuring happiness are contrary to morality; or that they weaken the force of the moral law. Nevertheless, Reason places a much higher value on morality, and commands us to wish for no other happiness, but such as is in perfect harmony with moral feelings. Upon this very occasion we learn, that the happiness of men is connected with conditions and circumstances, so various and incidental, that we cannot always attain it, by practising either the laws of morality or prudence. For, the moral conduct does not, as far as experience informs us, necessarily produce happiness; since we observe no physical connection between them; and since the association of good fortune with a moral conduct appears to be merely accidental. Even the utmost prudence of man cannot rear the fabric of felicity, though he should act in defiance of morality, and endeavour to make happiness his only and unconditional object. For the latter depends on too many circumstances, over which man has no power of controul, and through which frequently the wisest plans may be rendered abortive.

The happiness of a moral being, in a moral order of things, can properly be said to consist in no other maxim than the following:

“ every

“ every thing that happens, is in strict harmony with the general laws of morality.” Even the good man can wish and desire nothing further. If he now admit a moral principle or a God, he must likewise expect, that every thing shall really correspond with moral purposes ; and consequently, if a man act virtuously, he can expect nothing else, in a moral world, but real happiness. In fact, therefore, man awaits his prosperity from good fortune, the dispensation of which is entrusted to a wise Providence. This hope is entirely supported by the belief in God, and it is equally constant and safe as the latter.

Since man possesses no power over all those things, which relate to his ultimate destination, no other condition of attaining this remains for the virtuous, but to consider the whole world subject to a moral order ; that is, to look upon moral beings as absolute and ultimate purposes, to which every thing relates, that is real in the world ; or to consider these beings as containing the cause, on account of which every thing is thus constituted, and not otherwise. For, if these contain the ground of the constitution of the world, there must exist a certain order in it, conformably to which the essential purposes of moral beings can be attained. Allowing, therefore, that happiness is a part of the essential destination of human nature, and that men themselves belong to the class of moral beings ; nature itself must be so constituted, that their happiness can be effected by her aid. But the destination of human nature is not completed by the attainment of that happiness alone, which consists in mere enjoyment, but by morality, in union with happiness, and indeed so modified, that the latter be in proportion to the former. Morality must determine the measure of happiness allotted to every individual, and not *vice versa*. If thus we shall conceive the attainment of our destination, as a possible event ; we must admit a thorough moral order as really subsisting, though it be not in our power to produce an *objective* proof of it. The ground, on which we admit it, lies merely in our own mind, and indeed in the conviction, that we are moral beings designed for ultimate purposes. To conceive these beings in connection with other things, is altogether impossible, unless we grant, that the latter relate to the former, and facilitate the attainment

tainment of their destination. It is, consequently, the reflection made upon our own moral nature, which induces us to admit the existence of a moral order.

Though we cannot discover this moral order in experience, the truth of it is not thereby in the least degree affected, nor can it be disputed from that source. For experience could no where prove the existence of a thorough moral order, although all the phenomena, that we observe, should correspond with the idea of it. It would ever remain doubtful, whether this correspondence be general and constant, unless a very different manner of representing it, afforded certainty to the conclusions thus arising. For, to comprehend the reality of such an order *a posteriori*, there would be required a complete view of all things and their relations to one another; a view, that is unattainable by beings so constituted as we are. And the circumstance of our finding virtue frequently accompanied by misfortune, is by no means inconsistent with the *idea* of a moral order. This idea does not imply the necessity, that every moral action shall be immediately attended with a certain portion of happiness, or that the latter be physically produced: it involves only this much, that the lot of man, upon the whole, is in a certain harmony with his moral character. In this way it is not difficult to conceive, that one or several periods of his existence are particularly designed for the purpose of improving his moral nature, and that good and bad fortune may be so distributed during these periods, that they can be used rather as the means of improvement, than to serve as the scale of ascertaining the moral excellence of the individual. Nevertheless, the regulations in the world may be so made, that such a share of happiness arises from them for each moral being, as it has merited by its conduct. We elevate man above the consideration of his being a passive instrument in the hands of nature, when we represent him as sacrificing a part of that happiness, of which his sensitive nature is susceptible; in order to contribute his share, that other rational beings may likewise attain their destination; provided that he does not neglect his own. For, Reason itself must approve of such a regulation. If now, from this point of view, we consider the events and the vicissitudes of human life, which we observe by experience in the

world of sense ; all the facts thus obtained are perfectly consistent with the possibility of a moral order. We must however not attempt to make such use of them, as if they were absolute proofs ; since they can be used only as arguments for disproving the contrary of a moral order. But if we represent the question upon this foundation, that moral actions *ought* to produce happiness conformably to the laws of nature ; then the instances, by which we prove that virtue and misfortune are in certain cases accompanied by one another, would not only be irrefutable, but they would likewise prove the nullity of this complete moral order.

In the Kantian philosophy, it is a matter of no importance, and wholly undetermined, *how* such an order is *really* possible. The reality of it, KANT does not attempt to demonstrate from a pretended view of its causes ; he rather grants, that these are to us altogether inconceivable. He only admits this moral order, on account of the strong and constant demands of Reason ; a faculty, that thinks or judges of moral beings as absolute and ultimate, to whom every thing else relates, and who consequently must determine the order of all other things, - and their relations to the moral beings themselves.

Thus we presuppose a moral order, while we confidently rely upon our Reason and our moral nature ; because the reality of it must be conceived from its being so intimately united with our moral feelings. It is certain, that we are moral agents, consequently the conditions must also be certain, without which our moral nature, in the eyes of our own Reason, would be a nonentity. According to Reason, however, our moral nature consists in this, that man is an absolute purpose, to which all other things are subordinate means. Yet morality and happiness, united to one purpose, compose the destination of man, so that the former determines the latter. Without a moral order, this is impossible. And as, agreeably to Reason, moral beings must have it in their power to contribute towards the attainment of their destination ; the reality of a moral order must likewise be admitted ; because it is the only condition, upon which this inference can be justified. If we then allow the existence of a moral order, we must also submit to those conditions, without which it is wholly impossible. Though we
cannot

cannot comprehend the real possibility of this order, we must nevertheless grant, that those conditions are real, without which such an order cannot at all be conceived. But it is inconceivable, if we do not admit, 1, that the laws of the world of sense are not the only ones, by which all events are determined: that the world itself is subject to still higher laws, and upon the whole, relates to something, which is independent on the world; or external to it, and to which the world is merely subservient; 2, that there exists a cause, through which every thing is determined according to the laws of a moral order, to which consequently every thing is subject, and upon which every thing in the world depends; and lastly, 3, that the personality or individual existence of man continues, in order that through him the moral order may be accomplished.

It is easy to perceive, that the first of these postulates leads to the idea of a supersensible world, which is independent on the laws subsisting in the world of sense, i. e. which is *free*. The second idea involves the conception of a *Deity*. For, if we separate every arbitrary and adventitious matter from the idea of the Deity, and preserve that alone, upon which a representation worthy of so sublime a Being can be established; nothing further remains than the thought of a connection or relation, by means of which that Being must be the foundation of a thorough moral order. No other idea, however, but that of an intelligent power could entitle or even induce us to entertain a notion like that of moral order; hence it is conceivable, how in this idea alone we meet with some analogy; that serves to distinguish so sublime a Being, and, together with the most perfect will, to attribute to it all those properties, through which only so sacred a will can be exerted. Lastly; that the third principle before stated, leads to the *immortality of the soul*, is now a very rational inference.

The idea of *Liberty*, or the faculty of determining our actions uninfluenced by sensual motives, and self active, through the consciousness of the moral law alone; this idea is involved in that of morality. We therefore undoubtedly possess that liberty, as we are moral agents; and the conception of liberty in general has been perfectly justified by showing, that the physical world is not

the only one, which influences the nature of man ; that it is connected with beings of a very different kind, whose actions are determined by very different laws. The idea of a moral order stands in the same relation to that of our being moral agents, whose destination is certainly attainable ; as the former is connected with the idea of God and Immortality ; so that if we admit the truth of the one, the relation of the others must likewise be granted. Thus we are sufficiently and perfectly authorized to believe in God and Immortality, as the two essential pillars of all Religion ; though the arguments for this belief, are not taken from the perception of objects, but are derived from the more permanent nature of our mind.

Upon a cursory view of the statement here given, it might perhaps appear to some readers, as if in Kant's process of reasoning, first morality is represented as the ground-work of Religion, and afterwards Religion again is called an aid, to support the idea of a moral law. But, upon a mature consideration of the subject, this appearance will very soon vanish. For, the ground of discovering a moral law, lies merely and exclusively in our Reason, which presents to us this law, as soon as it is conceived in a practical or active-sense ; and which, independent on all Religion, imposes upon us the obligation of observing the precepts of morality. But if, with this moral obligation, we compare nature and her relations to the destination of man, Reason requires, that nature should likewise agree with the destination of moral beings ; because, in the contrary case, that value which Reason places upon its faculties and operations, and which is to be computed much higher than Nature itself, would not be real, but altogether imaginary. Thus convinced of a moral order, man may certainly make use of it, in order to remove those difficulties, which present themselves in the practice of the moral law. The doubts and uncertainties, which may arise against the reality of a moral order of things, are thereby suppressed ; the sensual appetites, too, are through this conviction so modified and regulated, that they shall be indulged only with a view of such an happiness as is consistent with virtue, while they gradually become familiar with the order, that is manifest throughout all nature. Besides, this mode of representing a
system

system contains a great number of arguments, from which even the sensitive faculty derives some consolation, if its purposes should be occasionally defeated, and its necessities too much limited; for there still remains a state, in which this also may be satisfied; provided that man perseveres in obeying the dictates of morality. Thus Religion certainly contains arguments in favour of morality, and on this very account it is calculated to remove many obstacles, which may occur in the practice of the moral law. Religion, therefore, offers no intuitive ground of discovering moral precepts, though it can be employed as an excellent psychological aid of strengthening the moral faculty of human nature; since it overcomes those difficulties, which frequently arise from false reflections, and which obstruct the due exercise of that faculty.

XXII. (6) *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*. Metaphysical Principles of Natural Philosophy. 8vo. Riga, 1786. 2d Edit. 1787, pp. 158, and xxiv pages Preface.

This is, without exception, the most profound of KANT's works; and in order to afford the reader a concise view of the author's aim, I shall first give an abstract from the elaborate Preface to this publication, and then exhibit the principles of this *new* science, in a close translation.

‘It is of the greatest importance to the progress of the sciences,’ says Kant, ‘to separate dissimilar principles from one another, to reduce each set of them to a particular system, that they may form a science of a peculiar kind. Thus we shall prevent that uncertainty in sciences, which arises from confounding them, and in consequence of which we cannot easily distinguish the limits, which, in a doubtful case, are to be assigned to each of them; nor can we discover the source of the errors, that may attend the practical application of them. On this account, I have deemed it necessary, to exhibit systematically the *pure* part of Natural Philosophy (*Physica generalis*), in which metaphysical and mathematical constructions of ideas occur promiscuously; and, in treating of the former, to show at the same time the principles of that construction,

and

and consequently to prove the possibility of a System of Natural Philosophy, deduced from mathematical demonstrations. This division of sciences, beside the advantage already stated, is attended with the particular satisfaction, which the unity and harmony of knowledge afford, when we can prevent the limits of the sciences from interfering with one another.*

‘As a second reason of recommending this process, it may be urged, that in every department of Metaphysics we may hope to attain to *absolute completeness*, such as we cannot expect in any other species of knowledge; consequently, the completeness of the Metaphysics of material nature may be expected, here, with the same confidence as in the Metaphysics of nature in general. For, in Metaphysics, the object is merely considered, agreeably to the general laws of thought, while in other sciences it must be represented according to the different data of perception, whether this be pure or empirical. In Metaphysics, too, we acquire a determined number of cognitions, which can be completely exhausted; because, here, the object must be continually compared with all the necessary laws of thought: while in the other sciences, on account of the infinite variety of perceptions, or objects of thought, which they present to the mind, we never can attain to absolute completeness, but may extend them in infinitum, as is the case with pure Mathematics and experimental Physics. I likewise believe, that I have completely stated these metaphysical principles of Natural Philosophy, to their utmost extent; but though I have succeeded in this attempt, I do not flatter myself with having performed any extraordinary task.’

‘To complete, however, a metaphysical system, whether that of nature in general, or that of the material world, the Table of the Categories * must serve as its Schema. For there are in reality no more nor fewer pure intellectual notions concerning the nature of things, than I have stated in that Table. All the determinations relative to the general notion of matter, consequently all that can be conceived of it *a priori*, that can be exhibited in mathematical construction, or that can be proposed as a determined object of experience, must admit of being reduced to the

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* Vid. the *Categories*, p. 45, and their *Schemata*; p. 47.

four classes of the Categories, viz. that of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. There remains nothing to be discovered or added here ; but if imperfections should occur, with respect to perspicuity and order, the system in this respect may be occasionally improved.'

' The idea of matter must, therefore, be examined through all the four mentioned functions of the intellect (in four Sections), in each of which a new determination of that idea occurs. The primary attribute of something, that represents an object of the external senses, must be motion ; for by that only can these senses be affected. To this, the Understanding reduces all other predicates of matter, that relate to its nature ; and thus Natural Philosophy is, throughout, either a pure or applied *theory of motion*. The metaphysical principles of this science must, consequently, be divided into four Sections : in the *first* of which, motion is considered as a pure quantum, according to its composition, without any quality of that which is moveable, and hence may be called PHORONOMY ; in the *second*, motion is investigated in its relation to the quantity of matter, under the name of an originally moving power, and is therefore called DYNAMICS ; in the *third*, matter is examined in reciprocal relation to this quantity, by its peculiar motion, and appears under the title of MECHANICS ; and in the *fourth* Section, the motion or rest of matter is determined merely in relation to the mode of representing it, or *Modality*, consequently as phenomenon of external senses, on which account it is called PHENOMENOLOGY.'

CONTENTS.

SECT. I. *Metaphysical principles of PHORONOMY.*

POSITION 1. Matter is that which is *moveable* in space. That space, which itself is moveable, is called the *material*, or likewise, *relative space* ; that, in which all *motion* must be ultimately conceived (and which consequently in its own nature is absolutely immoveable), is called the pure, or likewise, *absolute space*.

Posit. 2. The motion of a thing is the change of its *external relations* to given space.

Posit.

Posit. 3. *Rest* is the permanent presence (*præsentia perdurabilis*) in the same place; *permanent* however is that which exists, i. e. continues for a certain time.

Posit. 4. To *construct* the idea of compound motion, means to represent motion a priori in the perceptive faculty, as far as the former arises from two or several joint motions in one moveable space.

Theorem. Every motion, as object of experience, may be considered, either as the motion of a body in a resting space, or as the rest of a body and, on the other hand, motion of space in opposite direction with equal velocity.

Posit. 5. The *combination* of motion is the representation of the motion of a point, as being homologous with two or several motions of it united together.

SECT. II. *Metaphysical principles of DYNAMICS.*

Posit. 1. *Matter* is that which is *moveable*, so far as it *fills* a *space*. To *fill* a space, is to resist all that is moveable and that makes an effort, by its motion, to penetrate into a certain space. A space that is not filled, is a *vacuum*.

Theorem, 1. Matter fills a space, not by its mere *existence*, but by a particular *moving power*.

Posit. 2. The *power of attraction* is that moving power, by which one matter may be the cause of the approach of others towards it; or, in other words, by which it resists the removal of others from it.—The *power of repulsion* is that, by which one matter may be the cause of removing others from it; or, in other words, by which it resists the approach of others towards it.

Theorem 2d. Matter fills its spaces by the repulsive power of all its parts, i. e. by a peculiar power of extension, that has a determined degree, beyond which smaller or greater degrees may be conceived in infinitum.

Posit 3. One matter, in its motion, *penetrates* another, when, by means of compression, it completely removes the space of its extension.

Theorem 3d. Matter may be *compressed* in infinitum, but it never can be *penetrated* by matter, however great its pressing power may be.

Posit.

Posit. 4. That *impenetrability* of matter, which depends upon the resistance proportionally increasing with the degrees of compression, is called *relative*; as on the contrary that, which rests upon the *supposition*, that matter, as such, is not liable to any compression whatever, is here called *absolute* impenetrability.—The *filling* of space with absolute impenetrability may be called *mathematical*, while that of relative impenetrability receives the name of *dynamical*.

Posit. 5. *Material substance* is that in space, which is moveable of itself, i. e. separate from every other thing that exists without it in space. The motion of a part of matter, by which it ceases to be a part, is *separation*. The separation of the parts of matter is the *physical division*.

Theorem 4th. Matter is *divisible in infinitum*, and indeed into parts, each of which is again matter.

Theorem. 5th. The possibility of matter renders a power of attraction necessary; this being the second essential and fundamental power of it.

Theorem 6th. By the mere power of attraction, without that of repulsion, we cannot conceive the possibility of any matter.

Posit. 6. Contact, in a physical sense, is immediate action and reaction of *impenetrability*. The action of one matter upon another, without contact, is the *action at distance* (*actio in distans*). This action at distance, which is possible even without the aid of intervenient matter, is called the immediate *action* of matter upon matter, *through empty space*.

Theorem 7th. The *attraction essential to all matter*, is the immediate action of it upon another matter, through empty space.

Posit. 7th. A moving power, by which matters can immediately act upon one another only in a common surface of contact, is called a *superficial power*; but that, by which one matter can immediately act upon the parts of another, even beyond the surface of contact, may be called a *penetrating power*.

Theorem 8th. The original power of attraction, upon which the possibility of matter itself, as such, must depend, extends in

the universe immediately from every part of it to another ad infinitum.

SECT. III. *Metaphysical principles of MECHANICS.*

Posit. 1. Matter is that which is *moveable*, so far as it (as such) possesses moving power.

Posit. 2. The *quantity of matter* is the amount of that which is moveable in a determined space. This, so far as all its parts are considered in their motions as operating (moving) at the same time, is called *congeries*; and we say, that a matter acts in a congeries, when all its parts, moved in the same direction, exercise their moving power externally, and *at the same time*. A congeries consisting of a determined shape is called a *body* (in a mechanical sense). The *magnitude of motion* (mechanically computed) is that which is estimated both by the quantity of matter moved, and its velocity: when *phoronomically* considered, it consists merely in the degree of velocity.

Theorem 1st. The quantity of a piece of matter, in comparison with *any* other, can be estimated only by the quantity of motion in a given velocity.

Theorem 2d. First law of Mechanics. In all the changes of corporeal nature, the quantity of matter remains, upon the whole, without increasing or diminishing.

Theorem 3d. Second law of Mechanics. Every change of matter has an external cause. (Every material body remains in its state of rest or motion, in the same direction, and with the same velocity, unless it be compelled by some external cause, to change this state.)

Theorem 4th. Third Mechanical law. In every communicated motion, the action and reaction always correspond with one another.

SECT. IV. *Metaphysical principles of PHENOMENOLOGY.*

Posit. Matter is that which is *moveable*, as far as in that respect it can be an object of experience.

Theorem 1st. The motion of matter, in a straight line, is, with respect to an empirical space, merely a *possible* predicate, in contradistinction to the opposite motion of space. The very same predicate

predicate is *impossible*, if we conceive it in no external relation to matter, i. e. as *absolute motion*.

Theorem 2d. The circular motion of matter, in contradistinction to the opposite motion of space, is a *real* predicate of it; whereas the opposite motion of a relative space, if substituted for the motion of the body, is no real motion of the latter, and if considered as such, is a mere illusion.

Theorem 3d. In every motion of a body, by which it is moving, with respect to another body, an opposite equal motion of the latter is *necessary*.

XXIII. (7) *Grundlegung zur Critik des Geschmacks*. Fundamental principles of the Critique of Taste. 8vo. Riga. 1787.

Though we have not succeeded in procuring a copy of this publication, we shall find an opportunity of stating the outlines of Kant's ideas upon this interesting subject, in a subsequent work, under No. XXV. (9), in which he considers the various judgments resulting from *Taste*; the modes, in which they take place in the mind; and their respective peculiarities.

XXIV. (8.) *Critik der praktischen Vernunft*. Critique of Practical Reason. 8vo. Riga. 1788. 2d Edit. 1792.

If we abstract from the *empirical* part of experience, or if we conceive experience as a general idea, without attending to any variety that may be contained under this idea; we then acquire *a priori* the conditions of it. The empirical or experimental knowledge obtained by experience formed the *matter* of it; but those conditions, without which experience cannot be reduced to the rules of thought, we have called the *form* of it.—We must proceed in a similar manner, when we reflect upon the various operations of our *will*. I will, for instance, any one object, and I immediately become conscious of the idea relating to some expected pleasure; an idea, which is connected with this will. The representation of that pleasure, which the possession of the object might afford, is the empirical part of the will, that constitutes its *matter*. If we abstract from the latter, there is produced the idea

of a *free will*, the condition as it were of every thing that is *empirical*. If, further, we lay aside in thought every thing that refers to experience, and still suppose a will completely determined towards acting; there remains at last nothing but the faculty of reason itself, which determines this will to act. In this manner arises in us the idea of a *Practical Reason*; a faculty, which directs the will, independent of any impulse of the senses. The “*Critique of Practical Reason*,” therefore, sets out with the design of investigating this faculty.

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BOOK I. ANALYSIS OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON.

SECT. I. *Of the principles of pure practical Reason.*

Illustration. Practical principles are such as contain a general determination of the will, which again has a variety of subordinate practical rules. They are subjective principles or *maxims*, when the condition is considered as applicable only to the will of the subject; but they are *objective* principles or practical laws, when that condition is acknowledged as objective, i. e. applicable to the will of every rational being.

Theorem 1st. All practical principles, which presuppose an object (matter) of the desiring faculty as the cause of determining the will, are wholly empirical, and cannot furnish practical laws.

Theorem 2d. All the practical principles relating to material objects, are, as such, without exception, of one and the same kind, and originate from the general principle of self-love or personal happiness.

Theorem 3d. If a rational being shall conceive its maxims as practical general laws; it can consider them only as principles, which contain the ground of determining the will, not according to the matter, but merely according to the form.

Fundamental law of pure practical Reason.

“ Let such be your conduct, that the maxim of your will
“ may, in every instance, be admitted as the principle of a
“ general law;—or in other words :

“ Act in such a manner, as to consider and to employ hu-
“ manity,

“manity, in your own as well as in every other person, always as the *purpose*, but never as the *means* of obtaining your object.”

Theorem 4th. The *autonomy* of the will is the only principle of all moral laws, and of the duties conformable to them: all *heteronomy* of choice, therefore, not only establishes no obligation whatever, but is likewise contrary to the principles of it, and to the moral purity of the will. The sole principle of morality consists in the independence, namely of all matter of the law (i. e. the object desired), and at the same time in the determination of the choice by the pure general legislative forms, of which a maxim must be susceptible. That *independence*, however, is liberty in a *negative* sense; whereas this *peculiar legislative power* of pure, and as such practical, Reason is liberty in a *positive* sense. Hence the moral law expresses nothing else but the *autonomy* of pure practical Reason, i. e. of liberty, and this itself is the formal condition of all maxims, under which alone they can correspond with the supreme practical law. If, therefore, the matter of volition, which can be nothing else but the object of a desire that is connected with the law, enters into the *condition of its possibility*; there arises from it the heteronomy of choice, namely, the dependence on the law of nature, to follow any one impulse or inclination; and the will does not give itself the law, but only the precept for a rational-observance of pathological laws. But the maxim, which in this way never can contain the general legislative form, upon the same ground establishes not only no obligation, but is likewise contrary to the principle of a *pure* practical Reason, consequently also to moral sentiment, although the action thus arising should be lawful.

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Of QUALITY :

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practical rules of *omission*, (*prohibitivæ,*)

practical rules of *exceptions*, (*exceptivæ.*)

3.

Of RELATION :

To *personality*,

To the *condition* of the person,

Reciprocally of one person to the condition of another.

4.

Of MODALITY :

Permitted and *nonpermitted* actions,

Duty and contrary to duty,

perfect and *imperfect* duty.

SECT. III. *Of the motives of pure practical Reason.*

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BOOK II. DIALECTIC OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON.

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VIII. Of supposed truths, being a necessary result of pure Reason.

IX. Of the cognoscible faculties of man, being wisely proportioned to his practical destination.

Methodical doctrine of pure practical Reason.

XXV. (9) *Critik der Urtheilskraft*.—Critique of the Judging Faculty. 8vo. *Libau*, 1790. 2d Edit. *Berlin*. 1793, pp. 482, and lxx pp. Preface and Introduction.

The author's principal aim in this work is to inquire, 'whether the *Judging Faculty*, which, in the order of our cognoscible powers, forms an intermediate capacity between the Understanding and Reason, has likewise its own principles *a priori*; whether these are constitutive or merely regulative; and whether that faculty of judging affords *a priori* the rule for the sensations of pleasure and displeasure, which again are the intermediate degrees between the cognoscible and appetitive faculties.'

'A Critique of pure Reason, i. e. of our capacity of judging conformably to principles *a priori*, would be incomplete, if the Judging Faculty, which likewise claims these principles, were not treated as a separate part of that Critique; although, in a system of pure philosophy, the principles of judgment must not be considered as a separate part, belonging either to the theoretical or practical department of the system; but, in cases of emergency, they may be occasionally connected with either. For, if such a system shall once be established under the general name of Metaphysics (a work, the complete attainment of which is by no means impossible, and which would be of the first importance to the general use of Reason); the Critique must have previously investigated the ground, on which this structure is to be erected, as well as the solidity of the basis of this faculty, that deduces its principles independent on experience: and if any one part of this fabric should be found to stand upon a slight foundation, the downfall of the whole would be the inevitable consequence.

'But we may easily perceive from the nature of the Judging Faculty, that the discovery of the peculiar principle of it, must be attended

attended with great difficulties; for this faculty must necessarily contain some such principle *a priori*; because, in the contrary case, it could not be subject to the most common critique as a particular faculty of acquiring knowledge; and because the proper use of it is so necessary, and so universally admitted, that every body is acquainted with its influence. That principle, however, must not be derived from notions *a priori*, since these are the property of the Understanding, and the application of them only belongs to the Judging Faculty. Hence the latter must furnish an idea, through which indeed we obtain no intuition of any object, but which serves as a rule to that faculty itself. This rule, however, is not of an *objective* nature, so that we could compare the judgment with it *in concreto*; for to do this, there would be required a second Judging Faculty, in order to enable us to distinguish, whether the case applies to the rule or not.

‘ This perplexity on account of a principle (whether a subjective or objective one) chiefly manifests itself in those judgments, which are called *aesthetical*, which relate to the Beautiful and the Sublime, whether that of nature or art. And yet is the critical investigation of a principle of the Judging Faculty, respecting those objects, the most important part of the Critique of this power. For, though the *aesthetical* judgments, of themselves, contribute nothing to the knowledge we obtain of things, they nevertheless belong exclusively to the cognoscible faculty, and evince the immediate relation of this faculty to the sensations of pleasure and displeasure, in consequence of some one principle *a priori*, without confounding it with that, which may be the cause of determining the appetitive faculty; because this has its principles *a priori* in notions, which are the produce of Reason.’

Having premised this extract from the author’s preface to the work under consideration, I shall only add the result of KANT’s inquiry respecting the final purposes of nature, as exhibited in the SECOND BOOK of this publication; though, in my opinion, this investigation forms the most interesting and essential part of the whole. It is as follows.

In conformity to our Reason, we are obliged to assume a certain connection subsisting between the final purposes of nature, in the
same

manner as our Understanding, in consequence of its constitution, is impelled to combine things according to their efficient causes. As soon as we observe a certain positive relation among things to one another; as soon as we can represent to ourselves one thing as possible only through the idea we possess of another; we can reduce such a combination to no other idea than that of final causes, or of means and purposes. Although we are not able to perceive and to determine the ground, on which that connection rests, as a thing independent on our senses; we may still conceive it, in a general manner, as the ground of such a combination as can be represented by us under the idea of connecting final causes; we may thus think of it under the only *symbol*, which can properly denote the basis of this association, namely that of Reason. In this way, however, we have no title to refer the modes and actions we observe in our Reason, to that being (*substratum*) itself; but we must make use of them only as a symbol, which at least expresses similar relations.

We must, therefore, justly consider the world, as if every thing were arranged in it by the highest Understanding; and we must, with the greatest attention, endeavour to discover in experience those traces, that are every where scattered for the support of this conclusion; in order to prepare our minds for the conviction arising from a very considerable number of individual cases. In this, we shall the better succeed, if, as the ground-work of this inquiry, we exhibit that systematic order, which is already determined by our Reason *a priori*, and in consequence of which determination the moral beings compose the last and absolute purpose, to which all other things ultimately and necessarily refer as the means of the former. But since we can recognize no other moral being than man, we must accordingly regulate our investigations relative to final purposes, and particularly attend to what is connected with *his* nature. Here, however, we must abandon the notion hitherto erroneously maintained by many Theologians, that *every thing* has a necessary relation to man. For, as the world of moral beings certainly consists of more classes than we are acquainted with, we may indeed presuppose, that men are absolute purposes, yet far from being exclusively so; and that nature has

not been constituted for the sake of men alone, but that, at the same time, other moral beings have not been disregarded. We may therefore safely admit, that nature has been so formed, that the essential purposes concerning man can be certainly attained, notwithstanding that the accidental purposes must occasionally remain unaccomplished, on account of others that are more important and necessary. For this assertion, which is supported merely upon the principles of our moral nature, and not by any intuitive knowledge of the world itself, experience only furnishes us with arguments, which this order of the world displays in individual cases. But the greatest number of phenomena must necessarily remain inexplicable to us, who are acquainted only with the smallest part of the world, and from whom the extensive territory of moral beings is almost wholly concealed: whereas a complete knowledge of their relations to purposes would presuppose not only a thorough knowledge of the world of sense, but likewise that of moral beings. We derive from the contemplation of the world no proofs showing a regular order of moral purposes, but we investigate the cases corresponding with that order, so as to ascertain it in the individual, and to strengthen our knowledge upon what we had already presupposed, in consequence of our moral nature. For, that which affords some knowledge in a general way, gives but a slight degree of conviction; while that which animates this conviction and renders it applicable to particular cases, i. e. our sensation of it, is produced only by individual instances.

According to these principles, we shall be able to discover traces of divine wisdom in a great number of phenomena, without neglecting on that account our inquiries into nature, which alone can extend our knowledge of things; which previously unfolds the matter of knowledge; and which points out the relations, wherein divine wisdom is evident. The field of physics is immense; and by an appeal to the Deity, who has produced nature itself conformably to final causes, we can set no limits to that field. For, to obtain a complete view of final causes, and to apply them to the explanation of phenomena, is entirely out of our power: we can only mark them as the results arising from our intuitive knowledge of nature, with this limitation; that, when we obtain a
more

more accurate knowledge of the nature of these things, we shall likewise discover a greater variety of final causes, and so on in infinitum.

The contemplation of nature, agreeably to final purposes, is therefore fully established in the constitution of our Reason; although we have no intuition of the being that is the basis of this order. We can conceive this being merely by the idea of Reason in general, as the only possible way of apprehending it: thus, however, our knowledge of the nature of that being is not increased; and we only satisfy a subjective, but necessary claim of our Reason. For such an order of things as depends upon a regular succession of final causes, can be thought of by no other relation but that of a causality conformably to ideas; a result, which exactly corresponds with the general idea of an efficient Reason.

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The following Table exhibits the whole of what relates to the province of

TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

ELEMENTARY VIEW OF			
<i>Collective faculties of the Mind.</i>	<i>Faculties of Cognition.</i>	<i>Principles a priori.</i>	<i>Application to</i>
The Faculty of Cognition.	The Understanding.	Legality.	Nature,
The sense of pleasure and displeasure.	The Judging Faculty.	Conformation.	Art,
The faculty of desiring.	Reason.	Final purpose.	Liberty.

DIVISION I. CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL FACULTY OF JUDGING.

SECT. I. ANALYSIS OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGING FACULTY.

BOOK I. *Analysis of the Beautiful.*

FIRST MODIFICATION *of the Judgment of Taste according to its QUALITY.*

§ 1. The judgment of taste is *aesthetical*. 2. The approbation determined by this judgment is not influenced by any self-interest relative to the object. 3. The approbation, or the satisfaction we express upon what is *agreeable*, is connected with self-interest. 4. The same is the case with regard to what is *good*. 5. Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of satisfaction.

SECOND MODIFICATION *of the Judgment of Taste, namely according to its QUANTITY.*

§ 6. That which is represented as an object of *universal* approbation, independent on collateral notions, is called *Beautiful*. 7. Comparison of the *Beautiful*, the *Agreeable*, and the *Good*, by the above stated character. 8. The universality of approbation, in a judgment of taste, is represented only in a subjective sense. 9. Investigation of the question: whether in a judgment of taste the sense of pleasure precede the act of judging upon the object, or follow it.

THIRD MODIFICATION *of the Judgments of Taste, according to their RELATION to purposes.*

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FOURTH MODIFICATION *of the Judgment of Taste, according to the MODALITY of the satisfaction in the object.*

§ 10. This modality of an *aesthetical* judgment is not a necessary, but

but an *exemplary* determination of *all* individuals, respecting judgment, that is considered as an example of a general rule, the particulars of which cannot be defined. 19. The subjective necessity, which we attribute to an aesthetical judgment, is conditional. 20. The condition of the necessity, which a judgment of taste supposes, is the idea of a common sense. 21. Whether we have grounds, on which we may conclude the reality of a common sense. 22. The necessity of the general approbation, which is conceived in an aesthetical judgment, is a subjective necessity, which, under the supposition of a common sense, is represented as objective.

COROLLARIES FROM THESE FOUR MODIFICATIONS.

- I. *Taste* is the faculty of judging of an object, or of representing it by means of approbation or disapprobation, unconnected with *any self-interest*. The object of such approbation is called *Beautiful*.
- II. *Beautiful* is that which affords universal satisfaction, without reducing it to a certain idea.
- III. *Beauty* is the conformation or *nexus finalis* of an object, so far as it is observed in it, *without the representation of a purpose*.
- IV. *Beautiful* is that which is recognized as an object of *necessary* satisfaction, without combining with it a particular idea.

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XXVI. *Ueber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll.*

On a certain discovery, by means of which every (new) Critique of pure Reason is said to be rendered unnecessary by an earlier one. 8vo. Königsberg, 1790.

We merely take notice of this publication, here, for the sake of completeness. It can scarcely be considered as forming a distinct

part of KANT's systematic works ; it is neither mentioned as such, by the numerous German commentators upon the Critical Philosophy, nor has Mr NITSCH of London availed himself of this (apparently polemic) production, in his late view of the Kantian principles.—For this reason, we do not hesitate to pass it over in silence, and to devote a considerable degree of attention to the following work, on Religion, which is of infinitely greater importance.

XXVII. (10.) *Die Religion innerhalb den Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft.* Religion considered within the bounds of mere Reason. Koenigsberg. 1793. 2d Edit. enlarged. 1794, pp. 314, and xxvi pp. Preface.

It cannot be a matter of indifference to a philosopher, to know what relation the prevailing religion of the age bears to the speculative notions of Reason, that are propagated in the philosophic systems of his cotemporaries. Although the inquiries of this nature be conducted independently of any positive religious creed, we may yet congratulate ourselves upon the discovery, when that positive religion, which guides a very considerable part of mankind, and which has produced so many excellent moral effects, is not found to be altogether inconsistent with the principles, maintained by the most profound and eminent philosophers. We may at the same time learn, to give a more practical explanation upon those symbolical points, that have hitherto met with no useful application, and that have occasioned many fruitless and bloody contests.

No man of candour and impartiality will censure the design of a writer, who employs his philosophic maxims (if they be otherwise well established upon a critical basis), in order to serve as principles, for explaining ambiguous doctrines and positive institutions. For, if the Deity has immediately intrusted man with so valuable a gift as religion actually is, it must have been corrupted by men themselves, who have delivered it to their posterity, with such additions as are inconsistent with the principles of Reason ; and the true original sense of such traditions can be discovered only through

through the proper exercise of Reason. Every attempt, therefore, of restoring harmony between the positive tenets of Religion and those of philosophy, must be considered as highly beneficial to mankind; because, in this manner only, the design of that revelation can be consistently attained.

Our satisfaction, too, must be the more complete, when we have an opportunity of observing, that such a revelation has not only been preserved in its purity during the course of many centuries, but likewise has been the means of exercising the rational faculties of man, upon the most profound subjects of inquiry.—If we compare the principal tenets of the Christian Religion with the principles of the Kantian system, we shall be agreeably surprised to find, that the former are perfectly consistent with the latter, and that this author satisfies all the claims, which can be made on philosophy, to establish a pure religious doctrine. For the result of KANT'S investigations, upon this head, is nearly the following :

1st, That Christianity is throughout a *moral Religion*, such as Reason requires of every religious establishment whatever. It is, among the numerous religions in the world, the only one, which derives its principles from pure morals, and which represents to man his destination as attainable only by moral means. It indeed presupposes, that he has the power and ability of doing, what the law of philanthropy commands him; though, at the same time, Religion apprizes him of that resistance, which natural inclinations or *carnal* desires oppose to the exercise of Reason. It further appropriates to him, in express terms, the capacity of overcoming these difficulties; and as the human understanding can arrive at no objective knowledge of such a power, Scripture lays the foundation of it in something beyond the reach of the senses, while it gives man the assurance, that the Deity may also endow him with faculties, which materially differ from those of mere sensitive beings; in order to accomplish, by the power of his will, whatever he judges to be morally right and salutary. In this manner alone, Reason can form a complete and clear notion, that the moral power is a *supersensible* agent, whose origin or, in the language of KANT, whose possibility we cannot by any means conceive.

2d. The true destination of man is, conformably to the principles of Christianity, not sought for in the sensible, but in the supersensible part of nature. Man must acquire happiness by his moral conduct, but he ought not to expect the former in this world; not to derive his hopes of it from his sensitive, but from his moral nature. For, according to the Christian doctrine, his sole business here consists in preparing and making himself worthy of it, through a purely moral life.

3d. The Christian Religion throughout presupposes a moral government of the world, and the idea of the moral order of things serves as its basis: this order, however, can be realized or accomplished only in relation to the whole existence of rational beings. Exactly in the same manner is this proposition determined by our Reason.

4th. The Religion of Christ enjoins us to consider good will to all mankind as the supreme principle of all our actions. It enjoins us to unite self-love, in equal proportion with universal benevolence, or rather to make the former subservient to the purposes of the latter: and this is precisely the dictate of Reason, and what Kant asserts to be the first moral precept. Through this practical law alone, the Christians determine the attributes of the Deity, since they represent him as the moral creator, preserver, and ruler of the world.

5th. Thus, in the religion of Christ, morality is laid down as the cognoscible ground, on which we establish our knowledge of the Deity. We can boast, indeed, of no perceptive cognition of that Being; yet we are not contented with a mere speculative notion of him, whose attributes we can clearly exhibit in the idea of a moral intelligent power. Lastly,

6th. The whole aim of the Christian Religion is the moral improvement and perfection of man. The whole purpose of Religion, when contemplated by Reason, can be no other than to render man morally better, or to improve his moral worth. It must admit of being employed as the means of strengthening his moral faculties, of removing the obstacles that frequently occur in the practice of morality, and of fortifying the powers of Reason.

Even the dogmatical part of the Christian doctrine is of such a nature as to display, in the greater number of instances, a relative application to morals; and the principal tenets of it, have a manifest tendency to solve moral difficulties. These appear at so early a period among men, that attempts to account for them very soon follow. Such explanations, in general, are extremely ludicrous, especially in the infancy of Reason, when fancy supplies its place, and before experience has been made our guide. Imagination scarcely listens to the suggestions of Reason; and, in this situation, men are easily pleased with any plausible answer, which their ancestors have contrived from the rich stores of mythology. Though their knowledge of objects is not thereby increased, yet the hypotheses thus contrived are usually ingenious, so that they might afford some satisfaction, if they were founded upon any thing but fancy.

This infant age of reasoning, if it may be called so, is attended with the advantage, that it does not conceal the difficulties, for which it cannot account. Reason, being gradually enlightened by philosophy, is conscious of this chimerical method of explaining things; but as it imagines any other explanation to be impossible; it rather considers the difficulty itself as fictitious, in order to show, that all attempts at explaining it must be dispensed with.

By gradual advances, Reason discovers that such difficulties really exist, and that all sophistical disputes upon them are of no avail. At the same time, we find that the former are of such a nature, as to admit of no other solution than that by practical ideas, and that these ideas are expressed in those fanciful explanations of mythology, by the representation of *sensible* objects.

Now, since every thing connected with morals, as well as every conclusion drawn from that source, is justly denominated by the epithet 'divine;' it is easy to perceive, how those mythological objects, together with the fictitious productions of fancy, could be called divine revelations. For there really is a moral text or meaning at the foundation of them, but which can be disclosed only in a more improved state of Reason.

From this deduction, it becomes perfectly evident, in what manner we meet with two very different explanations of such books, as
contain

contain the like solutions of moral propositions, under the title of Revelation. One of these explanations namely boasts of stating the literal sense of the Writ, and is styled the *grammatical* interpretation: the other traces the ideas, that may originally have occasioned those fictions, and considers the subjects of mythology as the symbols of those ideas. And this is justly called the *moral* interpretation. If now each of the two pursues its own method of inquiry, disputes may easily arise among the different interpreters; for they will frequently find opposite meanings in one and the same passage.

These dissensions in the interpretation of Scripture, daily display their baneful effects, however easily they might be settled, if the interpreters were not averse to enter into a proper agreement upon certain points. For, no man will deny, that all Revelation rests upon the inward state of our mind; that all positive Religions are more or less perfect expressions of Revelation; and that, therefore, the true interpretation of it can be discovered only by our own subjective operations. Hence it is, that those only, who are well acquainted with the nature of the human mind, can find the true sense of Revelations. Reason is here likewise the supreme tribunal, from which no further appeal can be made. The doctrines of the original evil, of reconciliation, and many other principles, peculiar to the Christian Religion, are founded on a basis, that admits of very excellent and useful reflections, upon the moral constitution of man, and upon the manner in which his destination has been provided for. Nay, from these doctrines, it is evident, how those opinions, which appear to have a common origin in human nature, have ever been represented through certain narratives and allegories; and how the minds of men in all ages resorted to them, as if they had been conducted by an invisible hand; without being uniformly conscious of their true meaning. And is there any greater service, which the philosophic inquirer can render mankind, than to investigate these traces of Reason, which, by their sacred antiquity, have so important an influence on human affairs; though their origin be, for the most part, involved in obscurity. From this investigation, the only explanation must result, which can contribute to the attainment of that ultimate end, for which man is originally

ginally designed. If, in this way of explaining symbols, we search merely for signs of such truths, as are previously discovered by our mind, the errors or mistakes cannot be so detrimental, as if we aimed at finding the truth itself, by means of these symbols. For, in the former case, imagination can merely mislead us to denote a true thing by a false symbol; whereas, in the latter case, we are exposed to the danger of confounding a symbol (to which our fancy is but too fondly attached) with the truth itself, and thus of falling into mere chimerical notions. Let us therefore search in the regions of truth; and, directing our views to the monuments of antiquity, inquire, whether among them we can discover no signs corresponding with our moral attainments. Thus we may facilitate the access to the sanctuary of truth, in as much as our new method of explaining will ascertain, whether we have succeeded in exploring the just character of religious truths, and whether the true sense of the respective symbols has ever been clearly understood.

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§ 1. Of the general subjective ground of religious fancy.

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* *Pfaffenhum*, in German, is not literally 'priesthood,' nor does it signify 'priestcraft;' but it expresses the usurped dominion of the clergy, by which they pretend to be in the exclusive possession of the means of dispensing absolution from sins and divine grace.

2. The moral principles of Religion, considered in opposition to religious fancy.
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XXVIII: *Zum ewigen Frieden*, &c. Project for a perpetual peace. A philosophical Essay. 104 pp. 8vo. Königsberg, 1795.

Of this original work, which is so much and justly admired on the continent, we already possess an English translation. And if the appearance of this production in foreign versions could establish any proof of its merits, I might add, that "Kant's project for a perpetual peace" has been likewise translated into French, and indeed with the sanction of the author, who has furnished the French translator with a *new* Supplement, which contains, "*a secret article for a perpetual peace.*"

Many of our political readers must remember, that the idea of a perpetual peace has formerly employed the pen of the good ABBOT DE ST. PIERRE; and that, at a still earlier period, the most patriotic King of whom France can boast, HENRY IV, was seriously engaged in modelling this beneficent plan, which he proposed to submit to the consideration of his cotemporary potentates, if an untimely death had not frustrated that philanthropic design.— Though our sage politicians have always considered plans of this kind as the fanciful productions of good-natured fanatics, it may on the other hand be observed, that by disputing on the possibility of a perpetual peace, the necessity of a perpetual warfare must be admitted as a maxim; because, without being continually prepared for war, the different states of Europe could not long exist together. This maxim, however, is as abominable in theory, as it is practically destructive of every principle of morality. For, if *all* independent states adopt or continue to practice such a maxim, and if their views be constantly directed to the execution of it, their political existence itself must be extremely precarious. From this source, I am inclined to derive the frequent revolutions in the political

political world, the frequent returns from a state of intellectual and moral improvement to their former barbarism, and the perpetual animosities (emphatically called, *natural* enmities) between man and man, which are so industriously transmitted from one generation to another; especially in the frontier-provinces of different nations.—Man is a fighting animal! is the general outcry of all those who are interested, whether directly or indirectly, in propagating this absurd and pernicious doctrine. Even admitting, that man is naturally prone to exercise his physical powers; that he has this propensity in common with the lower animals; that he occasionally manifests the desire of revenge and conquest, not unlike the rapacious tyger or the victorious lion; and that he cannot easily overcome these natural inclinations, as long as his inhuman feats are more admired and encouraged than the dignified, though less alluring, exertions of his intellect;—does it follow from these *primitive* dispositions of savage man, that perpetual warfare is a necessary evil in the *present* state of society? I hope for the honour of humanity, that none but the callous financiers of deluded nations, or the avaricious contractors of armies and navies, with their numerous train of connections, will be hardy enough to draw so false a conclusion.

When we consider those, who direct the affairs of nations, in a moral as well as legislative capacity, it is rather surprising, that the important plan of a perpetual peace has never been duly weighed: while many subjects of less consequence, and comparatively trifling matters, daily occupy their attention. Nobody will deny, that the ideas of right and wrong, of just and unjust, are equally applicable to a plurality of states, as to different individuals of one or several countries. The only obstacle to the *just* application of these ideas must, therefore, lie in the diversity of opinions, arising among those *corrupted* servants of the state, to whom the management of external affairs is intrusted. Why, therefore, do the rulers of nations not agree upon a general federation of states?—Why do they not, like every other *reasonable* being, submit to arbitration, by choosing the arbiters from the bosom of disinterested states; in order to settle such differences as their own ministers cannot determine? This would be the only rational and proper method;

method; a method, which is daily practised in private life, by those very men, who seem to oppose its introduction in diplomatic transactions. Nay, if the arm of violence and rapacity were permitted to decide the quarrels of individuals, all civil institutions and social compacts would soon be dissolved. And does not the same reasoning apply to every government, whether monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic?—have we not sufficient testimonies upon historical record, that dissolution and annihilation have hitherto been their ultimate fate?

Induced by such considerations, the venerable Kant, after having observed the political changes of Europe, for upwards of half a century, steps forward with a plan drawn up in a diplomatic form. His noble design of stopping the prodigal effusion of human blood, and his aim at convincing the governors of nations, that the practicability of this plan merely depends upon the exertions of their moral will, are equally conspicuous. The great modern improvements in Ethics throughout society, particularly in the higher ranks; the view of the innumerable sufferings and exterminations accompanying the present state of warfare in Europe; and finally the conviction, that his “Project” is truly practicable and morally unexceptionable; these were sufficient motives to rouse the “hoary philosopher of the North,” and to animate him with new vigour for this grand and benevolent attempt.

The author exhibits the *Preliminary* and *Definitive Articles* for a perpetual peace, in two Sections, which he accompanies with proper illustrations. The preliminary articles are as follows:

1. “No treaty of peace shall be considered as valid, that has been concluded with a secret reserve of matters for a future war.
2. “No independent state shall ever be permitted to be transferred to the dominion of another state, whether by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or donation.
3. “Standing armies (*miles perpetuus*) shall in time be entirely discharged.
4. “No national or state-debts shall be contracted, that relate to the external or foreign affairs of the state.
5. “No state shall, by force of arms, interfere with either the constitution or government of other states.

6. "No state, at war with another, shall make use of such hostilities, as must destroy their reciprocal confidence in a future peace; for instance, the employing of assassins, poisoners, the violation of cartels, the instigation of treasonable practices, rebellion in the inimical state, &c."

The conclusion of a *definitive peace* presupposes it as a postulate: "that all men, who are able to produce reciprocal effects upon each other; must necessarily be subject to some civil institutions." All civil institutions, however, as far as regards the *persons* submitting to them, may be reduced to three classes: 1.) those concerning the right of the citizen in the state; 2.) those relative to the right of nations; and 3.) those ascertaining the rights of the citizen of the world (cosmopolite). Conformably to this introduction, the author proposes *three Definitive Articles*.

I. *The civil constitution of every state ought to be republican.*—By a republican constitution is here understood such a one, as is founded upon the principles of *liberty, dependence, and equality*. By means of that *liberty*, acquired by the constitutional law, all the members of a state must be entitled to the privilege of obeying no other external or bye-laws than those, to which they have given their consent. By virtue of their legal *dependence*, all members of a society are subject to only one common legislation. And by their legal *equality*, among men as citizens of the state, there must subsist such a relation, that none of them can lawfully oblige the other, without subjecting himself to the law, by which the other party *may* reciprocally compel him in a similar instance. This, therefore, is the only constitution, which forms the basis of every other in civil society; and it is also the only one, that can lead to a perpetual peace. For, in a government, where the consent of the citizens of the state is required for declaring war, they will be very cautious in giving their approbation to those horrid measures, in consequence of which they themselves must bear all the calamities of a bloody contest.

In order to prevent any misconstruction of terms, KANT distinguishes a *republican* from a *democratic* constitution, by discriminating between the *forms of government (imperii)*, and those
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of *administration* (*regiminis*); the former of which are determined by the distinction of *persons*, who hold the supreme power of the state, but the latter, by the *mode of governing* the people by a supreme head, whoever this may be. The forms of government, or those of the former kind, are, *autocracy* or the power of the prince, *aristocracy* or the power of the nobles, and *democracy* or the power of the people: those of the latter kind, namely the forms of administration, are *republicanism* and *despotism*. The former of these again consists, according to the essential characters above described, in the separation of the executive power from the legislative; the latter, namely despotism, is the arbitrary execution of the laws, which the sovereign himself has enacted; so that his private will becomes the public law of the nation.—Concerning *democracy* then, Kant affirms, that it *necessarily* leads to *despotism*; because it establishes a legislative and executive power, by which all have a share in forming resolutions relative to *one*, and even against this one, who consequently would not agree with them, so that *all* are said to partake of the legislation, when in fact they do not so; which is in contradiction to the general will itself and to liberty.

- II. *The rights of nations ought to be founded upon a federation of independent states.*—The author's ideas in this article are expressed with equal boldness, energy, and truth. The result of them is this: In the relative condition of states to one another, there can be rationally no other method of extricating themselves from the lawless condition, that engenders continual wars, than to imitate individual man in the resignation of his wild (unconstrained) liberty; to accomodate themselves to public compulsory laws; and thus to form a *federation of nations*, gradually increasing, and at length comprehending all the nations of the earth. Since, however, according to their notions of the right of nations, they are averse to submit like individuals to the laws of compulsion; and since they reject *in hypothesis* what is just *in thesis*; let them at least adopt the *negative* substitute of a federation (congress) for the prevention of war, instead of the *positive* establishment of an *universal republic*. Such a congress may at least save us from total ruin, by checking that hostile

tile disposition of man, which shuns the operation of the law ; it may gradually spread its beneficent influence to distant nations ; though it will nevertheless be in constant danger of being interrupted, by the capricious opposition of a lawless monarch.

III. *The cosmopolitical right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.*—The cosmopolitical right is that of a stranger, by which he is intitled to a friendly reception at his arrival upon foreign ground. It is not strictly the right of hospitality, but that of visiting one another, which belongs to all men, in offering their company, by virtue of their common inhabitation of the surface of the earth. The *inhospitality* of sea-coasts, for instance that of Barbary, and the *inhospitable* conduct of cultivated and chiefly of commercial nations of our quarter of the globe, who change their *visits* into *conquests*, is consequently against the law of nature. As, however, the means of communication among the nations of the earth are so much improved, that the violation of a right on *one* spot of the globe is now felt in *all* countries ; it hence follows, that the idea of a cosmopolitical law is not a whimsical or extravagant representation of a right, but a necessary supplement to a code, that remains to be written, and that relates to the rights of states and nations, as well as to the rights of man in general. Under this condition only, we may flatter ourselves with the hopes of a continual, though gradual, approximation to a perpetual peace.

In the further illustrations annexed to these articles, the author maintains, that both morals and politics, so far from being in opposition to this plan, rather tend to confirm and to render it universal ; “ for, ‘ says he, ’ the guarantee of this compact is the grand and ingenious artist, nature herself, who by her mechanical course evidently manifests her purposed aim of restoring harmony among men, even against their will, and in the very bosom of their contentions. The provisional dispositions made by nature for this purpose, are the following: 1) that she has provided for the subsistence of man in all climates ; 2) that she has dispersed them, through wars, in every direction, even to the most inhospitable countries, in order to people them ; and 3) that she has thus compelled them to enter into reciprocal

reciprocal engagements, which are more or less established by law."

The many valuable hints and philosophical reflections, contained in this little work, it is impossible to abridge. And as we possess an English translation of it, I must refer the curious reader to the book itself; at the same time assuring him, that he will find the arts of courts and the juggles of statesmen exposed, in a manner altogether original.

XXIX. (II.) *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre.* Metaphysical Elements of Jurisprudence. 8vo. Königsberg, 1797. xii pp. Preface; LII. pp. Introduction; and 235 pp. Text.

This work affords another proof of the very extensive application, of which the Kantian philosophy is susceptible. Having in his former publications established, on a critical basis (that of a pure and practical Reason), the principles of Physics, of Taste, of Morality, and of rational Religion, the author proceeds in the present, to deduce from the same source the elements of Jurisprudence; and not only lays down the private rights of individuals, but unfolds also the principles, which ought to determine the internal arrangements of Civil Society, and regulate the intercourse of nations.

The mode, in which Prof. KANT treats the subject, will appear from the following observation: "A System of Jurisprudence, the first part of the Science of Morals, derived from Reason, and which might be termed the Metaphysics of Law, is still a desideratum in philosophy. But as the idea of law, though pure, has a relation to practice; i. e. is applicable to the cases occurring in experience, a metaphysical system of it, in its division, must also have a reference to the empirical variety of those cases, in order to make the division complete, which is an indispensable requisite in the formation of a System of Reason. Completeness of division, however, in what is empirical, is impossible; and where it is attempted, or at least an approximation to it, such ideas cannot be considered as integral parts in a System, but merely as examples.

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The only proper appellation, therefore, for the first part of the Metaphysics of Morals, is '*Metaphysical Elements of Jurisprudence*;' because, with respect to the application to these cases, there can only be an approximation to a System, not a System itself."

Having, in a general introduction developed the principles of the Moral Science, and having shown the necessity of a Metaphysical System of Morals, i. e. of a practical philosophy derived from ideas *a priori* merely, and which has not nature, but the freedom of the human will, for its object; the author makes the following distinction between Justice and the other virtues, between Ethics and Jurisprudence.—“All legislation, however it may agree with respect to the actions, being in every case external, may yet be distinguished with regard to the motives. That legislation, which constitutes an action a duty, and at the same time makes this duty the motive, is *Ethical*. But that, which does not include in the rule the idea of duty, which on the contrary admits another motive than this idea, is *Juridical*. With respect to the latter, it is easy to perceive, that this motive, different from the idea of duty, must be derived from the pathological grounds, by which the will is determined, viz. inclination and disinclination, and among these from those of the latter kind; because it is a legislation which is compulsory, and does not influence the conduct by the allurements of reward.—The mere conformity of an action to the rule, without regard to the motive, is called its *legality*; but that, in which the idea of duty, arising from the rule, is at the same time the motive of the action, is its *morality*. The duties, according to a Juridical legislation, can only be external, because this legislation does not require, that the idea of duty, which is internal, should be in itself the principle, by which the will of the agent is determined; and as a proper motive for the rule is nevertheless necessary, it can only be externally connected with that rule. Ethical legislation, on the other hand, makes our internal actions also duties, not as it were excluding the external, but proceeding on what is duty in general. And as Ethical legislation includes in its rule the internal motive of action, the idea of duty, which determination can by no means be introduced into an external legislation; so this Ethical legislation cannot be external, not even that

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of a Divine will; although indeed it assumes for motives, as *being duties*, those duties which depend upon another, namely an external legislation. It is not a duty of virtue to keep one's promise, but an obligation of justice, of law, to the performance of which one may be compelled. Yet to do this, where no compulsion is to be apprehended, is a virtuous action, a proof of virtue. Jurisprudence and Ethics then are distinguished, not so much by the different duties they enjoin, as by the difference of the legislation, which connects with the rule the one or the other motive."

Next follows a particular '*Introduction to Jurisprudence*,' in which the following subjects are discussed.

SECT. I. § A. Of *Jurisprudence*. B. Of *Justice*.—The idea of what is just or right, so far as it refers to a corresponding obligation, includes first, the merely external and practical relation of one person to another, in so far as their actions, as facts, can have mediately or immediately an influence on each other. But secondly, it does not imply the relation of the will of one individual to the *wish* or mere *want* of another, as in the actions of charity or insensibility, but merely to the *will* of that other. Thirdly, in this reciprocal relation of wills, the *matter* of the will, i. e. the end, which every body has in view with the object, which he wills, does not come under consideration. For instance, the question is not, whether one gains or loses by the commodities, which he purchased from me for the exercise of his trade, but merely according to the *form* in the relation of each will, so far only as it is considered as free, whether the action of the one be consistent with the freedom of the other, according to a general law.—C. *General principles of Justice*.—Every action is just or right, according to the maxim of which the freedom of will of one individual is compatible with the freedom of another, agreeably to a general law. D. *Justice or law*, necessarily presupposes compulsion or force.—E. *Strict justice or law*, may also be represented as the possibility of a reciprocally exerted force, consistent with the freedom of every man, and with general rules or laws.

SECT. II. 1. Of *Equity*. 2. Of the *law of necessity*.

SECT. III. DIVISION OF JURISPRUDENCE.—A. *General division of the duties of justice*. B. *General division of laws and rights*. 1.) Law, as

a systematic doctrine is divided into the Law of Nature, which depends entirely on principles *a priori*, and positive or statutory law, which proceeds from the will of a legislator. 2.) Of rights, as the moral power of laying others under an obligation, the chief division is into the *original* and *acquired*; the former of which every man inherits by nature, independent of any legal act; the latter cannot be attained without such an act.—The only original right, that is born with man, is freedom or independence on any other arbitrary will, so far as it is consistent with the liberty of every individual, according to a general law.

Further Contents of the work.

PART I. OF THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN GENERAL.

CHAP. I. *Of the mode of possessing something external as property.*

§ 1. My property is that, with which I am so connected, that the use, which another might make of it against my will, would injure me. The subjective condition of the possibility of use, in general, is *possession*. § 2.—3. Juridical postulate of practical reason. It is possible to have every external object of my will as my property; i. e. the maxim is contrary to justice, according to which, if it were a law, an external object of the will behoved to be in itself without an owner (*res nullius*). § 4. Exposition of the idea of external property. Of the external objects of my will there can be only three: 1.) a corporeal thing without me; 2.) the will of another to a determined act (*praestatio*); 3. the situation of another in relation to me, according to the Categories of Substance, Causality, and Community between me and external objects, agreeable to the laws of freedom. § 5. Definition of the idea of external property. External property is that without me, to hinder me from using which, as I chuse, would be unjust, or an injury. § 6. Deduction of the idea of the mere legal or civil possession of an external object. § 7. Application of the principle of the possibility of external property to the objects of experience. § 8. To have something external as property, is only possible in a juridical state, under a public legislative power, i. e. in civil society. § 9. In the state of nature, nothing but a merely *provisional*, though real external, property can take place.

CHAP. II. *Of the mode of acquiring external property.*

§ 10. General principles of external acquisition.—I acquire something originally, when I cause that to become mine, which formerly was the property of no other person.—Division of the acquisition of external property: 1.) according to the *matter* (the object) I acquire either a corporeal thing (substance), or the performance of another person (causality), or this other person, i. e. his or her state, so far as I obtain a right to rule over that person; 2.) according to the *form* or mode of acquisition, I have either a *real* right, or a *personal* right, or *both* real and personal right to the possession, not the use, of another person or thing.

Sect. I. Of real rights. § 11. A real right is the right to the private use of a thing, in the common possession of which (whether original or acquired) I am with all others. § 12. The first acquisition of a thing can be no other than that of the soil. § 13. Every part of the soil may be originally acquired, and the ground of the possibility of this acquisition is, that the soil in general was originally common. § 14. The legal act of this acquisition is *occupancy*. § 15. It is in civil society alone, that any *peremptory* acquisition can be made: in a state of nature it can only be *provisional*. § 16. Explanation of the idea of an original acquisition of the soil. § 17. Deduction of this idea:

Sect. II. Of personal rights. § 18. A personal right is the possession of the will of another, as the power of determining that will, through mine to a certain action, according to the laws of freedom.—Of the transference of will by contract. § 19. Of the constituents of a contract. § 20. Of the causality of the will of another, which is acquired. § 21. In a contract, a thing is not acquired by the acceptance of the promise, but by the delivery of what has been promised.

Sect. III. Of real—personal right. § 22. This right is that of the possession of an external object as a *thing*, and of the use of it as a person. § 23. Of the right of the Family-Society. § 24,—27. Title *first*: of the right of marriage. § 28—29: Title *second*: of the rights of parentage. § 30. Title *third*: of the rights of a Master of a Family. § 31, 32. Dogmatical division of all the rights

acquirable by contracts. I. Of Money. II. Of literary property.

Seet. IV. Of the ideal acquisition of an external object of the will.

I. § 33. Of prescription, or the mode of acquiring property by length of possession. II. § 34. Of acquisition by Inheritance. III. § 35, 36. Of posthumous reputation.

CHAP. III. Of the subjectively conditioned acquisition, by the sentence of a Public Court of Justice.

A. § 37. Of the contract of Donation. B. § 38. Of the contract of Loan (commodatum). C. § 39. Of the re-acquisition or reclaiming of property lost (vindicatio). D. § 40. Of the acquisition of security by oath (cautio juratoria). § 41, 42. Transition from property in a state of nature, to that in a juridical state, or civil society in general.

PART II. OF PUBLIC LAW.

Seet. I. § 43, 44. Of the Constitutional Law of a State. § 45—47. Of a State as a collection of men.—Of the powers in a State, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. “The only rational plan of government is that, in which the combined will of the people determines the law.” § 48, 49. Of co-ordinate and subordinate powers.—*General Remarks.*—A. Of the supreme power; of the social compact, and the duty of obedience. Of redress of grievances. Of sedition and rebellion.—According to the principles established by KANT, “A change in the Constitution of a State, “which its faults may sometimes render necessary, can only in “justice be accomplished by the Sovereign, by means of *reform*; “not by the people, by means of a *revolution*; and if it take place, “it can only affect the executive, not the legislative power. At “the same time, if a revolution has once been brought about, and “a new constitution established, the injustice of this revolution in “its beginning and accomplishment, does not free the subjects “from the obligation to accommodate themselves, as good citizens, to the new order of things.” B. Of the rights of the sovereign power to the territory of the State. Of the rights of taxation. Of Finance and Police. C. Of the maintenance of the poor; of Foundling Hospitals; of a religious establishment. D. Of the

the distribution of offices ; of rank in the State ; of Nobility. *E.* Of criminal law, and a penal code ; of the right of punishing and pardoning. § 50. Of the relation of a citizen to his native and other countries, in point of right and obligation. § 51. Of the different forms of government. § 52. Of the attainment of that rational form, which the spirit of an original compact requires, which makes *freedom* alone the principle, i. e. the basis, and condition of all *force*.—Of the representative System.

Secl. II. Of the law of Nations, or international law. § 53, 54. Nations, in their external relation to each other, are in a state of nature, not unlike lawless savages, among whom the right of the strongest is established ; consequently, a confederacy of states becomes necessary, in order to protect one another against external attacks, conformably to the idea of an original social compact. § 55—58. Of the right of making war, both with regard to the subjects of a State, and foreign nations. § 59, 60. Of the right of peace. § 61. Of the injustice of a state of warfare. “ *There shall be no war*, is the irresistible *veto* of morally-practical Reason.”—Of the mode of bringing nations, like individuals, from a state of nature to a *juridical* state.—Of the establishment and maintenance of a perpetual peace, by means of a permanent Congress of States.

Secl. III. Of Cosmopolitical law, or the rights of the citizen of the world. § 62. Of the right of mutual intercourse and commerce, as belonging to all mankind.

Conclusion.

This union of the whole human race, under certain universal laws, it may be said, is not the partial, but the total and complete attainment of the grand aim, the final purpose of Jurisprudence within the boundaries of mere Reason. For, that the prototype of a juridical federation of men, according to public laws in general, must be derived from Reason *a priori*, is now obvious ; since all the examples, taken from experience, can indeed serve the purpose of illustrating, but not of establishing, the necessity of a metaphysical decision of this important question. Those very men, who smile at the novelty of this inquiry, incautiously betray themselves, when
they

they admit, and even make use of the common-place assertion, "that that is the best constitution, in which the laws govern, not men." And what, 'says the author,' can be more sublime than this idea, which is evidently applicable to practice, and capable of being realized in experience, and which alone—provided it is not attempted to be brought about by means of revolutions, or the forcible overthrow of all erroneous establishments (for that would be the annihilation of all law and justice), but by gradual reform, according to fixed principles—leads by continual approximation to the supreme political good, A PERPETUAL PEACE.

XXX. (12.) *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre.*

Metaphysical Elements of Ethics. 8vo. Koenigsberg. 1797.

With this publication Prof. Kant will probably conclude his systematic labours in the field of the Critical Philosophy. Though, on account of its very recent appearance, I have not yet obtained a copy of this work, among the books lately received from Germany; I can in some degree satisfy the curiosity [of the reader, by stating the object of it, as abstracted from the general Introduction, which is premised to the preceding "Elements of Jurisprudence."

'Moral laws can only be so far valid as rules, if they can be established *a priori*, so that the necessity of them becomes evident. For the conceptions and judgments, relative to our actions and omissions, have no moral application at all, if they contain nothing further than what is learned from experience. And if we should even be misled to assume any data, from the latter source, as moral principles, we cannot avoid falling into the grossest and most destructive errors.

'If the doctrine of morals had no other aim than that of personal happiness, it would be absurd to search for principles *a priori*, in order to establish such a doctrine. For, however plausible it may appear, that Reason can perceive previous to experience, by what means man may arrive at the permanent enjoyment of the true pleasures of life, yet every proposition of this kind, *a priori*, is either tautological, or it rests upon groundless hypotheses. Ex-
perience

perience alone can inform us of what is attended with pleasure. The natural instinct for nourishment, the sexual impulse, rest, motion, and (after developing the dispositions of nature) the struggles for honour, the enlargement of our knowledge, and the like, can intimate to every individual in particular, how he may *estimate* his pleasures, and at the same time inform him of the means, by which he is to *attain* them. All plausible reasoning *a priori* is, here, in reality nothing else but experience, which, by induction, has received a general character. This generality, far from being universal, is so very limited, that an indefinite number of exceptions must be granted to every individual, in order to adopt that choice in the mode of life, to his particular inclination, and to his susceptibility of pleasures;—so that, in the end, he can profit and grow wiser only from his own detriment, or that of others.

‘The doctrines of morality, however, have a very different origin. They are imperative to every individual, without regarding his inclinations; for this reason merely, because he is a free subject, and is capable of reasoning practically. Instruction, in the laws of morality, is not derived from reflection upon ourselves and our animal nature, nor from the observation of the course of the world, namely from events and actions; but Reason itself commands us, how to act, though we should find no analogy or example in experience, corresponding with the present case. Reason, further, in this injunction, does not attend to the advantage or disadvantage, which may accompany our actions; for experience alone could give us any information upon this point. We are indeed entitled to pursue our advantage in every possible manner, provided that we act consistently with both Reason and prudence; for the former enjoins, while the latter only advises that, upon the whole, we shall derive greater advantages, if we follow, than if we transgress the dictates of Reason.’

The following Essays, written by Prof. Kant, were published in different periodical works of Germany, in the chronological order here stated.

1. *Von den verschiedenen Ragen der Menschen.* Of the different races of man. Published in ENGEL'S *Philosopher of the world*: first Edit. 8vo. Leipzig, 1777, from p. 125 to p. 164.

2. *Briefwechsel zwischen Kant und dem verstorbenen Lambert.* Correspondence between Kant and the late Lambert.—Published in BERNOUILLI'S *Literary Correspondence between learned Germans.* Vol. I. from p. 333 to 368.—1781.

3. *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht.*—Plan of a general history in a cosmopolitical view. Published in the *Berlin Monthly Magazine*, for November, 1784.

4. *Beantwortung der Frage: was ist Aufklärung?*—Reply to the question, what is understood by illumination (of mind). *Ibid.* for December, 1784.

5. *Ueber die Vulkane im Monde.*—On the Volcanos in the moon. *Ibid.* for March, 1785.

6. *Von der Unrechtmässigkeit des Büchernachdrucks.*—On the injustice of printing spurious editions of books.—*Ibid.* for May, 1785.

7. *Bestimmung des Begriffs einer Menschenrace*.—Definition of the idea connected with the expression “a race of men.”—*Ibid.* for November, 1785.

8. *Muthmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte*.—On the probable Origin of Human History. *Ibid.* for January, 1786.

This Essay the author himself considers as the most successful of his popular productions, or minor works. And though I have not been able to procure a copy of that number, in which it appeared in the Berlin Monthly Magazine, without ordering the whole set for the year 1786, I can give the following character of this treatise, upon the authority of *Prof. Will of Altdorf*, as extracted from his “*Lectures on the Kantian Philosophy*, 8vo. 200 pages; 1788,” in which he says, p. 32:—“This masterly performance contains a philosophical explanation, which certainly is better founded than upon mere conjecture (as the title modestly expresses). Though it apparently deviates from the Mosaic narrative, it nevertheless forms an useful addition to the Bible, and affords illustrations of its historical truth.”

9. *Was heisst : sich im Denken orientiren?*—What is understood by the expression, “to familiarize oneself in thinking;” i. e. to trace the ideas of our own mind to their source.—*Ibid.* for October, 1786.

10. *Abhandlung von dem Gebrauche teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie*.—A Treatise concerning the application of teleological principles in philosophy.—Published in the *German Mercury*, for January and February, 1788.

11. *Ueber das Mislingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee.*—On the failure of all philosophical attempts made in the *Theodicea* (by Leibnitz).—*Berlin Monthly Magazine* for September, 1791.

12. *Ueber das radikale Böse in der menschlichen Natur*—On the radical evil in human nature.—*Ibid.* for April, 1792.

13. *Ueber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig seyn, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis.*—On the commonplace assertion, “that may be true in theory, but is not applicable to practice.” *Ibid.* for September, 1793.

14. *Etwas über den Einfluss des Mondes auf die Witterung.* Some Remarks relative to the influence of the Moon on the Weather. *Ibid.* for May 1794.

G L O S S A R Y.

Those terms, which explain themselves from the context of the Elements, are here omitted.

Such phrases, as have only one definition attached to them, must be understood in a general sense.

If any words occur in these definitions, which appear obscure or paradoxical, or do not sufficiently explain the meaning of the term under consideration, the reader is requested to have recourse to the further explanations of such words, in the alphabetical order of this Glossary.

To render this nomenclature subservient to the purpose of obtaining a more general view of Kant's Philosophy, than could be given in the preceding Elements, I have added explanations of many terms, which, though not occurring in this concise account, are used by the author in a peculiar sense.

AESTHETIC

commonly signifies the Critique of Taste, but with Kant, the science containing the rules of sensation, in contradistinction to Logic, or the doctrine of the Understanding.

TO AFFECT

means, to make immediate impressions on the Sensitive Faculty, i. e. to occasion representations and desires.

AFFIRMATIVE, See JUDGMENTS.

AGREEABLE; (*jucundum*) *angenehm*,

is an object of the Sensitive Faculty, so far as it influences the will; or what pleases the senses in relation to feelings; or

what affords us pleasure. The agreeable is not something *absolutely good*, i. e. good in the estimation of every rational being; because it does not immediately depend on Reason itself, but on the relative state of the mind, sensitive inclinations, and the like. The *good*, on the contrary, is an object of pure Reason, something that is conformable to the subject of all rational beings.

ANALYSIS—*Zergliederung*,

- 1) of an *idea*, is the reduction of it to those characters, of which it is compounded, in order to render the cognition of it clearer, though we cannot by this process make it more complete: hence it does not furnish us with additional knowledge, but merely arranges what we already possess.
- 2) considered in a *general sense*; Analysis is the science, treating of the form of real knowledge, and of the rules, by which we can examine that knowledge. It is a part of general *Logic*, and the negative criterion of truth; in this sense it is opposed to *Dialectic*.
- 3) *Transcendental Analysis* is the decomposition of the pure intellectual faculty into the elements, through which all the operations of thought are carried on.
- 4) of *pure practical Reason*, i. e. of the pure practical faculty of Reason, or of the pure will, into its elements.

ANALYTICAL, See JUDGMENTS.

ANTHROPOLOGY

signifies in general the experimental doctrine of the nature of man; and is divided, by Kant, into

- 1) *theoretical* or empirical doctrine of mind, which is a branch of Natural Philosophy;
- 2) *practical*, applied, and empirical Philosophy of Morals; Ethics—the consideration of the moral law in relation to the human will, its inclinations, motives, and to the obstacles in practising that law.

ANTHRO-

ANTHROPOMORPHISMUS

is the art of attributing properties, observed in the world of sense, to a being remote from that world ; or the sensualization of an idea of Reason : for instance, if we think of the Deity by human predicates.

ANTICIPATION

of experience, is a cognition of objects liable to observation *a priori*, previous to the observation itself, i. e. according to the pure form of perception, in consequence of which all phenomena are in *Space* and *Time*.

ANTINOMY OF REASON

1. in general ; a contradiction between two laws ;

2. in particular,

a) of *pure speculative Reason*, is the contradiction in the results of it, in the application of its subjective idea relative to the unconditional thing, as well as in the application of its law, to the world of sense ; a law, by which we form conclusions from the given (perceived) conditional thing, to what is unconditional.

b) of *pure practical Reason*, which occurs in the inquiry into the highest good ; where, on the one hand, practical Reason presupposes a necessary combination between virtue and happiness ; but, on the other hand, there is no possibility of perceiving this combination analytically or synthetically, neither *a priori* nor *a posteriori*.—This antinomy is solved by showing the real connection between our good conduct and wellbeing ; though this connection be concealed in the world of sense, yet it is really existing throughout the whole of it, and founded on the supersensible existence of ourselves, in connection with other things.

APODICTICAL

APODICTICAL

or absolute, and attended with the consciousness of necessity.

A POSTERIORI,

i. e. through sensation, experience.—The distinction between our knowledge obtained *a posteriori*, may be rendered more clear by its opposite, *a priori*. This distinction, in the philosophy of Kant, does not relate to the *series of time*, in which; but to the *source*, from which we receive knowledge or cognitions. Every representation or cognition is *a posteriori*; that is not founded merely on the original faculty of the mind; but in some one or other modification, which that faculty has received. Such representations or cognitions are therefore called *empirical*.

A PRIORI

originally does not signify, with KANT, a cognition or representation which, in order of time, precedes experience; of which we could become conscious independent of all sensations; and which, at the same time with the representing faculty, could be present in our mind as a real representation. Such are the “innate notions or ideas,” which Kant expressly rejects throughout his works. But by the term “*a priori*” he understands those representations, which we acquire through the exertions of our own mind, or the thinking subject; and not *through* observation and sensation (*a posteriori*); not through given objects and from them, but *from* our faculty of cognition; though this latter must be rendered active by means of sensible impressions; and though the origin or production of such a representation can in this manner only be accomplished. Further, all that is *a priori*, which lies in the original conformation of the thinking subject, and is not founded on the operation of objects, which consequently is not first introduced *into* the mind, but is evolved *from* it, by

its peculiar faculties. All these representations nevertheless presuppose experience, i. e. materials of application, if we are to become conscious of them, and refer them to objects. Without experience, they are non-entities. They do not precede experience as real representations, but as the conditions, that render experience itself possible. All objective reality of them is founded merely on experience.

APPERCEPTION

or consciousness, or the faculty of becoming conscious, signifies

- 1) in general, the same as representation, or the faculty of representing ;
- 2) in particular, the representation as distinct from the subject that represents, and from the object that is represented.
- 3) *self-consciousness*, for which we have two faculties,
 - a—the *empirical*, the internal sense, i. e. the consciousness of our state at any time, of our observations. This is as subject to change, as the observations themselves ; considered in itself, it is not confined to any one place, and does not relate to the identity of the subject.
 - b—the *transcendental*, pure, original, i. e. the consciousness of the identity of ourselves, with all the variety of empirical consciousness. It is that self-consciousness, which generates the bare idea “ I,” or “ *I think*,” as being the simple correlate of all other ideas, and the condition of their unity and necessary connection.

There occurs a remark in Kant's Critique of pure Reason, which is very humiliating in the transcendental doctrine of mind. He says upon this occasion : “ Though
 “ consciousness has no extensive magnitude, and there-
 “ fore is not divisible, it certainly has intensive magni-
 “ tude, and we may well conceive a cessation of it, by a
 “ *remission* of power.—For there is a certain degree of
 “ con-

“consciousness even in obscure representations, save that
 “it does not always suffice to distinguish one idea from
 “another, i. e. to make it clear and evident.”

APPETITIVE FACULTY, or FACULTY OF DESIRING,

(*Begehrungsvermögen*)

in the most general sense, is the power inherent in a living being, to become through his representations the real cause of obtaining the objects corresponding with them; although the physical powers should not be adequate to the real production of the object desired: v. g. to wish for the great prize in the lottery, and the like.

APPREHENSION

is an act of the mind, by which the variety of individual perceptions is collected, combined with one another, and images are produced. We may distinguish,

1. the *pure synthesis of apprehension*, which compounds the variety of perceptions *a priori*, of Space and Time, and produces pure images, such as representations of numbers, geometrical figures, &c.
2. *empirical apprehension*, which combines the pure perceptions together with their matter, i. e. with sensible impressions, and produces the images of phenomena; v. g. when I observe a house, the freezing of water, &c.

APPROBATION, See SATISFACTION.

ARCHITECTONIC

is the art of constructing Systems. The Architectonic of pure Reason is, therefore, the plan for a System of pure philosophy.

ART, (*Kunst*)

- 1, in the most extensive sense, is arbitrary production, in consequence of preceding representations;

2, in a more limited sense, is production through Liberty, i. e. through a free will, which adopts Reason as the ground of its actions.

ARTICULATION

is the structure of the members of a science, or the systematic unity of it.

ASSERTORY, See IMPERATIVE and JUDGMENTS.

ATTRIBUTE

or *property*, is a character belonging to the existence of a thing conceived, as to its internal possibility ; which character can be derived from things, or beings, as the necessary, i. e. sufficiently established consequence of them.

AUTONOMY,

a peculiar legislation of the *will*, is that constitution of a rational will, by which it is a law to itself, by which it determines itself, uninfluenced by inclinations. It is the independence of the will on all matter of it, i. e. on sensitive desires and their objects ; the dependence on a rational will, merely on itself, i. e. upon the form of Reason. This is a practically necessary idea, in order to comprehend in this manner the possibility of an unconditional Imperative, and a goodness (morality) of actions independent on external interest.

AXIOM

is a synthetical principle *a priori*, which contains immediate or intuitive certainty ; i. e. derived from objects of pure perception, and which does not admit of proof, and of the truth of which, we can point out no more accurate character, than what it itself expresses.

BAD—*Böses*

is that which, according to a rational principle, is a necessary object of detestation, in distinction from the *disagreeable*, i. e. what occasions an immediate sensation of pain.

BEAUTIFUL—*Schön*

is that, which excites pleasure and claims our approbation, without satisfying any wants : which pleases us by the harmonious employment of our representing faculty, unconnected with animal desires ; and which we are fond of communicating to others ; for instance, a witty idea, an acute or bold reflection, a strong picture, and the like.

BEAUTY—*Schönheit*

is the regular conformation of an object, so far as we observe this in it, without representing to ourselves any design or purpose ; the regular *subjective* conformation of an object of nature or art ; the expression of æsthetical ideas.

BEING—*Wesen, Ding*

signifies 1) a conception with its constituent parts ; logically, a *subjectum quod*. The term ' being ' is distinguished from the word ' nature ; ' in as much as the former is the internal principle of all those determinations, which relate to the *possibility* of a thing ; and the latter, nature, is the internal principle of all the determinations, relating to the *existence* of a thing :—
2) a real being, *subjectum quo*, the nature of a thing.

BELIEF—*Glaube*

- 1, signifies the *act* of taking something for true, on account of sufficient subjective, without any objective, reasons for doing so ; or, in other words, to conceive things as subjects of cognition, or to admit their possible existence ; because Reason enjoins it. These subjective grounds are a certain interest, certain *purposes* ;—
- 2, the *habit*, the moral way of thinking, by which Reason considers as true, what is inaccessible to our theoretical cognition of things ;—
- 3, in particular, *fides sacra* ; the adoption of religious principles.

CANON,

in general, means 'a science treating of the proper use of our faculty of cognition:' it is therefore opposed to '*Discipline*,' which is a guide, directing us to prevent the improper use of that faculty.

CATEGORICAL, See JUDGMENTS.

CATEGORIES

- 1, in general, are original notions or intellectual conceptions, which correspond with the simple form of a judgment; logical functions applied to objects in general;—
- 2, in particular, and according to their twofold use, they are,
 - a) *Categories of theoretical Reason*, or of *Nature*; so far namely, as they are referred to the variety of sensible perceptions, in order to give it unity of apperception in a judgment of experience, or a cognition of nature; hence they are conceptions of unity in this cognition;
 - b) *Categories of practical Reason*; so far as the same functions of the Understanding are referred to the variety of desires, in order to obtain for it unity in the rational idea of morality.

CAUSALITY—CAUSATION,

dependence, causal connection, signifies

- 1, *logically*, the function of the Understanding in a hypothetical judgment; the representation concerning the logical relation of cause and effect to one another;
- 2, as the *pure category* corresponding with this function, it expresses the notion of a real relation of different objects to one another; the necessary determination of the existence of a something through something of a different kind, whether this be homogeneous or not;—a species of synthesis,

in which, according to, and by means of, something A (cause) we necessarily admit something very different, B (effect), and this in consequence of an absolutely general rule, so that we can conclude the existence of A, from the existence of B.

CERTAINTY—*Gewissheit*

is the consciousness arising from sufficient objective reasons, which are valid with respect to every body.

CHANGE—*Veränderung*,

accidens, is the succession of different states, transition of a thing from one state to another; the co-existence of what is standing and steady in time, with that which changes; the connection of opposite predicates in one and the same object, but at different times, v. g. motion, i. e. a being and not-being of the same thing, in the same place, but at different periods of time.

COGNITION,—*Erkenntnis*,

in general, is a whole of connected representations in one act of consciousness; or the determinate reference of given representations to one object.—Every cognition has 1) *matter*, substance, i. e. something objective, which arises from the objects represented; the variety of given perceptions, objects: 2) *form*, i. e. a determinate way or mode, in which the given matter is received, modified, and combined by the representing faculty; that, which relates to the operation of mind in our cognitions; that, which depends upon the constitution of the thinking subject, or of the Understanding and Reason.

COMMON SENSE—*Gemeinsinn*

is the faculty of determining what pleases or displeases, not through conceptions, but merely through feelings; yet this determination has general validity.

TO CONCEIVE—*Begreifen*

is a function of Reason, as “*to understand*,” i. e. to think of an object, is an act of the Understanding.

CONCEPTION—*Begriff*,

1, in the most extensive sense; is every production of the active representing faculty, by which variety, or the multifarious, is connected into unity :

2, in a more determined sense; is a general representation abstracted from a variety of intuitions, and is opposed to a single representation or intuition. A conception of this kind is called by Kant, ‘*discursive* ;’ because it does not immediately refer to the object, but only by the representation of a character, which may be common to an infinite variety of things, the representation of which is contained *under* (not, *in*) a *discursive conception*.

IN CONCRETO,

i. e. in real nature, in real objects of experience. Here, many things may be differently constituted, from what they are “*in abstracto*,” i. e. when we reflect merely upon the pure idea of a thing, without attending to what may yet lie in the sensible perception of an object.

CONDITION—*Bedingung*,

the requisite, the ground, that which must be presupposed, in order to understand or to comprehend some other datum, or given thing.—Whatever presupposes a condition, is called *conditionate* or *conditional*.

In *practical* philosophy, we must distinguish

1, that, which is *practically conditionate*, which is determined through natural inclinations and necessities; for instance, the *imperatives* of happiness are valid only under the condition, that

that a person feels an inclination for something, an impulse towards something, a necessity of a certain kind ; and not otherwise :

2, that, which is *practically unconditionate*, which depends merely on Reason itself, i. e. on the moral law, for instance a pure, disinterested integrity, fidelity, and general utility.

CONFORMATION—*Zweckmäßigkeit*,

i. e. *forma, sive nexus finalis*, is that constitution of an object (or even of a state of mind, or of an action), which can be conceived, or thought of by us, as possible only through a causality according to conceptions, that is, through a Will.

CONSCIENCE—*Gewissen*,

means 1) the moral sense, relative to our own actions ;
2) the self-determining moral faculty of judging ; that unconditionate consciousness of duty, by which we can determine within ourselves, whether an action, we are about to perform, be just or otherwise.

CONSCIOUSNESS—*Bewußtseyn* ; See APPERCEPTION.

CONSTITUTION OF STATE—*Staatsverfassung* ;

the most perfect is that, in which the liberty of every individual is thoroughly consistent with the freedom of all members of society.

CONSTITUTIVE

principles are those, which refer to an object, so as to determine something relative to it, i. e. to the representation of it ; namely either the intuition of an object, v. g. the mathematical principles ; or the experimental conception of it, v. g. the dynamical principles of the Understanding.

REGULATIVE principles, on the contrary, are those, which do

do not determine the objects themselves, but which afford us rules, i. e. determinations of the Understanding, to search for the objects in question.

TO CONSTRUCT

an idea, means to determine an individual object, i. e. the perception itself of that object, which is perfectly conformable to the general idea.

An object requires perception; an empirical perception, however, we cannot spontaneously produce; for the pure perception only is possible *a priori*. In this, namely Space and Time, we can form certain determinations, and combine them in the pure representing faculty, for instance an equilateral triangle. In a similar manner, we can construct the intensive magnitude of the sensations of the solar light, i. e. we can compound them of about 200,000 times the quantity of the light of the moon, and predicate them in a determined manner *a priori*;—of two given members of a proportion, we are able to construct a third, such as $2 : 4 : 8$, &c.

Construction, in a general sense, signifies every exhibition of a general idea, by means of the self-active production of a perception, that corresponds with the idea.

CONTACT—*Berührung*,

1, in a *mathematical* sense, is the common boundary of two spaces, which is neither within the one nor the other, v. g. two intersecting lines do not touch one another, because their common point belongs to each of them :

2, in a *physical* sense, is the reciprocal effect of the repelling powers in the common boundary of two spaces; the immediate action and reaction of impenetrability. It is distinguished from the action at distance, i. e. from the effect of one matter upon the other, without the mediation of other intervening matters through the empty space, v. g. in the essential

tial attraction.—The beginning of contact in the approach of one matter to another, is called ‘percussion’ (*Stoß*) ; the continuation of it, ‘pressure’ (*Druck*).

C ONTINUANCE, or PERMANENCY—*Beharrlichkeit*, is existence at all times, without origin and evanescence. If; in this manner; we represent to ourselves the existence of phenomena, we class them under the pure intellectual conception; or Category of Substance.

CONTINUITY—*Stätigkeit*;

refers to that magnitude; no part of which is the absolutely smallest and most simple, and in the solution of which we never can arrive at determined last unities; for instance, Space and Time, together with the phenomena that exist in them.

CONTRADICTION—*Widerspruch* ;

the principle of contradiction, i. e. “no one thing admits of being represented by contradictory predicates,” is the negative criterion of all abstract truth, and the source of all our analytical, but not of synthetical, cognitions.

CONVICTION: See PROOFS:

COSMOLOGY;

the *transcendental*, rational cosmology; is either the Science embracing the whole of the phenomena in nature, or the metaphysical philosophy of the supersensible properties of all objects existing.

COSMO-THEOLOGY

is the cognition of a primitive Being, from the existence of a world in general, and its accidentality, as opposed to substance.

CRITICISM,

with Kant, signifies a critical mode of proceeding (doubts of delay) i. e. the maxim of general distrust with respect to all synthetical

synthetical judgments *a priori*, until we have acquired a view of the universal ground of their possibility, in the essential conditions of our faculties of cognition.

CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON,

or transcendental Critique, is the Science of the pure faculty of Reason; the inquiry into those particulars, which Reason is able to know and to perform, from its own sources, and independent of experience;—*vid.* the more ample definition, pp. 42 and 43.

CULTURE,

in a *positive* sense, is used by Kant, to express the promptness we acquire in obeying rules; to which he opposes the term '*Discipline*,' in a *negative* sense, which weakens and destroys that readiness, and makes us suspend our judgment. The whole Critique is a Discipline, as to the contents of pure rational cognition; but as to its method, only a particular part of the Critique is Discipline.

DAEMONOLÖGY

is the doctrine of higher, but in other respects finite, beings resembling man; in opposition to *Theology*, the doctrine of the highest and infinite Being. Physical Teleology leads us to the former; moral Teleology to the latter.

DECEPTION—*Betrug, Täuschung,*

is that illusion of the *senses*, when we consider something, which is obtained by conclusions, as the immediate observation itself. This is no error of the senses, but of the Judging Faculty or the Understanding.—There is not only a deception of the *external sense*, v. g. the optical, but also, an illusion of the *internal sense*, v. g. when the fanatic believes to feel supernatural influence, or when we confound the sensation, which necessarily accompanies a moral action or determination of the will, with the cause of the action itself.

U

DEDUCTION

DEDUCTION,

in general, is the proof of a legal claim, a right ; but, in particular, Kant understands by it the establishment of a representation ; the proof of the right we have to make use of it ; the proof, that a representation has sense, meaning, reality, objective validity, that it is not vague or empty, but relates to objects.

DEMONSTRABLE,

in *Logic*, are called those positions, which admit of immediate proof ; in opposition to *indemonstrable* positions, that admit of no proof ;—in a *critical* sense, such conceptions or judgments are demonstrable, as can be exhibited in perception, whether pure or empirical ; in opposition to the *indemonstrable*, which cannot be thus exhibited.

DETERMINATION—*Bestimmung*,

1) as opposed to substance ; accidents, a *logical predicate* of a subject : 2) a *réal predicate*, which amplifies the conception ; the determination of a thing : v. g. hard, elastic, &c. and *not* mere existence.—The *determinations* of a thing are, according to the source of cognition, *empirical*, when they are derived from experience ; *transcendental*, when they arise from the representing subject *a priori*.

DETERMINISM

is the principle of determining the will from sufficient internal (subjective) reasons. To combine this principle with that of freedom, i. e. absolute spontaneity, occasions no difficulty.

DIALECTIC

is used by Kant in the following significations :

1) *logical*, formal ; that Logic, which treats of the sources of error and illusion, and the mode of detecting them :

2)

2) *transcendental*, material Dialectic; the exhibition and judgment of that illusion, which arises from the subjective constitution of Reason itself a priori.

DISCIPLINE—*Zucht*, See CULTURE.

DISJUNCTIVE; See JUDGMENTS.

To DISPUTE

upon any thing, means to decide it by proofs, i. e. from objective conceptions, on which the judgment is founded.—To *contest* (*streiten*) any thing, signifies to claim the consent of others to our judgment; though we cannot always produce objective reasons, and frequently have only subjective grounds to go upon, i. e. æsthetical grounds, feelings.

DISTANCE: See CONTACT.

DIVINES—*Geistliche*

are teachers of the pure moral Religion; as being opposed to '*priests*, i. e. the consecrated ministers of *pious* customs and ceremonies.

DOGMA,

or a dogmatical judgment, is a direct synthetical decision from conceptions, and is distinguished

- 1, from analytical judgments, which properly teach nothing;
- 2, from experimental positions, which have no apodictic or demonstrative certainty;
- 3, from mathematical principles, i. e. from synthetical judgments arising from the construction of ideas; and
- 4, from principles, i. e. indirect synthetico-apodictic judgments, such as the principle of the '*sufficient reason*.' Speculative pure Reason contains no dogmas; for its ideas have no constitutive, objective reality; hence it admits of no dogmatical method.

DOGMATISM

or the dogmatical process of pure Reason, is the prejudice of maintaining and deciding metaphysical propositions according to customary principles, and of determining upon the existence or non-existence of supersensible objects and their properties, without having previously deduced the possibility of them from the faculties of Reason: it is therefore, Metaphysics without a previous Critique.—Dogmatism paves the way for Scepticism; this compels us to have recourse to a Critique; and this lastly conducts us to a solid system of science.

DUTY—*Pflicht*,

is the obedience of a law from a true regard for it; the objective necessity of an action for the sake of the law, so far as this *obliges* the will, i. e. *morally* compels it; though it may have some other subjective desires.

DYNAMICAL

1) in general, is said of things, so far as we do not attend to their quantity in perception, but to the ground or cause of their existence. Hence Kant calls, 2) in particular, a *synthesis* dynamical, where the things combined necessarily belong to one another, but must not necessarily be of a homogenous nature, because they do not, (as in the *mathematical* synthesis) constitute together One magnitude, *quantum*. The synthesis of cause and effect, for instance, is dynamical.

EFFECT: See CAUSALITY.

EMPIRICAL: See A POSTERIORI.

EPIGENESIS OF PURE REASON

has been called the Kantian explanation concerning the coincidence of the pure intellectual conceptions (Categories) with the objects of experience; according to which explanation,
by

by these pure notions or conceptions, being the forms of thought, experience itself and its objects, as such, become possible,

Vid. the fourth Problem, p. 49 & seq.

ETHICO-THEOLOGY

is that species of Theology, which is derived from pure moral arguments, and admits no symbolical representations.

EXPERIENCE—*Erfabrung*

is, with Kant, an objective, i. e. universally valid and necessary synthetical cognition of given objects (phenomena); or, the representation of observations in a necessarily determined connection; cognition through combined observation; the connection of sensible representations according to certain laws.

EXTENSION—*Ausdehnung*,

in the most comprehensive sense, is the representation of a whole, by means of its continued parts. If these are simultaneous or coexistent, it is *Space*: if they follow one another in succession, it is *Time*. According to this use of the word 'extension,' every *magnitude* is called *extensive*, which is represented by the successive connection of parts of time and space, when the representation of the whole becomes possible only by the representation of the parts. In this sense extension is used in Mathematics, and hence the *matheſis extenſorum*.

EXTENSIVE POWER

is, according to Kant, original elasticity or the power of an extended thing by means of the repulsion of all its parts.—It so far differs from what is commonly called *elasticity*, as this is the power of a matter, to resume its form or magnitude changed by another moving power, upon the remission of the latter.

FANCY

FANCY—*Wahn*

is that deception, in which we consider the mere representation of a thing as equivalent to the thing itself. *Religious fancy* manifests itself in this, when man considers the statutory belief and ceremonies as the substance of religion, and as the supreme condition, upon which he may obtain the approbation of the Deity.

FATALISM

is that system, in which the connection of purposes in the world is considered as accidental; and in which this connection is yet derived from a Supreme Being, not indeed from his rational nature, but from the necessary constitution of this Being, and the unity of the world thence arising. Such, for instance, is the system of Spinoza.

FINAL PURPOSE—*Endzweck*

is that, which requires no other purpose as the condition of its possibility; which contains in itself the determining cause, the necessary and sufficient condition of all other purposes.

FORM

is the determined mode of thinking something, or the manner of its existence; it is opposed to *matter*, i. e. that which is given and determinable.

FUNCTION

is the office, the activity, the form of an higher faculty of cognition: 1) of the *Understanding* —to think and to judge; 2) of *Reason* —to conclude.

Function is opposed to *affection*, as this implies a change, to which our Sensitive Faculty is subject.

GENIUS—*ingenium*

is the talent, the gift of nature, or the native disposition of the mind, from which nature prescribes the rule to art.

To

TO GIVE—*Geben*

an object, is to perceive it, to observe it; to refer the conception of it to real or possible experience. That an object be given, is a necessary condition for receiving a *cognition* of it, but not so, for *thinking* of it only.

GOOD—*Gutes*,

is that, of which reason approves, and which it considers as practically necessary; that, which according to a rational principle is a necessary object of the faculty of desiring; which has some value. It is opposed to the *agreeable*, which satisfies the inclinations of the senses, or which affords us pleasure.

GRAVITATION

is called the effect of universal attraction, which every part of matter immediately exerts on all other parts, and at all distances.—Kant distinguishes *gravitation* from *gravity*, i. e. the effort of matter to move itself in the direction of the superior gravitation.

GROUND OF DETERMINATION—*Bestimmungsgrund*.

The grounds or causes of determining our actions, are called *formal* (laws), so far as they ascertain the way and manner, in which we view an object; *material* (maxims), so far as they determine the objects, to which an action is directed, *subjective* (laws), so far as they depend upon pure rational conceptions; *objective* (motives), so far as they affect the Sensitive Faculty; *practical*, so far as the last ground, which determines the will is an idea from pure Reason; *aesthetical*, when the last grounds of volition are met with in certain feelings of sense. The pure moral law is the formal ground of determining moral actions; hence the good and bad, i. e. the objects of moral desire and aversion, depend upon this law: it is, therefore, likewise the material ground of determination,

tion, and is objective, as being the form of practical Reason itself. The moral sense is the subjective ground of the same action ; but, as this sense or feeling itself is again produced by Reason, it cannot be æsthetical.

HAPPINESS—*Glückseligkeit*

signifies, with Kant, the whole prosperity of a finite, rational being ; the consciousness of the agreeable situation, which uninterruptedly accompanies the whole existence of such a being. —It arises from the satisfaction of all inclinations, from the attainment of all ends, which the Sensitive Faculty proposes, and is therefore a prototype of the imagination.

HETERONOMY,

or a foreign legislation, is that, in which not the will itself, but something else determines us to act in a certain manner ; when not the action itself, but merely its object, its effect, interests us ; when, beside the idea of the action, another extraneous allurements or compulsion, i. e. hope or fear must concur, in order to produce the action.

HIGHEST GOOD—*Höchstes Gut*

is the whole unconditionate object of pure practical Reason, and consists 1) in virtue as the constituent of being happy ; the *supreme good* ; 2) in happiness itself, so far as it is connected with that worth ; the *perfect good*.

HYPOTHESIS

is an explanation of something that is real, by something else, the reality of which is not demonstrable or, at least, is not demonstrated.

HYPOTHETICAL : See JUDGMENTS.

IDEA.

This expression Kant employs more determinately (borrowed

rowed from Plato), than is commonly used in modern languages. According to Kant, it signifies a necessary conception of Reason, the object of which cannot be perceived by the senses, nor acquired by experience.

IDEALISM

is called that system of philosophy, in which the external reality of certain intuitive representations is disputed or doubted, and space as well as external objects are asserted to be mere fancies.—Such is the system of the celebrated bishop Berkley:

ILLUSION—*Täuschung, Schein,*

is a false judgment, in which we attribute a predicate to an object in itself, which predicate belongs to it merely in relation to the subject.

IMAGINATION—*Einbildungskraft*

is the faculty of representing an object, in perception, though it should not be present.

IMMANENT

is used by Kant in opposition to *transcendental*: the former term is applied to conceptions or principles, which are valid in nature, and are used concerning objects of experience, phenomena; though the principles themselves are not derived from experience: v. g. the application of the principle of causality is *immanent*, when it is applied to the relation subsisting among the phenomena of nature as such: it would be *transcendent*, when we go with this principle beyond experience, and endeavour to prove from it the existence of the Deity.

IMMORTALITY—*Unsterblichkeit,*

of the soul, cannot be proved from speculative reasons, nor from its self-subsistence, simplicity, and so forth; hence it is

not properly an object of knowledge, but it may yet be concluded by analogy, partly from the disproportion of the great talents of man to the confined duration of his present life ; and partly for the sake of giving energy to the necessary laws of morality : in this manner it may be defended against all the speculative objections of the rude materialists.

IMPERATIVE—*Gebot*,

- 1) in general, is an objective practical law ;
- 2) in a more determined sense, it is the formula or prescribed model of that law, by which it is referred to a will, as the necessary precept of its actions ; though this will may subjectively have some other object of its wishes, because it is not purely rational, but also depends on inclinations, v. g. those of the human species.

IMPRESSION—*Eindruck*.

‘ Objects make impressions upon us,’ signifies with Kant, that objects of the external sense, external phenomena, affect the internal sense, and are real objects of thought ; consequently, that they are sufficiently distinguished from the thoughts themselves, which never can be exhibited in *Space*.—The *modus operandi* or the origin of this influence occasioned by sensible impressions, cannot be explained by the principles of Kant, nor of any other philosopher.

INCLINATION—*Neigung*

signifies a sensible impulse, the dependence of the appetitive faculty on sensations ; in opposition to ‘ *interest*,’ i. e. the dependence of that faculty on rational ideas.—The amount of all inclinations is *self-love* ; the satisfaction or gratification of an inclination is *pleasure* ; that of all inclinations, is *happiness*.

INDETERMINISM

is that inert system of philosophy, which imagines freedom to consist

confist in the accidentality (chance) of actions ; that the will is not at all determined by arguments ; and that a free being is equally liable, to commit good as well as bad actions

INDIFFERENTISTS

are called those latitudinarians of neutrality, who assert, that there are indifferent or involuntary actions, which are neither morally good nor bad.

INDIVIDUAL : See JUDGMENTS.

INDUCEMENT—*Bewegungsgrund*,

is the objective ground of the will, so far as it, being represented by Reason, determines the will.—It is distinguished from the 'MOTIVE,' *Triebfeder*, which is something subjective, i. e. an inclination, which impels us to an action.

INDUCTION

is cognition of the whole or of the genus, by means of the parts observed or perceived : v. g. if we ascribe to bodies in general, what we have hitherto every where discovered in them. From induction there arises only a comparative universality, or generality of an empirical rule.

INFINITE : See JUDGMENTS.

INTUITION—*Anschauung*,

1) in the most extensive sense, is every representation of variety or the multifarious, so far only, as we consider the variety, and not the unity in the object. In so far, however, as the representation presents variety, we may call every representation a perception, and unfold it further as such ;

2) in a more confined and proper sense, an intuition is not a bare representation of sight, but every immediate representation of the individual thing, a single representation, which

immediately refers to an object, and by which this is given, i. e. perceived.

To JUDGE—*Urtheilen*

signifies to give unity to two representations, namely to the representation of an object, v. g. of a man, and that of a character, v. g. man is a rational being.

JUDGING FACULTY—*Urtheilskraft*,

is the power of thinking of the particular, as contained under the general or universal.—Kant divides this Faculty into 1) the determining (subsuming) power of judging; this again is a) empirical, b) transcendental; 2) the reflecting or reflex power of judging, which is further subdivided into a) æsthetical, b) teleological.—The meaning of these terms may be found in their respective places in the alphabetical order.

JUDGMENTS—*Urtheile*,

according to the usual definition of Logicians, are representations of one relation subsisting between two notions or conceptions. This explanation, however, applies only to the categorical judgments, and does not determine the nature of this relation. For, even by the laws of the representing power, there arises likewise a relation among our conceptions, which cannot with any propriety be called a judgment. According to Kant, therefore, a judgment in general is the act of comprehending a variety or the multifarious, represented by an intuition, under objective unity. And as nothing else but intuitions can be represented under this unity, they must exhibit either properties of a thing, or effects of a thing, or parts of a whole. Hence the following Judgments will be the result of all representations.

I. JUDGMENTS OF QUANTITY, which determine what can be comprehended under objective unity. The three species of them are,

Individual,

<i>Individual</i> or <i>singular</i> , when one individ-	} can be compre-
ual thing,	
<i>Particular</i> , when many,	
<i>Universal</i> , when all,	} hended under ob-
	} jective unity.

II. JUDGMENTS OF QUALITY, which ascertain the manner, in which the act of comprehending can be carried on.

Their species are,

Affirmative, i. e. so as really to unite an intuition with a conception ;

Negative, or so as to exclude something from a conception ;

Infinite, or so as to exclude a whole class of intuitions, without determining thereby the conception in any degree.

III. JUDGMENTS OF RELATION, or such as express the relations subsisting between things and properties, causes and effects, parts and a whole. The species of this class are,

Categorical, when particular properties or things,

Hypothetical, when particular effects or causes,

Disjunctive, when particular parts or wholes are comprehended under objective unity.

IV. JUDGMENTS OF MODALITY, are those which denote the particular faculties of the mind, by means of which they have been formed ; or determine that place, where the things judged of, or comprehended under objective unity, have their respective seat. The species of these are,

Problematical, when the things exist in the Understanding alone, or are mere ideas, of which it is not certain, whether they really exist without the mind ;

Affertory, when the things comprehended under the objective are in reality conceived, and believed to correspond with the conception we have of them ; and

Apodictical, or attended with the character of necessity, when the things are so conceived, as to carry along with them

them the conviction, that according to the constitution of the Understanding, they cannot be otherwise conceived, whether in an affirmative or negative instance.

The three last species of Judgments have been reduced by Kant to the class of 'modality;' because they add nothing to the contents of a judgment, as is the case with those of 'quantity,' 'quality,' and 'relation.'

The further division of Judgments, as to their *origin, objects, form, use, &c.* cannot be detailed in an elementary treatise; for this would require a separate work, which Kant has actually published, and of which the reader will find some account, in the preceding elementary view of his works, under No. XXV. (9).

TO KNOW—*Wissen*,

objectively considered, is to have apodictical or demonstrative certainty. This is possible only in cognitions, the origin of which is *a priori*.

KNOWLEDGE: See COGNITION,

LAW—*Gesetz*.

A Law is an objective necessary rule, or the representation of a general condition, according to which a variety or what is multifarious must be uniformly applicable to all.

LEGALITY—*Gesetzmäßigkeit*,

moral rectitude, is predicable of every determination of the will and subsequent action, which agree with the moral law; whether this action arise from the representation of the law itself, or from the inclination resulting from the view of the success and advantage of the action.—As to the *morality*, i. e. the properly moral value of the action, there is still required a virtuous sentiment, or the determination to a lawful action through the law independent of any prospect of gain or loss.

LIBERTY

LIBERTY, FREEDOM—*Freyheit*,

is considered as the attribute of an intelligent being, so far as its actions are not determined by foreign causes. Such a causality and its action is called free.

LIMITATION

is a Category of Quality, which is conceived in things, by connecting the predicate of reality with that of negation; in a similar manner as the judgments of quality (i. e. the species of those called by Kant, *infinite*), have something common with the form of both, *affirmative* and *negative*.

MAN—*Mensch*

a moral being, subject to moral laws by virtue of his rational nature: hence it is highly improper to call him a fighting animal, as some of the modern court-philosophers are pleased to define him.—A *bad* man, is he who has adopted deviation from the moral law as a maxim; a *good* man, who values the moral law as his supreme maxim;—an *accomplished* man, who is both inclined and able to communicate his agreeable feelings to others;—a *man of good morals*, whose actions correspond with the moral law.

MATERIALISM

in general, is the assertion, that the whole of worldly beings consist of matter;—in particular, the *psychological* materialism, or the doctrine, that the personality of man can subsist only under the condition of his being the same body;—the *cosmological*, that the existence and presence of the world can be owing to other circumstances, than to that of its being in *Space*.

MATTER,

1) as opposed to *form*, is the given, perceived thing in general; that, which is determinable; the correlate of the determination:

tion: 2) in opposition to *mind*, i. e. an object of the internal sense, matter is that, which is determined by the form of external perception; the substance of bodies.

MAXIMS

are subjective principles of Reason, relative to free actions; whereas *laws* are the necessary objective rules, which apply with equal force to every individual, whether morally disposed to obey them, or not.

MECHANICALLY

1) in general, is all that, which necessarily happens in time, according to the law of causality; 2) in particular, the effect, which bodies in motion produce upon one another by the communication of their motion (not by their internal powers, as in the chemical effects of bodies), v. g. mechanical separation by the wedge.

MECHANISM OF NATURE

is the necessary consequence of events in time, according to the natural law of causality.

METAPHYSICS

1, as defined by BAUMGARTEN, is the science treating of the first principles of human knowledge; it has no fixed limits, by which it is separated from other sciences:

2, with KANT; the whole system of pure philosophy; the philosophy of things that are not the objects of sense; or the Science of the hyperphysical predicates of sensible-objects.

METHOD

1, *Theoretically*, is the mode of teaching; the form of a science; that process of arranging the variety in our cognitions under systematic unity, which is guided and determined by rational principles:

2, *practically*, the mode and way of establishing genuine moral principles. The *methodical doctrine of practical Reason* is, therefore, that part of the 'Critique of Reason,' which teaches this method from principles.

The *transcendental doctrine of method* is the science treating of the form of a metaphysical system.

MIND—*Seele*

signifies 1) the soul as phenomenon, as the object of the internal sense, with all the internal reflections: it is thus considered in the experimental doctrine of mind; 2) the transcendental subject of thoughts, which we can represent to ourselves merely through the consciousness accompanying all our representations; 3) in particular, this self-same being, as the vital principle of matter.

MODALITY: See JUDGMENTS.

MOTIVE—*Triebfeder*: See INDUCEMENT.

MYSTICISM—*Schwärmerey*

1) that of *speculative Reason*, is Plato's doctrine of intellectual perceptions, and the cognoscible reality of those pretended innate conceptions of things beyond the world of sense; v. g. if we attribute positive predicates to the Deity; and still dispute their borrowed origin from phenomena!

2) that of *practical Reason*, is the moral system, which does not derive the material ground of human actions from the world of sense, and which consequently establishes the morality of them upon supersensible perceptions.; v. g. if we admit such divine laws, as differ from the essential commands of Reason.

NECESSARY: See JUDGMENTS.

NECESSITY—*Nothwendigkeit*

1) *logical*, formal; the necessary connection of conceptions in

an apodictical Judgment; that necessity, according to which certain predicates belong to a certain conception: 2) *real*, material, physical necessity of existence; the impossibility of non-existence: 3) *moral*, practical necessity, which depends upon practical Reason.

NEGATIVE: See JUDGMENTS.

NOTION

is a pure intellectual conception, which arises from the act of referring the form of a judgment to an object.—An original (not, innate) notion is called a Category.

NOUMENON—*Ding an sich*,

an object or thing in itself, i. e. without or external to the mind in a transcendental sense; a thing exclusive of our representation. It is generally opposed to the term '*phenomenon*,' or the sensible representation of an object.

NUMBER—*Zahl*,

is the representation of unity, from the successive addition of One to One, which is of a similar species. By the idea '*number*,' the Category of *Quantity* is sensualized, and the pure scheme of Quantity, or series of time exhibited.

OBJECT—*Gegenstand*

of a representation, in general, is the individual thing, to which the variety of given matter in a representation is referred.

OBJECTIVE.

signifies, in general, every thing which has objective reality, which relates to an object of sense and experience.

OBLIGATION—*Nöthigung*

is a moral and practical determination of a will governed by rational motives; or the practical necessity of volition, in a possible

possible contradiction to natural inclinations. In a sacred will, therefore, no obligation takes place.

ONTOLOGY

1) as it is pretended ; a systematic doctrine of synthetical cognitions *a priori* of things in general :

2) as it is possible ; a complete analysis of the pure Understanding, or transcendental philosophy, i. e. the science of the most general conceptions and laws of all rational and moral objects collectively considered ;—in opposition to that part of Metaphysics, which treats of the particular objects of the internal or external sense.

ONTO-THEOLOGY

is the cognition of a Supreme Being from bare conceptions.

ORGANON

1) in general, is the knowledge of those rules, by which a scientific system can be constructed :

2) in particular, the *Organon of pure Reason*; i. e. an Organon for the purposes of Metaphysics. From the complete application of the Organon, arises a system of pure Reason.

ORIGIN—*Ursprung*,

the *first origin* is the derivation of an effect from its first cause, i. e. that cause, which is not again the effect of another cause of the same kind.

ORIGINALLY—*Ursprünglich*,

i. e. not derived ; for instance, original action : (*See CAUSALITY*) ; an original character, which requires no derivation, no proof.

PARALOGISM

1) *logical* : a false conclusion of Reason, as to its form :

2) *transcendental* : when the ground of the paralogism depends

pends upon the constitution of the faculty of cognition itself; for instance, in the transcendental doctrine of mind.

PARTICULAR : See JUDGMENTS.

PATHOLOGICAL

is called that, which depends upon the passive part of human nature, upon the sensitive faculty. It is opposed to '*practical*,' i. e. that, which depends upon the free activity of Reason.

PEOPLE OF GOD

is a people, that live under the government of divine laws.

PERCEPTION

generally signifies the same as '*intuition*;' but, in particular, it is used by Kant in a more limited sense, i. e. a representation accompanied with consciousness or apperception.

PERMITTED—*Erlaubt*.

1) is that, which corresponds with a barely possible practical precept; *non-permitted*, what militates against a problematical Imperative: 2) that, which is consistent with a general law of morality, with the autonomy of the will; the contrary is unpermitted. In the former signification, the *non-permitted* is distinguished from that, which is '*contrary to duty*,' or what is against a real, subsisting law. In the latter sense, these terms are equivalent to each other.

PHENOMENON : See NOUMENON.

PHILOSOPHER—*Weltweiser*,

in idea, is he who renders all cognitions subservient to the necessary purposes of human Reason; a legislator of that faculty; a master in the science of wisdom.

TO PHILOSOPHIZE

means to exercise one's peculiar talent in the philosophical use of Reason, i. e. in the explanation of that, which is explicable.

PHYSICO-THEOLOGY

or rather physico-teleological theology, is the cognition of the Deity, as being the author of that order and perfection in the natural world of sense, which is every where discoverable.

PHORONOMY

Is the pure doctrine of the magnitude of motion.

POSSIBILITY—*Möglichkeit*

1) the form of a *problematical judgment*; the conceivable connection of two conceptions: 2) the corresponding pure *Category*, i. e. the reference of a form of thought in a problematical judgment, to perceptions in general, to an object: 3) the application of this Category to sensible perceptions; the agreement of a conception with the general form of sensible perceptions of time.—*Impossibility*, therefore, signifies the disagreement, the inconsistency with this form.

PRACTICAL

is that, which depends on freedom, on the self-active faculty of desiring; which relates to that faculty as the ground, consequence, &c.; for instance, practical cognition, laws, principles, philosophy.

PRAGMATICAL

is that, which is designed for the promotion of general prosperity.

PRAYING—*Beten*,

is a mere declaration of wishes towards the Divine Being; a Being, that stands in need of no explanation of the internal sentiment of the wishing person.—Praying considered as the means

means of producing effects upon God, is superstition. In order to improve ourselves, and to enliven our moral sentiment, it is one of the most salutary, but by no means generally necessary means.

PRECEPT—*Vorschrift*

means a practical rule, in the most extensive sense, whether it have an absolute (lawful) or only a comparative universality.

PRINCIPLE—*Grundsatz*

is every general cognition, from which others may be consistently derived and conceived.

PROBLEMATICAL : See JUDGMENTS.

PROOFS—*Beweise*

1) in general, are objective grounds of conviction. To prove something, is to demonstrate it sufficiently from objective, logical reasons, to convince, or at least, to prepare the mind for conviction, and not merely to persuade, i. e. to cause or produce our approbation from subjective (aesthetical) grounds of determination : 2) in particular ; proofs are either *empirical*, from real experience ; or *a priori*, from Reason and independent of all matter of experience.

PSYCHOLOGY,

is the doctrine of mind ; the physiology of the internal sense, and a part of physics in general.

PURE—*rein* : See A PRIORI.

PURPOSE—*Zweck*,

in general, is the conception of an object, so far as it contains, at the same time, the ground of the reality of this object.—

A purpose is said to be *hypothetical*, when it presents itself as
the

the means of attaining some other object ; *categorical*, when it exhibits itself as final purpose in the opposite case.—*Purpose of Nature* is the exhibition of the idea of a real, objective conformity in nature. A thing exists as a purpose of nature, when it is of itself both cause and effect.

The science or philosophy of all purposes is called *Teleology*.

QUALITY, }
QUANTITY, } See JUDGMENTS.

REALITY—*Wirklichkeit*

is real, not merely ideal existence ; and this is conceived 1) *pure*, through that Category, which is founded upon the form of assertory judgments : 2) *sensualized* ; i. e. the circumstance of being in a determined time.

REASON—*Vernunft*

A) *generally* implies the whole, supreme, self-active faculty of cognition, in contradistinction to the low, merely passive, faculty of the senses ; and, in this view, the Understanding is likewise comprehended under it. Hence the whole faculty of cognitions *a priori* is called *pure Reason* ; which is divided into the faculty of forming conceptions, i. e. the Understanding ; and into the faculty of forming conclusions, i. e. Reason in a more limited sense.

B) *in particular* : the power of conceiving something from principles ; of apprehending the particular from the general ; of reducing the unity of the rules of the Understanding to principles ; of classing particular conceptions under those, which are general ; and finally, of exerting the highest degree of activity in the free operating faculty of cognition.—Thus defined, Reason is not only distinguished from the Sensitive Faculty, but likewise from the Understanding in a more limited sense.

RE-

RECEPTIVITY,

the susceptibility of impressions ; the power of receiving representations ; of being affected by objects ; the *passive* faculty of representation ; sensibility. This, combined with spontaneity, forms the substance of the representing power of man.

REFLECTION—*Ueberlegung*,

1) *logical* ; the comparison made between existing conceptions in general : 2) *transcendental reflection*, the mode of comparing representations with respect to the faculty of cognition, in which they are compared ; the act of reflecting upon the manner, how and by what subjective conditions (states of mind) we arrive at certain conceptions and judgments, whether through inclination and custom, through the Sensitive Faculty, the Understanding, or through Reason.

REGULATIVE PRINCIPLES : See CONSTITUTIVES

RELATION : See JUDGMENTS.

RELIGION

1) *subjectively* considered, is the representation of the essential laws of Reason, as the result of divine commands and of virtue ; the coincidence of the will of a finite being with that of a sacred and beneficent author of the world, who has both, the will and power of realizing the most exact proportion between the happiness and the moral conduct of man. All Religion is founded upon morals. The Science of Religion is, therefore, called Moral Theology :

2) *objectively* considered, it is the whole compass of those doctrines, which relate to the subjective Religion.

REPRESENTATION—*Vorstellung*

is an internal determination, a modification of the mind. It is converted into a cognition, as soon as it is referred to an object.

RULE—*Regel*

is a conception or a judgment, so far as the connection of a variety is subjected to a general condition.—As to their validity, Rules are either *universal*, which are necessarily valid, and admit of no exception, for instance, the moral law, and all the rules a priori : or they are *general*, when we frequently observe them to be advantageous and applicable to the purposes of life : such are, for instance, the rules of prudence.

SATISFACTION—*Wohlgefallen*

is the corresponding relation of an object to the sense of feeling, or to the subject itself.

SCEPTICISM

of pure Reason, is the opinion, that we can form no decision upon the existence and non-existence of supersensible things and their properties, without pointing out with accuracy the grounds of this impossibility, which lie in the cognitive faculty itself.

SCHEMA

1) is the general determination of a perception according to general ideas ; for instance, the sensible representation of a man, a horse, a house in general. It must, therefore, not be confounded with a ' picture,' i. e. an example in concreto, v. g. that of an individual or particular man, horse, house, &c.

2) the *transcendental* schema of a pure intellectual notion, is the pure and general sensualization of such a notion a priori ; the sensible condition, under which the pure notions of the intellect are used ; i. e. objects can be classed under it.—The regular succession of variety is a priori the schema of causality ; number in general is the schema of quantity ; whereas an individual number, as that of 5, 15, &c. is merely the picture of it.

SENSATION—*Empfindung*

is sensible representation, impression of an actually present object upon the mind, modification of the Sensitive Faculty.

SENSE, or SENSITIVE FACULTY—*Sinnlichkeit*,

according to KANT, is that faculty of the mind, which is liable to be modified and affected by things, and thereby to receive impressions or representations of things. It is, therefore, neither a bare modification of the Understanding, as with LEIBNITZ, nor a mere activity or excitement of the corporeal organs, the peculiar existence of which, if it is to become an object of cognition, rather presupposes a receptivity in the mind itself.

The ‘*pure Sensitive Faculty a priori*,’ implies the faculty in itself; that, which belongs to it as a power of susceptibility a priori, which is not first determined by the sensible impressions, but which rather determines the latter themselves, according to Space and Time; it is the subjective condition of all that, which receives by it (namely the Sensitive Faculty a priori) the character of reality.

SENSIBILITY—*Empfindbarkeit*

is sometimes, though rarely, used in these ‘Elements’ instead of sensation; it expresses rather the capacity of receiving sensible impressions.

SENSIBLE and SENSITIVE

must not be confounded with one another, as the former is analogous to sensibility, the latter to sensation.

SIMULTANEITY—*Zugleichseyn*,

is the existence of a variety or the multifarious, at one and the same time.

SPACE—*Raum*

is the intuitive representation of things being without and near one another, and of extension in general.

SPONTANEITY

- 1) in general, is self-active, unconditionate causality ;
 2) in particular, the *spontaneity of the representing faculty* consists in the activity or operation of the representing subject upon the impressions received. The representing faculty is called, Understanding, Reason in the most extensive sense, so far only, as it is self-active and apprehends the impressions received, connects them into a whole, and has the power of reproducing them.

SPURIOUS WORSHIP—*Afterdienst*

is such a fanciful veneration of the Deity, as is contrary to that true service, which he himself requires ; v. g. by penance, mortification, pilgrimage, &c.

SUBJECT

- 1) *logical* ; that in general, in which certain predicates are inherent : 2) the *transcendental* subject in particular, the representing, thinking being in relation to its own thoughts : 3) the *real* subject, substance.

SUBJECTIVE,

as opposed to *objective*, signifies 1) that, which belongs to the subject, i. e. all representations : 2) that, which in part at least is determined by the nature of the subject. This is likewise the case in all our representations : 3) that, which relates to no object corresponding with the representation ; those conceptions and judgments, that cannot be exhibited in perception, as the Deity, Liberty, Immortality : 4) in a *practical* sense, such practical principles (maxims), which are not immediately founded upon Reason itself, but upon the particular constitution of the acting subject, upon the sensible impulse and inclinations of it.

SUBSTANCE

- 1) according to the pure *Category*, a subject in a categorical judgment

judgment; all that, which is not considered as predicate of something else: in this sense the mind itself is called substance: 2) *sensualized*; substance in a phenomenon, the continuance, perdurability in a perceived object, which exists at all times; that, which contains the ground of reality in the accidents, v. g. matter is the substance of all external objects, without which no object could be conceived in Space: 3) *Substance in itself*, external to the phenomenon; it is that unknown something, by which the different sensations are produced, and necessarily connected with one another in a phenomenon.

SUBSTRATUM.

The *superfensible substratum* of nature is that object, of which we can determine nothing in an affirmative sense, save that it is a being in itself, of which we know merely the phenomenon.

SYNTHESIS

1) in general, is the composition or combination of various representations (whether intuitions or conceptions) into one cognition, which may be conception, judgment, &c. 2) in particular: a) *pure* transcendental synthesis a priori, is the act of combining the variety of Space and Time into One representation of Space and Time. This lies at the foundation of pure Mathematics — b) *empirical* synthesis, when any experimental varieties, i. e. sensations, are connected into unity. Each of these species consists of three varieties, namely,

- 1) the synthesis of *apprehension*, when the affections of our internal and external sense are apprehended and arranged;
- 2) the synthesis of *reproduction*, when that, which has been collected and connected, is reproduced by the power of imagination, in order that the preceding affections may be annexed to those immediately succeeding; and
- 3) the synthesis of *recognition*, which forms One Intuition of what has been apprehended and connected.

SYSTEM

is a whole, which is connected by one principle, and therefore has necessary unity. It is opposed to 'aggregate,' i. e. a whole, which owes its origin to the occasional or accidental addition of one part to another, and consequently has not the character of necessary completeness.

TECHNIC

1) in a proper sense, means Art, causality according to ideas, purposes: 2) in a general sense, the *technic of nature*, the causality of nature in relation to those productions, which correspond with our conceptions of a purpose; in opposition to 'mechanism,' i. e. the determination of causes according to the laws of motion.

TELEOLOGY: See PURPOSE.

THEOLOGY: See RELIGION.

THEOSOPHY

signifies that theoretical cognition of the divine nature and existence, which satisfactorily explains the constitution of the world, as well as the moral laws.

THING IN ITSELF: See NOUMENON.

TIME—Zeit

is, according to Kant, the original perceptive representation of the possibility of simultaneity and succession.

TOTALITY—Allheit,

the representation of the whole, (*universitas*); that function of the Understanding, by which, when it is applied to conceptions, a plurality of cognitions is comprehended and connected into a general one; when applied to perceptions, Totality

ality is nothing else than plurality considered in things as unity, and forms a species of a Category, viz. that of Quantity:

TRANSCENDENT—*überschwenglich* : See IMMANENT.

TRANSCENDENTAL;

in a general sense, signifies a representation (whether perception or conception), a judgment, a science *a priori*, so far as it still refers to objects, and may be applied to them. For instance, it is a transcendental cognition, that Space is a perception *a priori*; and yet is applicable to sensible objects. The *transcendental* is opposed to the *empirical*, which latter not only relates to, but likewise arises from, experience.

TRUTH—*Wahrheit*

is the agreement or coincidence of our cognition, 1) with itself, i. e. its own characters; and with the general rules of thought: 2) with its objects; and hence material, positive; *objective*, real, synthetical truth, reality. It requires, that the object be given; the principle of contradiction is only a negative criterion of truth.

UNCONDITIONAL or UNCONDITIONATE—*Unbedingt*,

that, which is absolutely and in itself, i. e. internally possible, which is exempt from those conditions, that circumscribe a thing in Time and Space. Such is the idea of human Reason in the most extensive sense, as it is capable of continual improvement, which, although it cannot be realized in experience, is unlimited; the sphere of the objects of cognition being boundless. And this circumstance ought not to deter, but rather to encourage us in our exertions for the attainment of knowledge, which may be carried on *in indefinitum*.—Compare this Article with the term 'CONDITIONAL.'

UNDERSTANDING—*Verstand*

1) in the most extensive sense, is the self-active faculty of cognition (spontaneity), or the faculty of producing representations, of uniting the representations given or perceived, of thinking and judging upon objects :

2) in particular ; the faculty of forming conceptions and judgments of objects perceived ; the faculty of acquiring experimental cognitions, i. e. of forming rules, as opposed to laws. In this sense, the Understanding is distinguished from Reason in a more limited signification.

The WILL

1) in general, is the arbitrary determination, the causality of a living being, the power of producing objects corresponding with conceptions, or at least of determining oneself as to the attainment of them ; an appetitive faculty in general ;

2) in particular, the causality of Reason with respect to its actions, practical Reason and Liberty ; a faculty of acting conformably to principles, i. e. to the representation of laws—to produce something, that corresponds with an idea or purpose.

WISDOM—*Weisheit*

is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible purposes. It is therefore 1) *theoretically* considered, the cognition of the highest good : 2) *practically* : an attribute of that will, which realizes the highest good, or at least exerts itself for that purpose.

F I N I S.

THREE
PHILOLOGICAL ESSAYS,

CHIEFLY TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

OF

JOHN CHRISTOPHER ADELUNG, &c.

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ESSAY FIRST.

A concise history of the English Language, &c.

THE history of the English Language begins with the *Anglo-Saxons*; for, though the old *Britons*, the Ancestors of the modern *Welsh*, were the first inhabitants of this country, yet, with respect to its language, they form no epoch in the history of it; as there are but a very small number of words, which can be derived, with certainty and just etymology, from British roots.

It is, indeed, not very probable that the Anglo-Saxons, with their irruption into a new country, should have destroyed, or expelled, all the former inhabitants of it; and it is more reasonable to suppose, that besides those, who fled to the mountains of Wales, there must still have remained behind a very considerable part of the nation, but who, according to the barbarous custom prevailing in those times, were reduced to a species of slavery, were obliged to cultivate the fields of their masters, and were gradually compelled, however unwilling, to adopt the language of their conquerors.

Thus, the ancient tongue of the Britons, was completely eradicated; if we except a few single words, which have still remained current among country-people.—Similar phenomena have occurred in Germany, and frequently too, in other countries. When the Sclavi and the Vandals made themselves masters of the Eastern part of Germany, they did not destroy all the native Germans; but they subjugated and forced them to adopt *their* language. Hence, in Bohemia, there is scarcely any trace left of the ancient language of the country. When the Germans, in succeeding ages, reconquered many of these provinces, and united them into a political body, they proceeded in a similar manner; and it is now very difficult to detect any vestiges of the ancient language of the Vandals, among the country-people of these provinces.

The Anglo-Saxons, who began their irruptions into Britain about the year 450, came from the modern *Frisia*: hence their language bears a closer relation to the *Frisian*, than to any other. It is, however, to be much regretted, that the latter has

not been more accurately investigated hitherto by any philologist; for it certainly might be of great advantage for the illustration of the ancient *Anglo-Saxon*.

The history of the English language, from the first inroads of the Anglo-Saxons, down to the present time, comprehends a period of nearly fourteen centuries. As the nation, during this long period, has undergone various great changes and commotions, which were necessarily attended with relative influence upon the language, it becomes therefore necessary to divide it into certain periodical Sections, corresponding with these changes. I propose to adopt this method; although JOHNSON, my predecessor, has contented himself with giving promiscuous specimens of language, as prefixed to his large Dictionary, in chronological order, without however attempting a true historical division.

The principal changes, which, posterior to the Anglo-Saxons, affected the English language, were, the incursions of the Danes; the invasion of the Normans; and the adoption of French phrases and terms, together with the improvements and manners of that people. These collectively suggest to us *four* periods, in tracing the history of the English language: viz. 1st, the *pure Anglo-Saxon*, or the British-Saxon period; 2d. the *Danish Saxon*, or Danish Anglo-Saxon; 3d. the *Normannic-Saxon*, or the Normannic Danish-Saxon; and 4th, the *French-Saxon*, or the Normannic French-Saxon period, in which last the language gradually assumed the form of the *modern English*.

I. BRITISH-SAXON PERIOD.

This period begins with the first invasion of the *Anglo-Saxons*, in the year 450; it terminates with the incursions of the *Danes*, about the year 780, and consequently comprehends an era of 330 years.—It corresponds with that period in the history of the German language, which extends from the emigration of the Eastern nations, to the reign of CHARLEMAGNE; and with respect to the state of improvement during this period, both languages perfectly resemble one another.

The *Anglo-Saxons* were a rude, untutored people, not unlike all the German and Northern nations of that age, whose principal improvements related to the art of war. People of this

description do not stand in need of letters, or a written language; and it is very probable, that they neither had, nor knew, the alphabet. The increase of population, in a limited territory, compelled them, indeed, early to accustom themselves to order and a more rigid civil constitution; but as they were employed, for a considerable time, in combating the natives of conquered countries, this faint improvement was chiefly, and proximately, designed for warlike pursuits.

A more remarkable degree of improvement was manifest among the Anglo-Saxons about the year 570, when St AUGUSTINE arrived from Rome, and instructed them in the beneficent principles of the Christian Religion. These were the more eagerly embraced, as the progress of the mind, though hitherto small and partial, enabled them to perceive the necessity of abolishing that rude and undigested veneration for their idols, which were calculated only to amuse the fancy of a barbarous and unsettled people.

Together with the Christian Religion, the Anglo-Saxons also acquired the first rudiments of the arts and sciences, and a taste for the literature of ancient Rome, which very rapidly spread among them. This may be easily accounted for, as it was chiefly promoted by the continual increase of a numerous people, who had established themselves upon a limited territory. Thus prepared, they likewise adopted the Roman alphabet, which had already been introduced as the current small letter in their writings. But as they were accustomed to a *sound* in their language, which was expressed with a hissing tone, somewhat similar to both *t* and *s*, and which was foreign to the Romans, who had no character for it in their alphabet; hence the Anglo-Saxon teachers of Religion were obliged to borrow the *θ* (theta) from the Greek, which therefore supplied the place of the modern English *th*. The other Anglo-Saxon characters are perfectly similar to the Roman current letters of those times, and particularly of the sixth Century; and the *w* of the former is closely imitated from a compounded *v* of the latter.

If full credit be due to WARTON, there is no fragment extant from this period, but a small metric composition of the *genuine* CAEDMON, which is inserted in ALFRED's translation of the Ecclesiastic History, by BEDE*.—As the only,
a 2 and

* Vol. IV. Chap. 24. (not Chap. 4. as quoted by WARTON).

and certainly a venerable piece of curiosity left of these remote ages, it well deserves a place in this period of the British language. It is here offered in two different copies. One of them is transcribed from HICKES's *Grammat. Anglo-Saxon.* p. 187; the other still more ancient, is extracted from WANLEY's *Antiq. Literat. Septentr.* Part II. p. 287—I have met with a third Copy of this fragment in "WHELOCK's *Anglo-Saxon BEDE; Cambridge, 1643*; but the text in this differs from both the former, and does not appear to me equally authentic.

HICKES.

"Nu we sceolon herigea
Heofon rices weard
Metodes mihte.
And his mod gethanc.
Weorc wuldor faeder
Suua he wundra gehwaes.
Ece drihten ord onsteald.

He aereft scop
Eorðan bearnum
Heofan to rose
Halig scippend.

Da middangeard
Moncynnes weard
Ece drihte aester teode.
Firum foldan.
Frea aelmihtig."

English.

"Now we ought to praise the author of the celestial empire, the might of the creator, and his counsels, the deeds of the father of honour; how he became the author of wonders.

And when the eternal God first created heaven as the roof for the children of man, and afterwards the earth, being an omnipotent guardian of the human race."

WANLEY.

"Nu scylan hergan
Hefaen ricaes uard
Metudaes mæc̃li
End his mod gidanc
Verc uuldur fadur
Sue he nundra gihuaes.

Eci drihtin
Ora stelidae.
He aerist scop
Elda barnum
Heben til hrofe
Haleg scepen,

Tha middun geard
Moncynnaes uard
Ecy dryctin
Aester tiadae
Firum foldu
Frea almechtig.

German.

"Nun sollen wir preisen, den Urheber des Himmelreiches, die Macht des Schöpfers, und seinen Rath, die Thaten des Vaters der Ehre; wie er der Urheber der Wunder ward.

Und als der ewige Gott den Menschenkindern zuerst den Himmel zum Dache, und hernach als allmächtiger Hüter des menschlichen Geschlechts die Erde schuf.

Although

Although CAEDMON is said to have miraculously composed this Song, when dreaming; it nevertheless appears to be a translation from the Latin, which then, and for several succeeding centuries, was rendered so very literally, that even the article was left out, and the whole construction of the Latin with the participles and many other peculiarities were rigorously observed. It is for this reason, we ought not to judge of the spirit of a language from the like translations; and the want of rhymes is very probably owing to the same cause.

II. DANISH SAXON-PERIOD.

(or, *Danish Anglo-Saxon.*)

This period begins from the incursions of the Danes, about the year 780, and continues as far as the invasion of the Normans in 1066; it consequently includes nearly three centuries. Two circumstances co-operated here, which produced remarkable changes in the Old Saxon language; namely first, the domestic improvements of the Anglo-Saxons, both in a physical and moral sense, from which the improvement, and consequently the change of the language was inseparable; and secondly, the mixture of the latter with the Danish, which being closely related to the Anglo-Saxon, was more easily united into *one* language.

Many written fragments, from this period, are still extant; and all such as are commonly called Anglo-Saxon, properly consist of a mixture of Danish with the Anglo-Saxon. To this number we may particularly refer two literal translations of the four Evangelists, the writings of King ALFRED, and the beautiful poetical paraphrase of the *First Book of Moses*, by the *spurious* CAEDMON.

As a specimen of the prose-language of this period, JOHNSON gives the first Chapter of St LUKE, extracted from one of the translations above mentioned; but as such literal translations are by no means calculated to exhibit the spirit of a language, I have made choice of the Travels of OHTHER and WULSTAN, as King ALFRED, who died in 901, described them in his Preface to the translation of OROSIVS.—I have faithfully transcribed it from *Spelman's Vita Aelfredi*; Oxford, Fol. 1678; with
this

this difference only, that instead of giving the (very inaccurate) Latin of SPELMAN, I have subjoined a German translation; and for the greater convenience of readers, in general, I have likewise exchanged the Anglo-Saxon for the common Latin characters.

This original piece, on account of the many curious particulars it contains, I make no doubt, will prove more acceptable than any of those which are bare literal translations, and consequently improper to serve as specimens for displaying the genius of the language.

Ohthaere faede his hlaforde
Aelfrede de Kynincge thaet he
ealra Northmanna Northmest
bude; he cwaeth thaet he bude
on thaem lande northweardum
with tha waest sae. he faede theah
thaet thaet land sy swithe north
thanon. so hit is eall weste bu-
ton on feawum stowum. stice
maelum wiciath Finnas. on hun-
tathe on wintra. and on sumera
no fiscothe be thaere sae.

He faede thaet he aet sumum
cyrre wolde fandian hu lange
thaet land north rihte laege.
oth the hwaether aenig man
benortham thaem westene bu-
de: tha for he north rihte be
thaem lande. let him ealne
weg thaet weste lande on thaet
steorbord. and tha wid sae on
baec bord thry dagas. tha wes
he

OTHHER said to his Lord,
King ALFRED, that of all the
Normans he resided the farthest
towards the North; he affirm-
ed, that he resided in that coun-
try which, in the North, borders
on the Western Ocean. This
country extends far to the North,
is a complete desert, excepting
a few places which are inhabit-
ed by the *Finns*, who live in
winter by the chace, but in sum-
mer by fishing.

He related, that he had once
wished to examine, how far this
country extended to the North;
or whether this desert was in-
habited in its northern parts.
For this purpose he had sailed
three successive days in a straight
northern line, having the desert
country on the right, and the
open sea on the left hand; thus
he

OTHHER sagte zu seinem Herrn, dem Koenige AELFRFD, dafs er unter allen
Normannen am weitesten gegen Norden wohne; er sagte, er wohne in dem Lande,
welches nordwaerts an die Westsee stoefst. Dieses Land erstrecke sich weit gegen
Mitternacht, und sey voellig wuist, bis auf einige wenige Orte, wo einige *Finnen*
wohnen, welche im Winter von der Jagd, im Sommer aber von dem Fischfange
leben.

Er sagte, er habe einmal untersuchen wollen, wie weit sich dieses Land nach
Norden erstreckte; oder ob noch Menschen in Norden dieser Wuiste wohnten.
Deswegen sey er drey Tage lang gerade nordwaerts gereiset, habe das wuiste Land
zur rechten, und die offene See auf der linken Hand gehabt; da er denn bis dahin
nord-

he swa feor north swa swa hwaæl huntan fyrrest farath: tha for he tha gyt north ryhte: swa he mihte on thaem othrum thrim dagum gefeglian: tha beah thaet land wer eart rihte: oththe sio fae in on thaet land: he nyfte hwaether: buton he wyfte thet he ther bad westan windes oththe hwoñ northan: and segled thanon east be lande: swa swa he mihte on feowor dagum gefeglian: tha sceolde he bidan ryhte northan windes: forthan thaet land thaer beah suthrihte: oththe sio fae in on waet land: he nyfte hwaether: tha saegled he thanon suthrihte be lande: swa swa he mihte on fíf dagum gefeglian:.

Tha laeg thaer an micel ea up in that land: wa cyrdon he up in on tha ea: for thaem hy ne thorston forth be thaere ea seglian: for unfrithe: for thaem thaet land waes eall gebun on othre healfe thaere ea: Ne mette he aer nan gebun land: sythan he fram his agnum hame: for: ac him waes ealne weg west land on thaet steorbord butan físceran and fugeleran and huntan:

he had come to that northern region, to which the whale-fishers were accustomed to resort. From thence he had sailed, for three days, further North, where he found the country extending due East. But whether the sea continue within the land, he knew not; he only knew this much, that he had stopped there, waiting for westerly or northerly winds. After this he sailed four days along the coast, when he was again obliged to wait for a northerly wind, as the country extended to the South. Whether the sea continue within this part of the land, he also knew not. Then he sailed five additional days along the Southern coast.

Here he met with a great river that extended far up the country, and on the mouth of which he stopped, but for fear of the inhabitants, he did not venture to sail up that river; for the country, on one bank of the river, appeared fully inhabited. He had met with no other inhabited country than this since his departure from home: the country on the right always appearing

nordwaerts gekommen sey, wohin die Wallfischjaeger zu gehen pflegten. Von da sey er noch drey Tage lang weiter nordwaerts gefegelt, da sich denn das Land gerade nach Osten gestreckt habe. Ob aber innerhalb des Landes Meer sey, wisse er nicht; er wisse nur so viel, daß er sich daselbst aufgehalten, und auf den West- oder Nordwind gewartet habe. Hierauf sey er vier Tage lang an dem Lande hingefegelt, worauf er auf den Nordwind habe warten müssen, weil sich das Land nach Suiden gestreckt habe. Ob sich die See in dieses Land erstrecke, wisse er nicht. Hierauf sey er fünf Tage lang laengs der Kuiste suidwaerts gefegelt.

Da befand sich ein grosser Fluß, welcher weit in das Land ging, an dessen Mündung er sich aufhielt, sich aber aus Furcht vor den Einwohnern nicht den Fluß hinauf wagte, weil das Land auf der andern Seite des Flusses stark bewohnt war. Er hatte auch, seitdem er aus seiner Heimath abgereiset war, außer diesem kein bewohntes Land angetroffen, sondern hatte zur Rechten jederzeit

tan and thaet waeren ealle Fin-
nas and him waes a Widfae-
on thaet baec bord:

Tha Beormas haefdon swithe
well gebun hyra land ac hi ne
dorston thaew on cuman: Ac
thara Terfin na land thaes eall
weste butan waer huntan gewi-
codon oththe fisceras oththe
fugeleras: Fela spella him fae-
don tha Beormas aegther ge of
hyra agenum lande ge of thaem
lande the ymbe hy utan waeran
ac he nyfte hwat thaes sothes
waes for thaem he hit sylf ne
geseah: Tha Finnas him thuhte
and tha Beormas spraccon neah
angetheode:

Swithost he for thider to
eacan thaes landes sceawunge
for thaem horfwaelum for thaem
hi habbath swithe aethele ban on
hyra tothum: Tha tew hy
brohton sume thaem cynincge
and hyra hyd bith swithe god to
sciprathum: Se bwael bith
micle laessa than othre hwalas
ne bith he lengra thonne syfan
elna

ing a desert uninhabited, except
by a few fishermen, fowlers and
hunters, who were all of *Finnie*
extraction. But on the left, he
always observed the open sea.

Many *Biarmians* resided a-
mong them; yet he was not in-
clined to venture a landing
there. But the country of the
Terfins was uninhabited, except
by some hunters, fishermen or
fowlers who resided there.
The *Biarmians* told him much
of their own country, as well
as of the neighbouring lands;
but how far their narratives
were true, he could not ascer-
tain, as he had not himself seen
these countries. He believed,
however, that the *FINNS* and
*BIARMIAN*S had ONE common lan-
guage.

His principal object in tra-
velling thither had been, to ob-
tain the sea-horses, whose teeth
were composed of a very preci-
ous bone, and some of which
teeth he likewise gave to the
King. Their skins are of ex-
cellent use for tackle. This
species of whale is much smaller
than any other, being never a-
bove

wuistes Land gehabt, einige wenige Fischer, Vogelfaenger und Jaeger ausgenom-
men, welche insgesamt Finnen waren. Zur Linken aber hatte er jederzeit
das offene Meer.

Es wohnten viele *Biarmier* in ihrem Lande; allein er habe es nicht wagen
wollen, dasselbst anzulanden. Das Land der *Terfinnen* aber sey unbewohnt, ausser
dass einige Jaeger, Fischer, oder Vogelfaenger dasselbst wohnten. Die *Biarmier*
haetten ihm vieles, so wohl von ihrem eigenen Lande als von den benachbarten
Laendern erzachlet; allein er wisse nicht was daran wahr sey, weil er sie selbst
nicht gesehen habe. Er glaubte indessen, dass die *FINNEN* und *BIARMIER* EINE
und eben dieselbe Sprache haetten.

Er sey aber vornehmlich um der Wallrosse willen dahin gereiset, welche ein sehr
schachtzbares Bein in ihren Zaehnen haetten, von welchen Zaehnen er auch einige
dem Koenige gab. Ihre Felle sind sehr gut zu Schiffstauen zu gebrauchen. Diese
Art Wallfische ist weit kleiner als andere Arten, und nicht uiber sieben Ehlen
lang.

elna lange ac on his agnum lande isse bedsta hwaæl huntuth. tha beth eachta and feowertiges elna lange and tha mæsttan fifiges elna lange thara he saede thaet he syxa sum ofsloge syxtig on twam dagum.

bove seven ells in length. But good whales were also caught in his native country, which measured upwards of forty-eight yards, and sometimes above fifty yards in length. He affirmed, that he was the sixth among those (i. e. in company with five others) who had killed sixty whales in two days.

He waes swithe spaedig man on thaem aethum the hoera spe-da on beoth that is on wildrum. He haefde thagyt tha hethone cyning sohte tamra deora unbe-bohtra syx hund. Tha theor he hatad hranas wara waeron fix staet hranas Tha beoth swithe dyre mid Finnum fof thaem hy soth tha wildan hranas mid. He waes mid thaem fyrstum mannum on thaem lande naefde he theah mathonne twentig hry-thera and twentig sceapa and twentig swina and thaet lytle thaet he erede he erede mid horfan. Ac hyra ar is mæst on thaem gafole the tha Finnas him gildath thaet gafol bithon deora fellum and on fugela fetherum and hwales bane and on thaem sciprapum the beoth of hwaelles hyde

He was a very rich man in those things which, with them, were esteemed as riches, that is, in cattle. He had, when he came to the King, six hundred, unpurchased, tame deer, which he called rein-deer. Among these were six highly esteemed by the Finns, as by means of them they tamed the wild rein-deer. He was one of the Chiefs in the land, and yet he was possessed of no more than twenty oxen, twenty sheep, and twenty hogs. The small piece of soil, which he cultivated, was tilled by horses. The principal revenues (of the Chiefs) consisted in the tribute which the Finns paid them, viz. in skins of animals, bird-feathers, whale-bone and ship-ropes, which were manufactured

lang. Es wurden aber auch in seinem Vaterlande gute Wallfische gefangen, welche über acht und vierzig, und zuweilen über fünfzig Ehlen lang waren. Er versicherte, daß er selbst sechste (d. i. mit noch fünf) ihrer in zwey Tagen sechzig erlegt habe.

Er war ein sehr reicher Mann an solchen Dingen, welche bey ihnen für Reichthum gehalten werden, d. i. an Vieh. Er hatte, als er zu dem Könige kam, sechshundert ungekaufte zahme Hirsche, welche er Rennthiere nannte. Darunter befanden sich sechs, welche bey den Finnen sehr hoch geschätzt werden weil sie die wilden Rennthiere damit zahm machen. Er war einer der Vornehmsten in dem Lande, und hatte dennoch nicht mehr als zwanzig Ochsen, zwanzig Schafe, und zwanzig Schweine. Den wenigen Acker, welchen er bauete, den bauete er mit Pferden. Ihre vornehmsten Einkünfte bestehen in dem Tribute, welchen die Finnen ihnen bezahlen, und welcher in Thierfellen, in Vogelfedern, in

hyde geworht and of seoles :

Aeghwile gylt he his gebyrdum se birdsta sceall gildan fiftyne mearthes fell and fif hranes and an beran fel and tyn ambra fethra and berenne kyrtel oththe yterenne and twegen sciprapas. aegwer sy syxtig elna lang other sy of hwaelles hyde geworhte other of foles :

* * *

Thaet Eastland (WULFSTAN faede) is swithe mycel and thaer bith swithe manig burh and on aelcere byrig bith cyninge and thaer bith swythe micel hunig and fiscath and se cyning and tha ricostan men drincath myran meocl and tha unspethigan and tha

nufactured of the skins of the whale and sea-dog (seal).

Every one contributed in proportion to his abilities. The richest generally gave fifteen skins of the marret, five of the rein-deer, one bear's skin, ten measures of feathers, together with a coat made of the skins of bears or otters, and two ship's-cables, each of them sixty ells long, one of which must be manufactured of whale-skins, and the other of the skins of seals.

* * *

This Eastern country † (WULFSTAN related) was very large and contained many cities, each of which had its king. Much honey and many fishes were likewise found there. The King and the richest persons drank horse-milk, but the poor and the servants drank

Fischbein, und in Schiffsseilen bestehet, welche letztere aus Wallfisch-und Seehundsellen verfertigt werden.

Jeder giebt nach seinem Vermoegen. Der Reichste giebt gemeiniglich funfzehn Marderfelle, funf Rennthiere, ein Baerenfell, und zehn Maafs Federn, nebst einem Rocke von Baehren-oder Fischotterfellen, und zweyen Schiffsseilen, jedes sechzig Ehlen lang, deren eines aus Wallfisch—das andere aber aus Seehundsellen verfertigt seyn muess.

Dieses Oestliche Land (erzaehlte WULFSTAN) ist sehr gross, und hat sehr viele Staedte, deren jede ihren Koenig hat. Auch giebt es daselbst viel Honig und Fische. Der Koenig und die reichsten Personen trinken Pferdemiclk, die Armen und Knechte

* * * Here follow OHTHER's and WULFSTAN's *Geographical accounts of Norway*, the adjacent countries to the East, and the river *Visula*. They are, however, so inaccurately stated, and so little interesting in themselves, that I thought proper to save the room for other more curious and attractive specimens. I have selected a few of that description from the works of CAXTON, HARDING, WARTON, &c. which appeared to me better calculated, to exhibit the true state and progress of the English language, especially during the *third* and *fourth* periodical divisions, here adopted.

† Speaking last of the *Visula*, the *Ilfing* (modern *Elbing*) the *Eastbican Lake* (modern *Frisch Haff*) and the adjacent country to the East; WULFSTAN relates these curious facts concerning the different provinces, now inhabited by the East- and West-Prussians, who gained the victories of FREDERIC II. W.

tha theowan drincath medo :
 Ther bith swithe mycel gewinn
 betweonan him and ne bith thaer
 naenig ealo gebrowen mid Eſ-
 tum ac thaer bith medo genoh :

And thaer is mid Eſtum
 theaw thonne thaer bith man
 dead thaet he liſh inne unfor-
 baerned mid his magum and
 freondum monath gewhilum
 twegen and tha Cyningas and
 tha othre beah thungene men
 ſwa micel lenge ſwa hi maran
 ſpeda habbath hwilum healf
 gear that hi beoth unforbaerned
 and licgath bufan eoathan on
 hyra huſum and ealle tha hwile
 the thaet lio bith inne thaer
 ſceal beon gedrync and plega
 oth thone daeg the hi hine for-
 baerneth : Thonne thy ylcan
 daeg hi hine to thaem adeg be-
 ran willath thonne to daelath
 hi his feoh thaet thaer to laſe
 bith aeſter them gedrynce and
 thaem pegan on fif oththe ſyx
 hwilum on ma ſwa ſwa thaes
 feos andefn bith : Aleogath hit
 thonne fore hwaega on anre
 mile thone maeſtan daele fram
 thaem tune thonne otherne
 thonne thaene thriddan oththe
 hyt eal aled bith on thaere
 anre

drank mead. They likewiſe had
 much wine, but beer was not
 brewed among the Eaſtern in-
 habitants, inſtead of which they
 had plenty of mead.

The Eaſtern inhabitants had
 the (ſingular) cuſtom of keeping
 the bodies of their deceaſed
 friends and relations for a month,
 ſometimes for two months, with-
 in their houſes; but the kings
 and other men of rank were
 kept longer within the houſe,
 in proportion to their riches.
 Sometimes they were ſuffered to
 lie half a year above ground, in
 their houſes, without being
 burnt. As long as the corps
 remained there, they feaſted and
 played till the appointed day of
 burning. On this day they re-
 moved it to the funeral pile;
 they divided into five, ſix, or
 more parts, according to the
 nature of the property, the
 goods of the deceaſed, if any
 remained, after feaſting upon,
 and playing for them. Then
 they placed the greateſt part of
 them, at leaſt one mile from the
 village (of the deceaſed), then
 the ſecond, and then the third
 part, until every thing was pla-
 ced

Knechte aber trinken Meth. Es giebt auch vielen Wein unter ihnen; aber Bier wird unter den Oſtlaendern nicht gebrauet; dagegen haben ſie Meth genug.

Die Oſtlaender haben den (ſonderbaren) Gebrauch, daſs wenn jemand unter ihnen ſtirbt, derſelbe in dem Hauſe unter den Freunden und Verwandten einen Monath, zuweilen auch zwey, liegen bleibt; die Koenige aber und andere vornehme Maenner bleiben deſto laenger liegen, je reicher ſie ſind. Zuweilen liegen ſie ein halbes Jahr ueber der Erde in ihren Haeuſern unverbrannt. So lange die Leiche ſo liegt zechen und ſpielen ſie bis zur Verbrennung. An dem Tage aber, da ſie ihn auf den Holzſtofs bringen, theilen ſie ſeine Gueter, ſo viel nach dem Zechen und Spielen davon noch uebrig iſt, in fuinf, oder ſechs, oder mehr Theile, nachdem die Gueter beſchaffen ſind. Dann legen ſie den groeſten Theil derſelben wenigſtens eine Meile von dem Dorfe (des Verſtorbenen,) dann den zweyten, dann den dritten Theil, bis alles inner-

anre mile and sceall beon se laesta dæl nyht thaem tune the se deada man onlith : Thonne sceolon beon gesamnode ealle tha menn the swyftoste hors habbath on thaem lande for hwaega on fif milum oththe on fyx milum fram thaem feo : Thonne aernath hy ealle toward them feo thonne cymeth se man se thaet Swifte hors hafath to thaem aereftan dæle and to thaem mæftan and swa elc aester othrum oth hit bith eall genumen and se nimth thone laestan dæl. se niht thaem tune thaet feoh geaerneth and thonne rideth aelc his weges mid tha feo and hyt motan habban eall and forthy thaer beoth tha Swistan hors ungefoge dyre : And thonne his gestreon beoth thus eall aspeded thonne byrth man hine ut and forbaerneth mid his waepnum and hraegle und swi thoht ealle his speda hy forspendath mid than langan legere thaes deadan mannes inne and thaes the hy be thaem waegum alecgath the tha fremdon to aernath and nimath : And thaet is mid Estum theaw thaet thaer sceal aelces getheodes man beon for-

ced within that mile. The smallest part was upon this occasion always placed nearest to the village, in which the deceased had lived. This being done, all the men possessed of the swiftest horses, within five or six miles distance from the estate of the deceased, assembled and rode with the greatest speed to the places, where the goods were deposited ; so that he who had the swiftest horse arrived first at the best share of the property, and thus one after another, till the whole was carried away. But he who arrived at the lot placed nearest to the village, got the smallest share. Upon this, each of them rode off with his share and kept it wholly—as his property.—For this reason, too, swift horses were highly valued among them. After having thus distributed all his property, they carried out the deceased (into the open air), and burnt him, together with his armour and cloaths. The greatest part of the property was spent in the long keeping of the corps, but whatever was exposed on the road, was gained and carried

halb dieser Meile gelegt ist. Der kleinste Theil wird dabey allemahl zunæchst an das Dorf gelegt, wo der Verstorbene gewohnt hat. Alsdann versammeln sich alle Mænnner aus dem Lande, welche die schnellsten Pferde haben, fuinf bis sechs Meilen weit von den Guitern, und rennen sporenstreichs darauf zu ; da denn der, welcher das schnellste Pferd hat, zu dem ersten und besten Theil kommt, und so einer nach dem andern bis alles weggenommen ist. Derjenige bekommt aber den kleinsten Theil, der zu dem næchst an dem Dorfe gelegenen Theile gelanget. Alsdann reitet ein jeder mit seinem Theile davon, und behælt ihn ganz—as sein Eigenthum.—Dies macht auch, dafs die fluchtigen Pferde bey Ihnen uiberaus theuer sind. Wenn nun alle Guter vertheilet sind, alsdann tragen sie den Verstorbenen hinaus (in die freye Luft), und verbrennen ihn mit seinen Waffen und Kleidern. Sein meistes Vermoegen gehet bey dem langen Aufbehalten des Verstorbenen darauf ; was aber an dem Wege ausgesetzt ist, wird von Freuden gewonnen und weg-

forbaerned· and gyf thar man na ban findeth unforbaerned· hi hit sceolan miclum gebetan· And thaer is mid Eastum an maeosh· thact hi magon cyle gewyrcan· and thy thaer licgath tha deadan men swa lange· and ne fuliath· that hi wyrceath thone eyle hine on· and theah man asette twegen faetels full ealath oththe waetheres· hy gedoth· that other bith ofer froren· sam hit sy summor am winter.

carried off by strangers. It was a prevailing custom among the *Esibians*, to burn their dead; and if afterwards a single bone was found unburnt, such an omission was severely punished. The inhabitants of the East were also acquainted with the art of producing cold; hence the corps could lie so long without undergoing putrefaction, because they introduced cold (frigorific substances) into it. And if two vessels filled with beer or water were exposed, they could make both of them freeze, whether it were in summer or winter*.

weggenommen. Es ist bey den *Esiben* der Gebrauch, dafs jeder Verstorbene verbrant wird, und wenn hernach ein einiges Bein unverbrant gefunden wird, so wird solches scharf geahndet. Die Ostlaender haben auch die Kraft, dafs sie Kaelte machen koennen; daher auch die Leichen so lange liegen und nicht faulen, weil man Kaelte (kaltmachende Koerper) in sie bringet. Und wenn man zwey Gefaesse voll Bier oder Wasser hinsetzet, so koennen sie machen, dafs beyde frieren, es sey im Sommer oder im Winter.

In

* For such readers as may be only imperfectly acquainted with the *German* language, I beg leave to add the following remarks: 1st. that all Substantives are written with large initials; 2d. that, according to the *German* idiom, the *present* tense is used, throughout this narrative, instead of the *English imperfect*; 3d. that though a sentence in the *German* frequently begins with the *imperfect* tense, when introducing the speech of another, (v. g. *Er sagte, er habe*, &c. pag. xiii) yet by the *German* idiom, the quotation itself is expressed in the *conjunctive present*;—a peculiarity, which is uniformly observed by *ADELUNG* himself, whose translation I have here subjoined, with scarcely any alteration; 4th, that the preceding *English* translation deviates only from the *German*, where the construction of the former rendered it necessary. Finally; to prove, that the affinity of the *German* to the *Anglo-Saxon* is much stronger than to the *modern English*, I have here added some examples.

German.	AngloSaxon.	English.
Tagen. (pl. dat. of <i>Tag</i> .)	Dagum.	Days, (day)
Geseget. (pret. of <i>segeln</i> .)	Geseagian.	Sailed, (to sail)
Wuiste. (impr. conj. of <i>wissen</i> .)	Wuiste.	He might know.
Vogelfanger.	Fugeleran.	Birdcatcher.
Gegeben. (participle of <i>geben</i>)	Gebun.	Given.
Ihres (poss. pron. neut. of <i>ih</i> r)	Hyra.	Their.
Eigenes (part of a poss. pron.)	Agenum.	Own.
Hirschchen. pl. of <i>Hirsch</i>)	Hiryrethera.	Stags (deer).
Zuweilen,	Gewilum.	Sometimes.
Ueberfahren,	Oferferan	To travel (ferry) over.
Unverbrant (pret. of <i>nicht verbrennen</i>)	Unforbaerned.	Unburnt (not to burn.)
Meistentheils	Maestandacle.	For the most part.

And

In order to give likewise a specimen of poetical composition, I shall substitute for the poem furnished by JOHNSON, another original, which I found in HICKES's *Gramm. Anglo-Saxon.* pag. 178.—Though the age of it be not ascertained, it certainly belongs to this period, and may be considered as a concise

Topography of the City of Durham.

Is theos burch breome,
Geond Breoten rice.

Steopa gesta tholad.
Stanás ymb utan.
Wundrum gewaexen.
Weor ymb cornath.
En ythum strong.
And therinne wunath
Fisca feola kinn.
On floda gemong.
And there gewæxen.
Wuda festeru micel.
Wuniath in them wicum
Wilda deor monige.
In deopa dalum.
Deora ungerim.
Is im there byri.
Eac bearnum gecithed
De arfesta eadig Cuthberht.

And

This city is celebrated
In the whole empire of the
Britons.

The road to it is steep,
It is surrounded with rocks,
And with curious plants.
The *Wear* flows round it,
A river of rapid waves.
And there live in it,
Fishes of various kinds
Mingling with the floods.
And there grow
Great forests;
There live in the recesses
Wild animals of many sorts,
In the deep valleys
Deer innumerable.
There is in this city
Also well known to men
The venerable St Cudberth,

And

Diese Stadt ist berühmt.—In dem ganzen Reiche der Britten.—Der Weg zu ihr ist jache,—Sie ist mit Felsen umgeben,—Und sonderbaren Gewächsen.—Die *Wear* umfließt sie,—Ein Fluß von reißenden Wellen.—Und darin wohnen,—Fische vieler Arten—Die sich mit den Fluthen vermischen.—Und daselbst wachsen—Große Wälder;—In den Auen wohnen—Mancherley wilde Thiere,—In den tiefen Thälern—Unzählige Rehe, (Thiere).—Es ist in dieser Stadt—Auch den Menschen wohlbekannt—Der ehrwürdige heil. Cudberth,—Und

And if it be objected, that many of these words likewise bear strong marks of affinity to the *modern* English, I must remind the reader of my aim, which is *not* to deny this, but to prove, that contrary to the opinion of many Antiquaries, the *German* very probably is the *mother*, and *not* a *sister* language of the *Anglo-Saxon*. Hence the manifest absurdity, in Dictionaries, of giving references to either, as two different languages, especially in words whose origin cannot be well ascertained

And thes claene cyninges heofud.

Ofualdes Engla leo

And Aidan biscop

Aedberth and Aedfrid.

Aethele geferes.

Is therinne mid heom

Aethelwold bisceop

And breoma bocera Beda.

And Boifil abbet.

De claene Cuthberht.

On gichethe larde lustum.

And he is lara uuel genom.

Eardiath aeth them eadige.

In in them mynstre.

Vnarimeda reliqua

Thaer monige uundrum guurthath

The uurita seggeth

Mid then drihtnes uuerdomes bideth.

And the head of the chaste king.

Oswald, the lion of the Angli,

And Aidan, the bishop,

Aedbert and Aedfrid

The noble associates.

There is in it also

Aethelwold, the bishop.

And the celebrated writer Bede

And the abbot Boifil,

By whom the chaste Cudberth

In his youth was gratis instructed.

Who also well received these instructions.

There rest with these Saints,

In the inner part of the minster

Relicks without number,

Which perform many miracles,

As the Chronicles tell us,

And (which) await with them the judgment of the Lord.

des keuschen Koeniges Haupt.—Oswald, der Angeln Loewe,—und der Bischof Aidan,—Aedbert und Aedfrid,—Die edlen Gefaehten.—Es ist darin mit ihnen —Der Bischof Aethelwold.—Und der beruimte Schriftsteller Beda.—Und der Abt Boifil,—Der den keuschen Cuthberth—In der Jugend umsonst unterrichtete, —Welcher auch die Lehre sehr gut annahm.—Es ruhen bey diesen Heiligen,—In dem Innern des Muinsters,—Unzaehlige Reliquien,—Welche viele Wunder wirken,—Wie die Schriften sagen—Und (welche) mit ihnen das Gericht des Herrn erwarten.

Of this period, we must finally remark, that from the time of ALFRED, the old Anglo Saxon characters were gradually exchanged for the French letters of the Alphabet. There is little doubt, that the nation had already made such progress in taste, or intellectual discernment, as to become sensible of the want of symmetry in the Anglo-Saxon, when compared to the Roman characters; and that they readily gave the preference to the French letters, in which those of Rome were somewhat more faithfully copied.

INGULF*, as quoted by SPELMAN in the work above mentioned,

* Abbot of Croyland, and author of the history of that Abbey, was born in London A. D. 1030—This excellent Chronicler treats from the foundation of that Abbey,

tioned, expresses himself upon this adoption of foreign characters, in the following lines: "Manus Saxonica ab omnibus Saxonibus et Mercii usque ad tempora Regis *Aelfredi*, qui per Gallicanos Doctores omnibus chirographis usitata a tempore dicti Domini Regis desuetudine viluerat (vilipenderat); et manus Gallicana quia magis legibilis, et aspectui perdelectabilis præcellerat, frequentius indies apud Anglos omnes complacebat."

Yet this was the case only in a very gradual progression, corresponding with the improvement and diffusion of taste; for long after ALFRED's time, the *Anglo-Saxon* characters continued to be used, both in public and private writings.

III. NORMANNIC SAXON PERIOD.

(*Normannic Anglo-Saxon.*)

This æra extends from the invasion of the Normans, under WILLIAM the CONQUEROR, in the year 1066, to the beginning of the thirteenth century, beyond the reign of HENRY II. who died in 1189; and consequently comprehends a series of about one hundred and fifty years.

The state of the English language, during this period, cannot be better described than in the words of the learned and perspicuous WARTON, in his "*History of English Poetry, from the close of the eleventh, to the commencement of the eighteenth century*;" pag. 2. & seq.

"The Norman Saxon dialect formed a language extremely barbarous, irregular, and intractable; and consequently promises no very striking specimens in any species of composition. Its substance was the Danish-Saxon adulterated with French. The Saxon indeed, a language subsisting on uniform principles, and polished by poets and theologists, however corrupted by the Danes, had

Abbey, 664, to the year 1091; he introduces much of the general history of the kingdom, with a variety of curious anecdotes that are no where else to be found.—INGULF died of the *gout*, at his Abbey, A. D. 1109, in the 79th year of his age.—It is a matter of much regret, that men of his sound judgment and good sense (in spite of the superstitious absurdities which stain the annals of that age) did not themselves commence writing and cultivating their native language; instead of struggling in *monastic* Latin. The certain progress of both language, and knowledge, in the former case, is beyond every calculation of the Moderns. W.

had much perspicuity, strength, and harmony *: but the French, imported by the Conqueror and his people, was a confused jargon of Teutonic, Gaulish, and vitiated Latin. In this fluctuating state of our national speech, the French predominated. Even before the conquest, the Saxon language began to fall into contempt, and the French, or Frankish, to be substituted in its stead †: a circumstance, which at once facilitated and foretold the Norman accession. In the year 652, it was the common practice of the Anglo-Saxons, to send their youth to the monasteries of France for education: and not only the language, but the manners of the French were esteemed the most polite accomplishments. In the reign of Edward the Confessor, the resort of Normans to the English court was so frequent, that the affectation of imitating the Frankish customs became almost universal: and even the lower class of people were ambitious of catching the Frankish idiom ‡. It was no difficult task for the Norman lords to banish that language; of which the natives began to be absurdly ashamed. The new invaders commanded the laws to be administered in French §. Many charters of monasteries were forged in Latin by the Saxon monks, for the present security of their possessions, in consequence of that aversion which the Normans professed to the Saxon tongue ||. Even
 c chil-

* Because the Danish was intimately related to the Old Saxon; hence the language, which had originated in a mixture of both, necessarily preserved some identity (i. e. similarity and uniformity of structure.) A.

† Probably this was the case only among the higher ranks of society; for France, indeed, at this early period, was already considered as the School of the Sciences, and the legillatrix of taste to the rest of Europe. A.

‡ This strange bias seems, at present, to have shifted its ground, and to affect principally the *higher* classes of society;—the *highest*, or dictatorial, order itself (*individually*) not excepted. Thus our ears are *publicly* annoyed with terms and phrases, which even the Germans, of late years, stigmatize with the appellation of *neo-frankish*.—The *maigre* race of interpreters and translators, by profession, also contribute *their* share in corrupting the English language with new modelled words and idioms, the meaning of which they themselves (not rarely) mistake and misapply; but to what class of society *these* individuals must be referred, I shall, in this place, not attempt to decide. And as I am not desirous of advancing groundless assertions, or of extending them, if they be founded, to every respective individual, without exception; I must request the dispassionate reader, to turn over a few Numbers of the *Monthly*, the *Analytical*, the *Critical*, the *English*, or any other *Review*, in which the latest translations from the *French*, form the object of criticism; and his curiosity will be frequently, and amply, gratified.

W.

§ But there is a precept in Saxon from William the First, to the Sheriff of Sommerfetshire. *Hickes. Thes.* I. P. I. pag. 106.—See also *Prefat.* *ibid.* p. xv.

|| The Normans, who practised every specious expedient to plunder the monks, demanded a sight of the written evidences of their lands. The monks well knew, that it would have been useless or impolitic to have produced these evidences, or
 charters,

children at school were forbidden to read in their native language, and instructed in a knowledge of the Norman only. In the mean time, we should have some regard to the general and political state of the nation. The natives were so universally reduced to the lowest condition of neglect and indigence, *that the English name became a term of reproach*: and several generations elapsed, before one family of Saxon pedigree was raised to any distinguished honours, or could so much as attain the rank of baronage. Among other instances of that absolute and voluntary submission, with which our Saxon ancestors received a foreign yoke, it appears that they suffered their hand-writing to fall into discredit and disuse, which, by degrees became so difficult and obsolete, that few beside the oldest men could understand the characters. In the year 1095, WOLSTAN, bishop of Worcester, was deposed by the arbitrary Normans: it was objected against him, that he was "*a superannuated English idiot, who could not speak French*". It is true,

charters, in the original Saxon; as the Normans not only did not understand, but would have received with contempt, instruments written in that language. Therefore the monks were compelled to the pious fraud of forging them in Latin; and great numbers of these forged Latin charters, till lately supposed original, are still extant. See SPELMAN in *Not. ad. Concil. Anglic.* p. 125; STILLINGFL. *Orig. Eccles. Britann.* p. 14 MARSHAM, *Prefat. ad Dugd.* And WHARTON *Angl. Sacr.* Vol. II. *Monast. Prefat.* p. ii. & seq.—See also INGULPH, p. 512.—LAUNOY and MABILLON have treated this subject with great learning and penetration.

* *Matt. Paris. sub ann.*—as quoted by WARTON; p. 4. — When in our days the conversation turns upon the comparative excellence of languages, I beg leave to ask: 'are the modern rulers, tutors, or governesses (of and from France) actuated by a more discreet, by a less haughty spirit, than the Normans were EIGHT HUNDRED YEARS AGO?—This question is easily answered. For, although it is fortunately not in *their* power to make us adopt in a *mass* their new-fangled tongue, by the same means which have induced us and other nations to adopt instruments, machines and expedients formerly unknown, or *unpractised*, in the art of war; yet we are already invaded by such numbers of a race (however *different* in degree, still of the *same* kind) as renders the consequences of our excessive indulgence every day more alarming. I am led to this reflection, at a time, when I see the legislature itself seriously employed in concerting measures, to obviate these impending national evils—As a well-wisher, and inhabitant, of this country, I hope Providence will guide the councils of the nation, upon a subject of the utmost importance. Those who consider these symptoms of an *approaching metamorphosis* as of little importance, plainly manifest their unacquaintance with the history of man and nations. They seem to forget, that the Anglo-Saxons first came to Britain with *no* hostile intentions; that they were invited, only to assist the oppressed Britons in repelling their rapacious enemies; and that revolutions, if excited and aided by foreign allies, were always attended with consequences, equally certain and fatal to the Natives; however imperfectly and gradually they were introduced.— To return, from this involuntary digression, to the subject of language, I shall conclude this Note with a remark made by a veteran in the philosophy of grammar: 'That the *French*, with all its ease and "versatility, is a *monotonous* language; and that those alone who understand it, can "discover the great advantage the *English* have over that language by their accent, particularly in the article of verification." W.

true, that in some of the monasteries, particularly at Croyland and Tavistocke, founded by Saxon princes, there were regular preceptors in the Saxon language: but this institution was suffered to remain after the conquest, as a matter only of interest and necessity. The religious could not otherwise have understood their original charters. William's successor, Henry the First, gave an instrument of confirmation to William, Archbishop of Canterbury, which was written in the Saxon language and letters. Yet this is almost a single example. That monarch's motive was perhaps political: and he seems to have practised this expedient with a view of obliging his queen, who was of Saxon lineage; or with a design of flattering his English subjects, and of securing his title, already strengthened by a Saxon match, in consequence of so specious and popular an artifice."

"It was a common and indeed a very natural practice, for the transcribers of Saxon books, to change the Saxon orthography for the Norman, and to substitute in the place of the original Saxon; Norman words and phrases. A remarkable instance of this liberty, which sometimes perplexes and misleads the critics in Anglo-Saxon literature, appears in a voluminous collection of Saxon homilies, preserved in the Bodleian library, and written about the time of Henry the Second. It was with the Saxon characters, as with the signature of the cross in public deeds; which were changed into the Norman mode of seals and subscriptions."

'Among the manuscripts of Digby in the Bodleian library at Oxford, we find a religious or moral Ode, consisting of one hundred and ninety-one stanzas, which the learned Hickes places just after the conquest: but as it contains few Norman terms, I am inclined to think it of rather higher antiquity. The following stanza is a specimen:

'Sende God biforen him man
The while he may to hevene,
For betere is on elmesse biforen
Thanne ben after sevene."

That is, "Let a man send his good works before him to heaven while he can; for one alms-giving before death is of more value than seven afterwards." The verses perhaps might have been thus written as two *Alexandrines*:

'Send God biforen him man the while he may to hevene,
For betere is on elmesse biforen, than ben after sevene.'

'Yet alternate rhyming, applied without regularity, and as rhymes accidentally presented themselves, was not uncommon in our early poetry.'

HICKES and WARTON have printed a satirical poem on monastic

nastic life, in which the *Saxon* is remarkably adulterated by the Normannic, and which must have been written soon after the incursions of the Normans, or at least prior to the reign of Henry II. The poet begins this singular performance, with describing the land of idolence or luxury :

Fur in see, bi west Spaynge,
Is a lond ihote Cokaygne :
Ther nis lond under hevenriche (1).
Of wel of godnis hit iliche.
Thoy paradis bi miri (2) and brigte
Cokaygn is of fairir sight.
What is ther in paradis
But grafs, and flure, and greneris ?
Thoy ther be joy, and gret dute (3),
Ther nis met, bot frute.
Ther nis halle, bure (4), no bench ;
Bot watir manis thurst to quench, &c.

‘ In the following lines,’ says WARTON, ‘ there is a vein of satirical imagination and some talent at description. The luxury of the monks is represented under the idea of a monastery constructed of various kinds of delicious and costly viands.’

Ther is a wel fair abbei,
Of white monkes and of grei,
Ther beth boures and halles ;
All of pasteus beth the walles,
Of fleis of fisse, and a rich met,
The likefullist that man mai et.
Fluren cakes beth the schingles (5) alle,
Of church, cloister, bours and halle.
The pinnes (6) beth fat podinges
Rich met to princes and to kinges.—
Ther is a cloyster fair and ligt,
Brod and lang of sembli figt.
The pilers of that cloister alle
Beth iturned of cristale,
With harlas and capital
Of grene jaspe and red coral,
In the praer is a tree
Swithe likeful for to se,
The rote is gingeur and galingale,

The

1 The celestial empire, *Sax.* 2 Merry, chearful. “ Although Paradise is chearful and bright, *Cokaygne* is a more beautiful place.” 3 Pleasure. 4 Buttery ; or the room where provisions are laid up. 5 *Sbingles*. “ The tiles, or covering of the house, are of rich cakes.” 6 The pinnacles.

The flouns beth al fed wale.
 Trie maces beth the flure,
 The rind canel of fwete odure :
 The frute gilofre of gode smakke,
 Of cucubes ther nis no lakke.—
 Ther beth iiii willis (7) in the abbei
 Of tracle and halwey,
 Of baume and eke piement,
 Ever ernend (8) to rigt rent (9);
 Of thai fremis al the molde
 Stonis pretiuse (10) and golde,
 Ther is faphir, and uniune,
 Carbuncle and astiune,
 Smaragde, lugre, and prassiune,
 Beril, onyx, topofiune,
 Amethiste and crisolite,
 Calcedun and epetite (11).
 Ther beth birddes mani and fale
 Throstill, thruisse, and nigtingale,
 Chalandre, and wodwale,
 And othir briddes without tale,
 That stinteth never bi her migt
 Miri to sing dai and nig.

[*Nonnulla defunt.*]

Yite I do yow mo to witte,
 The gees iroftid on the spitte,
 Fleey to that abbai, god hit wot,
 And gredith (12), gees al hote al hote, &c.

‘Our author then makes a pertinent transition to a convent of nuns; which he supposes to be very commodiously situated at no great distance, and in the same fortunate region of indolence, ease and affluence.’

An other abbai is ther bi
 For soth a gret nunnerie;
 Up a river of swet milk
 Whar is plente grete of silk.
 When the summeris dai is hote,
 The yung nunnes takith a bote

And

7 Fountains. 8. Running. *Sax.* 9. Course. *Sax.* 10. The Arabian Philosophy imported into Europe, was full of the doctrine of precious stones. 11. Our old poets are never so happy as when they can get into a catalogue of things or names. (WARTON.) 12. Crieth. *Gallo-Franc.*

And doth ham forth in that river
 Both with oris and with stere :
 Whan hi beth fur from the abbei
 Hi makith him nakid for to plei,
 And leith dune in to the brimme
 And doth him fleilich for to swimme :
 The yung monkes that hi seeth'
 Hi doth ham up and forth he fleeth,
 And comith to the nunnes anon,
 And euch monk him takith on,
 And snellich (13) berith forth har prei
 To the mochill grei abbei (14),
 And techith the hunnes an oreifun
 With jambleus (15) up and dun*.

' This poem was designed to be sung at public festivals : a practice which was then very common ; and concerning which it may be sufficient to remark at present, that a *Joculator*, or *Bard*, was an officer belonging to the court of William the Conqueror.'

' Another Norman-Saxon poem cited by the same industrious antiquary (HICKES), is entitled "THE LIFE OF ST MARGARET." The structure of its versification considerably differs from that in the last mentioned piece, and is like the *French Alexandrines*. But I am of opinion, that a pause, or division, was intended in the middle of every verse ; and in this respect, its versification resembles also that of ALBION'S ENGLAND, or DRAYTON'S POLYALBION, which was a species very common about the reign of Queen Elizabeth. The rhymes are also continued to every fourth line. It appears to have been written about the time of the crusades, It begins thus :

Olde ant *a* yonge I priet *b* ou, our folies for to lete,
 Thinketh on god that yef ou wite, our sunnes to betē.
 Here I mai tellen ou, wit wordes faire and swete,
 The vie *c* of one maiden was hoten *d* Margarete.
 Hire fader was a patriac, as ic ou tellen may,
 In Auntioge wif eches *e* I in the false lay,
 Deve godes *f* ant dombe, he servid nit and day,
 So deden mony othere that singeth welaway.
 Theodofius was is nome on Criste ne levede he noutt,

He

13. Quick, quickly. *Gallo-Franc.* 14. To the great Abbey of Grey Monks.
 15. Lascivious motions. Gambols. *Fr.* Gambiller.

* HICKES. *The Saur.* I. Part. I. p. 231. seq.

a And. *b* I direct. *Fr.* " I advise you, our, &c. *c* Life. *Fr.* *d* Called Saxon. *e* Chose a wife. *Sax.* " He was married in Antioch. *f* Deaf gods, &c.

He levede on the false godes, that weren with honden wroutt,
 Tho that child sculde cristine ben it com well in thougt,
 Ebed wen g it were ibore, to deth it were ibrougt, &c.

‘ In the sequel, OLIBRIUS, lord of Antioch, who is called a *Saracen*, falls in love with MARGARET: but she being a christian, and a candidate for canonization, rejects his solicitations, and is thrown into prison.’

Meiden Margarete one nitt in prifon lay
 Ho com biforn Olibrius on that other dai.
 Meiden Margarete, lef up upon my lay.
 And Ihu that thou levest on, thou do him al away.
 Lef on me ant be my wife, ful wel the mai sped.
 Auntiogge and Afie scaltou han to mede:
 Ciculauton *b* and purpel pall scaltou have to wede:
 With all the metes of my lond ful vel I scal the fede.

‘ This piece was printed by Hickes, from a manuscript in Trinity-college library at Cambridge. It seems to belong to the manuscript metrical LIVES OF THE SAINTS, which form a very considerable volume, and were probably translated or paraphrased from Latin or French prose into English rhyme, before the year 1200. We are sure that they were written after the year 1169, as they contain the LIFE OF SAINT THOMAS OF BECKET. In the Bodleian library are three manuscript copies of these LIVES OF THE SAINTS, in each of which the life of St. Margaret occurs; but it is not always exactly the same with this printed by Hickes. And on the whole, the Bodleian Lives seem inferior in point of antiquity.’

Towards the conclusion of this period, true poetry begins to flourish in England as well as in Germany, some features of which are already discoverable in the preceding poems. Yet, withall, the Danish-Saxon, and probably also the British-Saxon bards can claim little more merit than that of making rhymes, and frequently only of writing abrupt sentences in prose. To prove this, I shall only quote (the two first stanzas of) a Normannic-Saxon Ballad*, which is full of alliteration, and has a burthen or chorus:

Blow

g In bed. *b* Checklaton. See Obs. Fair. Q. I. 194. (WARTON.)

* WARTON observes in his “History of English Poetry,” that this is the earliest English love-song, he could discover; that it is among the Harleian manuscripts in the British Museum; and that he would place it before, or about, the year 1200.

Blow northerne wynd, sent
 Thou me my suetyng; blow
 Northerne wynd, blou, blou, blou.
 Ich ot a burde in boure bryht
 That fully semly is on syht,
 Menskful maiden of myht,
 Feire ant fre to fonde.
 In all this wurhliche won,
 A bnrde of blod and of bon,
 Never *a* zete y nuste *b* non,
 Luffomore in Londe. *Blow*, &c.
 With lokkes *c* leffliche and longe,
 With front ant face feir to fonde;
 With murthes monie mote heo monge
 That brid so breme in boure;
 With lossun eie grete and gode,
 Weth browen blifsfoll undirhode,
 He that rest him on the rode
 That leflich lyf honoure. *Blou d* &c. &c.

In a truly pastoral vein, a lover * thus addresses his mistress, whom he supposes to be the most beautiful girl, "Bituene Lyncolne and Lyndeseye, Northampton and Lounde †."

When the nytenhale singes the wodes waxen grene,
 Lef, gras, and blosme, springes in Avril y wene.
 And love is to myn harte gon with one spere so kene
 Nyht and day my blod hit drynkes myn hart deth me tene.

'The following verses have nearly the same measure, and are not displeasing to the ear:'

My detli y love, my lyf ich hate for a levedy shene,
 Heo is brith so daies liht, that is on me wel sene.
 Al y falewe so doth the lef in somir when hit is grene,
 Zef mi thoht helpeth me noht to whom schal I mene?
 Ich have loved at this yere that y may love na more,
 Ich have siked moni fyh, lemon, for thin ore,
 . . . my love never the ner and that me reweth fore;
 Suete lemon, thenck on me ich have loved the fore,
 Suete lemon, I preye the, of love one speche,
 While y lyve in worlde so wyde other nill I seche, †.

If

a Yet. *b*. Knew not. *c* Lively. *d* Sic.

* Probably of the reign of King JOHN.

† London. † MSS. *Hart.* 2253. *Fol. Membran.* f. 72. b.—The pieces cited from this manuscript, appear to be of the hand writing of the reign of Edward the First, (WARTON.)

If we attempt to trace the progress of a language, we shall always find it connected with the intellectual improvement of a people; for language, in every instance, is the first object, in which national cultivation becomes manifest. To determine this, requires the most accurate knowledge of the gradual advances made by a people in manners, arts, and sciences, together with a very intimate acquaintance with the more ancient modes of speaking and writing, as well as with the changes produced in them, by these respective improvements. In this progress, every nation keeps its peculiar path; a path marked by the collective number of internal and external circumstances, the particular knowledge of which is indispensable to a philological inquirer.

In *Germany*, the old unpolished language of the country was improved through its own resources; hence the progress towards its refinement was necessarily slow. In *France*, the language of the natives was formed by a mixture with that of the Romans, yet in such a manner, as made the latter prevail in that mixture; hence its improvement was uncommonly rapid, because the Roman was already a polished language. In *England*, the native language received improvements by a mixture with the French; yet the former still remained the prevailing language: thus it made more rapid progress towards its refinement than that of the German, but slower than that of the French.—Yet we possess no history of any language executed, nor even attempted, in this *progressive* manner. And as the natives of Britain have hitherto neglected to trace the gradual improvements of *their* language, it can with less justice be expected, that *I* should enquire into the path, which they followed. Nor will it be required of *me*, to point out minutely the various changes that have taken place in the English language, and to state the causes, or the origin, of those changes.

IV. FRENCH-SAXON; OR ENGLISH PERIOD.

This is not only the longest, but also the most remarkable period in the literary history of England: it begins with the thirteenth Century, and extends to the present time.—The Danish-Saxon language, in the preceding period, being corrupted by the Normannic, now begins to unite with the more
d
modern

modern French ; to adopt likewise, in consequence of this precedent, many words from the Latin, and to form by the assistance of both the present English language.

The Normannic-Saxon language was suffered to fall into disuse and contempt, during the era, of which we have last treated ; the pure Normannic now became the fashionable language of the court, and of polished society. This happened with the greater facility, as the Norman barons and lords ruled over England, and oppressed its ancient inhabitants, with unlimited sway. But as soon as the power of the barons, during the thirteenth century, began to decline ; as soon as the commons, or the order of the citizens, acquired more authority and influence ; in fine, as soon as England, with gradual steps, approached to its present constitution ;—the popular language, hitherto despised, reclaimed its due rank ; it was again introduced into the higher circles, and thus its cultivation was the more easily and the more effectually accomplished. Still, however, the vernacular dialect had been almost suppressed, among the higher classes of the nation, by the language of the haughty Normans ; a circumstance which sufficiently accounts for its strange mixture with the French. And as in process of time, French manners and improvements found a more general reception in Britain, this mixture daily increased, not only through the reception of new words, but also in the terminations of old primitive words ; and in the various modes of exhibiting and combining them in phrases. In this manner, indeed, the ground-work of the language preserved its *Saxon* origin ; but its progress, its cultivation, its augmentation, and subsequent refinement, were carried on upon the principle of the *French*.

Consistent with the limits of this Essay, I cannot enlarge upon the particular phenomena connected with these multiplied changes ; I must, therefore, content myself with producing a few specimens selected from the best writers in every century, during this long and productive period.

* * * * *

In order to fill up a chasm which both, JOHNSON and ADELUNG, have left in this part of the history of the English language, by not entering into the respective merits of the different writers, during the middle ages, to whom we stand so justly indebted ;—I have here selected a number of passages relating to this subject, from a work
much

much esteemed at home, and still more abroad, among the lovers of British literature. This work, on account of its high—though comparatively small—price, is not in the hands of many readers; as it already extends to a considerable number of volumes, since its beginning in 1780. It is the *NEW ANNUAL REGISTER*, to which I allude, and from which I have carefully extracted (and exemplified with a great variety of specimens) those valuable and truly philological remarks, which the reader will find stated, at greater length, in the *fifth*, *sixth*, and following *Volumes* of this work, under the head of “*A concise history of the state of knowledge, literature and taste in Great Britain.*”—It therefore only remains to add, that the *principal part of this history* is partly abstracted from the learned disquisitions, partly founded upon the historical facts, which we find very perspicuously, though somewhat tediously, stated in “*WARTON’S History of English Poetry,*” three Volumes, Quarto, London, 1770. & seq.

Having recounted the particular causes, to which the greatest alteration and improvement of religious knowledge in England was owing, from the accession of EDWARD I. to the accession of HENRY IV.; and having justly observed that JOHN WICKLIFF * first opened the understandings of the regular clergy;—the philosophic annalist thus proceeds in illustrating the subsequent effects of these changes, with respect to the state of language and literature in Britain.

Division First; from 1272, to 1399†.

FROM EDWARD I. to HENRY IV.

‘The literary revolution, which took place in the reigns of EDWARD III. and RICHARD II. with no small degree of splendour, was the appearance of poetry in our own tongue. To this period was reserved the honour of engaging the *Muses* to speak in *English*, with such dignity as to call for general attention and admiration. We must not, however, imagine that before this time no attempts at versification were made in our native language. The poetical productions of the age, if

d 2

such

* This acute Divine opposed the Pope’s supremacy in 1377, and was forty years after, burnt for being a heretic.

† All passages enclosed within single commas, belong to the *New Annual Register*.

such they may be called, were numerous, and our old libraries abound in them: Previously to the æra, concerning which we are treating, the *Lives of the Saints* were written in verse, and many parts of the Bible were translated in the same manner.*

‘A love-song and some compositions of a miscellaneous nature occur in the reign of King JOHN *. Our early poetical effusions appeared likewise, not unfrequently, in the form of satire; and when this was clothed in allegory, it was sometimes conducted with success. The objects, on which it was exerted, were generally the lawyers and the clergy. But the principal efforts of our yet untutored Muses, were rhyming chronicles and metrical romances.’

WARTON, in the first Volume, p. 43, of his History, entertains us with a ballad, or a satirical poem, composed by a bard devoted to the court of SIMON of MONTFORT, Earl of Leicester, a powerful Baron. It appeared soon after the famous battle of 1264, which had a very unhappy issue for the king, and which is described as follows :

I.

Sitteth alle stille, ant herkeneth to mi :
The kyng of Alemaigne, be mi leaute (*Loyalty*).
Thritti thousand pound askede he
For to make the pees (*peace*) in the countre
And so so he dude more.
Richard, thah (*though*) thou be ever tricchard (*treacherous*)
Triethen shall thou never more.

2.

Richard of Alemaigne, whil that he was kying,
He spende all his tresour opon swyvyng,
Haveth he nout of Walingford oferlyng (*superior*)
Let him habbe, ase he brew, bale (*poison*) to dryng,
Maugre Wyndesore,
Richard thah thou, &c.

3.

The kyng of Alemaigne wende do ful wel
He saisede de mulne for a castel,

With

* A monarch of a vindictive and usurping temper, whom the English Barons compelled to confirm the *Magna Charta*, in 1215;—he died at Newark, October 8, 1216.

With hare sharpe swerdes he grounde the stel,
 He wende that the sayles were mangonel
 To help Wyndesore.
 Richard thah thou, &c. &c. &c.

‘In the reign of EDWARD I. *, the character of our poetical compositions was considerably changed. The minstrels either substituted fictitious adventures for historical traditional facts, or reality was disguised by the representations of invention; and a taste for ornamental expression gradually prevailed over the rude simplicity of the native English phraseology. This change was occasioned, among other causes, by the introduction and increase of the tales of chivalry. It was in the reign of EDWARD II. †, when the metrical romances chiefly flourished; and though the poetry of them was, in general, very rude, imperfect, and feeble, they occasionally exhibited gleams of imagination. One of them, entitled ‘*King of Tars*,’ has a warmth of description in certain passages, that is not unlike the manner of CHAUCER. From the productions of which we now speak, this great poet and his cotemporaries undoubtedly derived some advantage; but it was their acquaintance with Italian literature which still more enabled them to produce a literary revolution in their own country. Surprising effects had been wrought in *Italy*, by the genius and the writings of DANTE (1) and PETRARCH (2). Our *English* poets were not equally happy in their endeavours to enlighten the understanding, and to refine the taste of the nation. They had greater difficulties to contend with, and were far more unfavourably situated for obtaining a conquest over them. Their style was rough, and the harmony of their poetical numbers was very defective. Nevertheless we are much indebted to them for assiduously applying to the study of their native language, and for contributing, in a considerable degree, to its enrichment and cultivation. The change effected

* Born, June 16, 1239; succeeded to the Crown, November 16, 1272; reduced Scotland 1299, died July 7, 1307; was buried at Westminster, where on May 2. 1774, some antiquaries examined his tomb, when they found his corpse unconsumed, though buried 466 years.

† This unfortunate Monarch was born in 1284; was the first *Prince of Wales* ascended the throne, 1307; was dethroned and murdered in 1327.

(1) Born, 1265; died, 1321.—(2) FRANCIS PETRARCH, born at *Arezzo*, 1304, died, 1347.

fectcd by them is, upon the whole, an important event in the literary history of this country.'

' When we look into the accounts of the *British* writers, which have been given us by LELAND (3) and other biographers, and observe the number of persons whom these biographers have rescued from oblivion, together with the praises they have bestowed upon them, as excelling in almost every branch of knowledge, and only defective with respect to the elegance of their style, we are ready to believe, that the times preceding the *Reformation* were much more learned than has usually been imagined. Should we allow full credit to the encomiums, which our historians have so libell y poured on a number of men whose works are now either totally lost, or totally neglected, we might hence see that literature is of no avail (or is not duly valued) without taste; and that, if science be communicated in barbarous language, it will be treated with disregard and contempt by a polite and cultivated age. But the greatest part of our ancient monastic authors, notwithstanding the pompous eulogiums we read concerning them, were as despicable for the matter, as for the expression of their performances. In every view, therefore, they were justly consigned to dust and worms; and though we possess something of an antiquarian spirit, we are not endued with such a portion of it, as to be extremely fond of things which are recommended by nothing but their antiquity. Several persons, however, may deserve a place in a history of the progress of knowledge, whose compositions are no longer valuable; and, as learning cannot be pursued, even in the most disadvantageous manner, or in the most unfavourable circumstances, without producing good effects in certain instances, a diligent enquirer will always find some few names that are worthy of being mentioned with particular esteem. Where this is the case, there is a pleasure in paying the tribute due to departed merit; it is doing honour to our country, to let none be forgotten who have a lawful title to remembrance and applause.'

' Though general light seemed rather to increase during the period, of which we are treating; yet, excepting two or three illustrious men who appeared towards the conclusion of it,

this

3 JOHN LELAND, a celebrated antiquary, died 1552; aged 45: Vid. his works, for further information.

this æra did not produce a set of writers equal in abilities and character to those who flourished in the preceding.’

‘Philological and Polite Literature, till it was revived at the close of this æra, was in as low a state as Natural Philosophy.—Though we have seen that so much poetry was produced in the beginning of the period before us, it is remarkable that the names of its writers are, for the most part, buried in oblivion. We know not to whom we owe far the greater number of metrical romances, and other compositions which the age afforded. It is probable that they were the productions of monks who lived and died, unknown, in their convents. The first poet whose name occurs, is ROBERT of GLOUCESTER, who flourished about the year 1280. He was a monk of the abbey of Gloucester, and composed a poem of considerable length, which is a History of England, in verse, from Brutus to his own time. At the close of Edward the First’s reign, we meet with another poet named ROBERT MANNING, but more commonly, ROBERT de BRUNNE *, who appears nevertheless only as a translator. The work translated, or rather paraphrased by him, was originally written by ROBERT GROSTEST, and was entitled *Manual de Peche*, or the Manual of Sins. Among the authors of metrical romances in the time

* Because he resided in the monastery of *Brunne*, or *Bourne*, in *Lincolnshire* inhabited by the monks of the order of St Gilbert. He translated many pieces, from the French and Latin, into English verse; among which “*The castle of love*, by bishop GROSTESTES,” is not the least remarkable. It begins with the following pious lines :

That good thinketh good may do,
And God will help him thar to :
Ffor nas never good work wrought
With oute beginnynge of good thought.
Ne never was wrought non vuel (well, good) thyng.
That vuel thought nas the beginnyng.
God ffuder, and sone and holigofte
That alle thing on eorthe fixt and wofst
That one God art and thrillihod (trinity)
And threo perfonen in one hod,
Withouten end and biginnynge,
To whom we ougten over alle thinge,
Worshepe him with trewe love,
That kinc worthe king art us above, &c. &c.

time of Edward II. ADAM DAVIE (1) is the only person whose name has descended to posterity. ROBERT BASTON, (2) a poet who attended this monarch in his expedition to Scotland, wrote chiefly in Latin. It was not till the reign of EDWARD III. (3) that the geniusses sprang up, who produced that poetic revolution already mentioned, and which reflects so much honour on themselves and on their country. RICHARD HAMPOLE, a doctor

(1) Of this character no accounts appear to be extant respecting his merits as a bard, nor of the time when he flourished: at least I have not been able to discover any in Dr. KIPPIS' *Biographia Britannica*, in the *Encyclopedia Briannica*, last edition, and several other works I have purposely, though vainly, consulted.—The same will apply to other authors mentioned in this *History*, whose names are not accompanied with any biographical notes.

W.

(2) The greater part of his poems are written in *Latin*, of which that "*De Sacerdotum Luxuriis*" is not the least curious.—In English he wrote "*A Book of Poems*," and "*A Volume of Tragedies and Comedies*."—Being poet laureat and public Orator at Oxford, he accompanied Edward I. in his expedition into Scotland in 1304, to celebrate his victories over the Scots: but Robert Baston unluckily fell into the enemy's hands, and was obliged by torture to change his note and sing the successes of Robert Bruce, who then claimed the crown of Scotland. This task he reluctantly complied with, as he intimates in the two first lines:

"In dreery verse my rhymes I make
Bewailing whilst such theme I take," &c.

Our author's poetry was expressed in somewhat barbarous style, but not contemptible for the age in which he lived. He died about 1310. KIPPIS.

(3) Born at Windsor, 1312; proclaimed king and crowned at Westminster 1327; died in 1377.—He was undoubtedly one of the greatest princes that ever swayed the sceptre in England; whether we respect him as a warrior or lawgiver, a monarch, or a man. He possessed the courage and romantic spirit of Alexander; the penetration, the fortitude, the polished manners, of Julius; the munificence, the liberality, the wisdom of Augustus Cæsar. He was tall, majestic, of an elegant figure, with a piercing eye, and aquiline visage. He excelled all his contemporaries in feats of arms and personal address. He was courteous, affable and eloquent; a constitutional knight-errant; and his example diffused the spirit of chivalry through the whole nation. In imitation of the youthful monarch who delighted in tilts and tournaments, every individual betook himself to the exercise of arms; every breast glowed with emulation, every heart panted with the thirst

of

doctor in divinity, of the order of St Augustine, must not be reckoned in the number of these geniusses. ROBERT LONGLANDE, who flourished about the year 1350, and who was the author of the poem called "*The Vision of Pierce Plowman*," merits a far superior distinction. This poem contains a series of distinct visions, in which the vices of almost every profession, particularly of the clergy, and the absurdities of superstition, are ridiculed with much humour and spirit. The satire is accompanied with a strong vein of allegorical invention. The great defect of Longlande, lies in his language. He has adopted the style of the Anglo-Saxon poets, and imitated them in their alliterative versification; in consequence of which he is remarkably uncouth, and sometimes obscure. It is to be lamented, that so much genius and abilities should be hidden by so unpleasant and ungracious a mode of composition. Bad as the model set by Longlande was, he had a number of imitators.

Longland was a cotemporary of Mandeville, and his *Vision* before mentioned is one of the best poems that appeared during this æra. Under the fictitious idea of visions, or apparitions, he lashes in a satirical strain, the vices of all ranks, and particularly those arising from the absurdities of superstition and the corrupted manners of the clergy.—Instead of the long passages quoted by Warton, a shorter one will suffice here, in which *Nature* (Kynde) at the command of *Conscience* and its companions, *Age* and *Death*, sends her diseases from the planets.

Kynde Conscience then heard, and came out of the planetts,
And sent forth his forriours Fevers, and Fluxes,

e

Coughes

of glory; and when he took the field, there was not a soldier in his army, who did not serve from sentiment and fight for reputation. The love of glory was certainly the predominant passion of Edward, to the gratification of which he did not scruple to sacrifice the feelings of humanity, the lives of his subjects, and the interest of his country; and nothing could have induced or enabled his people to bear the load of taxes, with which they were encumbered in this reign, but the love and admiration of his person, the fame of his victories, and the excellent laws and regulations which the parliament enacted with his advice and concurrence; and finally, the first distinction was made between lords and commons in 1342, by which the foundation was laid for the present English constitution; a fabric that is believed to be capable of repairing and occasionally reproducing its worm-eaten pillars, however injured and preyed upon by the tooth of time.

W and BARCLAY.

Coughes, and Cardiacles, Crampes and Toth aches,
 Reumes and Kadgondes, and raynous Scalles,
 Byles and Botches, and burnynge Agues
 Frenefes, and foule Evill, foragers of Kynde.
 Ther was " Harowe! and Helpe ! here cometh Kynde !
 " With Death that is dreadful, to unde us all !"
 The lord that lyveth after lust tho aloud cried— — —
 Age the hoore, he was in the vaw-ward,
 And bare the banner before Death : by ryght he is claimed.
 Kynde came after, with many kene fores,
 As Packes and Pestilences, and much people shent.
 So kynde through corruptions kyllled full many :
 Death came dryvying after and all to dust pashed
 Kyngs and Kayfers, knightes and popes.
 Many a lovely lady, and lemman of knyghtes,
 Swoned and swelted for sorowe and Death's dyntes.
 Conscience, of his courtesye to Kynde he besoght
 To cease and sufere, of se where they wolde,
 Leave pride prively, and be perfite christen,
 And Kynde ceased tho, to see the people amende.

At length *Good Fortune* and *Pride* dispatch a numerous host
 of enemies led on by *Desire*, to make an attack upon *Conscience*.

And gadered a great host, all agayne Conscience :
 This Lechery led on, with a laughyng chere,
 And with a privye speeche, and paynted wordes,
 And armed him in idleness and in high bearyng.
 He bare a bowe in his hand, and many bloudy arrowes,
 Were fethered with faire behest, and many a false truth.

Upon this *Conscience* is besieged by *Antichrist* who is aided
 by the seven great giants (the seven mortal sins), in which ex-
 pedition *Idleness* forms the order of the attack with an army
 consisting of upwards of a thousand well-fed prelates, &c.

There was a Scottish poet in the present period, who
 is entitled to distinguished praises. The person we have in view
 is JOHN BARBOUR, (4) Arch-deacon of Aberdeen. His poem
 called

(4). Very little is known of this illustrious character, one of the
 earliest Caledonian bards, except that he seems to have been born
 about 1326 ; that he was Archdeacon of Aberdeen in 1357, in
 which year he travelled to Oxford, and was appointed by the
 Bishop of Aberdeen, one of the commissioners for the ransom of
 David II. king of Scotland ; and that in 1365 he accompanied

called "*The History of Robert Bruce, King of the Scots,*" allowance being made for the time in which it was written, is eminent for the beauty of its style. Another bard of the same country wrote a poem on the exploits of SIR WILLIAM WALLACE, which abounds with fine passages. Both these writers rose to a strain of versification, expression, and poetical imagery, greatly superior to the age and country in which they lived."

e 2

We

six knights to St Denis near Paris. In the year 1375, as he himself informs us, he wrote a poem of considerable length, which was first published, in the original Scottish verse, from a MS. dated 1489, with Notes and a Glossary; by Mr Pinkerton, in three Volumes 12mo. London, 1790; entitled, *The Bruce*; or the History of Robert I. King of Scotland.—Mr P. the present editor says that "taking the total merits of this work together, he prefers it to the early exertions of even the Italian muse, to the melancholy sublimity of Dante, and the amorous quaintness of Petrarca. The reader will here find few of the graces of fine poetry, little of the attic dress of the muse: but here are life, spirit, ease, plain sense, pictures of real manners, perpetual incident, and entertainment. The language is remarkably good for the time; and far superior, in neatness and elegance, even to that of Gawin Douglas, who wrote more than a century after. But when we consider that our author is not only the first poet but the earliest historian of Scotland, who has entered into any detail, and from whom any view of the real state and manners of the country can be had; and that the hero, whose life he paints so minutely, was a monarch equal to the greatest of modern times; let the historical and poetical merits of his work be weighed together; and then opposed to any other early poet of the present nations in Europe."

"It is indeed posterior in time to the earliest poetry of the most modern nations; but it must be considered that Scotland hardly had one writer in the thirteenth century, and this poem was written in the fourteenth."

The following short specimen of the poem will sufficiently prove these assertions, and we have only to attend to the observation which the editor has prefixed to his Glossary; viz. "The chief obstacle in perusing this work arises from the orthography, which is extremely irregular. To understand many words, it is only necessary to pronounce them aloud; and the meaning which is obscured by the spelling, will be evident from the sound."

A! fredome is a nobill thing!

Fredome mayse man to haiff liking; (1)

Fredome

(1) *Makes man to have joy*

We are now arrived to GEOFFREY CHAUCER, (5) who claims the highest place of distinction, on account of his pre-eminent merit, and the more extensive influence of his example. Into the particulars of his life, which are minutely discussed in the
Biographia

Fredome all solace to man giffis :
 He levys at ese, that frely levys !
 A noble hart may haiff nane ese,
 Na ellys nocht that may him plese, (2)
 Gyff fredome failyhe : for fre liking (3) ..
 Is yharnyt our all othir thing (4)
 Na he, that ay hafe levyt fie,
 May nocht knaw weill the propyrtè,
 The angyr, na the wrechyt dome, (5)
 That is cowplyt to foule thyrlidome.
 But gyff he had assayit it,
 Than all perquer he suld it wyt ; (6)
 And suld think fredome mar to pryse,
 Than all the gold in warid that is.

As a specimen of Barbour's rural poetry, the following few lines will confirm Mr ANDREWS's opinion, when he says in his *History of Great Britain, connected with the Chronology of Europe* ; &c. 4to, London 1794, " That Barbour wrote the life and exploits of Robert Bruce in good rhyme ; and in a style more like our modern English, than the language of Chaucer."

This was in midst of month of May,
 When birdis sing on ilka spray,
 Melland (7) their notes, with seemly soun,
 For softness of the sweet seasoun.
 And leavis of the branchis spreeds,
 And bloomis bright, beside them, breeds,
 And fieldis strawed are with flow'is
 Well favoring of seir (8) colours.

(5) GEOFFREY CHAUCER, justly considered as the father of our English poets, and the first great improver and reformer of our language, was born in the second year of Edward III. A. D. 1328. He studied first at Cambridge where he composed his poem called "*The Court of Love*," in the 18th year of his age, which carries in it very pregnant proofs of skill and learning as well as quickness

• (2) Na ellys nocht ; nor any thing else. (3) fre liking ; free will. (4) yharnyt our ; desired above. (5) angyr ; quære, angys, i. e. anguish? (6) perquer ; perfectly. wyt ; know.

(7) Melland ; mingling. (8) seir ; their

Biographia, we shall not enter. It may be sufficient to say, that he was conversant with the court, and engaged in public affairs ; that he was closely connected with John of Gaunt, and married

ness of wit, and great strength of genius. He compleated his studies in the University of Oxford, or as some say, at Canterbury College.—LELAND informs us, that he was a ready logician, a smooth rhetorician, a pleasant poet, a grave philosopher, an ingenious mathematician, and a holy divine. He afterwards applied himself to the study of Law, in the Middle-Temple ; and was made King's page, about the age of thirty, an office then very honourable, as the English court was the most splendid in Europe. He married Philippa Rouet, a favourite of the Duke and Duchess of Gaunt, about the year 1360 ; was sent by King Edward, as his agent to Genoa, to hire ships for the King's Navy ; and having accomplished the object of this mission to the satisfaction of his master, the King granted him, in the 48th. year of his reign, a pitcher of wine daily in the port of London, to be delivered by the Butler of England, and very soon after he was made Comptroller of the customs in the port of London. Yet it is doubtful, how long he remained in this lucrative office ; for in the second year of King Richard his affairs were in such confusion that he was obliged to have recourse to the King's protection, in order to screen him from his creditors.—By attaching himself to Wickliff, and his followers, he was involved in great calamities, and became equally suspected by the King, and disliked by the people.—In 1382, he was obliged to fly from London into Hainault, France, and Zeeland, in which banishment he almost perished by the barbarous ingratitude of his former friends in England, who instead of sending him any supplies, rather hindered every attempt made by others to relieve him. When almost perishing from want, he privately came over to England, where he was discovered, seized, thrown into prison, and upon disclosing all he knew of the king's enemies, he at last obtained his pardon. Yet he did not take any measures to revenge himself against his treacherous friends by the confessions extorted from him ; though with regard to himself they brought upon him an inexpressible load of calumnies and slanders.—The pension of 20 marks per annum, together with the daily pitcher of wine granted him by King Edward, and forfeited by his dereliction of the court party, were confirmed to him in the reign of King Henry, from whom he obtained a licence on the 11th of May 1389 to dispose of them to one Scalby. In this unexpected and terrible reverse of fortune, he very wisely resolved to quit
that

married the sister of the famous Catherine Swynford ; that he was involved in the misfortunes of his friend and master ; that he was obliged to flee into Holland, when the Duke was disgraced ;

that busy scene of life, in which he had met with so many troubles, and to seek a more lasting happiness in retirement. He therefore chose Woodstock for his retreat ; a place which had been the sweet scene of so much satisfaction to him in the days of his prosperity ; and here he employed part of his time in revising and correcting his writings, totally secluded from the world, and tasting only those calm and solid pleasures which are the result of a wise man's reflections on the vicissitudes of human life. He resided here in a square stone house near the park gate, which still retains his name ; and it well deserves this honourable token, for, being consecrated in his poems, the whole country round about is become, to Englishmen, a kind of Classic ground. The short time he lived after the accession of Edward IV, was chiefly employed in regulating his private affairs which had suffered by the public disorders : for all the public acts of the deposed King Richard, in the 21st year of his reign, being declared void, Chaucer was forced to quit his retirement, to come up to town to solicit his causes, and beginning now to bend under the weight of years, this unlucky accession of business, which obliged him to alter his usual way of living, might very possibly hasten his end, the near approach of which he bore with Roman constancy, or rather with christian patience. For there is still extant a kind of Ode that he is said to have composed in his last agonies, which very plainly proves, that his senses were perfectly sound, and the faculties of his mind not in the least impaired. He died October 25th 1400, in the full possession of that high reputation which his writings had deservedly acquired, and was buried in Westminster Abbey in the great south cross-isle.—The sonnet or ode above alluded to consists of three stanzas only, and as well for the beauty of the piece, as for the extraordinary occasion on which it was written, *Dr Kippis* has deservedly given it a place in his *Biographia Britannica*.

Gode consaile of Chaucer :

Attempted in modern English.

THE POET'S LAST ADVICE.

I.

Fly from the croud, and be to virtue true,
Content with what thou hast, tho' it be small.

ed; and that he afterwards returned into England, upon the restoration of his patron to power and favour.—His literary character was truly illustrious ; it has been lately, and with great ability

To hoard brings hate ; nor lofty thoughts pursue,
 He who climbs high endangers many a fall.
 Envy's a shade that ever waits on fame,
 And oft the sun that rises it will hide;
 Trace not in life a vast expensive scheme
 But be thy wishes to thy state ally'd.
 Be mild to others, to thyself severe ;
 So truth shall shield thee, or from hurt or fear.

II.

Think not of bending all things to thy will,
 Nor vainly hope that fortune shall befriend ;
 Inconstant she, but be thou constant still,
 Whate'er betide unto an honest end.
 Yet needless dangers never madly brave,
 Kick not thy naked foot against a nail ;
 Or from experience the solution crave,
 If wall and pitcher strive, which shall prevail ;
 Be in thy cause, as in thy neighbour's clear,
 So truth shall shield thee, or from hurt or fear.

III.

Whatever happens, happy in thy mind
 Be thou, nor at thy lot in life repine,
 He 'scapes all ill, whose bosom is resign'd,
 Nor way, nor weather will be always fine.
 Beside, thy home's not here, a journey this,
 A pilgrim thou, then hie thee on thy way.
 Look up to God, intent on heavenly bliss,
 Take what the road affords and praises pay ;
 Shun brutal lust, and seek thy soul's high sphere ;
 So truth shall shield thee, or from hurt or fear.

In order to give likewise some specimen of his original composition, Chaucer's humorous *Address to his empty purse*, and his *laconic advice to his own amanuensis*, well deserve here to be recorded.

Chaucer to his empty purse.

To you my purse, and to none othir wight,
 Complain I, for ye be my ladie dere,

I am

ability displayed by such writers as a TYRWGIT and a WARTON : hence it is the less necessary, here, to enlarge upon it. Chaucer was skilled in all the learning of the age, and especially in astronomy,

I am forie now that ye be so light,
For certis ye now make me hevie chere ;
Me were as lefe be laide upon a bere,
For whiche unto your mercy thus I crie,
Be hevy againe, or els mote I die.

Now vouchsafin this day or it be night
That I of yow the blisful sowne may here,
Or se your colour lyke the sonnè bright,
That of yelownesse ne had nevir pere ;
Ye be my life, ye be my hert'is steere ;
Quene of comfort and of gode companye,
Be hevy againe, or els mote I die.

Nowe purse, that art to me my liv'is light,
And fayvour, as downe in this worlde here,
Oute of this townè helpe me by your might,
Sithin that yow wol not be my tresoure,
For I am shawe as nighe as any frere,
But I preyin unto your curtesye
Be hevy againe, or els mote I die, &c.

Chaucer's wordes unto his own Scrivenere.

ADAM SCRIVENERE, yf ever it the befall
BOECE or TROILES for to write new
Under thy longe lockes thou maist have the scalle,
But after my makynge thou write more true,
So oft adaye I mote thy werke renew
It to correcte and eke to rubbe and scrape,
And al is thorow thy negligence and rape.

The following lines are said to have been anciently upon Chaucer's tomb-stone.

GALFRIDUS CHAUCER, VATES ET FAMA POESIS
MATERNÆ, HAC SACRA SUM TUMULATUS HOMO.

About the year 1555, Nicholas Brighman, a gentleman of Oxford, erected a handsome monument for Chaucer. His picture was taken from Occleve's book, together with the following inscription which still remains :

M. S.

*Qui fuit Anglorum vates ter maximus olim
Galfridus Chaucer conditur hoc tumulo :*

Annum

astronomy, as appears from his *Astronomie*, in which he has collected whatever was valuable in the works of his predecessors who applied to the study of that science. He wrote in English prose as well as verse, being persuaded that it was the duty of able men to cultivate their native tongue; an opinion corresponding with the successful efforts of Petrarch in Italy, whose example he found worthy of imitation.

Chaucer is entitled to eminent praise as a poet. He was endued with an uncommon genius, and shone in very different kinds of composition. His *Canterbury-tales* are masterpieces, which exhibit a wonderful variety of talents; for they abound with the sublime and the pathetic, with admirable satire, genuine humour, and an uncommon knowledge of life. The stories told by the several guests are, exactly suited to their characters, and clearly evince that the author, notwithstanding the aid he derived from his acquaintance with Italian literature, was possessed of a noble invention and a fruitful imagination. Whatever were the defects of his style, they were entirely the defects of the period in which he flourished. At the same time it has a claim to much higher praise than it has frequently received. His versification has been censured as deficient in harmony; this charge has often proceeded from our unacquaintance with the structure of the language in that age, and with the manner in which it was pronounced. Chaucer is usually characterized as the Father of the English poetry,

*Annum si quæras Domini, si tempora vitæ,
Ecce notæ subsunt quæ tibi cuncta notunt.*

25 Octobris, 1400.

A. *Ærumnarum requies mors.*

N. Brigham hoc fecit Musarum nomine sumptus.

1556.

In English thus :

Of English bards who sang the sweetest strains,
Old Geoffrey Chaucer now this tomb contains :
For if death's date, if reader thou should'st call,
Look but beneath and it will tell thee all.

25th of October, 1400.

Death is the repose of afflictions.

N. Brigham placed these in the name of the Muses at his own expence, 1556.

try : he was undoubtedly the first person in England, to whom the title of a poet, in its genuine lustre, could be applied with justice. He not only enriched our native tongue in general, but had the honour of establishing the English heroic verse, in which so many beautiful compositions have since appeared.'

' This illustrious man was uncommonly free in his religious sentiments ; he employed his talents with equal success in lashing the immoralities of the priests, and in covertly attacking some of the doctrines of the Church of Rome : nor has it been imagined without reason, that he was a great favourer, if not a direct follower of Wickliff.'

' Another poet of this æra, who is entitled to considerable applause, is JOHN GOWER (6). He was the intimate friend of Chaucer, and co-operated with him in all his valuable designs. With respect to religion he was equally liberal in his sentiments ; so natural is the connection between genius and the love of liberty. Though he was much inferior to Chaucer in spirit,

(6) Gower's chief work in English, is his *Confessio amantis*, or " The lover's confession ;" it was finished in the year 1393. It is divided into eight books, first printed by Caxton in 1483. He wrote this poem at the desire of Richard II. who meeting our poet roving on the Thames, near London, invited him into the Royal barge, and after much conversation requested him to *book some new thing*. On this piece Gower's character and reputation as a poet, are almost entirely founded. It is a dialogue between a lover and his confessor who is a priest of Venus, and like the mystagogue in the *PICTURE OF CEBES*, is called Genius.—What Gower wanted in invention, he supplied from his common-place book, which appears to have been stored with an inexhaustible fund of instructive maxims, pleasant narrations, and philosophical definitions : hence his object to crowd all his erudition into this elaborate performance ; yet there is often some degree of contrivance and art in his manner of introducing and adapting subjects of a very distant nature, and which are totally foreign to his general designs. (KIPPIS). That he was a man of judgment, appears from the circumstance of Chaucer's submitting his *Troilus and Cressida* to Gower's censure.—His munificence and piety were great ; he largely contributed to rebuild the conventual church of St Mary Overee in Southwark, in its present elegant form, and to render it a beautiful pattern of the lighter Gothic architecture ; at the same time he founded at his tomb a perpetual chantry, and died in 1402.

spirit, imagination, and elegance, his language is not destitute of perspicuity, and his versification is frequently harmonious. His erudition was very extensive, and accompanied with a knowledge of life. He critically cultivated his native tongue, that he might reform its irregularities, and establish an English style. His poems are distinguished for their moral merit. In short, if Chaucer had not existed, Gower would alone have been sufficient to rescue the age, in which he lived, from the imputation of barbarism.

‘In comparing the historians of this age with their predecessors, we cannot allow them equal merit in the same species of composition. The Compendium of THOMAS WICKES, which begins with the Conquest, and ends at the death of Edward I, is clear and full in its narration of several events. The Chronicle that goes under the name of JOHN BRUMPTON, is copious in its account of the Saxons, and transcribes many of their laws at large. HIGDEN, though a plagiarist, preserves some facts which would otherwise have been lost. MATTHEW OF WESTMINSTER (7) concluded his Annals with the year 1307; but his work was continued by other hands, and particularly by ADAM DE MERIMUTH, to 1380.’

‘This age also produced what was then extremely remarkable, an extensive and illustrious traveller. Such was SIR JOHN MANDEVILLE, a person descended from an ancient and noble family. He had received his education at the monastery of St. Albans, and applied himself for some time to the common studies of the day, and especially to physic; but at length he was seized with an invincible desire of visiting Asia and Africa. Having amply provided himself for the purpose, he set out upon his travels in 1332, and was absent from England *thirty-four years*. When he returned to his native country, he was scarcely known, as he had long been given up for dead, by his relations and friends. He became acquainted with many modern languages; in the course of his adventures, and wrote his Travels in Latin, French, and English. Several

f 2

false

(7) A Benedictine monk and an accomplished scholar, who wrote this history from the beginning of the world, to the end of the reign of Edward I, under the title of *Flores Historiarum*; he died in 1380.

false and fanciful things are to be found in them, as he was extremely credulous, and tells us not only what he saw, but what he heard. In other respects, his accounts of the countries, which he visited, deserve attention; and, excepting PAULUS VENUTUS, he was the first man who communicated, to the Western Europeans, the knowledge of the remote parts of the world (8).

Division Second; from 1399, to 1485.

From HENRY IV. to HENRY VII.

‘The period, in which Chaucer, Gower and Longlande flourished, was succeeded by an age that did not, in any tolerable degree, sustain the same reputation. There was only one poet in the reign of King HENRY IV. and he contributed nothing to the improvement of our versification and language. His real name was JOHN WALTON, though he is called *Johannes Capellanus*. He translated into English verse BOETHIUS’s “*Treatise on the Consolation of Philosophy*, a work of genius and merit, which in the middle ages, was admired above every other composition.’

‘HENRY V. though said to have been fond of reading, derives no lustre from his patronage of the fine arts, but from his character as a warrior. Although his coronation was attended with harpers, who must have accompanied their instruments with heroic rhymes, he was no great encourager of the popular minstrelsy, then in a high state of perfection. When, on his entrance into the city of London in triumph, after the battle of Agincourt, children had been placed to sing verses as he passed, an edict was issued by him, commanding that, for the future, no songs should be recited in praise of the late victory. This humility perhaps was affected; and, if it was real, does not appear to have been the result of true wisdom. While his inclinations directed him to pursue his eminent military achievements, he ought to have cherished the persons who were best able to do justice to his prowess. The
little

(8) His rambling disposition did not suffer him to rest; for he left his native country a second time, and died at Liege in the Netherlands in 1372.

little regard, however, which Henry paid to the poets, could not prevent them from celebrating his warlike actions. Among other productions, a minstrel-piece was composed on the siege of Harfleur, and the battle of Agincourt. It was adapted to the harp, and contained some spirited lines; but the style was barbarous, compared with that of Chaucer and Gower. The improvement of our language was attended to only by a few men, who had enjoyed the advantages of a superior education, and made composition their study. As to the minstrels, they were, in general, too illiterate to search after the refinements of diction.

‘Concerning OCCLEVE, though of some note in the poetical history of this period, much cannot be said in his praise. His principal poem is a translation of EGIDIUS *on the Government of Princes*. Occleve did not excel in vigour of fancy, and there is no energy in his writings. He had, however, the merit of contributing to the improvement of our language. His pathetic lines on Chaucer, who was his model, and with whom he had probably formed a connection in early life, reflect honour upon the gratitude and sensibility of his heart.’

‘JOHN LYDGATE (9), a monk of the Benedictine abbey of Bury in Suffolk, was the poet whose reputation stands the highest among the English bards of this age. He possessed the advantage of an education, not inferior to any that the times could afford. After having studied at the university of Oxford, he travelled for improvement into France and Italy. Here he acquired the knowledge, not only of the languages, but of the literature of these countries, and paid particular attention to the poetry of both nations. Besides obtaining an acquaintance with all the polite learning which was then cultivated, he was no inconsiderable proficient in the fashionable philosophy

(9) At what time he retired to the convent of St. Edmund's-Bury, does not appear; but he was certainly there in 1415. He was living in 1446, aged about 66; but in what year he died, is not known.—Lydgate, according to Pits, was an elegant poet, a persuasive rhetorician, an expert mathematician, an acute philosopher, and a tolerable divine. He was a voluminous writer, and considering the age in which he lived, an excellent poet. His language is less obsolete, and his versification much more harmonious, than the language and versification of Chaucer, who wrote about half a century before him.

philosophy and theology of his cotemporaries. The vivacity of his genius, and the versatility of his talents, enabled him to write a great number of poems, extremely diversified in their subjects, and in the nature of their composition. His three chief productions were the "*Fall of Princes*," the "*Siege of Thebes*," and the "*Destruction of Troy*."—Lydgate also improved the English tongue; for his language is uncommonly perspicuous for the times in which he lived, and his verses frequently excite surprise by their modern cast. He seems to have been ambitious, at least in the structure and modulation of his style, of rivalling Chaucer; but undoubtedly he was far inferior to him in the grand requisites of poetical excellence. His mode of writing is diffuse, and he is not distinguished by animation or pathos. Nevertheless, he is not destitute of beauties, and his *Destruction of Troy*, in particular, displays much power of description, in conjunction with clear and harmonious numbers.

“If it were compatible with the nature of our design to enumerate names only, other persons might be added. We might mention HUGH CAMPEDEN, THOMAS CHESTER, JOHN HARDING (10), who wrote a *Chronicle in Verse*, and JOHN NORTON and GEORGE RIPLEY, whose poems are didactic. It is scarcely expressing ourselves with propriety, to say that these men were mere versifiers. While they are totally void of the noble

(10) As a specimen of this chronicler's versification, may serve the following curious lines, which Spelman has quoted in his "*Vita Aelfredi*," p. 191. Append.

“Alfrede king was of this regioun
 That brother was to the noble Elthride,
 A perfect Clerk proved in opinion
 As, Clerks could discern, and proved.
 In knighthood also approved and notified
 So plenerly, that no man knew his peer
 So good a knight he was and singulere.
 In batails many in his father's daies
 And also in his brethren time all three
 He fought full ofte, and bare him wel alwaies,
 That for his dedes and singularitee
 He was commended among the emnitee
 Within the land and out, as well was know
 His fame among the people hye was blowe.”

noble qualities which constitute genuine poetry, their versification is unpolished and barbarous. Harding should therefore be marked as an antiquary and an historian, and Norton and Ripley as chemical writers. The latter is understood to have been no mean proficient in the general literature of the times.'

'However deficient the minstrels of this age might be in the excellencies of composition, they were great favourites with the nation at large. This is evident from the reward which they received for their attendance on particular solemnities. Superstitious as the body of the people were, they manifested greater liberality towards the administrators to their pleasures, than towards the leaders of their devotion. During one feast, while twelve priests had only four pence each for singing a dirge, the same number of minstrels were every one of them rewarded with two shillings and four pence, besides having entertainment provided for themselves and their horses. At another festival two shillings were given to the priests, and four to the minstrels; and the latter were treated with the most distinguished marks of attention and respect.'

'It is conjectured that the office of poet laureat originated in this period. An Italian who came into England and professed to be an imitator of the great Roman historian, Livy, assumed the name of Titus Livius, and was protected by Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester. He wrote, indeed, a judicious Epitome of Thomas de Elham's history, but did not attain either the elevation of sentiment or dignity of style, which so eminently distinguished the model he wished to follow. But the employment of a poet laureat, as held under the king, took its rise in the reign of EDWARD IV. and the first person thus appointed was JOHN KAY, of whom no composition is extant, which can be considered as asserting his claim to this character. The only work that remains of him, is an English translation in prose of a *History of the Siege of Rhodes*. A crown of laurel was sometimes conferred, in universities, on those who had distinguished themselves by their abilities in Latin composition, and especially in Latin verse. Hence the king's laureat might be nothing more than a graduate of this kind, employed in his majesty's service. The laureats appear originally to have written only in Latin, which custom is supposed to have continued till the time of the Reformation.'

'If the discoveries, professedly made some years ago at Bristol, in 1768, are to be credited, we must introduce the name of
a poet

a poet far more excellent than any, whom we have yet mentioned, and who would confer honour on this age, infinitely greater than that to which hitherto it has established its title. Our readers must be sensible that we allude to the poems which CHATTERTON produced as the works of THOMAS ROWLEY, a secular priest in that city, in the fifteenth century. The full discussion of this subject, which affords a very curious literary problem, would be foreign to our design. We know that Chatterton, when little more than fifteen years of age, brought to his friends certain manuscripts, and a great number of poems, said to have been transcribed from manuscripts, all of which were alleged to have been found in an old chest in the bellfrey of St Mary Redcliffe church, and to contain the genuine productions of this Rowley. We know that these poems are, in many respects, uncommonly beautiful; and that there is something very extraordinary in them, if they were the compositions of a stripling who had no other advantages of education than what could be derived from the instruction of a common charity-school. We know that they exhibit such marks of knowledge, and are otherwise accompanied with circumstances of so surprising a nature, that it has been deemed not only a matter of astonishment, but even of impossibility, that they should be written by Chatterton. We know that the authenticity of them, and the existence of Rowley, have been maintained by some able and learned men, with no small degree of acuteness and ingenuity. On the other hand, very important arguments and authorities have been urged to prove that they are of modern fabrication. That there ever was such a person as Rowley, has been called in question, and still more, that there could be any poet of that name in the fifteenth century, who was capable of producing the works ascribed to him. It is asked, how he could possibly have been concealed till within these few years, and how he could avoid being celebrated, in the highest terms of applause, by his own cotemporaries, and by every succeeding age. As to the manuscripts asserted to have been discovered by Chatterton, doubts, which will not admit of an easy solution, have been raised with regard to the truth of the fact. Independently of all these considerations, it is alleged, that the poems themselves afford the most decisive internal evidence of their being recent productions. This has been argued, with great force of reasoning, from a variety of concurring circumstances,

stances. The style, composition, sentiments, and measure, carry in them the marks of a refinement that was wholly unknown at the period, in which they are professedly written. In the abstraction of ideas, in the studied forms of diction, in the harmony of the versification, we are constantly reminded of our latest poets. The stanza principally used was not known in this country till the time of Prior. That such a regular piece as the *Tragedy of Ella* should come from Rowley, at the period pretended, is absolutely contrary to every thing of the dramatic kind, which existed at that period. The fact seems to have been that Chatterton originally wrote the poems in the present English language, and afterwards inserted the old words from glossaries and dictionaries. It is remarkable that when we peruse Rowley with dean Mills's learned notes, the moment we turn our eyes from the commentary to the text, the modern air of the latter strikes us in so forcible a manner, that the dean's elaborate arguments lose all power of conviction. It must be added, that many undeniable proofs have been exhibited of the most direct imitation of recent poets, even to the adoption of their very words. These and other considerations have induced a large majority of our ablest antiquaries and critics totally to deny the authenticity of the compositions in question. Should it, however, be allowed, that certain ancient manuscripts were discovered, and that some of them contained fragments in verse, written in the age pretended, Rowley, as we now have him, appears in too questionable a shape to give the fifteenth century the honour of the works published under his name.'

'But while—Rowley being rejected—it will be found that little true poetry flourished in England during the present period, if we direct our view to the northern kingdom of Great Britain, we shall meet with distinguished excellence in a person of the highest station, the sovereign of the country. It is JAMES I. of Scotland, who introduced a new literary epocha in the nation, over which he reigned. What originally was a great misfortune to this prince, and a flagrant act of injustice towards him, turned out, in one respect, eminently to his own service, and highly to the advantage of his country. When he was only a youth of thirteen, he was treacherously taken prisoner by the English, and detained, during the term of eighteen years in a confinement which was often very strict and rigid. His education, however, good rudiments of which

he had received in Scotland, was not neglected, but attended to with the utmost care. The person appointed to be his governor, was Sir John Pelham, a gentleman of worth and literature, who omitted nothing that could tend to form the mind and manners of his royal charge. James, being blessed with an admirable genius, and enjoying the ablest masters of the time, made an uncommon proficiency both in bodily exercises and in mental acquirements. To his knowledge of the Greek and Latin languages, the last of which he is represented as having written with ease, he added an acquaintance with the philosophy of the age. But the studies, to which he was more particularly devoted, were those of poetry and music. These liberal and pleasing arts formed, in his long and close captivity, the principal consolation of his solitary hours. When he was restored to the possession of his throne, from which he had been so unjustly withheld, his grand object was to enlighten and civilize his countrymen. Many of his exertions to this purpose were accompanied with such a degree of success, that he may be said to have given a new turn to the genius of Scotland. His exertions and success would have been still greater and more illustrious, if he had not been cruelly murdered in the forty-fourth year of his age. Various works were written by him, both in prose and verse, most of which are unfortunately lost: those which still exist, are of a poetical nature; and it is certain that several of his compositions of this kind are now no longer in being. Four of James's pieces, which have happily escaped the depredations of time, are a "Song on his Mistress;" "The King's Quair;" "Peblis to the Play;" and "Christ's Kirk on the Green." The King's Quair is a poem of large extent, being divided into six cantos. Its theme is the royal author's love to Jane, daughter to the Earl of Sommerfet; a beautiful lady, of whom he became enamoured while a prisoner at the castle of Windsor, and who was afterwards his queen. The misfortunes of his youth, his early and long captivity, the incidents which gave rise to his passion, its purity, constancy and happy issue, are all displayed in the mode of allegorical vision, agreeably to the reigning taste of the age. That the merit of the King's Quair is very great, cannot be denied. It is distinguished by its invention and fancy, by its genuine simplicity of sentiment, and by the felicity of its poetical descriptions: Several men of ingenuity and taste have contended; that James

is little, if at all, inferior to Chaucer. If the former's "Court of Venus" be compared to the latter's "Court of Love," the royal author will lose nothing by the comparison. The Jane, in particular, of King James, is painted with a beauty and delicacy that are not equalled in Chaucer's Rosal. It is to be lamented, that many of the graces of the King's Quair are concealed, at least from common view, in the antiquity of the language.'

Three other Scottish poets are named in this period, but they are, on the whole, contemptible, when compared with the monarch of the country. ANDREW WINTON, a canon regular of St Andrew's, and Prior of the monastery in Lochleven, and who preceded James I, wrote in verse a very large Chronicle of Scotland. His work, which is valuable, so far as it relates to his own country, and which contains materials not to be met with in Fordun, whom he had never seen, has not yet been published. Its publication would be a desirable accession to the history of North Britain *. HOLLAND was the author of a poem entitled "The Howlat," which appears to have described the poetical employments, and the musical entertainments of the age. HENRY the Minstrel, who, on account of his being blind from his birth, is usually called the BLIND HARRY, composed the "Life of Wallace." It is a romance, like Barbour's Bruce, but not to be ranked with it in point of excellence. At the same time, it is not destitute of merit, and there are various things in it, which cannot fail to gratify the curiosity of the antiquary and the critic.'

* CAXTON † comes before us in the character of an author,

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* It has since been published at London, in 2 Vols. 8vo.

† WILLIAM CAXTON, a mercer of London, eminent for the books he published, and for being reputed the first who practised the art of printing in England. He died at a very advanced age, probably above eighty, in 1494.—Much cannot be said in his praise as an author; for his language is rather uncouth; of which the following is a specimen, extracted from his Chronicle:

"King Alfred reigned 30 years, and a good king he had been, and wel coude chastise his enemies, for he was a good Clerc and let make many bokes. And a boke he made of English of adventures of Kings, and of batails that had ben done in the lond: and many other bokes of gestes he let hem write that were of grete

as well as in that of a printer. He is reckoned among the historians of his age; but in this respect he is entitled to a very small degree of applause. His chief merit is that of a translator. The books printed by him, were more than fifty in number; some of them very large volumes; and many of them were versions from foreign writers, made by himself.'

'Among the patrons of learning, in this period, the name of HUMPHREY, *Duke of Gloucester*, stands foremost; a man of an amiable character in our civil history. He is celebrated by Occleve as a singular promoter of literature, and the common patron of the scholars of the times. Besides him two other names ought to be mentioned, whose merits were great and eminent. JOHN TIPTOFT, *Earl of Worcester*, and ANTHONY WIDVILLE, *Earl Rivers*, were not only protectors and promoters of science, but writers themselves. So eminently was the former at the head of literature, and so masterly an orator, that when, upon a visit to Rome, he delivered an oration before Pope Pius II, he drew tears of joy and admiration from that celebrated and learned pontiff. The light in which he is now only known to us by his own works, is that of a translator. Of his original productions no more than a few letters and small pieces are remaining in manuscript. Anthony Widville, greatly to his honour, was the friend of Caxton, whose new art he patronized with zeal and liberality. The second book printed in England was a work of Earl Rivers's. He also employed himself principally in translations, according to the fashion of the times, and what was then the best mode of conveying instruction to the kingdom. Besides these he wrote several ballads against the seven deadly sins.—Imperfect as the writings of Tiptoft and Widville may now be deemed, great praise is due to them for their zealous endeavours to promote the cause of learning, and to spread among their countrymen a regard to mental accomplishments. The examples of men so illustrious could not fail of producing some good effects. It must ever be lamented that these two eminent noblemen met with so untimely and unhappy an end; both of them having been beheaded, when they were little more than forty years of age.'

'Another

grete wisdom and good lerning; thurgh which bokes many a man may him amende that will hem reade."

W.

‘ Another author deserves to be recorded at the conclusion of this period, not indeed on account of great merit, but for the sake of her sex. This was JULIANA BERNERS, prioress of Sopewell Nunnery, near St. Albans. She did not employ herself altogether in penning devout meditations and rules of holy living, but being a woman of rank and spirit, she wrote on hawking, hunting and fishing. That part which relates to hunting is in rhyme. This lady is the second, at least in point of time, of any of our female writers, and the first who appeared in print.’

‘ To the number of historians of this age, whose works were composed in Latin, we must add the name of ROBERT FABIAN, who wrote in English. He was a merchant and alderman of London, and consequently a member of a corporation which has produced few literary men, and in which many learned characters are not, in the nature of the thing, to be expected. His situation, therefore, in life, especially considering the age in which he lived, may be regarded as giving a certain degree of celebrity to his historical character. The Chronicle of his composition is entitled by him the *Concordance of Sins* ;” it is apparently written with sincerity, and its language is intelligible. Besides the more public facts which it includes, it contains a variety of particulars relative to the city of London. As Fabian’s work is carried down to the twentieth year of the reign of HENRY VII. he may in part be considered as belonging to the following period.’

In the manners ; in the political constitutions ; in the customs ; and consequently also in the languages of almost every European nation, great changes are discoverable during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. These changes cannot be explained otherwise than from the constant increase of population. The order of knighthood, which hitherto had been the only pride of nations, began much to decline ; on the other hand, the lower classes of the people, till then very much oppressed, recovered from their abject servitude, and formed a happy middle rank which soon became the seat of inventive genius, of thriving commerce, of the arts, and the sciences. The influence thus occasioned in language, will be easily recognized by him who is acquainted with the exact relation which languages bear to the whole circuit of ideas, and the degree of taste prevailing in a nation. The question, here, relates only to the English language, the progress of which, during the

the fourteenth century, particularly towards the end of it, was indeed very remarkable. The stock of words it contained, had now become too small and insufficient to express the accession of many new ideas; and therefore its continual augmentation from the French, with which it had already fraternized in the preceding ages, may be without difficulty understood.

Division Third; from 1485 to 1558: or

From HENRY VII. to the end of Q. MARY.

‘Of the English poets in the reign of Henry VII, the writer who best deserved that name was STEPHEN HAWES: he was patronized by this monarch. One of his principal productions was entitled the “Temple of Glasſe;” which was founded upon Chaucer’s “House of Fame.” Previous to Hawes, for almost a century, nothing had appeared but Legends, Homilies, and Chronicles in verse: His capital performance, however, was the “*Paſſetyme of Pleaſure*.” In this poem there is an effort of imagination and invention; and it contains some striking instances of romantic and allegoric fiction. In point of versification, he improved upon Lydgate, and was superior to that poet in genius and fancy. In the harmony of numbers, and clearness of expression he also excelled his immediate predecessors and contemporaries.’

‘Another poet who flourished in this reign was ALEXANDER BARCLAY. His principal work is the “*Ship of Fools*.” It was chiefly taken from a German original, and from two translations of that original, one in French and the other in Latin. Barclay made, however, some additions of his own.—The language of this writer is more cultivated than that of many of his contemporaries, and he had the honour of contributing somewhat to the improvement of the phraseology of his country. Besides other pieces, Barclay was the author of five Eclogues, which were the first of the kind in the English tongue. They were formed upon the plan of Petrarch and Mantuan, being of a moral and satirical nature, and containing but few strokes of rural description and bucolic imagery.’

‘JOHN ALCOCK, independently of his character as a divine and a bishop, was in many respects a man of distinguished abilities. And though he wrote upon the Penitential Psalms in English verse, we cannot presume to rank him as a poet.’

‘Three

‘ Three versifiers in this period, WILLIAM WALTER, HENRY MEDWALL, and LAWRENCE WADE, scarcely deserve any notice.—The dramatic entertainments called “ *Moralities*,” appear to have been carried to their height about the close of the present reign. A great contriver of them was JOHN RASTALL, a learned printer, and brother-in-law to Sir Thomas More. This sort of spectacle had hitherto been confined, either to moral allegory or to religion blended with buffoonery; but Rastall formed the design of rendering it the vehicle of science and philosophy.’

‘ To Scotland we stand indebted for names, in Henry the Seventh’s reign, which are unrivalled in England. That country produced writers who adorned the age with a degree of sentiment and spirit, a command of phraseology, and a fertility of imagination, not, perhaps, to be found even in Chaucer or Lydgate. These writers exhibited striking specimens of allegorical invention, a mode of composition which for some time had been almost totally extinguished in England. WILLIAM DUNBAR and GAWIN DOUGLAS are the two principal persons to whom this high praise is due.’

‘ Dunbar, the chief of the ancient Scottish poets, wrote a considerable number of poems, the two longest of which, and the most celebrated are “ The Thistle and the Rose,” and “ The Golden Terge.” The former was occasioned by an event which ultimately produced the union of the two crowns and kingdoms; namely the marriage of James IV of Scotland, with Margaret Tudor, the eldest daughter of Henry VII of England. In the latter he endeavours to shew the gradual and imperceptible influence of love, when too far indulged over reason.—Dunbar unites in himself, and generally surpasses, the qualities of the chief English poets; the morals and satire of Langland; Chaucer’s humour, poetry and knowledge of life; the allegory of Gower; the description of Lydgate.’

‘ Douglas attained to great excellence in classical learning. This, in conjunction with the natural vigour of his mind, enabled him to sustain a new character, that of a poetical translator, not from the old French metrical romances, but from the models of the Augustan age. In his early youth, he translated Ovid’s *Art of Love*; but he afterwards raised his thoughts to a much nobler and more difficult undertaking, which was a complete translation in heroic verse, of the *Aeneid*

of

of Virgil. The design, which had long been entertained by him, was accomplished in the space of sixteen months, and it is executed with equal spirit and fidelity. Dr Johnson represents Mr Pope's version of Homer, as a very important object in the history of the literature of this country, though it was performed at the time, when learning and taste were in a high state of cultivation in England. What, then, are we to think of such a work as that of Gawin Douglas's, in a period comparatively rude and unpolished? No metrical translation of a Classic had yet appeared in English, unless we are disposed to give that appellation to Boethius. Virgil was hitherto generally known only by Caxton's romance on the subject of the *Æneid*; concerning which Douglas asserted, *that it no more resembled Virgil than the devil was like St Austin.*

'Henry, Earl of Sinclair, was the particular friend and patron of Gawin Douglas; for it was at the Earl's request that Douglas undertook the translation of the *Æneid*; though he is eminent not only as a translator, but as an original writer. His allegorical poems, "King Hart," and "Palice of Honour" excel in the same species of composition;—the several books of his translation of Virgil are introduced with metrical prologues, which display a most extraordinary degree of poetical beauty. Milton's *L'Allegro*, and *Il Penseroso* have been reckoned the earliest descriptive poems in English. If that was the case, Scotland produced the finest examples of this delightful species of composition, nearly a century and a half before.'

'An illustrious lady must be mentioned as an author as well as a patroness of letters; MARGARET, Countess of Richmond and Derby, the mother of Henry VII. In point of time, she succeeds Julia Bergers, being the third female writer in England. Her works were chiefly translations of the devotional kind; though she, likewise, at the desire of her son the king, drew up orders with regard to the precedence of great and noble ladies, at public processions, and especially at funerals.'

'At the time when the nobility in general were involved in gross ignorance, Algernon Percy, the fifth Earl of Northumberland distinguished himself by being the protector of genius. SKELTON was encouraged by him to write an elegy on the death of his father; but what particularly marked the Earl's literary taste and his love for poetry, was a very splendid manuscript transcribed for his use, containing a large col-
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lection of English poems, finely engrossed on vellum and superbly illuminated.

The prime glory of the reign of Henry VIII, with respect to Polite Literature, was SIR THOMAS MORE. Though, according to Mr Hume, there was no man in this age who had the least pretension to be ranked among our classics, he acknowledges that Sir Thomas seems to come nearest to that character: with all his religious weaknesses, he was, indeed, one of the greatest ornaments of his time. "Sir Thomas More," says Mr Warton, "is revered by posterity as the scholar who taught that erudition which civilized his country, and as the philosopher who met the horrors of the block with that fortitude which is equally free from ostentation and enthusiasm: as the man whose genius overthrew the fabric of false learning, and whose amiable tranquillity of temper triumphed over the malice and injustice of tyranny." His Utopia may be regarded as an ethical as well as a political composition. His history of the reigns of Edward V. and Richard III, is far from being esteemed among the best of his productions.—The historical works of JOHN RASTALL, GEORGE LILLY, and EDWARD HALL, have little claim to notice; though Hall is of some use to the antiquary; by the attention which he pays to the variations of dress and of fashion.

This period was not unfruitful with regard to poetic writers. JOHN SKELTON* exceeded the licentiousness of the times, and was censured by his cotemporaries. His characteristic vein of humour is capricious and extravagant; his subjects are often ridiculous; and his matter is sometimes debased by his versification. In a short ode, which was composed by him, he has exhibited a specimen of the structure and phraseology of a love-sonnet, about the beginning of the sixteenth century. Notwithstanding his scurrility, he was a classical scholar.

Moralities still continued to hold their rank among the principal entertainments of the times, and they were represented

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* The editor of the Muses Library (E. Cooper) calls Skelton the restorer of invention in *English* poetry. Among his numerous performances, "The Crown of Laurel," is one of the best, and he displays in it considerable wit and humour; he died at Westminster Abbey, 1529.

sented by different bodies of men. When more regular plays came to be composed, some of them were acted at the Inns of Court. At these seminaries, masques and interludes were occasionally performed, during several succeeding reigns. The first instance of this kind, that is particularly recorded, occurs in 1527, when a comedy written by JOHN ROOS, a serjeant at law, was represented in the great hall of the society at Gray's Inn.'

'HENRY HOWARD*, Earl of Surrey, was a poet of a character far superior to that of Skelton. This accomplished nobleman led the way to great improvements in English poetry. Some of his stanzas approach to the ease and gallantry of Waller, and exhibit specimens of correct versification, polished language, and musical modulation. It is remarkable, that his translation of the second and fourth books of Virgil's *Æneid* is the first composition in blank verse that occurs in the English language.'

'SIR THOMAS WYAT's genius was of the moral and didactic kind; and his poems are more distinguished by good sense, satire and observations on life, than by pathos or imagination. He may justly be esteemed the first polished English satirist.—There was an inviolable friendship between Wyat and Surrey, arising perhaps chiefly from a similarity of studies. Besides adopting the same principal subject for their poetry, the passion of love, they were alike anxious to improve their native language, and to attain the elegancies of composition.'

'Other poets of this period, and of high rank, were SIR FRANCIS BRYANT, the friend of Wyat, GEORGE BOLEYN, VISCOUNT ROCHFORD, brother to Queen Ann Boleyn; and NICHOLAS LORD VAUX, an eminent statesman and soldier.—In Tottel's collection of the poetical writings of this period, is found the first example, that is known in our language, of the pure and unmixed pastoral. It is an example, likewise,
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* He was the first of the English Noblemen, who distinguished himself by a fellowship with the muses. In purity of language and sweetness of sound, he far surpassed his cotemporaries and predecessors. (E. Cooper). His imprudence, in adding some part of the Royal arms to his own, being descended from the heroic King Edward I, cost him his head; though justified by the Heralds. He was executed January 19, 1547.

of extraordinary merit. In ease of numbers, elegance of rural allusion, and simplicity of imagery, there is nothing of the kind equal to it in Spencer. The same collection affords one of the earliest instances of the pointed English epigram; and it is supposed that it came from the pen of Sir Thomas More. Several poems, which were chiefly the performances of his youth, were written by Sir Thomas in his native tongue.'

'NICHOLAS GRIMOALD was the next English poet, after the Earl of Surrey, who wrote in blank verse; he gave to this new mode of versification, additional strength, elegance, and modulation. Grimoald wrote, likewise in rhyme; in which respect he is inferior to none of his cotemporaries, for a masterly choice of chaste expression, and the concise elegancies of didactic versification. Some of his couplets have the smartness which marks the modern style of sententious poetry.'

'ANDREW BORDE, JOHN BALE, BRIAN ANSLEY, ANDREW CHERTSEY, WILFRID HOLME, CHARLES BARNSLEY, and EDWARD HALIWELL, were poets of a subordinate class in this period, of whom it is sufficient to mention their names.'

JOHN HEYWOOD, commonly called the Epigrammatist, is represented by some as the first writer of comedies in England. Though moralities and interludes were written and performed long before the time of Heywood, it must be allowed, that he is among the first of our dramatists who drove the Bible from the stage, and introduced representations of familiar life and popular manners.'

'The poetry of Scotland during the reign of Henry VIII. was much declining. The writings of SIR DAVID LINDSAY were very numerous and extremely popular, on account of their being applied to the purposes of the Reformation. Another Scots poet of this period was SIR JAMES INGLIS. His principal performance, the "Complaint of Scotland" is well written for the time, and displays abundance of learning. In one of his compositions, he mentions a number of poets of his country as then living, that is, about the year 1530. These are, CULROSE, KYD, STEWART, STEWART OF LORN, GALBREITH, KINLOCH, and BALLENTYNE. Concerning four of these persons, nothing is known. Lord Hailes has published some pieces of the Stewarts; and Ballentyne, must mean JOHN BALLENDEN, the translator of Hector Boethius's History of Scotland, in which work he has interspersed several poems, and particularly one entitled "Virtue and Vyce," which has

been reprinted. The author of the article concerning Ballengden, in the *Biographia Britannica*, represents his writings as distinguished by that noble enthusiasm which is the very soul of poetry.'

'About this time was produced, by an unknown writer, a comedy called *Philotus*, which is extremely valuable for its curious pictures of life, manners, dress, and other circumstances relative to the age in which it was composed.'

'Among the number of noble authors in the time of Henry VIII, the names of LORD MORLEY, and JOHN BOURCHIER, Lord Berners, still deserve honourable mention. The former appears to have been a multifarious writer, in prose and verse; he chiefly distinguished himself as a translator, and certainly was one of the most learned noblemen of that age. The latter also translated Froissart's Chronicle, by the command of the king, besides which he was the translator of some French, Italian, and Spanish novels.—The only circumstance that entitles JOHN LORD LUMLEY to the appellation of an author, is his having translated into English, Erasmus's Institution of a Christian Prince.'

'This æra was likewise adorned with some female authors of high rank. The principal of these were, CATHERINE PARR, the last wife of Henry VIII, and MARGARET ROPER, the favourite daughter of Sir Thomas More. The works of the former, which were partly originals and partly translations, are entirely of a religious nature: the compositions of the latter were not confined to the English language; for she wrote the Latin with no small degree of elegance.'

'Some idea of the literary character and taste of an age may be formed from the nature of its publications. The works issued by the press, were numerous; and among these, controversial treatises and devotional writings held a principal place. It is surprising what a number of law books appeared in this period.—Magna Charta was so often reprinted that it may hence be judged, that our ancestors were extremely attentive to, and had a high value for that grand security of English liberty.'

'Sir JOHN CHEKE can never be mentioned with too much respect, as one of those who first introduced genuine literature into this country. In a plan of innovation, which he had formed with regard to the orthography of the English language, he was neither so happy, nor so successful, as he had been

in restoring the pronunciation of the Greek and Latin tongues.'

'Sir THOMAS SMITH also directed his attention to his native language, which he was solicitous to refine and to polish. He published a treatise, the object of which was to promote the correct writing of the English tongue, and the true foundations of the letters and words. If he carried the matter to some degree of excess, and proposed alterations that would not be productive of much advantage, he has only erred in common with other ingenious and learned men.'

'ROGER ASCHAM was an excellent composer in his own tongue. Sir Thomas More excepted, he was perhaps the first of our scholars, who ventured to break the shackles of Latinity, by publishing his *Toxophilus* in English. This he did with a view of giving a pure and correct model of English composition, or rather of shewing how a subject might be treated with grace and propriety, in English as well as in Latin. His *Vindication* of his conduct, in attempting so great an innovation, displays the soundness and strength of his understanding. Dr. Johnson observes of Roger Ascham, that his philological learning would have gained him honour in any country; and that among us it may justly call for that reverence which all nations owe to those who first rouse them from ignorance, and kindle among them the light of literature.'

'The poetical annals of EDWARD VI. are marked with metrical translations of various parts of Scripture. Of these the chief is the versification of the Psalms by STERNHOLD and HOPKINS, a performance which is entitled to no regard from its own merit. Wyatt and Surrey had before translated some of the Psalms into metre; but THOMAS STERNHOLD was the first whose metrical version of them was used in the church of England. His co-adjutor, JOHN HOPKINS, was rather a better poet than himself. His other assistants were, THOMAS NORTON, and WILLIAM WYTTINGHAM, afterwards Dean of Durham. The spirit of versifying the Psalms, and other parts of the Bible, was generally diffused at the beginning of the reformation; and among the rest that employed themselves in this way, were WILLIAM HUNIS, WILLIAM BALDWIN, FRANCIS SEAGER, and MATTHEW PARKER, afterwards archbishop of Canterbury. Another contributor to the metrical theology was ROBERT CROWLEY, an Oxford Divine; and another still more extraordinary one was CHRISTOPHER TYE, a Doctor of Music at Cambridge. Tye projected a translation
of

of the Acts of the Apostles into familiar metre, of which he completed only the first fourteen chapters. The Book of Kings had before been versified by another hand. Dr. Tye carried his absurdity so far as to set his version to music; and his Acts of the Apostles were sung for a time in the royal chapel of Edward VI. Even this good king himself is to be ranked among the religious poets of his reign.'

'Among the anonymous poems of this period, we may reckon the first drinking ballad of any merit, in the English language, which appeared in the year 1551. It has a vein of ease and humour, superior to what might have been expected in those times; and it may be considered as the parent of many pleasing compositions, which have highly contributed to convivial entertainment. This ballad opens the second act of "Gammer Gurton's Needle," a comedy written and printed in the year just mentioned, and which was soon afterwards acted at Christ's-College in Cambridge. It is the first English play which was neither mystery nor morality, and which handles a comic story with some disposition of plot, and some discrimination of character. Earlier in the reign of Edward VI, we find a poet of the name of KELTON, who wrote the "Chronicle of the Brutes," in English verse.'

'King EDWARD VI. stands in the list of royal authors, and he is justly entitled to that distinction. Considering the times in which he lived, and the early period of his death, his Journal of his own reign, his Remains, and his other compositions display such a promise, and indeed such a possession of abilities, as add greatly to the regret arising from his premature decease.—The Duke of SOMERSET has obtained a place among the noble writers of the age. His principal title to this honour is founded on one or two religious pieces, which were penned during his troubles.—EDMUND LORD SHEFFIELD is said to have composed a book of Sonnets in the Italian manner.—HENRY LORD STAFFORD, and FRANCIS HASTINGS, second Earl of Huntingdon, exerted their talents only as translators.'

'The female authors belonging to this short period, are considerable in number, and eminent for their station. The principal of them are, QUEEN MARY, Lady JANE GREY, MARY ROPER, and Lady ELIZABETH FANE. Several other ladies of high rank distinguished themselves as translators from, and into, the Greek and Latin languages; among these we find
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Lady JOANNA LUMLEY, and Lady MARY HOWARD, Dutchesses of Norfolk.'

' Under Queen Mary, notwithstanding the wretched situation of the public, arising from the horrid persecutions which bigotry was carrying into execution, poetry assumed a higher tone. A poem was planned, though not fully completed, which sheds so common lustre on the dark interval between Surrey and Spenser. This poem was entitled "A Mirrour for Magistrates," and in the composition of it more writers than one were concerned. Its primary inventor, however, and most distinguished contributor, was THOMAS SACKVILLE, afterwards Lord Buckhurst and Earl of Dorset, and who in the next reign will come before us as the author of the first genuine English tragedy. The object of the "Mirrour for Magistrates," was to make all the illustrious but unfortunate characters in our history to pass in review before the poet, who descends like Dante, into the infernal regions, and is conducted by Sorrow. A poetical preface called an "Induction," and one Legend, which is the life of Henry Stafford, Duke of Buckingham, were the only parts executed by Sackville. The completion of the whole was recommended by him to Baldwin, before mentioned, and GEORGE FERRERS, who carried it into execution, with the assistance of CHURCHYARD, PHAYER, SKELTON, SELGERS, and CAVYL. Among these finishers of the "Mirrour for Magistrates," Ferrers was the most eminent in point of abilities; but he composed no more than three of the Legends, far the greater number of them having been written by Baldwin. As to the poetical merit of the work, it rests almost entirely with Lord BUCKHURST, whose Induction and Story of the Duke of Buckingham contain many proofs of a vigorous fancy, and many splendid passages.'

' Another poet of this period was RICHARD EDWARDS, whose principal work was the "Paradise of daintie Devises." What chiefly entitles him to notice is, that he was one of the earliest of our dramatic writers, after the reformation of the British stage.—In THOMAS TUSSEK we meet with, perhaps, the first exhibition of didactic poetry in this country. He was the author of a work in rhyme, the title of which was, "Five Hundred points of good Husbandrie," and which has more in it of the simplicity of Hesiod, than of the elegance of Virgil. Indeed, it is so destitute of poetical ornaments, that its sole value arises from its being a genuine picture of agriculture,
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the rural arts; and the domestic œconomy and customs of our ancestors.—WILLIAM FORREST brings up the rear of our poets, but with no degree of splendour. He composed, in octave rhyme, a panegyrical history of the life of Catherine, the first Queen of Henry VIII. His other poems do not deserve a distinct specification.

‘The only Scotch poet we shall now take notice of, is ALEXANDER SCOT, the Anacreon of his time and country. If the age in which he lived be considered, his pieces are correct and elegant. He wrote chiefly upon subjects of love, and stands at the head of the ancient minor poets of Scotland.’

Division Fourth ; from 1558, to 1625 or

During the reigns of Q. ELIZABETH and King JAMES I.

‘In a scene of great and unavoidable theological disputation, the scholars of England were obliged to direct their principal attention to objects that were esteemed of infinite importance; and consequently they had not much leisure for researches into the niceties of languages and learning. We have no names in Elizabeth’s reign, that can be compared with Sir John Cheke, Thomas Smith, and Roger Ascham, whom, in the preceding Division of this History, we have mentioned as eminent improvers of classical taste. Smith and Ascham may in part be considered as belonging to the reign of Elizabeth; for Smith’s “Treatise on the proper mode of writing the English language,” was not published till the year 1568; and “Ascham’s Schoolmaster” was first printed in 1573.’

‘One circumstance, which contributed to the increase of knowledge in general, and to the improvement of the English language in particular, was the multiplicity of translations. This multiplicity constitutes a striking feature in the literary character of the age. On the benefits, which may be derived from translations, it is needless to enlarge. Besides the great store of materials, scientific, literary, and entertaining, which they import into a country, they promote a more accurate acquaintance with the language from which they are made, and enrich the tongue into which they are rendered. A much superior advantage might have resulted from them, at the time we are treating of, if our writers had been better judges
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of the subject, and if they had not, in particular, most of them, entertained an opinion, that it was necessary for versions to be strictly literal.'

'The Greek authors, which now appeared in English translations, were briefly the following. Ten books of Homer's Iliad, from a metrical French version of that work; by ARTHUR HALL: a complete and regular version of Homer, from the original; by GEORGE CHAPMAN: Musæus (according to a poetical passage of Drayton); by the same author: the Jocasta, or the Phæniissæ of Euripides; by GEORGE GASCOIGNE, and FRANCIS KINWELMERSH: Aristotle's famous treatise on the ten categories; by BARNABY GOOGE; seven orations of Demosthenes; by THOMAS WILSON: Herodian's History, from a Latin version of Angelus Politianus; by NICHOLAS SMITH: Xenophon's Institution of Cyrus, from the original; by WILLIAM BERCHER, or as he is called in another edition of the book, Wylliam Barkar: the Table of Cebes, from a Latin version; by Sir ANTHONY POYNGZ. It is the first translation of Cebes that appeared in the English language.—ABRAHAM FLEMING, who was a frequent translator, among other works, produced in English, Aelian's various History. Something, likewise, of Isocrates came from the same hand; and also Synesius's Panegyric on Baldness, which had been brought into fashion by Erasmus's Encomium on Folly. Fleming was of considerable service to the literature of his country, by rendering into English many celebrated books, which had been written in Latin about the fifteenth century, and at the restoration of learning.—The only remaining translation from the Greek, of which we are able to give an account, is that of the ten books of Heliodorus's Ethiopic History; by THOMAS UNDERDOWNE. By the publication of this work, a new field of romance was opened, which is supposed to have suggested to Sir PHILIP SIDNEY the scheme of his Arcadia.'

'The translations from the Latin poets were more numerous than from the Greek. Seneca's ten tragedies were translated by different poets, at different times, and they were printed together in 1581. The Hyppolitus, the Medea, the Hercules Oetæus, and the Agamemnon were translated by JOHN STUDLEY; the Octavia, by THOMAS NUCE, or NEWCE; the Oedipus, by ALEXANDER NEVYLE, who, in the sixteenth year of his age, produced the most spirited and elegant version

sion in the collection; the *Hercules Furens*, the *Thyestes* and the *Troas* of Seneca, by JASPER HEYWOOD, son of John Heywood the Epigrammatist; and lastly, the *Thebais*, by THOMAS NEWTON, the publisher of the whole.'

'Early in Queen Elizabeth's reign, the first four books of Ovid's *Metamorphosis* were translated by ARTHUR GOLDING; and in a short time afterwards, he completed the whole. His style is poetical and spirited; he excelled many of his contemporaries as a translator and a poet; his versions of many modern Latin writers were then of considerable utility, as being adapted to the condition and opinions of the times. The *Fasts* of Ovid were rendered into English verse by an author whose name does not appear; and THOMAS UNDERDOWNE not only gave a translation of the *Ibis*, but illustrated it with annotations.—CHRISTOPHER MARLOE was so void of principle and decency, as to translate the elegies of the same poet; the elegant language of which can make no atonement for their obscenities.—Ovid's *Remedy of Love* met with an anonymous translator. A version of the *Heroical Epistles* was published by THOMAS TUBERVILLE.—There exists, it is said, one of Ovid's *Epistles* translated by the accomplished Earl of Essex. But if it could be recovered, it is probable that it would only be valued as a curiosity; since it is apparent, from a few of his *Sonnets*, which are preserved in the Ashmolean Museum, that he was not endued with a poetic genius.—Finally, Ovid's three first books of his *Tristia* were translated by THOMAS CHURCHYARD.'

'Great attention was also paid to the prince of Latin poets, Virgil. Thomas Phayer, as mentioned in the preceding Division, had translated in the reign of Q. Mary, the seven first books of the *Æneid*. He afterwards finished the eighth and ninth books, but died soon after he had begun the tenth. This imperfect work, after a space of more than twenty years, was completed by THOMAS TWYNE. To the four last books of Virgil, Twyne added a translation of Maphæus's supplemental book. The reason of Phayer's undertaking this version, according to his own account, was to inspire the young nobility, gentry, and ladies of this country with a sense of the riches of their native tongue, and to shew, that the English language was not, as too many thought, incapable of propriety and elegance.—ROBERT STANYHURST, a native of Dublin, also translated the four first books of the *Æneid* into English hexameters.

hexameters. He was more unfortunate in the measure of his versification than his predecessors, and he was not equal to them in other respects.—The *Bucolics* and *Georgics* of Virgil were translated as literal as possible, by rendering verse for verse, in the regular Alexandrine without rhyme, by ABRAHAM FLEMING; he afterwards published separately the *Alexis* of Virgil, translated into English hexameters, verse for verse.—EDMUND SPENSER condescended to translate, though in a vague and paraphrastical manner, the *Culex* ascribed to Virgil.

‘THOMAS DRANT published a translation of the two books of Horace’s *Satires*, which was followed by the *Epistles*, and the *Art of Poetry*. The translator was at first very paraphrastical, but afterwards endeavoured to be so literal as well nigh to render word for word, and line for line. TIMOTHY KENDALL did not obtain much glory by the specimens which he exhibited of his application to classical literature. His performance cannot strictly be called a translation of Martial, because it includes epigrams from many other writers, modern as well as ancient. Martial, however, forms the principal basis of the work.’

‘MARLOE gave a version in blank verse of the first book of Lucan. His death prevented his carrying on the design, which, in the reign of James I, was completed by GEORGE CHAPMAN, but in a very inferior manner — The *Thebais* of Statius, was translated by THOMAS NEWTON.’

‘Besides the translation of the ancient Latin classic poets, versions were not uncommon from some of the modern poetical writers in the same language. Among others, Mantuan, who had acquired the rank of a classic, was translated by TUBERVILLE.—Another favourite author, among the English scholars in this period, was Palingenius, whose “*Zodiac*” was rendered into English verse by BARNABY GOOGE; and the translation had the good fortune of the original, to be very much admired.’

‘The translations from the ancient Latin prose writers were not so numerous as from the poets. GOLDING, whom we have already mentioned with due respect, enlarged the knowledge of the treasures of antiquity, by his versions of Justin’s *History*, Cæsar’s *Commentaries*, and Seneca’s fine moral treatise on *Benefits*. Works of less consequence, rendered into English by Golding, were Pomponius Mela’s *Geo-*

graphy, and the "Polyhistory" of Solinus.—Cicero's Oration for Archias was translated by DRANT —ABRAHAM FLEMING published a translation of certain select epistles of Cicero, and afterwards gave a large collection from the same author, to which were added letters of Pliny, and of other writers.—Tully's offices were translated by NICHOLAS GRIMALD, a poet of the age; and so adapted was the book to general instruction, that it was several times reprinted.—One of the most important translations of this period, was that of the four first books of Tacitus, and the life of Agricola, by Sir HENRY SAVILLE. This translation was accompanied with notes; which were deemed of such consequence; that they were afterwards rendered into Latin by Gruther, and published at Amsterdam.'

'The books that were chiefly rendered into English from Italian and French authors, were of the fictitious and narrative kind. Among the productions of this nature, those of Boccace were the most distinguished favourites; and the versions made from different parts of his works; were very numerous. Indeed the Italian language now began to be so fashionable, that Dictionaries and Grammars of it, written in English, became common publications. The principal persons who figured as translators, were GEORGE GASCOIGNE, GLOFFRY FENTON, THOMAS TUBERVILLE, GEORGE WHITSTONE; Sir JAMES HARRINGTON, and EDWARD FAIRFAX.—One of the works translated by Gascoigne, is a comedy of Ariosto's called "Suppositi," which was acted at Gray's Inn. This translation is in prose; and it is observable, that it was the first comedy in prose which was composed in our language; and exhibited upon our stage.—The most valuable of Fenton's various performances, was his version of the twenty books of Guicciardin's History of Italy; for in this he presented to his readers not fiction but truth; and truth, too, of the first importance.—Sir James Harrington's translation of Ariosto's Orlando Furioso, was a great undertaking; and though it is neither executed with spirit nor with accuracy, it contributed to enrich our poetry with new stores for the imagination, both of the romantic and comic species. A wonderful union was presented to the reader of Gothic machinery and familiar manners.—Edward Fairfax concludes the list of poetical translators, with no small degree of eminence and celebrity. As he lived till the year 1632, he is commonly reckoned among the poets of James the First's time. The grand work, upon which

which his reputation wholly depends, the translation of Tasso's "Jerusalem delivered," was performed by him in very early life, and was published in Queen Elizabeth's reign, to whom it was dedicated. It undoubtedly stands at the head of the poetical versions of that æra. This translation is particularly distinguished by the harmony of its versification, in which respect he ranks nearly, if not entirely, upon a level with Spenser. Waller acknowledged that he had learned his numbers from Fairfax.*

'In general it may be observed, that the best stories of the early and original novelties of Italy, in one form or other, were given in an English dress. The versions from French authors were less frequent, and for the most part of less importance. With regard to translations from the ancients, Mr Warton has remarked, that almost all the Greek and Roman classics appeared before the year 1600. The remark we consider as too general. Were we to enter into an enumeration of them, it would be seen, that many of the finest classic writers, both in prose and verse, were left untranslated.'

'Imperfect as the multifarious translations of this period were, they contributed, amongst other causes, to excite a spirit of criticism, and an attention to the laws of composition. This spirit, however, had been previously displayed by one of the authors of the age, of whom little notice had been taken, till Mr Warton drew him out of obscurity. It is THOMAS WILSON*, who in Q. Mary's reign, (though he flourished chiefly in

* This great improver of the English language was a native of Lincolnshire, and, in 1541, was admitted a scholar of King's College, in Cambridge. He became fellow of the College, and whilst he resided at the University, was tutor to the two celebrated youths, Henry Duke of Suffolk, and Lord Charles Brandon, his brother. In due course, he took the degree of Doctor of Laws, and was afterwards one of the ordinary masters of requests, and master of St Catherine's Hospital near the Tower. Being a man of business as well as learning, he was at times employed by Queen Elizabeth as ambassador to Mary Queen of Scots, and into the low countries. At length he rose to be a secretary of state, and a privy counsellor. In 1579 he was appointed Dean of Durham, and died in 1581. It is said, that Dr Wilson was endued with an uncommon strength of memory, and that this enabled him to act

in Elizabeth's) published an *Art of Rhetoric in English*.—A technical and elementary manual, in our own tongue, written by LEONARD COX, had indeed appeared many years before; but Wilfon's treatise is more liberal and discursive. It has the merit of having illustrated the arts of eloquence by example, and of having examined and ascertained the beauties of composition with the speculative skill and sagacity of a critic: so that this work may justly be considered as the first system of criticism that appeared in our language. The four parts belonging to elocution he states to be plainness, aptness, composition, and exornation; and has some excellent observations on simplicity of style. Among other lessons, this, he says, should be first learned, never to affect any strange inkhorn terms, but to speak as is commonly received; and he strongly condemns those writers who seek so far for outlandish English, that they altogether forget their mother tongue. It appears from the work, that to write elegantly in English now began to be fashionable, and to meet with the highest applause.'

'Another composition of a similar nature with Wilfon's *Art of Rhetoric*, though more confined in its object, was PUTTENHAM's "*Art of English Poesy*." Puttenham had right notions of the true character of a poet, which is, to be possessed of a creative genius. Accordingly, he commonly uses the word "*Maker*" for poet; and he was the first author that brought this expression into fashion, the significance of which has been much commended by Sir Philip Sidney and Ben Jonson. Imperfect as Puttenham's work is upon the whole, it was the only piece of poetical criticism of any consequence, that England produced for a long period. Indeed, nothing of importance appeared on the subject, till Dryden began to write his prefaces.'

'During Elizabeth's reign, the English language was carried by some writers to a high degree of perfection. There have not been wanting persons who have thought, that our native tongue then rose to the greatest excellence which it has ever attained;

with remarkable dispatch in his negotiations. He was the author of various other works besides the two which we had occasion to mention, and was one of the most accomplished scholars of his time.

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attained ; and Dr Johnson, we believe, has expressed the same opinion. In this opinion, however, we do not agree, though we are sensible of the extraordinary merit of a few individuals. Amongst these, particular praises are due to RICHARD HOOKER, a celebrated divine. He exhibited a fine model of the reasoning style in his famous “ Ecclesiastical Polity ;” a work that reflects high credit on his powers of reasoning, and the extent of his literature. In this admirable production he set a noble example to his successors ; an example which was successfully followed by a Chillingworth, a Locke, and a Hoadly.—Sir WALTER RALPHIGH afforded several proofs, in this reign, of that dignity of composition which he afterwards displayed in his History of the World.—WILLIAM PERKINS, an eminent Divine at Cambridge, is said to have written the best language of any of that age or the next, and that many passages in his writings are equal to those of the best authors in modern times.’

‘ Some of the statesmen of Elizabeth’s reign excelled in the propriety, freedom, and strength of their style. This was the case with ROBERT DEVEREUX, Earl of Essex ; ROBERT DUDLEY, Earl of Leicester ; and THOMAS RATCLIFFE, Earl of Sussex. Of all the illustrious characters of this period, none, with respect to English composition, was equal to the Earl of Essex, the Queen’s unfortunate favourite. In a variety of instances he gave ample proofs of his being both a vigorous and an elegant writer. Indeed, public men may be more likely to excel in this respect than mere scholars. The latter, being confined to their closets, contract a formality and stiffness of style ; and this was particularly the case, when the learned by profession did not so generally mix with the world, as is customary at present. But those who are engaged in the grand scenes of business, who have their talents called into exercise by frequent and striking emergencies, and who follow the dictates of their immediate feelings, provided they have had a tolerable education, acquire an ease and variety of expression, which the others cannot readily attain.’

‘ English Poetry assumed a peculiar importance and character in the reign of Elizabeth. This was owing to a variety of causes and circumstances.—The age we are treating of has often been called the golden age of our poetry ; and, if this may not be true in the strictest sense, it was certainly a very poetical æra, and few periods can be mentioned in our history, which shine in that view with superior lustre. The principal features,

features, that strike us in the poetry of the times, are the predominancy of fables, fiction, and fancy, and a fondness for interesting adventures and pathetic events. This characteristic distinction may be chiefly referred to the following principles, which were sometimes blended, and sometimes had a single operation. The principles we speak of were the revival and vernacular versions of the classics; the visionary reveries or refinements of false philosophy; a degree of superstition, sufficient for the purposes of poetry; the adoption of the machineries of romance; and the frequency and improvement of allegoric exhibitions in the popular spectacles.'

'Many circumstances contributed to give a descriptive, a picturesque, and figurative cast to the poetical language of our country; and even the prose compositions of Elizabeth's reign took a tincture from the same causes. In the mean while, general knowledge was widely and rapidly increasing. Books began to be multiplied, and many useful and rational topics had been discussed in our own tongue. Science, at the same time, had not made such great advances as to damp the spirit of invention (fiction). On the whole, we were now arrived at a period that was eminently propitious to original and true poetry. It was a period in which genius was rather directed than governed by judgment; and in which taste and learning had so far only disciplined imagination, as to suffer its excesses to pass without censure or controul, for the sake of the beauties to which they were allied.'

'At the time when the objects pointed out by us were calculated to have a powerful operation upon the nature and character of our poetry, a genius of the first order arose, who was animated with a full portion of the spirit of the age, and capable of painting it in all its energy. This genius was SPENSER, and the production we allude to, his "*Faery Queene*."—It was not to Homer, or Virgil, or even to Tasso, that Spenser looked up for a model; but to Ariosto: and it was consequently his intention to produce a poem which should consist of allegories, enchantments, and romantic expeditions, conducted by knights, giants, magicians, and fictitious beings. If he was blameable in this respect, the fault is not so much to be imputed to himself, as to the times in which he lived. It was natural for him to follow the mode of composition which then was most admired, and to adopt those laws of taste, which Italian critics had approved: for Italy, not France, was

was in Elizabeth's reign the arbiter of elegance; and in Italy Ariosto was greatly preferred to Tasso. Whether this opinion was just or not, we are not here called upon to determine. It is sufficient for our purpose to observe, that it was embraced by Spenser; and that upon this principle, the plan of his grand poem, the *Fairy Queen*, was framed.—In powers of invention and richness of fancy, he has scarcely ever been exceeded. To the display of these talents, the subjects he was led to, by the fashionable reading of the times, were peculiarly accommodated. There could not be more admirable instruments in the hands of a genuine poet, than the adventures and manners of chivalry, and the superstitions and enchantments of the dark ages: They gave scope for all the wildness and beauty of imagery, and for all the splendour and majesty of description; circumstances, of which Spenser has availed himself in the highest degree. As, therefore, his *Fairy Queen* comes recommended to us by so many excellencies, it may be thought surprising, that at present it should, comparatively, have only a small number of readers. But this may be accounted for from several causes. The customs and manners described by Spenser are vanished away, and consequently are little understood by the bulk of mankind. His allusions, likewise, are often too abstruse and learned for common apprehension; and some degree of obsolescence hangs upon his language. Nor is allegorical poetry adapted to the general understanding. Hence it is that Spenser, with all his merit, can only be the lasting favourite of the few, who, by reading and true taste, are fully qualified to appreciate, and to feel, his transcendent beauties. By such persons, he will be admired and applauded, so long as poetry shall continue to be the object of admiration and applause.—Various other poems were written by him, besides the *Fairy Queen*, among which the “*Shepherd's Calendar*,” has excited the greatest attention. By the admirers of pastoral poetry it has always been held in high estimation, and it has no small merit of its kind. It has been the subject of imitation to succeeding writers; and the same has been the case with regard to his “*Astrophel*,” or *Elegy on the death of Sir Philip Sidney*. It is a pastoral elegy; and we know that pastoral elegies have been fabricated in this country, by a long train of versifiers, till they have become insignificant, and even disgusting. It need not be added, that we except the *Lycidas* of Milton.’

‘ So strongly was the age of Elizabeth devoted to poetry, that poetical publications were more numerous than those of any other species of composition in our language. One effect of this taste in the nation was, that there were two collections of “ Flowers ” selected from the works of the most fashionable poets. The first was entitled, “ England’s Parnassus ; ” and the other, “ Belvidere, or the Garden of the Muses.” The former had the superiority, both in point of method and selection. Thus a custom was begun, which in our own time, has been carried to a blameable excess. If such compilations are not wholly destitute of utility, they have the disadvantage of contributing to the number of superficial readers, and of preventing many authors from being entirely read, the whole of whose productions might justly claim a diligent perusal.’

‘ It will not be expected, that we should endeavour to recite the names of all the writers of general poetry, that appeared during the reign of Elizabeth. Several of them, though applauded by their cotemporaries, are now found to have been entitled to no more than a small degree of praise.—GEORGE GASCOIGNE, in addition to his merit as a translator and a dramatist, may here be mentioned as having been esteemed one of the best love-poets of his time. He attained also some reputation as a satirist.—GABRIEL HARVEY deserves to be remembered with respect, on account of a copy of verses written by him, signed Hobbinol, and which is prefixed to Spenser’s *Fairy Queen*. It has even been said that this poem, if he had composed nothing else, would have rendered him immortal. GEORGE TUBERVILLE’S compositions, besides his translations, were of various kinds ; such as epitaphs, epigrams, songs, and sonnets ; and poems describing the places and manners of the country of Russia, where he resided for a time, as secretary to Sir Thomas Randolph. He was one of those who endeavoured to refine the English style.—SIR JOHN HARRINGTON deserves little notice as a poet, independently of his translation of Ariosto. His Epigrams, however, are not destitute of wit.—If, amidst so many claims to admiration and applause, SIR WALTER RALEIGH is to be spoken of as a poet, his title to that appellation belongs to the reign of Elizabeth ; for his poetical pieces were entirely the amusements of his youth, his attention being soon directed to superior pursuits.’

‘ There is some difficulty in ascertaining the exact proportion of fame due to SIR PHILIP SIDNEY, as a poet. He was a passionate

passionate admirer of the art of poetry, and his productions in this way were very numerous. It is universally allowed, that he was unfortunate in his attempts to introduce the Roman measures of verse into our language, those measures not agreeing with the genius of the English tongue.'

'JOSEPH HALL, who, in process of time became successively Bishop of Exeter and Norwich, is entitled to particular distinction as a satiric poet. At the beginning of his celebrated "*Virgidemiarum*," he claims the honour of having led the way in this species of composition ;

" I first adventure, follow me who list,

" And be the second English satyrist."

This assertion of our poet is not strictly true; for there were various satirical writings previously to his appearance. But he was the first who distinguished himself as a legitimate satirist, upon the classic model of Juvenal and Persius, with an intermixture of some strokes in the manner of Horace. Succeeding authors have availed themselves of the pattern set them by Hall.'

'SIR RICHARD MAITLAND was the principal Scotch vernacular poet of this period. His productions were various, and are read with pleasure by those who are competent masters of the local and obsolete language in which they are written.—ALEXANDER ARBUTHNOT, ALEXANDER MONTGOMERY, and JOHN ROLLAND, may be passed over without farther notice; nor is it merit, but rank, that induces us to mention JAMES VI. of Scotland. He published in 1585, "*The Essayes of a Prentise in the divine Arte of Poesie*;" and in 1591, "*His Majesties poetical Exercises at vacant Houres*." King James acted the critic as well as the poet. At the end of the first of these performances are, "*Rewlis and Cautelis of Scottis Poesie*," which, says Mr Pinkerton, are curious, though stupid.'

'We close the subject of the poetry of this period with some view of it, as displayed in the dramatic form. The first regular tragedy which England produced was early in Elizabeth's reign; and this was the *Gorboduc* of THOMAS SACKVILLE, Lord Buckhurst. It is written in blank verse, divided into acts and scenes, and cloathed in all the formalities of the legitimate drama. The first exhibition of it was in the great hall of the Inner Temple, by the students of that Society, as part of the entertainment of a grand Christmas; and in Ja-

nuary, 1561-2, it was again represented before the Queen at Whitehall. It was not intended for the press, but having been surreptitiously and carelessly printed, a correct edition was given in 1571. Though this tragedy never was a favourite, even among our ancestors, and has long fallen into general oblivion, the language of it has great purity and perspicuity, and it is entirely free from that tumid phraseology which afterwards took place among our dramatic poets. Every scene of the *Gorboduc* is marked with Sackville's characteristic manner, which consists in a perspicuity of style, and a command of numbers, superior to the tone of his times.'

CHRISTOPHER MARLOE, whom we have mentioned as a translator, appeared with greater lustre as a dramatic poet. Six tragedies were written by him, and he began a seventh, which was completed by another hand. It is remarkable, and indicates the credulous ignorance of the age, that the subject of one of his pieces should be the *Tragical History of the Life and Death of Dr. John Faustus*. Marloe's chief fault in description is an indulgence of the florid style, and an accumulation of conceits, resulting, however, from a warm and brilliant fancy. It has even been said of him, that he bore some resemblance to the incomparable Shakespeare. The tragedy of *Dido*, left incomplete by Marloe, was finished by THOMAS NASHE, who was likewise the author of a comedy.

—GEORGE WHETSTONE was a writer upon various subjects in prose; but his poetical compositions were of too quaint and pedantic a nature, to deserve the attention of posterity. His comedy, "*Promos and Cassandra*," no otherwise deserves to be noticed, than as it is said, that Shakespeare founded upon it his "*Measure for Measure*." Besides other works, Whetstone drew up a life of GEORGE GASCOIGNE, who claims a place among our dramatic poets, not only as the translator of the "*Jocasta*" of Euripides, and the "*Supposes*" of Ariosto, but as the author of a tragi-comedy, called the *Glass of Government*, and a Masque, entitled, "*The Princely Pleasures of Kennelworth Castle*." This Masque is composed partly in prose, and partly in rhyme; and is a relation of the entertainment given to Queen Elizabeth at Kennelworth, by Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, in the month of July, 1575.—

JOHN LILLY wrote a number of comedies, which were acted before the Queen, and seem to have been much applauded in their day. He has been highly extolled as a reformer and purifier

purifier of the English language; but the affected turn of his compositions, and especially of his "Euphues," a romance, does not give credit to such an encomium.—Another comic writer of this reign was ROBERT GREEN. He was a man of great humour and drollery, and by no means deficient in point of wit; which talents, however, were prostituted by him to the base purposes of vice and obscenity. It is said of him, *that he was the first author who wrote for bread.*—GEORGE PEELE exercised his abilities for the stage in a different form. His "Arraignment of Paris" was a dramatic Pastoral; his "Edward the First" an historical play; and his "King David and Fair Bethsabe," a tragedy. He wrote, likewise, another tragedy, called "The Turkish Mahomet, and Hyren the fair Greek," which has not been printed. The story, no doubt, is the same as that, upon which Dr. Johnson's "Irene" is founded. Other poems were written by Peele, and it has been admitted, that he was a good pastoral poet.

'But all the dramatic authors, we have mentioned, and the lustre they shed on the reign of Queen Elizabeth, are of little significance, when compared with the glory, which was reflected upon it by its having produced SHAKESPEARE, that master of human nature and human life; that prodigy of invention and imagination; that commander of the sublime, the pathetic, and the comic; that painter of external passions and external manners; that miracle of description, moral wisdom, and deep penetration; and that treasure of pure poetry. It was in the latter end of this period, that he wrote some of his finest pieces, and displayed the wonderful sources and energies of his mind. We pretend not to give a minute character of Shakespeare. This it would be impossible to do with justice, in many pages. Besides, he chiefly flourished in the next reign of James I, surrounded with his great competitors, but far surpassing them all.'

'Among the miscellaneous writers of the age, SIR PHILIP SIDNEY deserves the first place. His "Arcadia" was long highly celebrated and greatly admired. What Sir Philip has observed concerning "Amadis de Gaule," may in some degree be applied to his own performance. "Truly," says he, "I have known men, that even with reading Amadis de Gaule, which God knows, wanteth much of a perfect poesie, have found their hearts moved to the exercise of curtesie, liberality, and especially courage."—But there is another production,

duction, on account of which Sir Philip deserves to be recorded with honour as a miscellaneous writer. This is his "Defence of Poësie," which will probably long continue to be read with pleasure, by persons of true taste and discernment. It is an ample and masterly vindication of the art, and there are many passages in it, which display great power of composition.'

'HENRY CUFF has here some claim to remembrance, in consequence of his "Treatise on the Differences of the Ages of Man's Life." It is a curious and philosophical performance; but the value of it is diminished by its partaking too much of that uncouthness of language, which was generally prevalent. Cuff was the unfortunate secretary to the Earl of Essex, and had in his master a superior model of English style; for the former had habituated himself to write like a scholar, while the latter managed his pen with the freedom of a man of the world.—To the names already given, may be added that of SIR GEOFFREY FENTON, secretary of state in the kingdom of Ireland. He chiefly figured in the capacity of a translator, and his principal works were "Golden Epistles," gathered from Latin, French, and Italian authors; and a translation of "The History of the Wars of Italy, by Francis Guicciardini, in twenty Books."—Sir Geoffrey wrote with ease, and his style reflects credit on his judgment and taste.'

'The miscellaneous authors of eminent station were the following: LORD BUCKHURST; EDWARD VERE, seventeenth Earl of Oxford; WILLIAM POULETT, Marquis of Winchester; ROBERT DUDLEY, Earl of Leicester; WILLIAM CECIL, Lord Burleigh; HENRY HOWARD, Earl of Northampton; Lord Chancellor HATTON; and HENRY CARY, first Lord Falkland. —Among the female authors of this period, the illustrious QUEEN ELIZABETH maintains the first rank; for she was the most learned woman of the age. Besides her translations into Greek and Latin, which are foreign to this historical view, she translated Plutarch de Curiositate, Boethius's Consolation of Philosophy, Sallust's Jugurthine War, and part of Horace's Art of Poetry, into her native language.—By her cotemporaries Elizabeth has been highly extolled for her poetry; but this must be attributed to the flattery of the age. The beautiful, the unfortunate, and the imprudent MARY QUEEN OF SCOTS makes but a feeble comparison with her rival Elizabeth; for she was far inferior to her in profound erudition, and rather excelled in those lighter parts of literature,

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that were fashionable at the Court, where she had been educated. Besides the poems written by her in Latin, French, and Scotch, she composed also a "Consolation of her long Imprisonment, and royal Advice to her Son." Many of her Letters occur in public libraries, and are frequently finding their way to the press, in consequence of the minute attention to historical information, which is now so generally prevalent. MARY SIDNEY, Countess of Pembroke, and sister to Sir Philip Sidney, was a very accomplished lady, and received ample testimonies of her merit. The two works, which she published, were only translations; one being "A Discourse of Life and Death;" and the other, "The Tragedie of Antonie."—But among the women of this period, who were devoted to the study of literature, the principal place is due to the four daughters of Sir Anthony Cooke. They were well acquainted with the ancient and modern languages, and translated several works into their own.—MILDRED, the eldest of the four sisters, was, for more than forty-two years, the wife of the illustrious statesman William Cecil, Lord Burleigh. She translated a piece of St. Chrysostom's, from the original, into the English language.—ANNE, the second daughter of Sir Anthony Cooke, became the wife of the Lord-keeper, Sir Nicholas Bacon, and was the mother of the illustrious Francis Bacon. She translated from the Italian into English, twenty-five Sermons written by Barnardine Ochine, a celebrated divine of that age, concerning the predestination and election of God. Not long after her marriage, Lady Bacon gratified the curiosity of the public, and contributed much to the instruction of her countrymen, in religious matters, by translating from the Latin into English, an "Apology for the Church of England;" originally written by the learned and eloquent Bishop Jewel.—ELIZABETH, the third daughter of Sir Anthony, was first married to Sir Thomas Hobby, and secondly to John, Lord Russell, son and heir to Francis Russell, Earl of Bedford. She wrote epitaphs for her son, daughter, brother, sister, both husbands, and a venerable old friend, in the Greek, Latin, and English tongues. Besides these, Lady Russell translated, from the French into English, a tract, entitled "A way of Reconciliation of a good and learned Man, touching the true nature and Substance of the Body and Blood of Christ."—KATHERINE, the fourth daughter in this learned family, though likewise famous for her knowledge in the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin language,

languages, and for her skill in poetry, does not appear to have been the author of any distinct treatise.'

'It must, however, be remembered, that the literature of the women of that period extended comparatively but to a few persons, and those only of considerable rank; the generality of the female sex being in a state of ignorance. There was by no means that diffusion of knowledge, that cultivation of mind, that taste for books, with which we now meet, in almost every company of ladies. Neither do we find, that the learned women of the sixteenth century produced such works as have continued to be read much by posterity. The most important production of any of Sir Anthony Cooke's daughters, was Lady Bacon's translation of Bishop Jewel's Apology; and yet, who but an antiquary will now seek for it, or give himself the trouble of perusing it? Not a single poetess, deserving to be mentioned, arose in this country till the seventeenth century. The DUTCHESS OF NEWCASTLE, Mrs KATHERINE PHILIPS, and Mrs. BEHN, appear to have been the first who could, in any degree, merit that appellation. Independently of poetry, the learned women of Elizabeth's reign have been far exceeded by the ingenious ladies of the present age, both in the general and extensive utility of their writings, and in the elegancies of composition. There is a remark to be made concerning the difference between the literature of the ladies of the sixteenth century, and that of the females of more recent times. The former entered deeply into the study of the ancient languages; whilst the latter, besides acquiring a skill in the modern tongues, especially the French and the Italian, have paid their principal attention to the cultivation of general knowledge; though a few of them have been no small proficient in the learning of antiquity.'

'Among the numerous Divines of this period, who have a claim to peculiar and extraordinary distinction, both as men of letters and as improvers of their native language, we have already mentioned RICHARD HOOKER, to whom we shall join the name of THOMAS BILSON, successively Bishop of Worcester and Winchester. This prelate was one of the final correctors of the English translation of the Bible, in the reign of JAMES I. For this office he appears to have been particularly qualified, as his style is, in general, more easy and harmonious than was common among the ecclesiastics of his time.'

'Amidst the endless theological productions of the age, original

ginal works in Ethics were almost totally unknown among us, till at length the public received ample gratification from FRANCIS BACON's Essays, concerning which we need not say, that they opened a rich treasury of moral observation, and that they were worthy of the great and comprehensive mind, from which they proceeded. The name of Essays was then new to the world, and perhaps had been derived from Montaigne. Thus Bacon introduced into England a species of writing, which has since been largely cultivated, which has produced a vast number of beautiful compositions, and which constitutes an elegant part of modern literature.'

The specimens of composition quoted by Dr. Johnson, in his History of the English language, extend only to the period, in which Dr. Wilson wrote; a man whose merits in refining his native tongue we have stated in page lxxiii & seq. It would, however, have been very useful, if Dr. Johnson had produced further specimens, * taken from the writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, so that the subsequent transition, from the Saxon-Normannic to the modern English language, might have been exhibited in an uninterrupted view. During a period of two centuries and a half, a living language must undergo great changes. This is particularly obvious in the German, when we compare the language of the modern Germans with that of Luther and his cotemporaries. I propose, therefore, to conclude this Essay with a few general remarks.

1. The cultivation of a language altogether depends upon the progress, which a nation makes in taste, and in philosophical acquisitions. The latter enrich a language, while the former contribute to give it an agreeable form, and to regulate its inflexion and harmony. Hence the history of a language cannot be properly exhibited, without giving a closely connected view of the respective improvements of the people, that make use of this language.

2. As in languages we find no arbitrary but conventional
1 arrange-

* If it were consistent with the limits allotted to this publication, many other specimens from later writers might have been inserted. But as the works of the best authors, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, are pretty generally known, this omission cannot be considered as material.

arrangements in every part of them ; hence the changes, which a language from time to time undergoes, must be deduced and explained from the particular circumstances, in which a nation is placed. In order to fix our attention here exclusively upon the English language, we may observe, that though the conquest of England by the Normans, points out the cause of the subsequent mixture of the Saxon-Danish dialect with the Normannic ; yet as many nations have been conquered by invaders, whose languages were not introduced into the vanquished countries, this mixture cannot be satisfactorily explained, unless we have recourse to a variety of concurrent circumstances. Among these, the relative situation, in which the conquerors were placed towards the conquered, deserves particular attention. As long as the conquerors ruled the natives with despotic rigour, their language prevailed, both at court and in common life ; they compelled the subjugated Britons to make use of the Normannic language, as well in their mutual intercourse as in all public transactions. Thus this language spread rapidly, even among the lower orders of the people. But as the dominion of the proud Norman Barons did not continue long enough, to suppress completely the language of the country ; and as the lower classes, under Henry II, again acquired their former importance, the old popular language likewise resumed its former authority. Besides this circumstance, the nation at the same time advanced in knowledge, taste, and improvements of every kind, so that the deficiencies and imperfections of the ancient language were soon discovered. On this account, the more refined Normannic tongue, with which the people were already acquainted, was mingled with the dialect of the natives : and as England henceforth continued to improve in knowledge and taste, by its intercourse with France, it happened, that the French language displayed its influence more and more upon that of the English ; particularly as its kindred dialect, the Normannic, had already paved the way for this mixture. Hence, too, we can explain the singular phenomenon, that of two names given to the same object, the one of which is of Saxon-Danish, and the other of Normannic or French extraction, the latter should be more dignified than the former, or, at least, used more frequently among the higher classes of society. The words *ox*, *calf*, *wether*, are derived from the Danish-Saxon ; but *beef*,
veal,

veal, and *mutton* * from the Normannic-French. Many other instances of a similar nature occur in modern English.

3. Besides the peculiarities found in every individual nation, there are, in many languages of nations intimately connected, always some particulars, in which they all agree: and as this is observable during one and the same period of time, it must be explained from the prevailing spirit of the age. In order to give an example of this kind, we shall mention the appearance of the softening letter *e*, which, since the fifteenth century, has been prevalent in several languages of Europe. The adoption of this letter appears to have arisen in consequence of the progressive refinement of taste, so that speakers and writers of modern languages felt the necessity of softening the harshness of the vernacular tongues, which were overloaded with consonants. For this purpose, the insertion or the addition of the vowel *e* has been the most usual and the most general expedient; by which, among other languages, the French in particular has been much refined. The same has been adopted in the German, as the words, *Bube*, *Knabe*, a boy; *Käse*, cheese; *enge*, narrow; *blöde*, weak, timid; *Getreide*, corn, and many others, were since that period written and spoken with an additional *e*; instead of the harder words, *Bub*, *Knab*, *Käs*, *eng*, *blöd*, *Getreid*.—A similar method has been practised in the English language, as is obvious from the specimens given in the earlier periods of its History. But the limits of propriety, in this respect, were soon transgressed in all the modern languages; and this *e* was frequently annexed, without necessity, to many words, in which it served only to obscure their structure and inflexion, or at least to render them awkward and heavy. Such are, in German, the words, *die Geschwistere*, the brothers and sisters; *die Bürgermeistere*, the Burgo-masters; *oft*, frequently; *reine*, purely; *die Ableitunge*, the derivation; and in English, the words, *orderinge* both *e*, *accordynge*, *suche*, *anye*, and many others. Hence all the languages, as the people advanced in sound taste and knowledge, have, in latter times, restrained this addition within certain and proper limits.

* The words here employed in illustration of the remark, do not appear to have been distinctly understood by Mr. Adelung; for they are not strictly synonymous, and though they both refer to the objects expressed by them, yet always in different states of their existence. W.

ESSAY SECOND.

A Philosophical view of the English Language.

Why called Philosophical?

IT has now become usual in language, to call that method of treating a subject *philosophical*, where we not only describe the phenomena as they exist, but inquire also, how they came to be what they are, and why they are so. And it is merely in this sense I make use of this expression here; for the term *philosophical* strictly implies nothing more than *rational*. It would lead me too far, were I to show the superiority of this rational method in languages, over the mechanical mode of teaching, hitherto practised. It has already been introduced, with success, in all the other sciences; language alone is behind in this respect: for which reason grammar must still be contented with the contemptible appellation of a mere art, however susceptible it may be of a scientific method. All I intend here is merely an experimental inquiry, in which I propose to select a few of the more remarkable phenomena occurring in the English language; so that the reader must by no means expect to find a grammar, in the common acceptation of that term.

Of the English Language.

What has been the origin of the English language, and by what means, by what intrinsic and extrinsic changes it has been gradually improving, for upwards of a thousand years past, has been shewn in the preceding Essay.—It is spoken in the greatest part of England, and in the Low-lands of Scotland, while, on the contrary, in the mountainous parts of Scotland, in Ireland, and in the English provinces of Wales and Cornwall, another language prevails, which is the offspring of the oldest language of the country, the British, and bears an affinity to that spoken in the French province of Brittany.

Of the English Written Language.

The English, like every other living language, is again divided into various dialects, which differ, partly according to the districts of the country where they are spoken, partly according to the degrees of cultivation acquired by those who speak them. The most improved of these dialects, as in every other language, is likewise the written language of the nation, and in the strictest sense termed the English language. The most accomplished part of the nation is here, as in many other states, the court, and the higher classes of the inhabitants of the Capital; for wealth and taste are generally the attendants of the court, and their natural influence on language is here accordingly most remarkable. Hence it is this refined dialect, which all writers of taste employ, and which, out of the Capital, can be learned only from books.

Division of Grammar.

Grammar is divided into two principal parts, of which the first and most important relates to the art of speaking with propriety, the second to the art of writing correctly, or orthography. As one must first speak properly, before he can write with accuracy, orthography ought, in justice, to hold the last place in every grammar. Yet as no progress can be made in speaking, without acquiring the elementary part of the mode of writing, it is customary to begin with the orthography; particularly in such languages as are spoken differently from what they are written.

Of the English Written Characters.

There is every reason to believe, that the ancient Britons were as little acquainted with the art of writing, as any of the rude and semi-barbarous nations of those times. The Romans, indeed, as soon as they established themselves in Britain, likewise introduced their written characters; but it does not appear, that they were adopted by the natives: and though this had been the case, they would have been lost by the succeeding invasions of the Saxons, who, at their first appearance in this country, were a more rude and savage people than the ancient Britons.—As soon as the Saxons were converted to Christianity, they received the Roman characters
from

from their Italian and Gallic teachers of religion ; and these characters had been already transformed, and adapted to the running hand, then in use.

Of the Anglo-Saxon Alphabet.

As the Saxons had certain sounds in their unpolished and harsh language, with which the Romans, as well as the cultivated Gauls were unacquainted, and which therefore could not be expressed by the common written characters of the latter, many of these were changed, and some new ones adopted ; such as that which represents the hissing *th*, and which was borrowed from the Greek *θ*, thêta. This alphabet, termed the Anglo-Saxon, maintained its ground till the invasion of the Normans, and for a considerable time after that event.

Of its disuse.

However much the ancient Roman characters might have been disfigured by the corrupted taste of the middle ages, they still retained a certain affinity to their original form : but this affinity was destroyed by the peculiar Anglo-Saxon letters. —In the Saxon and Saxo-Danish periods, the national taste, notwithstanding the progress it had made, was still much too rude, to exhibit this corruption, in a sensible manner. But when the Normans subjected England to their power, and began to spread the higher degrees of improvement, that prevailed in France ; when the Saxo-Danish language itself was refined by the Normannic and later French ; this awkward state of things became evident, the old Anglo-Saxon characters were again abandoned, and the Roman alphabet in its pure form, such as prevailed at that time in France, was consequently adopted, in preference to the former. This change, however, was now attended with the inconvenience, that the simple hissing middle-sound, which had formerly been expressed by the letter *θ*, borrowed from the Greek, behoved now to be denoted by the compound *th*, which could express it only in a very imperfect manner. But if the improvements in a language be carried on with taste, of two inconveniences, that one is always preferred, which is the least repugnant to the sense of beauty and propriety. The old Anglo-Saxon figure disagreed altogether with the symmetry

metry of the Roman letters ; and therefore proved more offensive to sound taste, than the *tb*, although it be a compound sign for a simple sound, because it was still agreeable to the Roman fashion, at least with respect to its shape.

Of angular Written Characters.

To trace all the changes, which these characters have, from time to time, undergone in their figure, would be tedious, and is not properly an object of this inquiry. I shall remark only one circumstance. In the latter centuries of the middle age, when taste and industry began to revive, there arose a mode of writing, which is properly denominated the "Broken writ," but which, in common life, is generally called the "Monkish writing," because the monks, in particular, used it in their manuscripts. It is also frequently termed the "Gothic character," not as if it had been invented and used by the Goths, but in so far only, as we are accustomed to call all that taste Gothic, which delights in angular, pointed, and curled ornaments. As this handwriting was certainly more beautiful than the long and "waving" current hand, formerly in use, it afterwards became general over all Europe, and maintained its place till the revival of the sciences and of good taste, when people returned to the beautiful Roman letters, as they were formed, before the barbarous nations imprinted on them the marks of their corrupted and uncultivated taste.

These characters were first discontinued in Italy, where the round Roman hand was soon revived, which is therefore termed Italian ; and whence it was by degrees introduced into several countries of Europe. But as the prevailing degree of taste was by no means uniform, either in all countries, or among all the classes of one and the same nation, this change happened in different ways, and with various modifications. England, since the preceding century, has been gradually adopting the round Italian letter, in all writings designed for the higher and middle classes ; while, on the contrary, in such writings as are immediately addressed to the common people (for instance, in acts of parliament, public deeds, &c.) the old angular character, generally called "engrossing," is still used ; because they have been long accustomed to it, and have not yet acquired a sufficient degree of taste *, to perceive its inelegance.

The

* The author certainly alludes here to the English lawyers *only* ;
as

The English write differently from what they speak.

The English language consists of a mixture of the old Saxon and Danish, of the Normannic and modern French, and of the Latin. The Italian and Spanish are often added to this number, but these two languages neither have had, nor could have had, so great an influence on the English, as to form a constituent part of it, although individual words may be derived from them, which holds also with respect to many other languages. And as the languages before mentioned are so different from each other in their external and internal structure, it is easy to see, that this association or combination of words could not take place without great violence, and the destruction of a great part of the peculiarities of each of the languages thus combined in the English. Since, in all languages, a close adherence to etymology preserves their peculiar form, and has a tendency to prevent those remarkable changes, which the constant progress of civilization, as well as the precipitate alterations of the people, would otherwise produce; it is not difficult to perceive, that, by this method of adopting and incorporating words, the proximate structure of them, with respect to the ear at least, must in a great variety of instances be destroyed; especially as this structure, in general, is but very imperfectly known in such words, as are derived from a foreign language, that forms a component part of the ancient language of the country. The pronunciation, accordingly, in all such mixed languages, is exceedingly variable; because the nearest derivation, of the greater number of words, is unknown to the people, who speak them; and consequently there is no fixed immovable point, to which the ideas denoted by them, might be attached, and which could guide the tongue and the ear. This deficiency is obvious in all those modern languages, which have been formed by a mixture with the Latin, as the Italian, French, Spanish, and Portuguese, the pronunciation of which is exposed to far more considerable changes than such languages, as have remained pure and unmixed, like the German

as the continuation of this barbarous character is productive of considerable fees, while the disuse of it would materially affect their interest.

Note of the Composer.

man and her northern sisters. Those mixed languages, too, would in a few centuries be deprived of their uniformity, had not the "latent perception" of necessity furnished these nations with a method of preserving, for a long time, the proximate derivation of words, at least to the eye, though the ear may have lost it.

Explanation of this phenomenon.

The method of preserving the etymology of words, as adopted by the nations above alluded to, is no other than this, that people write differently from what they speak: a phenomenon, which indeed has been hitherto represented, by grammarians and philosophic linguists, as the most palpable absurdity that can be conceived; although the agreement of all the western nations of Europe, in what they have thus termed absurdity, should have convinced them, that there must be some reason for it, and which ought not to be overlooked. This reason then is no other, than to preserve, as long as is necessary, to the eye at least, the proximate derivation by means of writing, although the pronunciation has lost it; to promote thereby that universal intelligibility, which is the first and principal object of language; and, at the same time to prevent the swerving and fluctuating pronunciation, as long as possible, from further and still greater deviations.—An example or two will serve to make the matter more evident. The following words, being borrowed from the French and Latin languages, *legality*, *legion*, *organ*, *orgies*, are now pronounced *legality*, *ledzhun*, *argun*, *ardzhyz*. If they were written in this manner, an Englishman might, at length, learn to understand them tolerably well, but he would still find a difficulty, when these words occurred to him again in their original language, to recognize his own in them. The bond of connection between the English language and its constituent parts would thus be dissolved, and the reciprocal intelligibility would thereby be rendered obscure. Further, as the pronunciation in all such mixed languages, from the causes above mentioned, is from time to time considerably changed, many words would soon become altogether obscure and unintelligible, did not the etymological way of writing them, still maintain their true form, as long as is practicable and necessary. Besides, the adherence to the nearest derivation, and the preservation of the original form of words, by accurate writing,

are likewise the means of preventing the extremely fluctuating pronunciation from still greater deviations. This is the true reason, why all the western Europeans, and consequently the English too, write differently from what they speak : and as this phenomenon has been produced entirely by “ the latent perception of purpose and means,” which is involved in so much obscurity, that, so far as I know, their grammarians have not yet been able to account for it ; hence we receive a lesson, not to censure the like regulations, if they are universally adopted by one or more nations, until the real foundation of them has been discovered. The difference of this mode of writing from that of speaking, is indeed in itself an imperfection ; but in all those languages, that are so thoroughly mixed, it is a real perfection ; because it preserves, at least to the eye, the immediate derivation, and consequently furnishes us with the easiest possible method of understanding words, while it serves to prevent any further deviations in the pronunciation.

Of Orthography.

On the preceding doctrine of pronunciation, is also founded the greatest and most important part of the English orthography, or rather, the orthography of the English language is the reversed doctrine of pronunciation ; because it must shew, how every uttered sound is to be written with its proper characters. The less important parts of it are, the rules for using initial capital letters, the division of syllables, the spelling of compound words, the orthographical signs, and the like.

Of the structure of words.

Neither orthography, nor the doctrine of tone, nor any other part of grammar, can dispense with the elements of the *structure of words*, or *etymology* in the strictest and most rigid sense ; however much this has been neglected in all the English grammars, with which I am acquainted. Hence I propose here, to make an attempt towards tracing and marking the outlines of this doctrine, which is so little understood in all languages.

Definition of words and syllables.

Language is composed of words. A word is the perceptible expression of an idea, which is pronounced without suspending the voice. Words then are the names of particular ideas

ideas, and are consequently as various in their structure, as the ideas themselves. In general, a word may consist of one or more syllables; and a syllable is a perceptible sound; which is pronounced with a single emission from the mouth. Since, therefore; the vowels are simple sounds, which are produced by the mere opening of the mouth, and diphthongs are double sounds, namely two vowels; in which the voice passes; without suspension, from one opening to another, it follows from this, that a word properly contains as many syllables, as there occur in it vowels or diphthongs. I have used the term "properly;" for the pronunciation, in English, occasions a variety of exceptions; by suppressing many vowels, so that for instance a word, which in writing consists of four syllables, may in pronunciation consist only of three.

Division of words; according to their structure.

All words, with respect to their structure, are of three kinds; they are either *radicals*, or *derivatives*, or *compounds*. Contracted words might also be added here; but they belong for the most part to the language of low life; for instance, *gaffer* for good father; *gammer*; for good mother; or if they are at all in general use; they are considered and treated as radicals.

Definition of radicals.

Radical words are properly such, as express the first original idea; of whatever kind, by a single emission from the mouth; and hence they are uniformly monosyllables, because every original idea is founded on a single transient and undivided sensation. These radicals may again be divided into various species: but in grammar, this division is not attended with any practical advantage; for every word that is a monosyllable; if it cannot be proved to be contracted from two others, is admitted there as a radical. In the following part of this treatise we shall find, that, in English, the most of the words borrowed from the French, Latin, and other foreign languages, are treated as radicals, of whatever number of syllables they may consist.

Among the radical words are likewise comprehended those, which have adopted the final letter *e*, for the sake of rendering the harsh monosyllables somewhat softer, although they acquire, by this process, an additional syllable. In all the modern European languages, particularly in the English, German, and French,

French, this *e* has been an useful expedient, to soften the harshness of the old languages, and to introduce into them smoothness and harmony. Examples of this kind, in English, occur in the words *ake*, *alcove*, *ale*, *anise*, *ape*, to *appease*, *babe*, *baize*, to *bake*, &c. ; as likewise in the German words *Affe*, an ape ; *Bube*, *Knabe*, a boy, and many others. Upon a superficial perusal of English works, written during the last centuries, we shall find, that this expedient, from an extravagant fondness for refinement, has been carried to excess, and thus the structure of words rendered obscure. There is no doubt, that, with increasing cultivation, the English perceived this impropriety, and therefore rejected this *e*, with which, in many cases, the words had been unnecessarily loaded : in those words, however, where it was still preserved in writing, it was suppressed in the pronunciation, and thus became a mute final *e* ; hence the above mentioned words are pronounced *äbk*, *al-kobv*, *äbl*, *ännis*, *äbp*, &c. But whether this alteration has been accomplished within proper limits, and whether the language has not acquired, through this medium, much unnecessary harshness, I shall not attempt to decide. I must only observe, that it is a very erroneous rule, by which, according to the English grammarians, this mute *e* makes the preceding vowel *uniformly* long, if by the term *long* we are to understand *extended*. Examples of the contrary occur in the words, *axe*, *sickle*, *badge*, *bottle*, and a great many others ; beside the words consisting of three and four syllables, in which the preceding syllable is not at all accentuated, and much less should it be lengthened, as in *artifice*, *concurrence*, *perceptible*, &c.

Of Derivatives.

The limits of the *derived* and *compound* words cannot, in every individual case, be accurately ascertained ; although they may be determined with sufficient precision, according to the ideas connected with these words. In a grammatical sense, a *derived idea* is formed by joining an obscure collateral notion to a principal, or radical idea, and by considering both as one single idea : and a *derived word* arises from expressing this obscure collateral notion, by means of a syllable, which is no longer used as a peculiar word, consequently is as obscure as the collateral notion itself. Such a syllable is then called a *derived syllable*.

The *derived syllables* now are of two kinds ; they are placed either

either before or after the word: in the former case they may be called *præposita*, while in the latter, we shall call them *postposita*. Both, however, must no longer be used as peculiar words; for in this case the new word is not a *derivative*, but a *compound*. The *præposita*, as well as the *postposita*, are, in English, of two different sorts: they originate either from the Saxo-Danish, or from the Latin and French. The words derived from the last two languages are, indeed, considered as radicals, and are not subject to any determined rules; but with the former, namely the Saxo-Danish, he ought to be accurately acquainted, who is desirous of acquiring a thorough knowledge of the English language, and of facilitating his study of the tone or accent of words; a doctrine, which without this previous knowledge, would appear very perplexed.

The principal *præposita*, from the Saxo-Danish, are the syllables *a*, *be*, *for*, (in so far as it represents the German *ver*) *mis*, and *un*; for instance, away, aloud, abroad, above, anew, to abet, to abide, abode; before, to begin, beget, befall, befriend; to misgive, mislead, misbehave, mistrust, mistake; unaware, unbelief, undone.—The chief French-Latin syllables are the following; *ac*, *com*, *con*, *em*, *en*, *ob*, *op*, *pre*, *re*, *se*, *sub* and *sur*.

The principal Saxo-Danish *postposita* are these: *ard*, coward; *ed*, for forming passive participles; as created, oppressed, animated; *el*, synonymous with the German *el*, as bowel; *er*, not only in substantives, where it corresponds with the German *er*; adder, answer, alder, angler, finger; but likewise in verbs, to stammer, to waver; and in prepositions, as after;—the syllable *en*, in adjectives, as leaden, sudden, fullen; in verbs, to heighten, blacken, redden;—*es*, abbess, dutchess, largefs;—*ey*, agreeing with the German *ey*, as abbey, survey;—*ing*, for forming the present participles, as well as substantives, in both of which it corresponds with the German *ing* and *ung*: feeding, breeding;—*ish*, like the German *isch*, in apish, foolish;—*le*, the same as the German *el*, as idle, angle, apple;—*ly*, as the German *lich*, particularly for forming adverbs, as absolutely, greatly, accordingly—*ness*, for the formation of abstract ideas, like the German *niss*, as goodness, frankness, abstemiousness;—*ship*, not unlike the German *schaft*, as lordship, friendship—*y*, corresponding with the German *ig*, in adverbs, and *ey*, in substantives, as already, abbey.—But far more numerous are the terminations formed from the Latin-French syllables, *ance*, *ant*, *ate*, *ble*, *bly*,
cal,

cal, clē, cy, eer, ier, en, ence, ent, ial, ian, ic, ist, ive, ion, sion, tion, ment, or, ous, ple, tive, ure, y, &c. I cannot enter upon the signification and the practical use of all these derived syllables; since my purpose, in this place, is merely directed to excite the attention of future teachers of the English language, with respect to them. Let nobody, however, imagine, that the investigation of these particles is a mere illusion; for their utility, throughout the whole grammar, is very great, particularly in the subsequent doctrine of the accent.

All these derived syllables, and especially the *postposita*, may again be combined with one another in different ways; as coward, cowardly, cowardliness, or cowardice; crafty, craftily, craftiness, or craft; yet to investigate their peculiar structure, would exceed the limits of this Essay:

Compound words:

If two or more words, still current by themselves, are combined into one, there arises from this combination a *compound word*. By means of derivation we conjoin an obscure collateral notion to a radical idea; but in compounding words, we unite two radical ideas, or rather two clear notions, into one. The design of such an union is to determine a word and its meaning, more accurately, by the medium of another; but frequently also to express a metaphorical idea, by means of both. That, which is *determined* by another, or the *cardinal word*, in English as well as in German, is placed last: while the *determining* word, in both languages, stands foremost. Thus in the examples, cherry-tree, child-birth, powerful, to undergo, to subdue, the latter words contain the principal idea, that is more closely determined by the words standing foremost.

The compound words are as various as there are parts of speech, which can be mutually combined. The substantive may in this manner be determined by another substantive, as gold-fish; or by an adjective, as green-fish; or by a participle, as looking-glass; or by a pronoun, as self-conceit; or by a verb, as break-fast; or by an adverb, as fore-noon;—the adjective and participle may be joined to a substantive, as hand-full; to another adjective, as big-bodied;—the verb to a substantive, as horse-whip, bind-weed; particularly by the particles *fore, out, ab, ad, at, de, in, ob, e, ex, &c.*;—the adverb to another adverb, as there-fore, where-ever, &c.

It would lead me too far from my object, if I attempted to define the nature of true compounds; for this can be accomplished only by means of a minute and accurate investigation of them, from which the general rules for the compounding of words must result, and at the same time the various modifications, to which the *determining* word is liable, might be discovered and established.

Of the tone or accent of words.

The rules for the tone or accentuation of words, in English, are perhaps more variable and intricate than in any other language. This want of uniformity is owing, partly to the whole genius and disposition of the language, partly to the careless method and confused notions of grammarians.—1. On account of the genius and disposition of the language. The English tongue is a mixture of the Saxon, Danish, French, and Latin; it has therefore lost a great share of its peculiarity, while each of these foreign languages, being thoroughly mixed with it, have likewise communicated to it a considerable part of their analogical affinities. Among other parts of grammar, this deviation is obvious in the accentuation of words, which is regulated by different analogies; hence no general or determined rules can be laid down for it. In the German language, the tone is the most regular and settled part of grammar; hence it can be reduced to a few plain rules.—2. On account of the confusion prevailing among grammarians, who, in English, as well as in German, have always confounded the *prosaic* measure of the accent with that of the *metrical*, and therefore constantly speak of *long* and *short* syllables; notions, which do not at all apply to this doctrine, and which occasion great embarrassment.

I am induced to censure, upon this head, not only the grammarians and schoolmasters of the common sort, but even such teachers and writers as claim a superior rank, for instance a JOHNSON, SHERIDAN, and several others. The latter has published “A General Dictionary of the English language, in two Volumes, Quarto, London, 1780;” in which he confines himself entirely to the accent, and the pronunciation of words; but, with respect to the former, he proceeds in the same intricate, fluctuating, and undetermined manner, as his other brethren of Priscian’s family.

It

It is therefore my aim in this Essay, to propose a method, by which rational teachers may, in a great measure, explain this obscure doctrine concerning the accentuation of words, and thus arrive at some certainty, at least with respect to a considerable number of English words. Previously to this inquiry, however, it will be requisite to premise some general ideas, and to dismiss altogether, the former notions of *long* and *short* syllables.

General Definitions of the accent.

The accent consists in a particular elevation of the voice, with which, in polysyllables, the one syllable is as it were raised above the others: thus in *emergency*, *employment*, the syllables *mer* and *ploy* are called *accentuated syllables*. The reason of this mode of distinguishing one syllable from another, is properly contained in the nature of the word and the intention of the speaker, who, by this elevation of the voice, points out that syllable, which expresses the principal idea, and to which he chiefly directs the attention of the hearer. Hence the two accentuated syllables, above mentioned, contain the principal ideas of the words, in which they occur, and all the other syllables denote only collateral ideas, or further determinations, inflexions, and the like. I have said, that this, in the nature of the thing, is “properly” the intention of the accent; for this reason in the German, and probably, too, in all other unmixed languages, we meet with the general rule, that the radical syllable, in such words as consist of a plurality of syllables, always receives the accent; since it contains the principal idea of the word. In the German language, this rule is so general, that the few exceptions from it scarcely deserve any attention. But as the English is a very mixed language, this rule is liable here to a much greater number of exceptions; especially with respect to the words borrowed from the Latin and French, in which the radical syllable has become obscure, so that it cannot in all instances preserve its due accent. Since I propose to resume that subject in another part of this Essay, I shall here only remark, that those words from the Anglo-Saxon, which are still current in the English language, follow this rule, and perhaps as uniformly as in the German.

Distinction of the accent as to its force.

The tone or accent must be distinguished, both as to its
force

force and duration. With respect to the former, it may be divided into the *principal* and *concurrent* force of the accent. There are certain polysyllables, in which two of the syllables are marked by the accent, when one of them, that requires the strongest elevation of the voice, receives the *principal* force; while the other, in which the elevation of the voice is weaker, is uttered with a *concurrent* force. Thus, in the word *horse-courser*, the syllable *hor*, as well as the syllable *cour*, are both marked by the accent; yet with this difference, that the former is more strongly pronounced, and the *principal* force is laid upon it; while in the latter, the elevation of the voice is weaker, and consequently it is denoted only by a *concurrent* force. There is, however, a general rule, which deserves to be remarked in this place, and according to which no word can have more than one principal accent. But the cases, in which words, beside the principal one, may have a concurrent accent, are the two following: 1, in compound words, where every word retains its accent, yet so that, in one of the words, this accent becomes the principal or predominant sound, as will clearly appear from the sequel; 2, in derivatives consisting of polysyllables, which require the principal accent to be laid upon the fourth or fifth syllable from the end; in which case, unless a syllable be suppressed, one of the derived syllables receives a secondary or concurrent accent; because three or four syllables in succession, without any distinction of tone, would offend the ear. In the word *degenerateness*, the accent rests upon the syllable *ge*; and though the *e* in the syllable *te* be suppressed, there would still follow three syllables in succession, without any elevation of the voice, if the syllable *ra* were not pronounced with a secondary accent; by which means this monotony is avoided. The same occurs in the words, *fatherliness*, *delicateness*, *absolutely*, &c.

Of the duration of the accent.

Whether the accent be principal or secondary, it is with respect to its duration, either *extended* (long) or *acute*, (short). It is *extended*, when the voice dwells longer upon the vowel, as in the words, *fame*, *fate*, *father*; *acute*, when it quickly passes over the vowel and rests upon the consonant, which then acquires a double sound, as in *fan*, *when*, *mother*, *pén*. These distinctions between the *extended* and *acute* accent, the grammarians of the English as well as the German and other lan-

guages, have endeavoured to express by the terms *long* and *short*; but as they were under the necessity of calling those syllables, which are pronounced with no accent whatever, upon the same plan, either long or short, they involved themselves in perpetual labyrinths, from which there was no escape. The fact is, that in prosody every accentuated syllable is likewise long, whether the accent be extended or acute; for here the unaccentuated or neutral syllables alone are short.—In the Dictionary of the English language, which I have published in two volumes, 8vo. Leipzig, 1783 and 1796, I have pointed out the extended or long accent thus (á) and the acute or short accent with this (â) mark: yet as I was misled at the commencement of the work, by implicitly following Johnson as my guide in the accent, I began that distinction only about the middle of the letter A.

Difference between extended and acute syllables.

From what has been said in the preceding section, it is evident, that in the extended accent the voice dwells longer upon the vowel; thus the succeeding consonant can have only a mild and simple sound: as on the contrary, in the acute accent the voice quickly glides over the vowel and rests upon the consonant, which consequently is pronounced with more energy, or like a double consonant. Hence, in German, we find the excellent rule prevailing, by which only a simple consonant is used after a long or extended vowel, but a double consonant after a short or acute vowel; excepting those cases, where two different consonants accompany the preceding vowel; for instance, *ich kám*, I came; *Der Kámm*, the comb; *die Muse*, the Muse; *zu müssen*, to be obliged. This rule indeed is liable to some exceptions, but it forms nevertheless one of the most admirable peculiarities of that language; a peculiarity, of which the modern innovators wish to despoil it; as these men are more fond of destroying than of erecting. But in the English language, where the pronunciation is perpetually at war with the orthography, that excellent rule cannot be put in practice, as the exceptions from it are more numerous than the cases to which it applies. Thus the words, *mán*, *ínú*d, *múg*, *mó*ther, *mín*ion, &c. have the short or acute accent, though only a single consonant follows the vowel, while the words, *ál*l, *ál*ms, *mó*st, *cáll*, *fáll*, *fà*lse, *fà*rm, &c. take the long or extended accent, notwithstanding that the vowel is ac-

com-

accompanied by two consonants. Even the orthographical diphthongs are not uniformly pronounced as such; for they are very frequently uttered short or acute, as is obvious in the words, déad, héad, léarn, léad, méadow, &c. Nay, it often happens, that even double sounds; according to orthography at least, may occur in syllables, which receive no accent; for instance in the words, chaplain, pidgeon, forfeit. In these circumstances, it must be extremely difficult to lay down fixed rules, in what cases and situations the accent is acute, and where it must be extended.

Of the accent of radicals.

All radicals are originally monosyllables, except in the cases already pointed out, where the harsh sound of the monosyllable has been softened by the additional vowel *e*. As every radical word is the sign of an idea; it likewise has its peculiar determined accent, but which is perceivable only in combination with other words; for the accent itself is nothing else than a relative idea. There are however words, which in the connexion of a sentence receive no accent, but throw it upon the succeeding word; and these are commonly such words as denote circumstances or unimportant modifications; for instance, the article; several of the pronouns, and the particles. In "*the finger, my house, on the east,*" the determining words, *the, my, on the*, throw their accent upon the substantives that accompany them. All these cases ought to be determined with precision in an English grammar; it is sufficient here, to have hinted at them.—All the radical words, however, which signify principal ideas, such as substantives, verbs, adjectives, &c. must necessarily be accentuated. It is evident from these remarks, that the accent, in monosyllables, as well as in polysyllables, wholly depends on the importance of the idea.

Of the accent of derivatives.

With respect to the accent, the derivatives must be divided into two great classes; namely into such as are derived from the Saxo-Danish, and into those which have been adopted from the French and Latin: both must, in this respect, be subject to different rules.

The words derived from the Saxo-Danish, follow that very easy and precise rule, according to which, in polysyllables, the principal accent is uniformly placed upon the original
or

or radical syllable; a rule, which in German is liable to fewer exceptions than any other, and which I believe to be as general in English, since it is so deeply founded on the nature of the thing, and the purpose of language: for my part, I am acquainted with no words, that can be considered as exceptions. A few instances will serve to illustrate this assertion. The following are derivatives with additional preceding syllables; *afar, away, behind, begét, begin, besides*;—with succeeding syllables are, *acorn* (from the Low Saxon *Ecker*, in which instance the syllable *orn* corresponds with the German final syllable *er*), *bàreness, béggarliness, tàmeness, fàther, móther, singer, bósom, bóisterous, súdden*;—with both preceding and succeeding syllables are, *ashàmed, behòlden, behàviour, beginning, becómingly*.—Those, who pay proper attention to this easy rule, will find, that one half of the difficulties, in placing the accent on English words, is thereby removed.

The words derived from the French and Latin, in some instances, likewise follow this rule; *to abàte, to abándon, abridge, abóminable, abstémious* &c.; but as the exceptions from it are more numerous than the cases to which it applies, it cannot be considered as a general rule; for in the examples, *ávenue, bardárity, bombardment, cómmisary, cóntinent, continuity, inoculátion*, &c. the accent is throughout placed upon derived syllables. In addition to this difficulty of distinguishing the accent, we may observe, that the English words very frequently displace the accent from the syllable, which possessed it in Latin or French. This is the case in the words, *Eùrope, ábsence, áblative, ábrogate, ábsolute, ácademy, áccent, ádage, ádvocate, assignèe, balloòn*, and a great many others. But even here some general rules may be formed, which would hold good, at least with respect to some particular cases. Thus in derived words, that terminate with the syllables *sion, tion, cious* and *tious*, the accent rests upon the next-preceding syllable: this and similar rules we find already stated in the common grammars.—The causes, from which the placing of the accent in English words is so precarious, are chiefly the following: 1. because these words had in their original languages, namely in Latin and French, already deviated from the natural rule above mentioned; the Latin words, *imputàre, imprudentia, adequàtus*, and the French words *imputèr, marine, marchèr, opinión*, have not preserved their accents upon the radical syllables;—2. because in the English language these

words

words were frequently contracted, so that a change in the placing of the accent became necessary; v. g. *to opine*, from the Latin *opinari*, or the French *opiner*; although this accidental change was frequently attended with the advantage of replacing the accent upon the radical syllable of the word; in this condition we find the verbs, *to desire*, from the French *desirer*; *to despair*, from the Latin *desperare*; *to detest*, from *detestari*.

Of the accent of compound words.

Although every word, when compounded with another preserves its peculiar accent (*book-binder*, *back-bite*) yet as there can be only *one* principal accent pronounced in each word, this accent is usually, “and according to rule,” placed upon the determining word, namely that which stands foremost; for instance, *alder-man*, *axle-tree*, *back-bite*, *back-ward*, *bane-ful*, *bare-foot*, *blood-shed*, *coal-pit*. I have said, “according to rule;” for there are indeed many exceptions here, not only with respect to various particles, as in the words *al-mighty*, *an-ther*, *arch-deacon*, *with-hold*, *with-out*, *where-by*, *un-like*, *under-take*, &c. but likewise in the triple compound words, *al-to-gether*, *ash-wednes-day*, *what-so-ever*, *here-to-fore*, for which instances, however, many fixed rules might be discovered.

Reflections upon words as parts of speech.

The rules concerning the letters and their pronunciation, the structure of words, and the accent founded upon that structure, compose the first and *etymological* part of grammar; after which follows the second division, treating of words as parts of speech, and their inflection. Words are called *parts of speech*, in so far as they denote different modifications of ideas in the connexion of a sentence: and in order to understand a language thoroughly, we must previously acquire clear notions of this subject.—Speech is the audible enunciation of our ideas, and these are (generally) produced by objects without us. In so far as these objects affect the representations of the mind, they are of two kinds only; namely, either self-subsistent things, i. e. *substances*; or those circumstances and modifications which occur in substances, i. e. *the accidental*. If our speech were conformable to the nature of things, we should have no more than these two parts of speech; but as we cannot comprehend a substance with all its relations, at one view, nor conceive these in an uniform manner, various parts

of speech must necessarily result, particularly with respect to the *accidental*. Besides, the degree of perspicuity in our conceptions renders a new distinction necessary; since the representations of the mind are either so obscure, that they remain mere sensations, or assume the form of clear notions. As, therefore, with respect to the parts of speech, every thing depends upon the method, in which they are exhibited to the mind; and as this method is by no means uniform in all nations, consequently the number and disposition of the parts of speech do not correspond with each other in all languages. The English, for example, have arranged their ideas and representations in the manner as follows.

I. Abstruse representations, or mere *sensations*, in an abstract sense. The expression of these affords the *interjections*, or words of sensation, which denote mere abstract sensations. — From the higher branches of etymology we learn, that the interjections are the foundation of all language; because our representations must be first abstruse, and consequently mere sensations, before they can be developed into clear notions.

II. Distinct representations or ideas, the expression of which furnishes us with *words*, in the most concrete and peculiar sense. — The things, of which we have ideas, are of a twofold nature; namely,

1. *Self-subsistent things* or *substances*, and every thing that is exhibited to the mind as independent. The sign or expression of them is the *substantive*.

2. *Accidental things*, among which we comprise all that can be distinguished in the self-subsistent thing, and that relates to it. In general, this is again of a twofold nature; for it is either belonging to the thing itself, as *red, great, beautiful*; or it is external to it, as *now, here, away*: in the former case, it is called a *quality*; in the latter, a *circumstance*. But according to the manner of exhibiting it, this accidental thing is again divided into different classes, which afford an equal number of parts of speech. It is considered,

A. Independently, external to the self-subsistent thing, and in immediate connection with it; and then it is in the aforesaid manner of two kinds; namely,

1. a *quality*; hence arises the qualifying word, or the
adverb

adverb of quality, which can be predicated of the substantive, only by means of a verb ;

2. a *circumstance*, which in grammar, is of three different kinds ; viz.

a, an independent circumstance, the *adverbium circumstantiæ*, or a word expressive of a circumstance, in the most concrete sense ;

b, the relation subsisting between two self-subsistent things, the *preposition* ; and

c, the relation between sentences and their members, the *conjunction*.

B. As comprised in the attribute, i. e. something accidental respecting the circumstance of time, number, &c, predicated of the self-subsistent thing, viz. the *verb*.

C. As already attributed, or in immediate connexion with the substantive. This is either

1. a predicated quality, i. e. a property, the name of which is expressed by the *adjective* ; or

2. a circumstance ; and then again

a, of self-subsistence, the *article* ;

b, of the accidental relation to the person, the *pronoun* ; and lastly

c, of computation, the *number*.

Farther reflections upon words.

From the premises laid down, the following parts of speech are the necessary result :

1. The *substantive*, or the sign of all things, which do not only subsist of themselves, but which are likewise conceived as such. It is either a proper name, *nomen proprium* ; or the name of a certain class of things, *nomen appellativum*. As the latter appertains to several things of the same species (for instance, *man, horse, house,*) and thus again suffers a great diminution of its self-subsistence, certain words became necessary, in order to restore this self-subsistence, in such situations as required it. This was accomplished

2, by means of the *articles* ;

3, by *numbers*, that express the circumstance of computation ; and

4, by the *pronouns* ; which serve to denote the immediate relation of the person, in connexion with the substantive.

5, The accidental thing, as connected with the substance itself, is considered, in the German language, in two different ways, namely of itself (*per se*), in which case it can be predicated of the substantive, by means of a verb only, v. g. *this house is large*; or in immediate connexion with the substantive, as *the large house, a great house*. In the former case it is called *adverbium qualitatis* or a *qualifying word*; but in the latter, it is simply an *adjectivum* or a *word of property*: this is derived from the former, by means of a peculiar method of inflecting it, by grammarians called *concretion*. In English, however, this distinction does not prevail; for the adjectives here are nowise different from the adverbs of quality; hence a peculiar term of art would be requisite to denote, with precision, the idea combined in both cases: *God is almighty*, and *the almighty God*.—To this head also belong the *participles*, which are not considered as particular parts of speech, but are either adjectives or adverbs of quality derived from the verb; so that they express, in the same word, the collateral idea of time.

6, The *verb*, a part of speech, predicating of the substantive that which is accidental, together with different collateral ideas, combined in one and the same word.

7, The *prepositions*; 8, *conjunctions*; and 9, *interjections*, having been considered in the preceeding section, require no further explanation.

Analysis of the inflections.

That which is accidental may be expressed in a great variety of ways, as belonging to the self-subsistent thing; whence a number of casual relations arise, which would render our speech extremely prolix, if we had not contrived means of immediately denoting them in the compass of every word itself, through simple radical sounds, i. e. by inflecting the word. The Germans have adopted the following modes of inflection. 1. The distinction of plurality in substantives, or the *formation of the plural*. 2. The distinction of the relation subsisting between the substantive contained in the predicate, and the subject; the *declension*. 3. The distinction of the gender in the words determining the substantive; the *motion*. 4. The change of an adverb of quality into an adjective; the *concretion*. 5. The distinction between a higher and the highest degree expressed in an adverb of quality, or adjective; the *degrees of comparison*. And finally, 6, the distinction of the different relations,

relations, which verbs denote, or the *conjugation*.—The *English* language is, with respect to the inflection of words, very simple, or rather defective; for, of the six modes of inflection above specified, three only are known in English; namely, the formation of the plural, the degrees of comparison, and the conjugation. As the adjective here is in no manner different from the adverb of quality, and as the substantives likewise have no peculiar declension, there can be exhibited neither *concretion* nor *motion* in their form.

I. *Further reflections on the substantive.*

1. *Division of it.*

Every part of speech must be separately considered in grammar; it must be divided into its different species, and the inflections, to which it is liable, must there be exhibited. The substantive justly occupies the first place, as it is the most important word in speech; in the next place, the words which determine the substantive, namely the articles, adjectives, pronouns, and numbers ought to follow; after these the verbs, and finally the adverbs and interjections conclude the whole. As it is not my intention to write a grammar in this Essay, I shall content myself with making a few remarks upon each part of speech.

The substantive is the sign of a self-subsistent thing, or a substance. This is either really and independently subsisting; or it is not substantially existing, and only represented as self-subsistent: the former is called a *concretum*, the latter an *abstractum*. The *concrete* thing is again divided into four classes; for it represents either the name of an individual, the proper name, *nomen proprium*; or that of a whole class of similar individual things, *nomen appellativum*; or that of a multitude of things, in which no individuality is distinguished; a collective name, *nomen collectivum*; or lastly, that of matter, *nomen materiale*, such as iron, wood, stone, bread.

2. *The gender of substantives.*

Many languages divide all their substantives into certain classes, borrowed from the physical gender of the animal kingdom, so that all their words of determination, i. e. the articles,

ticles, pronouns, adjectives, and sometimes also the numbers, must mark the gender peculiar to every substantive. The question now arises, whether this be likewise the case in English. If we follow the common statement of grammarians, we must answer in the affirmative: but if we reflect upon the nature of the thing, we cannot allow the English substantives any such gender as these words possess in the German, Latin, and many other languages. The strongest proof of this is the absence of all the genders in the determining words above mentioned. The personal pronoun of the third person, indeed, appears to prove the contrary; for *he*, *she*, and *it*, are really inflected according to the three different genders. But there is a great difference between marking the physical gender, where this distinction becomes necessary; and between classing all substantives according to the different genders, although they might refer to inanimate things, and to abstract ideas. All languages practise the former expedient, though they do not make use of the latter classification; and this is also the case in the English language. The English substantives, as substantives, mark no particular gender; for if they did so, their determining words likewise ought to point it out; which however is not consistent with practice. Hence this apparent deficiency greatly facilitates the acquisition of a language, which does not impose upon us the task of studying the genders of nouns; since it is obvious, that this distinction, in our present method of representing objects to the mind, is not attended with the least advantage, that could in any degree compensate this inconvenience.

3. *Of the formation of the Plural.*

Since the words expressive of kind, or *appellatives*, may either relate to one thing of the kind, or to a plurality of things, the *numbers* serve the purpose of marking this double distinction. The formation of the plural, which in the German, Latin, and other languages is very difficult, is remarkably easy in the English; as it is formed by adding the letter *s* or the syllable *es* to the singular; and the few exceptions, or deviations from this rule, we find stated in every grammar.

4. *Of the Declension.*

To *decline* a noun, is to denote certain relations of a self-subsistent

substant thing, by means of simple radical sounds, which are annexed to the word itself: for instance, *Haus*, a house; *Häuses*, of a house; *Hause*, to a house; *Häuser*, houses; *Häusern*, to the houses, &c. The English language does not admit of these inflections, and by rejecting them, saves much trouble and inconvenience, which attend the many declensions, and the exceptions from them prevailing in other languages. In English, therefore, some prepositions are used, which express the inflected cases of other languages: and as two cases only are marked by the prepositions, namely the genitive or ablative of the Latin by the particle *of*, and the dative by *to*, both of them are employed like all other prepositions, without distinction of numbers, or any other circumstance. Yet there is still a vestige of a true declension remaining in English, which consists of what is called the *genitivus possessivus* (more properly *postpositivus*), which is pointed out by the letter *s*, and made use of, when the genitive stands before its substantive without an article; v. g. *the king's speech*, *the queen's brother*; instead of "the speech of the king, the brother of the queen."—It is not difficult to discover, that this *'s* is a vestige of the German genitive, *des Königes Rede*. And as the English substantives have no variety of gender, this *'s* consequently remains unaltered, of whatever gender the word may be in other languages.

II. *Of the Article.*

The article is a part of speech, which serves to distinguish different kinds of absoluteness in substantives, and is chiefly used with *appellatives*. These mark whole kinds of things of the same nature; such as *horse*, *house*, *tree*; which, from their very extensive application, lose a great share of their absolute identity: or, in other words, as they are common to many owners and places, the hearer could never know, which individual horse, house, or tree is meant, if this circumstance were not determined by the article. *I have seen horse*, has a very obscure meaning, whence the hearer is necessarily induced to ask, whose or what sort of a horse I have seen.—The pronouns and numbers, indeed, likewise serve to determine the objects; but there is yet another determination requisite, to which they are not adapted, namely that of absoluteness, which is expressed by the articles.

In the English grammars, *three* articles are generally enumerated; the *indefinite*, which is said to consist in the preposition *of* in the *genitive*, and *to* in the dative case; the *definite* expressed by the word *the*; and the article of unity, *a* or *an*. But this may be called true pedantry of the schools, by which we are led from one absurdity to another. For 1, who will allow himself to consider the words *of* and *to* as articles, since they are real prepositions, which govern their respective cases. 2. If these particles *of* and *to* represent the definite article, we must likewise grant, that in the expressions “*of the king*” and “*to the king*,” two different articles are used before the substantive, viz. one that is indefinite or undetermined, and another that is definite or determined, so that one of them necessarily supersedes the other: this, however, is a palpable contradiction. 3. The proposed article of unity is incorrectly expressed in its denomination, because it is liable to be confounded with the number *one*, and has actually been confounded with it, by several English grammarians.—The definitions and explanations of the articles, which appear in the usual French grammars, are equally erroneous. The English language admits only of *two* articles; the *definite*—*the*, and the *indefinite*—*an* before a vowel or mute *b*, and *a* before a consonant. The latter, no doubt, has likewise a tendency to determine the self-subsistent thing; but as it does this in a much weaker degree than the former, it has received the name of the indefinite or undetermined article. I. The definite article points out an individual of a kind or class, that is already known and self-subsistent: *the emperor*, signifies, according to the connection of the sentence, either the present reigning emperor, or that emperor, of whom we were speaking last; consequently this article denotes one individually determined person, which is singled out from that class of individuals, who are or have been emperors. II. The indefinite article *an* or *a* serves to mark; 1, an indefinite self-subsistent thing belonging to a whole class, without pointing out a particular individual; v. g. “an enemy is not to be trusted,” i. e. “no enemy whoever he be;” 2, the species or class, to which a thing belongs, as an undetermined self-subsisting thing, v. g. “he was killed by a sword,” i. e., “by one of the weapons called swords.”

Without any article may be used; 1, proper nouns; because they are already more accurately determined by means of

of the individual, to which they refer, than they could be through the articles; v. g. *Cicero was an excellent orator*; —all *Europe is in confusion*: excepting, however, when these nouns again partake of the nature of appellatives, i. e. when they may be referred to more than one thing; for instance, *the elder Pliny, the little James*. In like manner are the names of rivers and ships considered as appellatives, and connected with the definite article;—2, if a determined single individual is meant, and the whole kind or class is understood by it, in which case the Germans make use of the definite article; v. g. *der Mensch ist vernünftig*, “man is rational;” but in such expressions, the English make use of no article:—3, if an indefinite number of single things, out of a whole class, is to be expressed; or in such cases as require the indefinite article in the singular number;—“I want pens,” in the singular, “I want a pen:”—and 4, if merely the class, kind, or matter is to be denoted; as “building is precious; or, “it is fine cloth.” In all these instances, the oblique cases of the nouns are only marked by the prepositions *of* and *to* in the genitive and dative, and by the sense of the active verb itself in the accusative, without admitting any article.

III. *Of the Adjective.*

In the German language, that which is found to be changeable in the thing itself, is considered in two different ways, namely, 1, as independent of the substantive or, at least, not in immediate connection with it, in which case it is enunciated by the verb; v. g. *der Mann ist gut*, “the man is good;” or 2, in immediate connection with the substantive, v. g. *der ist ein guter Mann*, “that is a good man,” where the German adjective is regularly inflected, according to the gender of the noun: while in the former case, it is used adverbially, and remains indeclinable. Hence arise two parts of speech, namely the adverb of quality, and the adjective, or the word expressive of the property of the thing, which is derived from the former, by means of the concrete syllables *e* for the feminine, *er* for the masculine, and *es* for the neuter gender, or with the simple vowel *e* for all the three genders, when the definite article is connected with the noun. And as the German substantives not only mark different genders, but also the oblique cases, it may be easily inferred, that the adjectives are
 liable

liable to similar inflections; a circumstance, which is attended with considerable difficulties to foreigners, who apply themselves to the speaking and writing of that language. In English, a much easier and shorter method is practised, since the adverb of quality is, in no respect, different from the adjective; and may be combined with the substantive, without any inflection: thus it remains uniformly in the same termination, whether we say, "the prince is powerful," or "the powerful prince." Hence, too, the adjectives distinguish no plural; and as the English substantives mark no gender, and are of themselves indeclinable, the adjectives likewise cannot be inflected, and are in this respect throughout managed like adverbs.

The only inflections, of which adjectives are capable, are the degrees of comparison, which are formed nearly upon the plan of the German, by adding to the positive degree the syllable *er*, in order to make the comparative; and the syllable *est*, to form the superlative: but very frequently these two degrees are expressed by prefixing to the simple adjectives the respective adverbs *more* and *most*.

IV. *Of numerical words.*

The words denoting numbers are rarely introduced into English grammars, as particular parts of speech, and frequently they are not at all mentioned: we must nevertheless attend to several peculiarities in the use of them. As, with respect to the idea combined with them, they are remarkably different from all other parts of speech; they certainly deserve to be separately treated.—Numbers denote nothing that is discoverable in the things themselves, as is the case with the preceding part of speech; but they establish a circumstance, namely that of numerical computation. Beside this peculiarity, they are also distinguished from the usual words denoting circumstances, by their immediate connexion with the substantive, while the former can be predicated of substantives, by means of verbs only. Grammarians ought to distinguish the different species of numerical words, since they signify either absolute number without any collateral idea, viz. the *radical* or *cardinal* numbers, which may again be divided into *definite* and *indefinite*; or they are connected with the collateral ideas of order or succession, classification, proportion, &c.

All

All these words are liable to many peculiar applications, which, however, properly belong to the province of grammar.

V. *Of the Pronouns.*

Pronouns are words determining the substantives, and denoting those changeable relations, which are indicated in the very act of speaking, and the principal of which concerns the relative condition of the person. They are as various as the relations pointed out by them ; namely,

- 1, *personal*, which refer to persons only. These may be farther 1,) *definite*, which are again divided according to the three persons, and according as each of them is in the singular or plural number. The first and second persons are sufficiently determined by the relation, in which they appear in speech ; hence there is no farther necessity for pointing out their gender. But the third person is, of itself, wholly undetermined ; and for this reason its gender is marked in the singular number, by different words for each of the three genders. Yet as the English substantives, in general, express no peculiar gender, the third personal pronoun serves only to denote the physical gender of the person ; for this reason all such things, as cannot be distinguished by being physically of the masculine or feminine gender, receive the impersonal pronoun *it* ; 2,) *indefinite*, among which this undetermined syllable *it* occupies the first rank ; a syllable, which indicates a determined subject in so undecided a manner, that it does not positively follow, whether a person or a thing is understood by it : v. g. "*it* is said ; *it* was Mr Pope ; *it* is I." In like manner is used the improper pronoun *one*, in as far as it corresponds with the German pronoun *man* or *jemand*, "somebody ;" v. g. to love *one*.
2. *Reciprocal* pronouns, which properly belong to the former class, and are only used, when the predicate is again referred to the subject : "I love myself," &c.
3. *Possessive* pronouns serve to determine the relation of possession, with respect to the person. They are either *conjunctive*, when immediately combined with their substantives, "my house, your father ;" or *absolute*, when they are predicated of substantives by means of a verb, as likewise in answering a question : v. g. "this house is mine ; —whose father called?—yours." The possessive pronoun
of

of the third person is, like the personal pronoun, again distinguished according to its physical gender, so that *his* and *her* are used of things, which by the laws of nature are of the masculine or feminine gender; and in all other cases the possessive pronoun *its*.

4. *Demonstrative* pronouns, which denote the relation of the place with respect to the speaker, so that the nearest place is expressed by the words, *this* in the singular or *these* in the plural, and the most remote, by the respective words *that* or *those*.
5. *Determinative* pronouns, which ascertain the subject, to which a sentence is referred by means of the subsequent reciprocal pronoun. To this number belong, partly the personal pronouns *he* and *she*, when they are used in a determinate sense, v. g. "he that, or who, fights with silver arms;" partly the pronoun *such*, in which case it is accompanied by the particle *as*: "such as are loyal, &c."; partly also the "pronoun of identity," *the same*, with its further determinations, *the very same*, *the self same*, and *the very*.
6. *Relative* pronouns, which bring back the sentence to a subject, either previously pointed out, or connected with a determinative pronoun; of which class are, *who*, *which*, *what*, and *that*.
7. *Interrogative* pronouns serve to introduce a question, for which purpose we make use of the relative pronouns, *who*, *which*, and *what*.

The pronouns, in general, and the personal pronouns, in particular, are very irregular in their inflection. This peculiarity is remarkable, not only in the English, but likewise in all the languages hitherto discovered: for the pronouns may be classed among the most ancient words in speech; their origin must be traced in the primitive ages, when the language of every nation was yet in its infant state.

A number of other pronouns are commonly enumerated in grammars under the name of *pronomina indefinita*; but as they express none of the relations denoted by pronouns, they cannot be reduced to any of the classes before specified. Besides, many of them are so pointedly determined, that no rational being will consider them as indefinite; for instance, *all*, *whole*, *each*, *neither*, *every*, &c. By far the greater part of them rather belong to the class of general numbers, viz. *all*, *any*, *some*, *both*, *each*, *either*, *neither*, *every*, *few*, *much*, *no*, *none*.

Some

Some again, as *whole*, *certain*, *other*, are with more propriety ranked among the adjectives; and others as *ever* and *never*, are in reality adverbs.

VI. *Of the verb.*

The verb is, in all languages, the most artificial and the most difficult part of speech; because men have contrived to point out, in immediate connection with it, very different and multiplied relations. To denote these relations properly, in the various inflections of the verb, is called by grammarians, to *conjugate*. The verbs are divided into different species, arising partly from their *signification*, partly from their *use*, and partly also from their *conjugation*.

With respect to their *signification*, they attribute something to an object, which can either be conceived immediately in it, and in this case they are called *intransitive*, sometimes too, but not very properly, *neuter* verbs; or they imply something that takes place externally to it, *transitive* verbs; when two self-subsistent things are required, the one of which is in an active, and the other in a passive state. On this account, in many languages, the transitive verbs have two different forms; namely the *active*; when the subject is in an active state, and the *passive*, when it is suffering. The *reciprocal* verbs are true transitives, with this exception only, that the predicate is brought back to the subject, by means of a pronoun.

With respect to the *use*, the verbs are either *personal*, when their subject is determined, or *impersonal*, when it cannot be ascertained, and consequently is something unknown. Farther, they are either *perfect*, when they can be used in all the different relations, in which the predicate can be placed towards the subject; or *defective*, when they are used only in some of these relations.

With respect to the *conjugation*, the verbs are called *regular*, when all their relative states can be expressed conformably to one rule; or *irregular*, when they deviate from the established rule.

The relations, circumstances, and collateral notions, which mankind have contrived to express by the verb, are very numerous. The principal of them are as follows.

1. The *form* of the word, whether a verb is *transitive*, or *intransitive*; and in the former case, whether it is *active* or *passive*.

2. The *mood* or the manner, in which the predicate is stated concerning the subject. This may be done, a,) in a positive manner, implying truth and certainty ; hence the *indicative mood* ; b,) in an uncertain and doubtful manner, the *conjunctive* ; c,) by way of command, the *imperative* ; and d,) without any reference to the person, the *infinitive*.—The participle, which is sometimes considered as a peculiar mood, deserves no place here ; since it is properly an adjective derived from the verb, and carrying with it the collateral idea of time.
3. The *time*, in which the predicate belongs to the subject. This strictly consists of three periods only, namely the *present*, *past*, and *future* ; but as the two last are susceptible of a great variety of farther determinations, not indeed arising from their own nature, but from the various relations of speech, many languages express these in the verb itself ; and thus the *past* time is again divided into three tenses, the *imperfect*, *perfect*, and *pluperfect* ; in a similar manner the *future* is again resolved into several species.
4. The *number* of the persons of the subject ; and lastly,
5. The *species* of the person itself, whether it is the first, second, or third.

To express all these circumstances and relations in the verb itself, agreeable to the method adopted in every language, is by grammarians called, *to conjugate*. Under this expression, however, we understand only this much, that all the relations, above stated, ought to be expressed by means of proper syllables of inflection, attached to the root of the verb itself ; and in this process, the English language is remarkably simple and easy. It admits only of *one form* and *one gender* ; for the *intransitive* verbs are likewise conjugated in the *active* form ; in this there are only three *moods*, the *indicative*, the *imperative* and the *infinitive* : in the indicative we make use of two tenses, viz. the *present*, and a species of the past, the *imperfect* ; but in the imperative, and infinitive, of one tense only : in both tenses of the indicative, there appear *two numbers*, and in each of these, three persons, which however can be only imperfectly marked by the verb itself ; a deficiency, which renders the prefixing of the pronouns necessary.

To denote the remaining relations, the English are obliged to make use of circumlocution, or of indirect expressions furnished them by certain verbs, that generally indicate some collateral

lateral circumstances, and on this account are called *auxiliary words*; because they serve to express those relations, in the formation of which the English verbs are deficient. These then consist of the verbs, *to be*, for the passive form; *I may*, for the conjunctive; *to have*, for the past; and *I shall*, for the future tenses;—although several other auxiliary verbs are commonly enumerated. But, as the whole of this *periphrastical conjugation* has been formed merely upon the plan of the more complete Latin inflection of verbs, those above specified will answer the present purpose; since any other method of conjugating verbs, if carried on by auxiliary words, is in every respect periphrastical:

I cannot here enter upon the extensive application and the use of these auxiliary words; and therefore I shall only observe, that the *transitive* verbs, in the German language, are divided into two classes, according as the ideas expressed by them partake more of the active or passive meaning. In the former case, they are accompanied by the auxiliary verb *haben*, “to have;” in the latter, by *seyn*, “to be;” v. g. *er hat geschlafen*, “he has slept;” but in another instance, *er ist genesen*, “he is recovered.” This distinction, however, does not prevail in English, where all transitives are inflected by the auxiliary verb, *to have*, without attending to their signification.—*Regular* verbs are such as preserve the radical syllable unchanged, and in which the inflection is carried on, in an uniform manner, by means of fixed terminating syllables. *Irregular* verbs either deviate from the established syllable of inflection, or they frequently want it altogether; for instance, *I burst*; imperf. *I burst*; participle, *burst* or *bursten*; or the inflection takes place in the radical syllable itself; *I bleed*; imperf. *I bled*; participle, *bled*; or where both deviations occur in the same verb; *I beseech*; imperf. *I besought*; participle *beseeched* or *besought*. The irregular verbs are, in all languages, the most ancient and the most original: in tracing the nature and origin of them, we must resort to the higher branches of etymology. In English we find the irregular verbs throughout derived from the Saxo-Danish, in which language they likewise appear in the irregular form; as, on the other hand, the verbs formed from the French and Latin uniformly follow the regular inflection.

VII. *Of the Particles.*

The particles furnish a subject of inquiry, that would be inconsistent with the limits of this Essay. They are throughout considered as adverbs; since they denote either a circumstance in general, in which case the precise meaning of them results from those parts of speech, with which they are immediately connected; or they point out a circumstance of itself, and independent of any other part of speech, in which situation they are called adverbs; or they relate to particular kinds of circumstances: thus the *prepositions* denote the relation subsisting between two substantives, in which relation they have been placed by the verb; as the *conjunctions* mark the relation between sentences and their members.—The last part of speech, with which grammarians conclude their task, comprises the *interjections*. They express the various sensations or emotions of the mind, simply as such, and may be divided according to the various kinds of these emotions. There are however some words, i. e. expressions of clear ideas, which are occasionally used to denote mere sensations; for instance, “O sad! well a day!” and for this reason they cannot, with strict propriety, be called interjections.

Conclusion.

Since my intention, throughout the whole of this treatise, has been no other, but to shew in a cursory manner, that the English grammar is less arbitrary, and more susceptible of rational treatment, than many philologers imagine, I must content myself, for the present, with this short specimen.

If teachers and learners should gradually adopt this method of etymological reasoning, it will be easy to apply it to the syntax; which, independently of this consideration, is much easier and more concise in English than in other languages; because the words, in the former, are deprived of nearly the whole of their inflection. Indeed, by far the most essential business in the syntax consists, partly of a rational method of constructing the *series of words*, in which the English language much resembles the German; partly of the proper use of the participles, which display many peculiarities in the construction of that language.

ESSAY THIRD.

*On the relative merits and demerits of Johnson's
English Dictionary.*

THE English are in possession of a very copious Dictionary of their language, with which the late DR. SAMUEL JOHNSON has presented them, and of which the fourth edition appeared (London, 1773) with some additions, in two large Folio Volumes, comprising upwards of thirty Alphabets, or 716 Sheets of letter-press *.

As the completeness of this work, together with the critical and philosophic manner, which the author follows, has been frequently the subject of great praise, not only in England, but also in other countries, by recommending it as a model of a useful Dictionary for any language; I was induced to think, that an accurate abridgment of this work might of itself suffice, to supply so important a defect in German literature. Nor indeed had I directed my views further, when I resolved upon publishing an English-German Dictionary, designed chiefly for the use of my countrymen. But upon a more minute inquiry into the merits of Johnson's work, I very soon discovered, that this performance, notwithstanding the many advantages it possesses, is replete with great imperfections.—As these imperfections are of such a nature, as to exhibit themselves more remarkably in an abridgment, translated into German, than they perhaps do appear in the original; and as the principal utility, which the Germans expect from such an undertaking, might thus have been much diminished, I was obliged to submit to a more arduous task than I was, at first, inclined to undertake.

This assertion will not be considered as unjust, when I shall point out, individually, the principal requisites to a Dictionary, and remark upon every point, how far *Johnson* has performed

* This computation is made from the first Edition, Lond. 1755.

formed his duty, and wherein *I* have endeavoured to improve upon him.

1. In the number of words.
2. In the value and dignity of every word, whether it be quite obsolete or current; and in the latter case, whether it is used in the more elevated, poetical, social, or vulgar style.
3. In the grammatical nature of the word; to which I also refer the orthography, the mark of the accent, and the pronunciation.
4. In the etymology or derivation.
5. In the decomposition of the principal idea denoted by the word;—either by means of a definition, or by a synonymous *German* word;—and in the analysis of the different significations.
6. In the illustration of words by examples; and,
7. In the grammatical combination, or the use of every word, with respect to the syntax.

Conformable to this division of the subject, I shall offer some remarks upon each of these particular points.

I. Concerning the number and the practical use of words I expected to find the work of Johnson in its greatest perfection. In a book, consisting of 2864 pages, large folio, and four times reprinted; I hoped to meet with the whole treasure, or at least with the most necessary and current words, of the English language. But, in this respect, my disappointment was great; and those, who have consulted Johnson's Dictionary with the same view, will agree with me, that upon this very point he displays his weakest side. We must however do him the justice to allow, that with respect to terms of science, and written language, his work is very complete; but it is defective in social language, in the language of civil life, and in the terms of arts and manufactures. His defect in the last-mentioned branches, the author himself acknowledges in the preface, and makes this strange apology for it, "that he found it impossible to frequent the work-shops of mechanics, the mines, magazines, ship-yards, &c. in order to inquire into the different terms and phrases, which are peculiar to these pursuits." Yet this is a great desideratum to foreigners, and considerably detracts from the merit of a work of this nature; for these are the precise cases, in which they have most frequent occasion for consulting a Dictionary. To
this

this head we may refer the names of plants, fishes, birds, and insects, frequently occurring in common life, of which a great number are wanting in the work of Johnson; though this deficiency might have been most easily supplied, as there certainly is no want of botanical books and publications on Natural History, in the English language. In order to show the extent of this deficiency, in a particular instance, I shall only remark; that in the single work containing the last voyage of Capt. Cook, in two moderate volumes, octavo, (published 1782) there occur nearly one hundred words, relating partly to navigation, partly to Natural History, that cannot be found in Johnson's or other Dictionaries.

It will be admitted, that a dictionary of a language ought to possess the greatest possible degree of completeness, particularly with respect to names and technical terms, which are more rarely employed in common language, and the meaning of which cannot be conjectured from the context. As such words frequently become an object of research, I have found myself under the disagreeable necessity of filling up these chasms, as far as my time, my plan, and my sources of information would admit. Thus I have increased the stock of words, occurring in Johnson's and other English Dictionaries of distinguished merit, with a great number (perhaps several thousands) of words which were wanting; especially such as concern the objects of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, of the English constitution, and of various other departments. With regard to the laws, manners, and customs of England, I have availed myself of the well known work of Entick.

The proper names of countries, places, and persons, when deviating from the genuine orthography, I have likewise more correctly stated, and added such as have been omitted in Johnson's and other dictionaries.

For the improvement of terms in social language, I am much indebted to Boyer's English and French Dictionary. But as I had, in this respect, placed more confidence in Johnson than I could justify after a careful examination of his work; and as, on this account, I did not bestow the portion of time requisite to a close comparison with other Dictionaries, I readily confess, that there remains much to be done yet, especially with the assistance of the latest English productions in the department of Belles Lettres. For, in latter times, the
English

English language appears to have undergone the same changes as the French and German.

II. It is well known, that all the words of a language do not possess an equal value or degree of currency : some of them are entirely obsolete, but still occur in writings, which are studied in modern times, for instance, in the translation of the Bible, in Shakespeare, Spencer, &c. ; others are peculiar to poetical language ; again, others are current only in certain provinces, or in particular situations of life ; and still others are vulgar, and exploded from the more dignified written style, as well as from the polite circles of conversation. It is one of Johnson's great merits, that he has carefully attended to this distinction ; I have likewise marked it, in my English and German Dictionary, with equal attention ; and I have pointed out the most necessary of these distinctions, by means of particular signs or characters.

III. Next to the preceding, I consider the grammatical designation of every word as the most important part of a good Dictionary : and under this head I place not only the orthography, the accentuation, and pronunciation, but also the classification of a word, to whatever class it belongs as a part of speech, and finally, its inflection ; whether it be regularly or irregularly declined or conjugated. Upon this point, also, Johnson is in most instances very correct ; excepting that he does not always distinguish the substantive from the adverb, and this again from the adjective ; an imperfection which, with the aid of some general ideas of grammar, I have had no great difficulty to remedy.—In the spelling of words, Johnson has adopted the method prevalent among all sensible people, and consigned the orthographic disputes to those, who, from want of more important knowledge, have no other means of obtaining reputation. For my part, I saw no reason for differing from Johnson on this head.—The proper* accentuation is, in the English language, one of the most difficult points. The causes of this difficulty must be obvious from the remarks upon the accent, which I have premised in the second Essay. The greater number of English Dictionaries, therefore, have considered it as necessary, to mark that syllable, which is accentuated in a word. Nevertheless, they have committed the common error, that the reader is never certain, whether an accentuated syllable must be pronounced with the grave i. e. extended, or acute, i. e. short tone of the voice ; for instance, *blóod and róom,*
are

are marked with the same accent ; though the former be pronounced short, and the latter long. In this matter I have followed Johnson, nearly as far as the middle of the letter A ; but as the true pronunciation is thus very imperfectly marked ; and as I was successful enough to discover this common error, I began very early to differ from him and his colleagues ; and, consequently, from the middle of the first letter, I have endeavoured to distinguish carefully the *length* of an accented syllable by a mark drawn from the left towards the right, and the *shortness* of it by a mark running from the right towards the left.—In the remaining part of grammatical determinations of words, I have followed Johnson as my guide, and carefully distinguished the neuter from the active form of verbs : though, in a few instances, I have been induced to differ from him, when he had mistaken the neutral use of an active verb for a neuter verb.

IV. The proximate derivation of a word is a matter of importance in all languages ; for upon this circumstance depends not only the full idea or intelligibility of words, but likewise their orthography. Johnson has sensibly perceived this difficulty, and consequently has shortly pointed out the immediate derivatives, “ in cases where he was acquainted with them ; ” and I must add, “ that he has done it in such a manner as appeared to him the most proper.” For, upon this particular head, his Dictionary is very defective. When an English word is derived from the French or Latin, he does not easily mistake its proximate root : in words, that are obvious derivatives of familiar Anglo-Saxon terms, he is equally successful. But in most other cases, he proves himself a shallow etymologist : and as his own notions of the origin of languages were not very clear, he is frequently led into great errors. Thus he considers the words, with whose origin he is unacquainted, either as *fortuitous* and *cant words*, or he derives them frequently in the absurdest manner from words nearly corresponding in sound, while he aims at explaining them in three or four different ways ; for instance, “ to *chirp*,” derived from, “ to cheer up, to make cheerful, &c.” yet this word obviously comes from the vernacular German, *tſchirpen* or *xirpen*, “ to twitter like birds.” This may serve as a specimen of the manner, in which he searches for the source of one river in the mouth of another, which is altogether different from the former. Here I have had frequent opportunities of correcting him ;

him; particularly as SKINNER was his principal hero in etymology, and as Johnson himself was unacquainted with the German and other languages related to it. But in cases, where the derivation of a word required laborious researches, such as would have occupied much room to little purpose, I have rather passed it over altogether, because the like words are generally considered as radicals, or as proper names. And as the object expressed by a word of this kind must be represented by a sensible exhibition of [the thing itself, the method of rendering it intelligible, by a probable derivation, is but a negative advantage; though the etymology of it might be established by a far-fetched analogy with other words.

Upon this occasion, I cannot omit mentioning a circumstance of some importance to the philosophic inquirer into the structure of languages. There are, in English, as well as in all other languages, a great number of words, which are pronounced and written perfectly analogous to one another; although it can be proved, that they are derived from very different roots. Such are, for instance, the German words, *Bär, Bock, Hund, Katze, &c.* and the English words, "arm, buxom, cock, &c." To consider words of the same sound as of common origin, and to treat them as such, discovers a very superficial knowledge in languages: besides, this method is attended with the singular effect of misleading the ignorant, who form the strangest combinations of ideas, when they attempt to derive the different significations and applications of a word from *one* common root. Johnson was aware of this impropriety, but he has not always been successful enough in obviating it. Hence we frequently meet with such a number of significations crowded upon the same word, that it is a matter of astonishment, how they happened to meet under the same head. For this reason, I have separated the different significations of monotonous words by means of numbers, and have endeavoured to show the derivation of each, when I was enabled to do this in a satisfactory manner.

V. To ascertain the principal and peculiar signification of a word, from which the others, if there be any, must be derived, has been my next employment. This, indeed, is always the most difficult point in a Dictionary; a point, which not only presupposes correct ideas of the origin of languages, but also the most precise knowledge of every word, and of its use from the earliest periods. The whole of this knowledge must

must be founded upon a sufficient number of works, written by men who lived in the different ages, in which the language was spoken. But as we possess no such number of works in any language, as is sufficient to make us acquainted with all the words, that are or have been current in it; it may be easily conjectured, that the primitive signification of every word cannot be pointed out with precision. But even in cases where this is possible, it requires the most careful examination of all the ancient monuments of a language, that are still preserved, together with much sound philosophy, in order to avoid falling into dreams and fancies, and deriving, in an arbitrary manner, the words from one another. In etymology, as soon as it carried him beyond the proximate derivation of a word, my predecessor has not been very successful. For, even in the latter case, he relied too much upon the authority of others; and it evidently appears from his Dictionary, that the structure of language did not induce him to philosophical inquiries. On this account, we can form no great expectations, and we must be satisfied with his classification of the different meanings of words, so as they in every instance appeared to him most proper. His want of knowledge in etymology, however, is attended with this advantage, that it has guarded him against a thousand follies, to which the pseudo-etymologists, of all languages and climates, are very liable.

As a foreigner, I could not easily remedy this deficiency in the classification of words, unless it had been my inclination to proceed upon arbitrary principles, which ought not to be introduced into the philosophy of language. Yet I have corrected another, perhaps more important, error. Johnson is uncommonly liberal with a variety of significations, particularly in such words as are frequently used; for in these, the significations pointed out by him, are almost endless. Thus he has given *seventy* different significations of the verb, *to go*; *sixty-nine* of the verb, *to stand*; &c. and he might, without great difficulty, have produced the double of that number, if he had proceeded upon a similar plan.—In these verbs, as well as in many hundred other cases, Johnson has obviously and uniformly confounded the various applications of one and the same meaning, with the different significations themselves. Hence I found it necessary, to reduce many of his significations to one general idea, and thus to save the reader the trouble of searching for the accurate idea of the word in ques-

tion among a number of similar ideas, and of frequently missing the true meaning of the word altogether. In order to perceive this inconvenience, I request the reader to compare with one another the words, *ground*, *form*, and many others of a similar tendency.

It is a very common practice among the compilers of Dictionaries, to point out the signification of a word, by means of a synonymous expression used in another language. A small share of correct philological knowledge must convince every one of the impropriety and disadvantage of this practice. There are no words completely synonymous in any language; nor can any two words, from different languages, be considered as synonymous. And although in languages, that bear strong marks of affinity to one another, there should be two words of common origin, or even radically the same, such as "*ground*" with the German *Grund*; "*to go*," with the German *gehen*; they still deviate in the indirect significations, or, at least, in the application to individual cases. The safest and most rational method, therefore, is to resolve every signification into other words, or to give a clear and, if possible, concise definition of it. I am sensible, that in this manner the idea of a word cannot be exhausted, nor is it possible to point out this idea with all its shades and subtle modifications. I further admit, that this developement of the idea is not in all instances practicable; since the meaning of a word, in many cases, is so obscure that it cannot be made perspicuous. Yet, at the same time, where this expedient is applicable, it affords the most certain method of exhibiting a competent notion of every word and its significations; while it serves to promote a clear and just knowledge of things in general. This, therefore, is one of the most important advantages of Johnson's Dictionary: for the author possessed a very happy talent of displaying the idea of a word in a concise, intelligible, and pertinent manner. In this respect, I have throughout followed him as my guide, except where I was obliged to contract the significations of words, which he had unnecessarily accumulated, and consequently to search for an appropriate and more comprehensive idea.

Johnson has not avoided the common error of lexicographers, who have either neglected to state the names of plants and animals, or have done it in a very vague and undetermined manner. He commonly dismisses the names of vegetables with the addition, "*a plant*." Thus he forsakes the reader, where

a guide is most anxiously looked for. I have endeavoured to supply this deficiency, by adding a number of names from the three kingdoms of nature, together with the systematic name of Linnæus, to every plant, in order to prevent any mistakes. As the Germans, according to the different provinces, make use of a variety of names for one and the same plant, the addition of the Linnæan name was indispensable. It is now to be hoped, that none of their numerous translators from the English, will, in future, be induced to translate the word "pine-apple," *ananas*, by the German expressions "*Tannzapfen*, or *Fichtenapfel*," which signify the respective productions of the fir and pine-trees; *Abies*, and *Pinus Lin.*; while the pine-apple is the produce of the *Bromelia Ananas Lin.* Such mistakes have been frequently committed in German books on gardening; and, in the imperfect state of the English-German Dictionaries hitherto published, it was not an easy matter to avoid them.

VI. In order to supply the imperfect definitions of words, the signification of which cannot be fully collected from the notion contained in the definition, it is a necessary point in a Dictionary, to illustrate them by examples. From these illustrations, this additional advantage results, that the grammatical use of a word, and its combination with other parts of speech, can be rendered more conspicuous. Johnson is very liberal with his examples, and not unfrequently prodigal to excess. The greater number of them, he has extracted from poetical works, as he had employed much of his time in publishing the English poets. I have made it my study, to hold a middle course, and to select from the rich store of Johnson's examples the most concise and pertinent, especially in such cases as appeared to require an example, to show the precise meaning or the grammatical use of a word. As, however, his examples and the whole stock of his words principally relate to the language of authors or "written language;" I have endeavoured to supply the obvious want of examples for the purposes of social life, from the above quoted English and French Dictionary, by BOYER; a work, the phrases and explanations of which are principally of the latter kind.

VII. Concerning the practical application of words, when in connexion with others, Johnson has bestowed great attention upon the most important cases, in which every word may occur. His accuracy in this respect has induced me to adopt
his

his examples, without attempting to change or improve them.

To conclude this account, I shall add some remarks, which exclusively concern the publication of my own Dictionary.—It is a common error of the most, if not of all, Dictionaries which appear with German explanations, that the authors of them not only pay no attention whatever to the propriety and dignity of the German expressions and phrases, but likewise that they are very studious to find the most absurd and vulgar words in the German, and to make use of them for the illustration of foreign words; though the latter should not hold out the least inducement to this outrage. The injury thus occasioned to inexperienced students of languages, who most frequently stand in need of such books, is much greater than is commonly imagined; because their taste or intellectual discernment is thereby for ever depraved. And what must be the ideas of foreigners, respecting the German (as they cannot avoid making use of such books), when they discover in them the essence of all that is obscene and vulgar, instead of the more polished language of authors? What must an Englishman think of us, when he finds in our English German Dictionaries, “gormandizer” translated *Saumagen*; “to gormandize,” *ein Saumagen seyn*; “gangrel,” *ein grosse lange Strunze*. Similar indecencies occur in every page. A small degree of common sense would have prevented the insertion of this trash into our Dictionaries, while it would have taught the compilers, to render the expression with becoming dignity. I have exerted myself to shun the like inelegant terms and phrases, even in those cases where the English word might have afforded an opportunity of using them; for I have rather submitted to the task of circumlocution, than to the propagation of mean and indecent words.

There is another remark to be made, relative to the orthography of the English. Johnson has given a separate analysis of every compound word, after having first printed the words in a combined state. In order to save room and trouble, I have thought proper to point out the compound words immediately in the order of the alphabet. For this purpose I have almost throughout the whole (for in some instances I may have overlooked it) divided such words in the spelling, as “hopeless,

less, black-smith, &c. though these words should be read and considered as inseparable *.

The following Extract from a Critical Essay originally published in the Edinburgh Review for 1755, will, it is hoped, be acceptable to the reader; as the ideas contained in it very nearly coincide with those advanced by Mr. ADELUNG; and as it is now understood to be the production of the celebrated Dr. ADAM SMITH:

‘ A Dictionary of the English language, however useful, or rather necessary, has never been hitherto attempted with the least degree of success. To explain hard words and terms of art, seems to have been the chief purpose of all the former compositions, which have borne the title of English dictionaries. Mr Johnson has extended his views much farther, and has made a very full collection of all the different meanings of each English word, justified by examples from authors of good reputation. When we compare this book with other dictionaries, the merit of its author appears very extraordinary. Those which in modern languages have gained the most esteem, are that of the French academy, and that of the academy Della Crusca. Both these were composed by a numerous society of learned men, and took up a longer time in the composition, than the life of a single person could well have afforded. The Dictionary of the English language is the work of a single person, and composed in a period of time very inconsiderable, when compared with the extent of the work. The collection of words appears to be very accurate, and must be allowed to be very ample. Most words, we believe, are to be found in the Dictionary, that ever were almost suspected to be English; but we cannot help wishing, that the author had trusted less to the judgment of those who may consult him, and had oftener passed his own censure upon those words which are not of approved use, though sometimes to be met with

* This method of pointing out compounded words is professedly contrived to save room and the repetition of words; yet, at the same time, it is unavoidably attended with this disadvantage, that it may induce foreigners, to consider *all* those words, which are printed with a sign of division, as separable compounds.—Mr. Adelung might have easily obviated this inconvenience, by using different marks of separation for those compounds, the parts of which are written separately, as “party-man;” and for those, that are contracted into one word, as “spite-ful.”

with in authors of no mean name.—Where a work is admitted to be highly useful, and the execution of it intitled to praise; the adding, that it might have been more useful, can scarcely, we hope, be deemed a censure of it. The merit of this Dictionary is so great, that it cannot detract from it, to take notice of some defects, the supplying which, would, in our judgment, add a considerable share of merit to that which it already possesses. These defects consist chiefly in the plan, which appears to us not to be sufficiently grammatical. The different significations of a word are indeed collected; but they are seldom digested into several classes, or ranged under the meaning which the word principally expresses; and sufficient care has not been taken to distinguish the words apparently synonymous.

‘It can import no reflection upon Mr. Johnson’s Dictionary; that the subject has been viewed in a different light by others; and it is at least a matter of curiosity to consider the different views, in which it appears. Any man who is about to compose a dictionary; or rather a grammar of the English language, must acknowledge himself indebted to Mr. J. for abridging at least one half of his labour! All those who are under any difficulty, with respect to a particular word or phrase, are in the same situation. The Dictionary presents them a full collection of examples; from whence indeed they are left to determine; but by which the determination is rendered easy. In this country*; the usefulness of it will be soon felt, as there is no standard of correct language in conversation. If our recommendation could in any degree incite to the perusal of it, we would earnestly recommend it to all those who are desirous to improve and correct their language; frequently to consult the Dictionary. Its merits must be determined by the frequent resort, that is had to it. This is the most unerring test of its value: criticisms may be false, private judgments ill-founded; but if a work of this nature be much in use, it has received the sanction of the public approbation.’

* Scotland.

FINIS.

SPECIMEN

OF AN

IDENTICAL DICTIONARY

OF THE

GERMAN, ENGLISH, FRENCH, AND LATIN LANGUAGES.

Note. *All those compounded words, which are easily explained from their constituent parts, are here purposely omitted.—The vocables first stated, after the German, express the most literal sense.—Substantives, without a number referring to the declension, are indeclinable; the numbers mark the five German declensions.—Further, the asterisk (*) points out those substantives, which change their first vowel into a diphthong, when used in the plural number;—a. a. stands for adverbial adjective;—adj. for adjective;—adv. for adverb;—conj. for conjunction;—obj. for objectively, or in a physical sense;—subj. for subjectively, or in a mental sense;—s. f. for substantive feminine;—s. m. for substantive masculine;—s. n. for substantive neuter;—v. a. r. for verb active, regular;—ir. for irregular—v. n. for verb neuter;—vulg. for vulgarly, or in low life.*

GERMAN.	ENGLISH.	FRENCH.	LATIN.
<i>Aal</i> , s. m. 2.	eel	anguille.	anguilla.
<i>Aas</i> *, s. n. 5.	carion, carcass	charogne, cadavre	cadaver.
<i>Ab</i> , syll. of compounds.	down, from, off	de, du, &c.	de
<i>Abänderlich</i> , a. a.	variable, changeable	variable	varians, mutabilis
<i>Abändern</i> , v. a. r.	to vary, change, shift	varier, changer, corriger	mutare, immutare
<i>Abänderung</i> , s. f. 3.	alteration, variation	alteration, variation	mutatio, immutatio
<i>Abarbeiten</i> , v. a. r.	to work or labour for	travailler a compte de ce qu'on a reçu d'avance	aliquid labore compen- sare
——— (<i>sich</i>) recipr.	to fatigue, or wear oneself out by labour	épuiser ses forces par le travail	laboribus frangi
<i>Abarten</i> , v. n. r.	to degenerate	dégénérer, forligner	degenerare, depravari
<i>Abartung</i> , s. f. 3.	degeneration	dégénération	degeneratio, depravatio
<i>Abbeißen</i> , v. a. ir.	to bite off or from	mordre, arracher avec les dents	demordere
<i>Abbestellen</i> , v. a. r.	to countermand	contremander	renunciare, adimere.
<i>Abbilden</i> , v. a. r.	to fashion or portray	représenter, tirer d'a- près nature	effingere, exprimere
<i>Abbildung</i> , s. f. 3.	formation, picture	image, portrait.	formatio, effictio

GERMAN.	ENGLISH.	FRENCH.	LATIN.
<i>Abbinden</i> , v. a. ir.	to untie or unloose	délier, détacher	solvere, resolvere.
<i>Abbitte</i> , s. f. (sing. only)	excuse, apology,	excuse, apologie	deprecatio, ignoscendi postulatio.
<i>Abbitten</i> , v. n. ir.	to beg pardon, or to apologize.	demandeur pardon	deprecari, veniam pe- tere.
<i>Abborgen</i> , v. n. r.	to borrow.	emprunter	mutuari.
<i>Abbrechen</i> , v. a. ir.	to break off	rompre	carpere, decerpere.
———— v. n. ir.	to pull down	rabattre, démolir	diruere, demoliri.
————	to stop short, in speaking	s'arrêter, pauser	abrumper sermonem.
————	to detract, lessen.	déduire, rabattre	detrahere (de pretio)
———— (<i>sich</i>) recipr.	to abstain from.	s'abstenir de qq. ch.	abstinere, sese conti- nere.
<i>Abbrennen</i> , v. a. r. & ir.	to burn down, or out	réduire en cendre	urere, comburere.
———— v. n. ———	to consume by fire	consommer par le feu	deslagrare, conflagrare flammis.
———— ———	to give over burning	cesser de bruler	desinere ardere.
———— ———	to discharge a gun	tirer un canon ou un fusil	tormentum vi pulveris igniferi mittere.
<i>Abbruch</i> , m. 2. (sing. only)	detractio	rahais	detractum, decerptio.
———— ———	diminution, detriment	diminution, detriment	deminutio, detrimentum
———— ———	loss, damage	perte, dommage	jactura, danum.
<i>Abbrüchig</i> , a. a.	derogatory	dérogatoire	derogans.
<i>Abbüßsen</i> , v. a. r.	to expiate, or atone for	expier	luere.
<i>Abdanken</i> , v. a. r.	to say thanks or grace	remercier	gratias agere.
———— ———	to discharge	congédier	dimittere.
<i>Abdankung</i> , s. f. 3.	discharge, dismissal	congé, démission	missio, dimissio.
———— ———	resignation, abdication	resignation, abdication	abdicatio muneris.
<i>Abdecken</i> , v. a. r.	to uncover (the roof)	découvrir	detegere (domum).
———— ———	to strip off (the skin)	écorcher	pellum detrahere.
<i>Abdecker</i> , s. m. 1.	the skinner	écorcheur	pellium detractor.
vulg. <i>Schinder</i> .	the hangman (in office)	bourreau	carnifex, tortor.
<i>Abdeckung</i> , s. f. 3.	uncovering, denudation	dénuement	detectio nudatio.
<i>Abdingen</i> , v. n. r.	to deduct in bargaining	défalquer	detrahere pretio.
<i>Abdringen</i> , v. a. ir. or }	to extort	extorquer	exprimere, extorquer.
vulg. <i>abdrücken</i> (subj.) }			
<i>Abdruck</i> * s. m. 2.	a copy, impression	copie, empreinte	exemplar, impressio.
<i>Abdrucken</i> , v. a. r.	to imprint, or to take a copy	imprimer, tirer copie	typis exscribere.
<i>Abdrücken</i> , v. a. r. (obj.)	to let down the cock of a fire-lock	presser, séparer à force	premendo avellere, solvere.
<i>Abend</i> , s. m. 2.	the evening	soir, soirée	vespera.
<i>Abentheuer</i> , s. n. 1. }	adventure	aventure	eventura, portentum;
or <i>Ebentheuer</i> , — }			
<i>Abentheurer</i> , s. m. 1.	adventurer	aventurier	qui tentat et periclitat- ur fortunam.
<i>Aber</i> , conj. —	but, yet, however	mais, pourtant, or	ast, ad, sed, verò, &c.
<i>Aberglaube</i> , s. m. 3.	superstition	superstition	superstitio, falsa religio.
(sing. only)			
<i>Abergläubisch</i> , or }	superstitious	superstitieux	superstitiosus.
<i>Abergläubig</i> , a. a. }			
<i>Aberkennen</i> , v. a. r. & }	to judge, pass sentence upon	juger, décréter	abjudicare.
ir. }			
<i>Abermal</i> , or <i>Aber-</i>	once again, anew	encore, de nouveau	iterum, rursus, denuo
<i>mal</i> , adv. }			
<i>Abermalig</i> , a. a. }	repeated	nouveau, autre	iteratus.
<i>Aberwitz</i> , s. m. 2. }	dotage, delirium	folie, délire	amentia, delirium.
(sing. only) }			
<i>Aberwitzig</i> , a. a. }	distracted, insane	devenu fou	amens, delirus
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